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VABSTRACT
The thesis takes as its starting point the historical 
failure of Indian communism to create a viable, popular alter­
native to the country's dominant political culture. It argues 
that the 'Stalinisation' - or, as I have termed it, 'bolshevisa- 
tion'- of Indian communism has been central to this failure. 
Bolshevisation'has undermined the autonomy of Indian communism 
and has thus prevented the movement from maintaining two 
relationships critical for political success - with its national 
environment and its own history. But not all communist parties 
suffered this fate. Why, then, was the Communist Party of India 
bolshevised'? The thesis is devoted to answering this question; 
for it was during the formation of the Communist Party of India 
(CPI), between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s, that it was first 
' bolshevised’.
The 'bolshevisation' phenomenon is an interesting one.
Not only was it a central cause of the CPI's failure to create 
a political alternative, but it also performed a necessary 
integrative function for the Party - a necessity largely arising, 
in turn, from its inability to maintain a stable mass base. This 
inability was largely a consequence of a. number of specific 
features of the colonial Indian environment.•The negative 
environmental features operating in Calcutta and Bombay were 
quite different: in the former the problem was largely one 
arising from the intensive 'colonialisation' of eastern India; 
in Bombay it was a problem of what I have called 'political 
space' for revolutionary mass politics. Thus we are investigating 
a phenomenon that was, simultaneously, a cause,cure and 
symptom of the failure of Indian communism. This investigation
vi
therefore allows us to connect a leadership failure with 
the environmental features contributing to that failure.
The first Indian political groups with identifiably 
Marxist programs were founded in 1927 in the cities of Bombay 
and Calcutta - the two locations to which Indian communism was 
virtually to be confined throughout almost all of the formation 
period. This event followed an extended period of ideological 
transition, guided from abroad, among a few nationalists. Both 
groups then sought to take advantage of a contemporaneous wave 
of working class unrest. But while the Bombay group achieved a 
remarkable success and built for itself a major mass base, the 
Calcutta group was unable to replicate this achievement. There 
was a corresponding contrast in the two groups' development as 
communist leaderships - the Bombay group progressed towards 
becoming a 'proletarianised' and autonomus leadership while 
the Calcutta group stagnated, then disintegrated. The Bombay 
group's development could be seen clearly in the markedly 
independent stance it adopted towards the Communist International 
(Comintern) . But this, achievement remained unconsolidated and 
very vulnerable.
This phase ended in 1929 with the arrests of both 
provincial leaderships and the breaking of the Bombay mass base: 
the environmental conditions under which the Bombay developments 
had occured proved to be both temporary and atypicaHy favourable.
In the unfavourable conditions for communist politics in the 
ensuing period, from 1929 to 1933, the communist leadership 
which remained, regressed. Between 1929 and 1933 Indian communism
vii
consisted of a constellation of impotent and mutually hostile 
factions based on regional, personality and policy differences.
After surveying the communists' situation the imprisoned 
former leadership realised that Indian communism faced a dilemma, 
imposed by the extremely difficult 'objective conditions': a 
'natural' process of national Party formation'from below' would 
be extremely protracted and uncertain; therefore the Party could 
be formed in the foreseeable future only by the artificial,
'from the top'method of direct Comintern intervention - i.e., by 
full'bolshevisation1. However the jailed leadership did not com­
prehend the full implications of the 1bolshevised' alternative - 
that it involved the long term failure of Indian communism. It 
chose this course. After its unanticipated release from prison 
it managed,between 1934 and 1937, as a proxy Comintern represen­
tative, to form a centralised, functioning CPI. The Party has 
subsequently retained these 'bolshevised' foundations.
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In researching and writing this thesis I have been 
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heavy debt to all of the members of the ANU's South Asia History 
section. Professor D.A. Low has provided great encouragement 
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Steve Henningham have been generous beyond words with both their 
comments and their time. All have improved my conceptual clarity 
and Steve and Robin have been particularly helpful with my 
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together with. P.C.joshi, the results of their collective 
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after I met him and it is a great sadness and loss to me that 
he was unable to read and criticise the end-result. I am also 
indebted to Damodoran and to his wife, Padmam, for having helped 
in many other ways to make my stay in India a happy one. In 
Bombay I received invaluable assistance from Professor 
N.R. Phatak and Shri B.N. Phatak, both of whom gave me a great 
deal of their time. They helped me by locating source material 
and in suggesting valuable lines of enquiry. I am grateful to my 
interviewees for giving me their time and much valuable inform­
ation. The staffs of the National Archives of India, the Bombay 
Special Branch archives, the Tamil Nadu Archives, the West 
Bengal Archives,and, in London, the India Office Library, the 
Marx Memorial Library and the British Museum, were all of 
great assistance.
I am very thankful to Rosemary Metcalf for the fine 
maps which she drew at short notice, and to Bev Ricketts, Margaret 
Carron and Janet Healey, for having provided emergency help at 
the end. Glenda Hudson, Lynn Peters and Barbara Button have done 
an excellent job in the typing of the thesis. I am also thankful 
to my multi-disciplinary colleagues at Childers Street 
for having helped me to remember that there was more to life than 
the Meerut Conspiracy Case. Finally I owe more than I can express
Xto my wife,Anh Thu, for her suggestions and critical commentary 
and/together with Eliane, my parents and my friends, for having 
provided me with constant support under trying circumstances.
A Note on Terminology
In the thesis I often refer to the Communist Party of 
India (which was founded, as an essentially nominal organisation, 
in 1925) as 'the Party'. In the late 1920s the communists' 
main political organisation was called the Workers' and Peasants' 
Party. I distinguish this from the CPI by referring to it as 
'the party' - with a lower case 'p'. In addition, I use the 
lower case 'p' when referring to communist parties generically, 
and an upper case 'P' when referring to specific communist 
parties.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE 'BOLSHEVISATION' OF INDIAN COMMUNISM
'The history of any given party can only emerge from 
the complex portrayal of the totality of society and 
State (often with international ramifications too). 
Hence it may be said that to write the history of a 
party means nothing less than to write the general 
history of a country from a monographic viewpoint, in 
order to highlight a particular aspect of it.'
- Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, (London and New York, 1971), p.151.
'Thus it came about that the Comintern [Communist 
International] not only shone with the reflected 
light of the Russian party, but that it reflected 
each of its internal alignments in turn. This was 
so much the case that anybody who would try to 
comprehend the history of any Communist party merely 
in the context of its own national environment would 
fail'.
- Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography,
(London, 1966), p.394. (My emphasis.)
The subject of Indian communism has received 
considerable attention, but no satisfactory account of its 
formative phase, from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s, has yet 
been written. This lacuna seriously weakens our understanding 
of its later history, for the most crucial features of 'mature' 
Indian communism were established during the protracted 
formation of the Communist Party of India (CPI) .
The most comprehensive study of the CPI as a 
national party, G.D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller's Communism 
in India, (Bombay, 1960), provides only a summary sketch of the
2Party's formative period. Moreover, the authors' very 
Ideological, Cold War perspective further detracts from the 
value of their study. The negative effects of this perspective 
are partially counter-balanced by the detailed empirical work 
behind their account of the CPI in its later phases, but it 
almost completely undermines the explanatory value of their 
already schematic treatment of the Party's formative period.
J.P. Haithcox's Communism and Nationalism in India: M.N. Roy
and Comintern Policy 1920-1939 (Princeton, 1971), is, as the 
title suggests, essentially a study of Roy's career, and 
particularly of his changing relationship with the Communist 
International (Comintern). Haithcox provides a useful and 
detailed (though uncritical) biographical account of Roy in 
his Marxist phase and of Comintern policy on India. But he adds 
little to our understanding of the CPI as such. M.R. Masani's 
The Communist Party of India: A Short History, (London, 1954),
is an anti-communist polemic in the mainstream of the Cold War 
tradition. It provides some useful information for those who 
have not had access to the Government of India's Intelligence 
Bureau's studies of Indian communism.^ However for our period 
at least, it adds little, either factually or interpretatively,
1. Four of these confidential studies were published by the 
Intelligence Bureau, Home Department, Government of India 
(hereafter IB), between 1924 and 1935, for distribution to 
relevant government officers. These were: Communism in India, 
(1924), (Republished, Calcutta, 1971); Communism in India- 
1924-1927, (1927), (Republished, Calcutta^ 1972); India and
Communism, (Calcutta, 1933); and India and Communism, (Revised 
up to January 1, 1935), (Calcutta, 1935). These will be cited 
as, respectively: IB, Communism, (1924); IB, Communism,
(1927); IB, Communism, (1933); and IB, Communism, (1935).
3to those studies. L.P. Sinha's The Left Wing in India (1919-47),
(Muzaffarpur, 1965), does include a more detailed narrative 
account of the CPI's formative phase and considerable - though 
still limited - empirical data not available in other published 
accounts. Nevertheless it does little to explain why the Party 
developed in the way that it did or, therefore, the relationship
tbetween formative and 'mature' communism in India.
But apart from their specific failings, all of these 
studies share a common feature: their very narrow frameworks.
In particular, by failing adequately to relate the Party to its 
Indian environment they are unable satisfactorily to explain 
either its development as an Indian party or the 
determining features of its relationship with international 
communism. For example, they are unable to explain the marked 
regional differences in Indian communism, the consequences of 
this for the national Party, and the reasons why the CPI (in 
contrast to some communist parties) became so firmly linked to 
Moscow. Gramsci's argument that the history of a party should 
be a 'general history of a country from a monographic viewpoint' 
provides an ambitious ideal but a necessary counter-perspective 
for an explanatory account of the development (or non-development) 
of a political leadership. It is a perspective which is 
essentially absent from the above studies. For this reason they 
tend towards tautological 'explanations' of the fate of 
leaderships in terms of their own observable characteristics.
This shortcoming is compounded in several cases by a priori 
assumptions about the nature of the relationship between a 
communist party and international communism. The contemporary 
student of Indian politics who seeks to go beyond these limits
is fortunate in being able to draw upon the very considerable
4body of South Asian scholarship produced in the last decade 
or so.
The existing historiographical gap for the CPI's
formative period contrasts with the greater scholarly attention
which has been given to the equivalent periods in the histories
of the communist parties of most of the other major Asian
colonies and semi-colonies. No doubt the absence of satisfactory
accounts of the early development of Indian communism is due
primarily to its subsequent marginality in the politics of the
colonial period and its inability to establish itself as a
decisive national political force after Independence. These
historical features distinguish it from a number of its
fraternal parties elsewhere in Asia. Yet, as D.A. Washbrook
has argued persuasively, the study of colonial India solely
from the perspective of those movements which won power at
Independence may inhibit the identification of the deeper
2roots of Indian politics. The study of 'failures', and of 
the sources of those failures, is a necessary complementary 
perspective. A study of the formative phase of Indian 
communism not only illuminates its later history, but also 
provides an explanation of some of the reasons for the failure 
of a radical alternative to Congress politics. Furthermore, it 
adds to our understanding of the nature of Congress politics, 
and of the general problems of the Left in relation to it and 
to the wider context of colonial India. At the same time, it
D.A. Washbrook, The Emergence of Provincial Politics: the
Madras Presidency^ 1870-1920 , (Cambridge, 197 6) , pp.6-10.
2 .
5provides a case study in the application of communist politics 
in the era of the Communist International. It 
therefore adds to the literature on the problems of communism 
in the wake of the Russian Revolution.
Some Characteristics of 'Mature' Indian Communism
Having characterised the history of Indian communism
since the formation of the CPI as one of 'failure', it is
necessary to establish more precisely what is meant by that term.
I certainly do not mean to imply a failure of will on the part
of the individual communists. Indeed the record of dedication
to their cause, and of courage and sacrifice in pursuing it,
makes the failures of the movement seem the more surprising.
I am not seeking to explain the overall failure of the CPI
to gain hegemony within the nationalist movement, though that
fact is of some analytical significance in comparison with
the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Parties. Nor am I
concerned, directly, with the Party's failure to establish
itself as a decisive force in Indian politics, although this
study will help to explain why that has been the case. Rather,
the failure which I am primarily concerned to explain is close
to that defined by Bipan Chandra as 'the basic failure' of
Indian communism: the failure to create and project the
essentials of 'an alternative social system, ... an alternative
3political leadership'. This failure to create even the nucleus
3 . B. Chandra, 'Total Rectification', in Seminar, No. 178, 
1974, p.26.
6of an alternative to Congress and communal political culture,
and to make such an alternative credible and accessible for
the masses of the Indian population, underlies the wider
failures of communism in India.
But is such a negative characterisation of the
record of Indian communism legitimate? After all, it does have
many notable achievements to its credit - from the formation of
India's first genuine mass trade union in the late 1920s, to
the world's first communist government elected under the system
of parliamentary democracy. Further, informed observers, from
4the Intelligence Bureau of the colonial Government of India
5to a more recent, Indian historian of the Party, have 
consistently seen the CPI as a very real threat to the 
established order. In 1958 Overstreet and Windmiller could 
conclude that though the CPI was 'as yet some distance from 
the achievement of power in all of India', it was very possible 
that it could become 'truly a force to be reckoned with' in 
the future.^
An assessment from the vantage-point of the 1970s 
presents a rather different picture. For instance, a 1974 
symposium devoted specifically to this question, to which a 
number of distinguished Indian academics and one former CPI
7leader contributed, produced a remarkable degree of consensus.
4. See fn.l.
5. Masani, op. cit..
6. Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., pp.538-9.
7. Seminar, No. 178, 1974. It is titled 'Marxism and India: a
symposium on the Application of an Ideology'. The contributors 
are: K. Damodaran, Bipan Chandra, Asok Sen, Ashok Mitra, and 
P.C. Joshi (of the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, not 
the former General Secretary of the CPI with the same name).
It should be added that the critiques which they offered were 
not 'anti-communist'. For a post-Emergency restatement see 
N. Chakravarty, 'The Communist Spectrum', in Seminar, No.
216, 1977, pp.48-51.
7Fronu their different angles of vision they confirmed the
follLowing characterisation of the movement's history:
... somehow, relating Marxism ... to the Indian 
context has been an elusive process. ... [today] there 
seems little to demarcate the parties of the 
proletariat from the parties of the bourgeoisie... The 
history of the communist movement, as the main 
purveyor of Marxism in the country, reveals a 
vacillation between blunders and irrelevancies, both 
accompanied by a unique courage. ... Nowhere in 
all these years of Marxist parliamentary ... or 
underground activity has there emerged a picture 
either of the objective reality or the projected 
future of the Indian State.8
This is an essentially accurate, if bluntly stated,
assessment. There is ample documentation of the shortcomings
of t:he Indian communist movement since it emerged as a functioning
9Partly in the mid-1930s: a chronic factionalism of sufficient
severity to split the movement twice; violent strategic 
oscillations between extremes, such as ill-fated insurrectionary 
poli.tics and pronounced 'popular-frontism', in the absence of 
majo>r concurrent changes in the Indian situation; the communist 
maimstream' s early 1960s' abandonment, in favour of 'parliamentarism 
of ai revolutionary mass strategy; a continuing inability to 
prodluce an autonomous and sociologically concrete theory of 
Indi.an politics or to act on the lessons of the past; a failure 
to c:reate a politically educated, rather than merely executive, 
cadre structure; and the failure to build a firm base among the
8. The Editor, 'The Problem', in ibid., pp.10-11.
9. For sources see fn.37, below. We will return to these issues 
later in this chapter.
10. By 'parliamentarism' I mean the strategic conception that 
fundamental social change can be achieved essentially 
through parliamentary activity, and the consequent 
centering of political activity around electoral strategies 
at the expense of independent mass organising towards 
revolutionary ends.
8more exploited sections of the peasantry. These failures
heavily outweigh Indian communism's many partial achievements
and its positive contributions to Indian political and
intellectual life;^ and they flow from the communists' 'basic
failure' to establish an alternative political vision. The
contemporary participation of the two biggest Communist Parties
in Indian politics as little more than two more parties competing
for power through the parliamentary system - giving only secondary
attention to independent extra-parliamentary mass organisation -
12is one indication of this 'basic failure'. The absence of a
significant, Marxist-inspired, popular ideology and culture - a
13feature in striking contrast with, for instance, Vietnam - is 
another. The failures of the later history of the movement form 
a necessary perspective for an historical account of its origins.
Why, then, has Indian communism failed to create the 
essentials of a credible and commanding alternative political 
culture and leadership? One of the movement's dominating 
features has been the deeply symbiotic nature of the relationship 
which the Party leadership has established with post-revolutionary 
communist parties abroad. Many have seen this symbiosis as 
central to the Party's failures. K. Damodaran, for example, 
speaking with the added authority of having been a long-standing 
CPI leader, active at nearly all levels of the Party structure,
11. For a brief summary of some of these achievements, see 
Chandra, op. cit., p.25.
12. See, eg., Bipan Chandra's comment (in op. cit., p.26) on the
Punjabi agricultural labourer who told him that the 
'capitalists' had three parties in his area: 'the Congress,
the Akalis and the Comrades'. For other commentary on 
contemporary communist 'parliamentarism' see fn.39 below.
13. See fn.43, below.
9has described this relationship and its effects in the 
following terms:
... the Indian Communists failed to use the Marxist 
methodology to understand and change Indian reality.
... They were more eager to study the history of the 
CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] than their 
own history, economy and culture. ... Reliance on 
outside bodies - whether Moscow or China - as 
infallible and absolute authorities has undermined 
the necessary process of strategy formation ... [by] 
a praxis of Marxist theory and Indian revolutionary 
action.14
He argues, further, that this type of relationship has been
replicated within the Party:
This external authoritarianism has also been 
reproduced in the relationships in the movement 
itself. This has resulted in a lack of education 
of [the] cadre through democratic participation. 
Democratic discussions depend on education of [the] 
cadre. Lack of education necessarily leads to the 
negation of inner party democracy and the consolidation 
of bureaucracy.15
An important consequence of this combination of 'external' and 
'internal' characteristics has been the alienation of the Indian
14. K. Damodaran, 'The Past', Seminar, op. cit., p.23. See 
also his interview with Tariq Ali: 'Memoir of an Indian
Communist', in New Left Review, No. 93, 1975, pp.35-59. 
Damodaran is unique in the Indian communist movement in 
having produced a radical critique of the movement's 
record after a long and distinguished career within it.
He began as a founding member of the Party in Kerala in 
the late 1930s and became an important mass organiser and 
propagandist in that state as well as a leading member of 
the provincial organisation. He was elected to the Party's 
Central Committee in 1956 and was a member of that committee 
and its successor, the National Council, for the next 
twelve years. He served on the Central Executive Committee 
from 1958 to 1968. He has also been concerned with cultural 
, issues and has written a number of books in this field and 
several popular dramas in the Malayalam language. He was 
a leading figure in the Progressive Writers Association.
He represented the CPI in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of 
the Indian Parliament) from 1964 to 1970. He was engaged 
in historical research on the CPI, as a Fellow at Jawaharlal 
Nehru University (New Delhi), when he died in July 1975. 
Because of his experience and the quality of his evaluation 
of the CPI's hifetory he is an invaluable source for a 
study such as this.
15 . loc. cit..
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communist movement from both its Indian environment and 
its own historical experience - from two relationships 
essential for the development of an effective political 
alternative.
Damodaran and others have categorised this complex
of features under the rubric of 'Stalinism'. There can be
little doubt that the dual 'Stalinist' pattern described by
him has been a dominant characteristic of Indian communism
- particularly when it has been engaged in a revolutionary,
extra-parliamentary, rather than a 'parliamentarist',
16strategy. That it has been retained by the Communist Party
which has sought to make the most radical break with the Indian
communist tradition - the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI(ML)) -
17indicates the depth of its roots.
16. For example, the CPI(Marxist) (CPI(M)), which split from 
the CPI in 1964, has been formally - though far from 
completely - independent of the 'external' dimension
of 'Stalinism'. However the CPI(M) has been, from 
the time of its inception and in common with the contemporary 
CPI, a 'parliamentarist' Party. Moreover, the 'internalised' 
dimension of 'Stalinism' has not weakened in the CPI(M).
For accounts of the CPI(M) as a 'Stalinist' Party see:
Ram, Indian Communism, passim; Damodaran, 'Memoir', p.57.
17. This is seen, for example, in the following slogan, which
was popular during the 'Naxalite' period: 'China's
Chairman is our Chairman'. The following appeared in 
the Party's organ in February 1970:
... we must conscientiously and seriously wage a 
struggle to establish the revolutionary authority of 
Comrade Charu Mazumdar (the CPI(ML) leader). Our 
slogan is: Internationally, we must follow Chairman
Mao, Vice-Chairman Lin Piao and the great glorious and 
correct Communist Party of China as well as the world 
lessons of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; 
nationally, we must be loyal to Chairman Mao, Vice- 
Chairman Lin Piao, and the Communist Party of China 
and must fully accept the revolutionary authority of 
the leadership of Comrade Charu Mazumdar.
(Quoted in M. Ram, Maoism in India, (Delhi, 1971), p.134.)
For discussion of 'Stalinism' in the CPI(ML) during the 
Naxalite period, see Ibid., passim; M. Ram, Indian
'Stalinism' has indeed been, I will argue, central to the 
problems of communism, and particularly revolutionary 
communism, in India. In demonstrating my case in the 
discussion which now follows I will be referring primarily to 
the undivided CPI, in the period from the mid-1930s to the 
early 1960s.
That Indian communism has been so completely 
'Stalinised' has been due in large part to the apparently 
necessary role the phenomenon has played. Paradoxically, 
not only has 'Stalinism' been the introduced cause of the 
movement's most fundamental problems, but it has also been 
adopted as the 'cure' of fundamental and chronic problems 
in its internal relationships. These problems have been due 
not only to the Party's 'Stalinist' character, but also to 
the great and manifold difficulties it has faced in its 
Indian environment. That is, the 'Stalinisation' of Indian 
communism has been, simultaneously, a cause, symptom and 
cure of the range of problems which have prevented the communist 
movement from emerging as a viable alternative, revolutionary 
force in India. Thus the concept of 'Stalinisation' focusses 
the most fundamental of the Indian communist movement's 
internal troubles and the relationship between these and the 
difficulties imposed by its national and international environments. 
For this reason the concept can be used not only descriptively, 
but also as a valuable analytical tool.
17. Cont'd
Communism: Split Within a Split, (New Delhi, 1969) ,
pp.253-67; and P. Mitra and M. Sen, Communist Party and 
Naxalites, (CPI, New Delhi, 1971), which also reproduces many 
selections from the CPI(ML) press.
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However I have chosen to use the term 'bolshevisation'
rather than 'Stalinisation'. I have adapted the term from
one which was used in the post-Leninist Comintern. During
the debates at the Fifth World Congress of the Comintern in
June-July 1924 the anti-Trotsky faction associated with Stalin
introduced a slogan which was subsequently to become a program
18- 'Bolshevise the Communist International'. The 
'Bolshevisation' program came eventually to incorporate all 
of the characteristics which are associated with 'Stalinisation'. 
But the term 'bolshevisation' is not only less burdened by the 
pejorative (and sometimes laudatory) connotations of 
'Stalinisation', but is also a more useful concept analytically. 
It does not limit the phenomena associated with 'Stalinisation' 
to the personality, goals and initiatives of its most outstanding 
protagonist in the way that the latter term tends to do. It is 
more suggestive of a wider context - of the fact that the 
roots of 'Stalinism' went much wider and deeper than Stalin 
himself, beyond the extremes for which he, personally, was 
responsible. The 'bolshevisation' of the Comintern was a 
structural phenomenon,as well as a conscious policy initiated 
by a particular Soviet faction during Stalin's rise to 
prominence in the 1920s and consummatedwith his dictatorship 
in the 1930s. It arose largely from the exigencies faced by
18. For analyses of the content and context of the 'Bolshevisat­
ion' slogan see: F. Claudin, The Communist Movement: From
Comintern to Cominform, (London^ 1975) , pp.141-2, p. 624 ;
I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed - Trotsky: 1921-1929, 
(London, 1959), pp.146-51; E.H. Carr, Socialism In Öne 
Country, Vol. 3, (London, 1964), pp.92-4^ 293-308;
K.E. McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution 1928-1943: 
the Shaping of Doctrine, (London and New York, 1964) , 
pp.55-7, 93-4.
the isolated Russian Revolution and post-Revolution Soviet 
Union, and it incorporated certain premises established in 
the Comintern during its Leninist phase. In this thesis I 
distinguish the more inclusive sense of the term and its 
derivatives from the narrower, programatic sense, by the 
use of a lower case 'b' for the former and an upper case 'B' 
and quotation marks for the latter: bolshevisation and 
1Bolshevisation1 respectively.
The Soviet Roots and Dynamics of Bolshevisation
Before investigating the relationship between 
bolshevisation and the failures of 'mature' Indian communism 
we need first to examine the phenomenon at its source - post- 
Revolution Soviet Russia.
In December 1924, some six months after the emergence
of the slogan 'Bolshevise the Communist International', there
appeared another, complementary slogan:' Socialism in one 
19country'. " These complementary slogans heralded an allegedly 
theoretical, though in fact pragmatic resolution of the 
dilemmas produced for Marxist theory by the unanticipated and 
unprecedented situation of an isolated 'workers' state' in a 
predominantly pre-capitalist society, riven by internal crisis, 
with its original Party activists and working class decimated, 
and surrounded by hostile and far more powerful capitalist 
states. The 'Bolshevisation' program was based on the twin 
assumptions that revolutions would not occur elsewhere in the 
forseeable future and that in the interim the interests of the
19. For the following, see the sources .cited in fn.18.
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world revolution were coterminous with the consolidation of
thae Soviet Union and the construction of socialism within
it:s boundaries. The 'Bolshevisation' of the Comintern thus
retquired a fundamental erosion of the autonomy of its member
pairties. In 1929, when the 'Bolshevisation' program was
reaching its penultimate phase, it was described in the
Cormintern's Executive Committee (ECCI) as
... a process of cleansing of the Party membership 
of all that is putrid and inactive, of all that 
weighs down upon them as ballast, and retards the 
progress of the Parties. What the Right wingers 
call "crises" in the Comintern is but the 
Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties ... This, 
if it may be so put, is but a passing into a "higher 
class", in the course of which all that is undesirable, 
unsuitable and backward, is swept away from the 
Communist movement.20
'Bolshevisation' required the communist parties' 'overcoming
of internal resistance and hesitations' in regard to the
execution of Comintern and ECCI policy, it was explained
21els;ewhere on the same occasion. But by 1929 the Stalinist 
faotion of the CPSU, rather than the communist parties of the 
wor'ld, established the criteria for determining which communist 
eleiments were 'putrid and inactive, ... undesirable, unsuitable 
and backward', and what constituted a '"higher class"' of communist 
party. Thus the implementation of the 'Bolshevisation' program
20. Report by Manuilsky to the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI, 
3/7/29, International Press Correspondence (hereafter, 
InprecorT~^ Vol. 9(4) , 1929 , p. 852 .
21. From Kuusinen's concluding speech at the Tenth Plenum 
of the ECCI, Inprecor, Vol.9(53), p.1151. Kuusinen's 
speech contained a special section titled 'On the 
Further Bolshevisation of Communist Parties'.
involved, in Trotsky's words, the transformation of the
communist parties from 'the vanguards of the world revolution'
22into 'the frontier guards' of the Soviet state.
That both the 'Bolshevisation' and 'Socialism in one
country' slogans first appeared in the year of Lenin's death
has great symbolic significance. Nevertheless the compromising
of the autonomy of the member parties did not begin with Stalin.
From the time of its foundation in March 1919 the Comintern
had been an 'ultra-centralist' organisation. Its central
organ, the ECCI, for example, possessed drastic executive
powers over the national sections far in excess of that of
2 3the executives of the First and Second Internationals.
Stalin did not have to change the constitution of the Comintern
in order to achieve his objectives within it. It was a long way
from the original operational principles practised in the
organisation to Dimitrov's 1935 rallying call - 'To guard
the Bolshevik unity of the party as the apple of one's eye
2 4is the first and highest law of Bolshevism'. There was, 
nevertheless, a certain continuity. This element of continuity 
is important. The founding of the Comintern, and the extremely 
centralised form that it adopted, were intimately connected to 
the pressing problem of the continued isolation of the victorious
22. Trotsky, quoted by Isaac Deutscher, in Stalin: a Political 
Biography, (London, 1966), p.389.
23. The structure of the organisation was not formalised until 
its Second Congress in 1920. The constitution and 
operational principles adopted in 1920 are reproduced in 
J. Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents, 
Vol. 1 - 1919-1922 , (London, 1956), pp.161-72'.
Quoted in Claudin, op. cit., p.122. (Claudin's emphasis.)24.
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revolution in Russia: both the timing and the form were
closely linked with the need to break this fateful isolation
25by facilitating revolution elsewhere in the immediate future.
In 1917 Lenin, following his theory of contemporary, 
finance-dominated monopoly capitalism being capitalism's 
'highest' and last phase, believed that the advanced capitalist 
west - and particularly Germany - was in an 'objectively 
revolutionary' state. Proletarian revolution in Russia, he 
argued, would almost certainly catalyse revolution in the west. 
Indeed, this was a fundamental premise of the 1917 'April Theses' 
with which he convinced his hesitant Bolshevik comrades that 
the Party should take the gamble and by-pass the bourgeois- 
democratic revolution and proceed directly to the proletarian 
revolution. But Lenin recognised that without a supporting 
proletarian revolution in the west - or in at least some of the 
advanced capitalist countries - soon after the Russian Revolution, 
the latter would have little chance of survival. In the 
immediate aftermath of the 1917 Revolution Lenin continued to 
believe that Europe was 'objectively revolutionary'. The 
failure of the Revolution to materialise was due, he believed, 
to the absence of a crucial element - effective communist parties 
of the Bolshevik type. Accordingly, in 1919, with the isolated
25. See for example: ibid., pp.51-5, 103-9; M. Liebman,
Leninism Under Lenin, (London, 1975), pp.385-416, and 
particularly pp.404-16; E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 
1917-1923, Vol. 3, (London, 1966), pp.121-33. Claudin's 
analysis is particularly interesting for the relationship 
that he establishes, between Lenin's theoretical schema of 
the world revolution and the timing of the formation of the 
Comintern and the structure which it was given. The 
following discussion of Lenin and the Comintern is based 
primarily on Claudin's analysis.
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Russian Revolution gravely endangered, he initiated an event 
which he had been urging ever since the Second International 
had capitulated to national chauvinism and the bourgeoisie at 
the outset of the First World War: a split with the Second
International and the founding of a Third International of 
revolutionary Marxist parties. The Third, or Communist 
International was Leninist in its organisational form, in the 
policy it adopted and in the theory of world revolution which 
underlay both. It was imperative and urgent, Lenin argued, 
that, with world capitalism in its terminal phase, the 
revolutionaries of the advanced capitalist nations should 
come together to form a World Party which, as a 'General Staff', 
could effectively plan and execute a coordinated World Revolution. 
As Claudin has shown, Lenin's conception of the World Party was 
that of an internationalised Bolshevik Party. The model was 
internationalised without taking into account the specificity 
of the original model's development or of its relationship 
to the conditions of Tsarist Russia: it was, in effect, a
2 6proposal 'to create chemically pure Bolshevik parties overnight'. 
In fact the founding of the Comintern created both the 
International and its first member parties in the same act.
In accordance with Lenin's theory of the imminence of world 
revolution, and through the universalisation of the Bolshevik 
model, the Third International became a highly centralised 
organisation directed, above all, towards one immediate goal.
Its Executive Committee, apart from being given great directive 
powers over its national sections, was also, and necessarily, 
seated in Moscow until - Lenin hoped - revolution elsewhere made 
its transfer possible. Moreover, the Soviet, state provided most
26. Claudin, o£. cit. , p.109.
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of its funding and Bolsheviks occupied the most important
executive positions. Because of these organisational,
operational and situational features and - probably more
importantly - because of the successful Bolsheviks' tremendous
prestige among revolutionaries, the Russian Party inevitably
dominated the organisation. In doing so it transgressed a
principle of international revolutionary organisation earlier
upheld by Lenin. Commenting in 1907 on the authority held
within the Second International by the German Social Democrats
(who at that stage he greatly respected), Lenin stressed that
important though this authority is in widening the 
horizon of the [proletarian] fighters, it would be 
impermissible in the workers' party to claim that 
the practical and concrete questions of its immediate 
policy can be solved by those standing a long way off. 
The collective spirit of the progressive class-conscious 
workers immediately engaged in the struggle in each 
country will always remain the highest authority on 
all such questions.27
Had Lenin's schema of world revolution been confirmed
by events in the short term, and had the isolation of the
Russian Revolution thus been broken, then the Comintern's
subsequent problems would not have arisen in the acute form in
which they did. Claudin has demonstrated how the discrepancy
which did arise constituted an implicit and fundamental crisis
of Leninist theory and practice. However only Lenin appears to
2 8have become aware of the crisis. But, immobilised by his
27. Quoted in ibid., pp.115-16. (My emphasis.)
28. Most notably, in his last article (Feb. 1923), 'Better 
Fewer, But Better', in his Collected Works, (Moscow, 1966),
Vol.33,pp.499-501. See also his critical comments on the 
excessive 'Russian-ness' of the decisions taken at the 1922 
Fourth World Congress of the Comintern, in 'Five Years of the 
Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution', 
in ibid., p .430.
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stroke, it was too late for him to act effectively upon his 
last reflections. The centralism of, and the Bolshevik hegemony 
within, the Comintern, had initially been linked to a theory 
of imminent revolution. These characteristics, of doubtful 
value even initially, became completely anachronistic in the 
post-War stabilisation of the capitalist world. But instead 
of being decentralised accordingly, the Comintern was, from 
1924, progressively to become far more centralised and Soviet- 
dominated. Moreover, Stalin's programs for revolution elsewhere 
were firmly linked to his domestic preoccupations and so by­
passed most of the revolutionary content of Leninism. Certain 
crucial modes which had been absent from the latter were 
introduced. One example was the 'religiosity' which was 
imported into Marxist theory and ideology: the canonisation,
and thus neutralisation, of Lenin's writings, the cult of
Lenin, and then of Stalin, and the theological category of
29crime of conscience for dissent from majority positions.
Another was the sanctification of bureaucracy and hierarchical 
privilege and the active promotion of bureaucratic structures 
and values close in form to those of Tsarist Russia. 
Bolshevisation meant the transference to the Comintern of these 
modes, which were associated with the 'construction of socialism' 
in Russia. It thus represented the projection of the problems 
of one particular post-revolutionary situation, and of one
29. A particularly clear example of this novel 'religiosity' is 
cited by Deutscher - Stalin's 1924 'Oath to Lenin'. In this 
'the style of the Communist Manifesto is strangely blended 
with that of the Orthodox Prayer Book' - in Stalin, 
pp.272-3. This style was to become all-pervasive.
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particular response to those problems, on to communist
parties which were in a highly diverse range of pre-revolutionary
situations.
The form which this projection took in the post-
Leninist Comintern had a number of specific dimensions. The
bases of political activity - theory, ideology, policy and
organisation^ - were progressively distorted between 1924 and
1935, and the issue of the relationship between political
31activity and popular culture was barely raised. Theory, the 
ostensible basis of organisational forms and policy, was 
transformed into extremely abstract rationalisations of policies 
determined by the dominant faction of the CPSU according to 
criteria only tangentially related to concrete realities in 
specific national situations. The already fragile democracy of 
the 'democratic centralism' which was the original organisational 
principle of the Third International was replaced by the ideal 
of the 'iron monolith', its 'iron unity' protected from dissent, 
actual or potential, by the exercise of 'iron discipline' from 
above. In the realm of ideological activity, the notorious 
'wooden language' which became the lingua franca of the Comintern, 
epitomised the reduction of ideology to a dogmatised, cliched
30. I do not make a sharp division between 'ideology' and 
'theory'. But I use the former in the sense of 'world- 
view' - a conception of the social world which is not 
necessarily internally logically consistent. I use the latter 
in the sense of a systematic body of reasoning within which 
internal logical consistency is important - at least as a 
goal. 'Ideology' is the interconnected constellation of 
conceptions through which the world is 'spontaneously' 
understood - continuous with both 'culture' and 'common- 
sense'. The transformation of the existing popular 
ideologies through the propagation of an alternative 
ideology acceptable to the masses is a pre-condition of 
revolutionary change. Theory is the analytical guide to 
political practice.
31. Gramsci was a notable exception. But he was jailed by the 
Fascists in 1926 and his conceptions had little impact 
outside Italy.
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orthodoxy. Finally, Comintern policies came to possess 'a
peculiarly deadening quality: they were neither revolutionary
32nor reformist, but abstract and ineffective'.
Thus the implementation of the 'Bolshevisation' 
program both realised, and added greatly to, the most negative 
of the possible consequences for the autonomy of the world's 
communist parties inherent from the beginning in the isolation 
of the Russian Revolution and in the character of the Comintern. 
The issue of bolshevisation therefore raises the more general 
question of the nature of the complex legacy of the Russian 
Revolution for revolution elsewhere, and it suggests that it 
was an ambiguous legacy. On the one hand, the 'ten days that 
shook the world', and their aftermath, have provided inspiration, 
revolutionary principles and resources for other communist 
movements. Moreover, a few of these have been successful.
But at the same time the projection on to the world stage of 
the patterns of the Bolshevik Revolution and of its post­
revolutionary consequences in Russia has eroded the potential 
for revolution elsewhere. The study of the bolshevisation of a 
particular communist party - in our case the.Communist Party of 
India - can perhaps illuminate, to a limited extent, this much 
broader question.
Bolshevisation, Communist Parties and National Environments 
Isaac Deutscher has encapsulated the effect of 
bolshevisation on the relationships between a communist party 
and its Comintern and national environments in the following 
passage:
32. Claudin, o£. cit., p.640.
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It was as if the giant figure of an athlete engaged 
in a homeric fight had thrown around itself twenty or 
thirty shadows, each mimicking the tense wrestling 
and violent gestures of the real body, each pretending 
to shake heaven and earth. The strange picture was 
made even stranger by the fact that the foreign sections 
of the Comintern were not mere shadows. They were 
half bodies and half shadows. With one part of their 
existence they were immersed in the realities of their 
national life ... while with the other they 
participated in the hectic dance of phantoms round 
the General Secretary.33
In the terms of this metaphor, a particular communist party
was bolshevised to the extent that it became a 'shadow' of
Soviet politics and correspondingly divorced from its own
national environment. No communist party, not even the Maoist
faction of the Chinese Party (CCP), escaped bolshevisation 
34completely. Yet some parties, and most notably the Chinese 
and Vietnamese, managed to retain sufficient autonomy in 
their relationships with the Comintern to become 'bodies' 
rather than 'shadows', and thus to provide effective leadership 
for their respective revolutions. This fact raises the question 
of why some parties were able largely to escape bolshevisation 
while most did not.
Although a comprehensive comparative answer to this 
question is beyond the scope of this study, it does introduce 
a necessary perspective. A number of determinants of the nature 
and extent of the bolshevisation of communist parties can be 
identified with some confidence.
33. Deutscher, Stalin, pp.398-99.
34. For a perceptive analysis of the relationship between Maoism 
and 'Bolshevism' see R. Lew, 'Maoism and the Chinese 
Revolution', in The Socialist Register, 1975, pp.115-59.
See also S. Schram, 'The Party in Chinese Communist 
Ideology', in China Quarterly, No. 38, 1969, pp.1-26.
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The level of contact between a party and the 
international communist movement, and the amount of attention 
paid to the party by the Comintern leadership, were factors 
of obvious importance. So, too, were the timing of a party's 
first contact with the Comintern and the particular way in 
which it was mediated. These factors would determine the 
extent to which a party leadership was exposed to both the 
positive and the negative elements of the Russian Revolution's 
ambiguous legacy, the extent to which it became aware of the 
Leninist rather than the post-Leninist phase of the Comintern, 
and the level of its exposure to the 'Bolshevisation' program.
But the inter-related factors of the extent of a 
communist party's capacity for effective revolutionary 
leadership, and the nature of its national environment, were 
also crucial. The social and political backgrounds of a party's 
recruits, and the extent to which they were familiar with the 
Marxist revolutionary tradition, would have a direct bearing 
on the question of its competence as a revolutionary leadership. 
But the.key determinants would be the existence or otherwise of 
autonomous radical mass traditions and of contemporary social 
and political upheaval, and the degree of stability of the 
existing structures of social and political control. These 
features would determine the extent of the available 'space' 
for revolutionary organising and the consequent potential for 
the development of communist-led, autonomous, revolutionary 
momentum. They would also determine the viability of radical, 
non-communist political alternatives for the politicised 
intelligentsia, and thus, to a significant degree, the extent 
to which a communist party would be able to attract talented
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leaders to its ranks. The importance of able leadership was
demonstrated as well as stressed by the Bolsheviks. But the
Bolshevik experience also demonstrated the conditioning effects
of national environmental factors on a political leadership.
For example, the development of the Russian labour movement
particularly as manifested in the 'spontaneous' workers'
soviet movements of 1905 and 1917 - made a deep impact upon
Lenin's conceptualisation of the relationship between the
Party and the masses. This led him (though ambiguously)
beyond the mechanistic and exaggeratedly 'elitist' thinking
35of his 1902 work, What Is to Be Done?. Similarly, it was 
the development of the revolutionary situation in 1917 that led 
Trotsky, finally, to abandon the non-Bolshevik revolutionary 
alternative and join Lenin's party.
The following chapters of this thesis will show that 
in the CPI's formative phase the combination of the above 
national and international features was, on balance, decidedly 
unfavourable, and that the potential for bolshevisation was 
correspondingly great. The failures of Indian communism have a 
context - they have not simply been the failures of leaderships.
Bolshevisation, the CPI and the Indian Context: the Dilemma of
the Indian Left
With an understanding of the meaning of bolshevisation, 
and of the importance of specific environmental factors in 
determining its specific role and effects within a particular 
party, we can now return to the question raised earlier - the
35. See A. Carlo, 'Lenin on the Party', in Telos, No. 17, 1973, 
pp.1-40.
25
nature of the relationship between bolshevisation and the
CPI's failure. The issue of Party factionalism provides a
useful focus for this inquiry. It has been the most
conspicuous of the Indian movement's internal problems, and
one which bolshevisation was intended to resolve; moreover,
it has been the most overt symptom of the Party's difficulties
in relation to its Indian environment.
The evidence provided by existing studies of Indian
3 6communism after the period of its formation reveals a
definite pattern of relationships between bolshevisation and
37Party factionalism. As we have seen, a centra! intention 
of the 'Bolshevisation' campaign was the eradication of 
factionalism - 'deviationism' - and its replacement by 
'monolithic unity'. This campaign could be effective in the 
Soviet Union, where all of the resources of the state apparatus 
could be mobilised to crush opposition. For the CPI (and other 
communist parties), without such resources, bolshevisation produced 
a different result. It could not 'liquidate' the problem in the
36. In addition to: Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit.; Ram,
Indian Communism and Maoism; and Sinha, op. cit.; see:
J.H. Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India, (New 
York, 1956); B.S. Gupta, Communism in Indian Politics, 
(Columbia, 1972), and 'India's Rival Communist Models',
in Problems of Communism, Vol. 22(1), 1973, pp.1-15;
P.R. Brass and M.F. Franda, (Eds.), Radical Politics in 
South Asia, (Cambridge, Mass., 1973)1 M.F. Franda,
Radical Politics in West Bengal, (Cambridge, Mass., 1971);
Hi Gelman, *The Communist Party of India: Sino-Soviet 
Battleground', in A. Doak Barnett, (Ed.), Communist 
Strategies in Asia: a Comparative Analysii~~of Governments
and Parties, (Bombay, 1968); and B. Pavier, 'The Telengana 
Armed Struggle', in Economic and Political Weekly (hereafter 
EPW), Vol. 9(32-34), 1974, pp.1411-20, which provides a 
useful analysis of the relationship between the different 
levels of the CPI leadership during that movement. I have 
included few of the several regional studies of the CPI 
that are available.
37. This pattern has emerged most clearly during the movement's
periodic crises. For example: the transition from
P.C. Joshi's leadership to the B.T. Ranadive leadership
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CPI; it could only provide certain external resources to
suppress the immediate symptoms. At the same time the dogmatic,
arbitrary, bureaucratic and highly authoritarian bolshevist
modes have aggravated the problem in the longer term. The
factions were bolshevised and, as a consequence, have tended
to be particularly rigidly formed and sectarian rather than
fluid alliances based primarily on serious political differences.
The Party split in 1964 appears to have been the logical outcome
3 8of this situation. Rather than 'monolithic unity', Indian
communism has been characterised by what Overstreet and
39Windmiller have called a 'factional balance of power'.
The factions, rather than the Party as a whole, have been 
'monolithic': the Party has been characterised by a 'multiple 
monolithicity'.
37. Cont'd
in 1947-48; the struggle to replace the Ranadive leadership 
during 1949-50 and then the successor Andhra leadership 
during 1950-51; and the protracted crisis leading to the 
formal split and formation of the CPI(M) in 1964. The 
later split within the CPI(M) ranks and the formation of 
the CPI(ML) falls within this pattern. For the most part, 
the studies cited in fn.36 above do not go beyond describing 
the conflict patterns. They do not provide an adequate 
explanation of the interaction of the bolshevisation mode 
and the social roots of factionalism.
38. Even though it was the most overtly ideologised of factional
struggles in the CPI, it was, in the opinion of one of the 
participants, more an organisational struggle for electoral 
tactical advantage than an expression of major strategic 
differences: Damodaran, 'Memoir', pp.55-7. T.R. Sharma's
'Electoral Imperatives in the Indian Communist Party Split' 
in Modern Asian Studies (hereafter, MAS), Vol. 10(3), 1976, 
pp.349-60, lends further support to this analysis.
Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., p.352.39.
27
The 'factional balance' has characteristically been 
maintained by the dominance of one faction over suppressed 
competitors, and of one exclusive policy over equally rigidly 
defined alternatives. Among the resources available for 
maintaining this dominance, and hence 'unity', legitimacy 
conferred by the ECCI and its successors has been the most 
important. But legitimacy has not necessarily been conferred 
in accordance with demonstrated political superiority. This 
situation has resulted in recurring struggles by subordinate 
factions for the conferred legitimacy and, if granted (or
apparently granted), in a realignment in the 'factional balance
4 0of power'. The realignment has usually been traumatic, involving 
a campaign to discredit the previous leadership and the dis­
sociation of the newly dominant faction from its predecessors.
This process has resulted in sharp discontinuities not only in 
policy, which has often swung from one pole to its diametric 
opposite, but also in leadership - and hence in political 
experience. Beneath these discontinuities, however, the more 
fundamental continuity of the bolshevist mode has prevailed.
The factionalism and discontinuity inherent in this 
mode have been supplemented by the periodic changes in the 
content of policy issued by Moscow. These changes have
40. This is particularly apparent in the prolonged crisis 
between 1947 and 1951, when successive factions gained 
control of the Party by virtue of their being able 
successively to claim Moscow's concurrence in their 
policies. The sequence was completed when the unstable 
new Central Committee sent a four man delegation to Moscow 
to get a definite ruling from the CPSU leadership. See: 
Ram, Indian Communism, pp.49-50; Damodaran, 'Memoir', 
pp.43-4; and S.A. Dange (one of the delegation), When 
Communist (sic ) Differ, (Bombay, 1970) , pp.56-8.
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consistently lacked theoretical justification and have been 
quite arbitrary in relation to Indian developments. Nevertheless, 
the CPI has been required to accept that the successive changes 
were theoretically continuous. The legitimisation of policy 
changes by arbitrary authority, rather than by demonstrated 
theoretical and political consistency or superiority, has 
further exacerbated factional disagreement. This arbitrariness 
has also required the development of a camouflaging mystique 
of infallibility around the leadership. The leadership has not, 
as a rule, made itself accountable to the lower Party levels, 
and so has not had to justify its policy changes to them 
in terms of demonstrable changes in the 'objective situation'.
It has relied instead on a claim to infallibility-by-proxy 
by virtue of its role as representative of 'the Centre' of 
the 'World Party'.
This bolshevist leadership cult has reinforced rather 
than confronted the 'neo-feudal' modes of consciousness imported 
into the Party by recruits. In K. Damodaran's words, the bolshevist 
cult of the 'great teacher' has fitted comfortably with an
41Indian 'tradition ... of political gurus enlightening the masses'. 
This cultism has encouraged a passive attitude of loyalty to 
particular leaders among the lower level cadres. This attitude
41. Damodaran, 'Memoir', p.38. This quotation occurs in the
following passage, in which he comments upon his own induction 
into this cult in the 1930s and 1940s:
We were told that Stalin was the 'great teacher', the 
'guiding star'... . And being both new to communism 
and relatively unschooled in Marxism and Leninism I 
accepted what I was told. There is a tradition in 
Indian politics of political gurus enlightening the 
masses and this tradition suited Stalinism completely. 
Hence we could accept anything and everything that we 
were told by the party elders who themselves were 
dependent f-or their information exclusively on Moscow.
See also B. Chandra, op. cit. , passim, for an analysis of 
this phenomenon.
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iss conducive to 'vertical' factionalism around personalities 
raither than 'horizontal' factionalism around serious political 
diif f erences.
Thus the combined result of the bolshevist mode and
thie changes in policy content within that mode has been the
continual interruption of the movement's continuity and the
separation of the Party from the Indian environment. These
conditions have precluded the development of an effective
Mairxist alternative to the predominant political modes. Instead,
wiith few exceptions, the CPI's Marxism has been characterised by
42a curious combination of bolshevist 'metaphysical materialism'
and a narrowly pragmatic-programatic type of analysis, and by
a failure to create a body of Marxist theory and popular culture
43wedded to the Indian environment.
It can be seen, then, that bolshevisation undermined
thie potential of communism in India. Yet, despite this, the
CF5I did survive as a significant political entity, whereas the
non-bolshevised Marxist movements which developed in India in
4 4thie colonial period have not survived. This fact
42. This is Gramsci's term; see his penetrating critique of the 
'vulgar Marxist' elevation of materialism to a transcendental 
metaphysic, in his 'Critical Notes on an Attempt at 
Popular Sociology', in Prison Notebooks, pp.419-72.
43. For an analysis of the communists' failure in the spheres 
of culture and philosophy see P.C. Joshi, 'Towards a 
Renewal', in Seminar, No. 178, 1974, pp.47-57. As Joshi 
points out, the relative lack of concern with culture, ethics 
and philosophy, contrasts markedly with the development of 
the communist movements in China and Vietnam. In the case
of Vietnam this concern, and its importance for the 
development of communist hegemony in that country, is 
demonstrated very clearly in David Marr's current work 
on continuity and change in Vietnamese cultural and 
intellectual history from the 1920s into the 1940s 
(tentatively titled 'Vietnamese Tradition on Trial: An 
Intellectual History, 1920-1945'). This complements his 
Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925,
suggests that revolutionary Marxism in India faced a dilemma 
which was inherent for the Left in the Indian situation. On 
the one hand, bolshevisation appears to have fulfilled a 
necessary function by providing the only effective resource 
for the resolution of the recurring internal crises 
consequent upon the problems it has faced in its Indian 
environmsnt. But, simultaneously, bolshevisation contributed 
to the crises and precluded the development of a viable 
communist alternative.
The crisis had already appeared and the bolshevist 
solution had been adopted by the mid-thirties, when the CPI 
first emerged as a functioning centralised party. Both the 
problem and solution had developed organically from the 
experiences of the communist groups in the preceding decade, 
during the difficult process of formation of the Party. This 
foundation has been retained by the Indian communist movement 
since then, through all of the violent oscillations of policy, 
splits and regroupments which have characterised its history. 
When viewed from this perspective the CPI's history has not 
been one of development, but of the continuous reproduction 
of this original mode. This is a case, therefore, where a
30
43. Cont'd
(Berkeley, 1971). See also Nguyen Due Minh, 'A Study Of 
the Literature of Persuasion of North Vietnam', (Ph.D.
Thesis, University of London, 1973).
44. Two notable cases being the socialist group in the Indian 
National Congress, whose cooption by the Congress leader­
ship is studied in B.R. Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress 
and the Raj , 19 2 9-1942 , (London, 1976) , and. the Royists, whose 
eventualdemise Is traced in Haithcox, op. cit.. Damodaran 
says that one of the reasons for the CPI^s continued 
’Stalinism' was that for dissatisfied communists 'there
was no revolutionary alternative to the line of the CPI': 
'Memoir', p.51.
31
study of origins leads directly to an understanding of a 
movement's later history in quite different conditions.
The following thesis is an investigation of the previously 
neglected questions of why and how the pattern was first 
established.
The Formation of the CPI - the Thesis
The ascription of a date at which the process of 
Party formation began is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. One 
could argue that the formation began in the immediate post­
war years, with the ideological impact of the Russian Revolution 
upon the few intellectuals who were to become India's first 
communists. One could also - with the CPI(M) - nominate
1921, which was when an expatriate CPI was formed by some
45Indians at Soviet Tashkent. Or one could choose - as does
the CPI - 1925 , which was when a nominal CPI was formed on 
46Indian soil. I have selected 1927, which was when the first 
political grouping with an identifiably Marxist program was 
formed. Moreover, it was from this point that changing political 
conditions stimulated communist development. However I
45. For a CPI(M) statement of this position, see M. Ahmad,
The Communist Party of India and its Formation Abroad, 
(Calcutta, 1962).
46. The CPI's argument for 1925 is put forward in G. Adhikari,
'The First Indian Communist Conference in Kanpur: 
Introduction', in G. Adhikari, Documents of the History 
of the Communist Party of India, Vol. I (1917-1922) , (New 
Delhi, 1972), pp.591-629. However Adhikari does recognise 
(p.629) that the 1925 conference 'did not have thefeatures of a proper foundation congress of a communist party'. 
See the essentially social democratic Constitution and 
Objects of the Party formed at Kanpur in 1925, reproduced 
in ibid., pp.662-66. The executive committee formed at 
this conference did not meet again until May 1927.
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would agree with critics that this is an arbitrary choice and 
that earlier developments were important. But in agreeing 
with them I would nevertheless argue that the gradual, hesitant 
ideological transition of India's future communists, from 
'pure' nationalism towards a Marxist conception of nationalist 
politics, was of much more significance for the subsequent 
development of the Party than were the two contested CPI foundation 
dates.
From 1927 the formation of the Party proceeded unevenly 
until a functioning, centralised, all-India organisation was 
finally established in the mid-1930s. The formation process 
can be separated analytically into three distinct stages, 
the first two of which are defined primarily by developments 
in Bombay: 1. 1927-29 - a stage in which a systematic Marxist 
theory of Indian politics, a communist mass base and position 
of influence in nationalist politics, and functioning communist 
political organisations, were established for the first time;
2. 1929-33 - a stage in which a sharp conjunctural change 
occurred,resulting in the disintegration of the mass base, 
of the position in nationalist politics, and of the communist 
leadership itself, and in the reversal of the earlier trend 
towards theoretical and political autonomy; and 3. 1934-37 - 
a stage in which the old leadership emerged from jail and 
forged a functioning (and bolshevised) national Party 
organisation from the existing scattered and divided communist 
groupings. It was from this basis that the CPI emerged as a 
significant element in Indian politics.
Did the CPI have an alternative to bolshevisation?
This thesis argues that bolshevisation was a necessary pr.e-
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condition for the formation of a centralised communist party 
in the conditions existing in colonial India. That the 
original bolshevisation dynamic which was established in 
these formative years bears a close relationship to the 
pattern described earlier for 'mature' Indian communism 
suggests that there has been a high degree of continuity in 
the conditions which have shaped the Party. In this thesis 
I will attempt to identify the main features of this 
conditioning structure of opposition to communist politics 
as it operated in the critical mid-1920s to mid-1930s phase 
of Indian politics.
That the CPI was not bolshevised until the latter
I
stages of its formative period facilitates the investigation. 
The period under study forms a unity in terms of the theme 
of formation, but a clear distinction can be made between a 
'pre-bolshevised' phase and one of bolshevisation. The year 
1929 was the watershed between the two phases. A comparison 
of these two phases is particularly instructive because 
significant, though contrasting, successes were won in each 
of them. This comparison reveals the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of both non-bolshevised and bolshevised Indian 
communism and allows a more penetrating study of the original 
causes of the Party's bolshevisation. The heuristic value of 
this contrast is complemented by that of the contrast between 
Bombay and Calcutta - the two locations to which, essentially, 
formative Indian communism remained confined. By studying 
the reasons for the widely varying outcomes for communist 
politics in these two cities we are able to identify more 
precisely the elements in the colonial Indian environment
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which contributed towards the bolshevisation of the CPI.
These elements are outlined in Chapter 2. This 
chapter first examines the historical background of the 
Dombay and Calcutta communists' national and international 
environments and establishes the way in which these environments 
functioned in the early and mid-1920s, before the CPI's formation 
began. I identify 'colonialisation' as the ultimate national 
determinant of the possibilities for and limitations to 
communist politics. More precisely, the character of British 
colonialism in India, and the different levels of its penetration 
into eastern and western India, meant that the communists 
faced quite different prospects in the two cities. The extent 
of colonialisation determined the extent to which pre-colonial 
characteristics were retained in the colonial period. It 
profoundly affected those elements of the environment which 
would have a direct bearing on the fate of communist politics: 
it shaped the socio-economic and politico-cultural characteristics 
of the social groups from which the communists were recruited 
(these characteristics including the intelligentsia's relationship 
to the masses), and it largely determined the socio-economic 
bases and ideological characteristics of nationalism, the political 
economy of industry, the composition and characteristics of 
the working class, and the relationship between the colonial state 
and society. Chapter 2 begins, therefore, with an account of 
colonialisation, as it operated in India, and establishes the 
unevenness of its penetration into the two regions. It then 
outlines the ways in which colonialisation shaped the 
different relevant elements in eastern and western India and 
then, against this background, delineates the contrasting
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characters of Calcutta and Bombay. The emergence, in the 
upheaval of the post-War years, of the antecedents of Indian 
communism, is then related to these respective contexts.
I then examine a particular problem common to both communist 
groups - the nature of the Raj's strategy towards political 
opposition in general, and radical mass politics in particular. 
The Raj's first initiatives against Indian 'Communism' are 
examined against this background. Finally, I look at the 
international communist environment shaping the development 
of Indian communism in the 1920s. In particular, I identify 
India's role in Comintern analyses and politics and the 
organisational links between international communism and 
India, and evaluate the adequacy of the Indian communists' 
received Marxism.
Chapter 3 is a study of the implementation of the 
communists' working class programs in Bombay and Calcutta in 
1927-29 - a period of unusually high industrial unrest and 
freedom from anti-communist repression. By studying the 
widely contrasting results in Bombay and Calcutta it shows 
how, in these conditions, the structural and 
ideological differences outlined in Chapter 2 allowed the 
communists to establish close contact with the Bombay working 
class and to build a mass trade union base, but prevented the 
Calcutta communists from replicating these achievements. From 
this comparative study I draw some conclusions about the 
necessary conditions of the mass mobilisation which was the 
necessary pre-condition, in turn, for non-bolshevisation.
In Chapter 4 we examine comparatively the consequences 
for the respective communist leaderships, of the working class
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success in Bombay and the failure in Calcutta. In particular,
I examine the integrative and 'proletarianising' effects of 
a mass base and political momentum upon a communist leadership, 
and the correlated autonomous tendencies induced by this mass 
base and momentum in the communists' orientation towards the 
Comintern. Bombay and Calcutta provide an instructive, if 
not total, contrast in this regard.
In Chapter 5 we see that the conditions under which 
the Bombay developments of 1927-28 occurred were atypical and 
temporary. The political conditions which allowed the 
communists to exploit the industrial opportunities which 
became available proved to be dependent on a particular, 
concurrent phase in the overarching conflict between their 
two main political opponents - 'bourgeois' nationalism and 
the colonial state. From early 1929 this situation changed, 
and by mid-1930 the earlier 'revolutionary space' had virtually 
disappeared. The leadership was arrested and the still very 
vulnerable communist mass movement was broken. These difficult 
conditions were to remain in force throughout the Depression/ 
Civil Disobedience period. By studying the crises of the 1929- 
33 period we are able to see more clearly the essential features 
of the complex structure of opposition to radical mass politics 
which, in the final analysis, ensured the bolshevisation of the 
CPI. In this structure we can see some of the continuities, as 
well as the discontinuities, between 'bourgeois' nationalism 
and the Raj.
The conjunctural shift in India from 1929 coincided 
with major changes in the Comintern - the penultimate phase in 
the bolshevisation of the Comintern. Mpreover, the negative
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effects of this intensification of the 'Bolshevisation' 
program were compounded by an associated, ECCI-decreed, 
political strategy. These changes are the subject of Chapter 
6. Because India played a number of important ideological 
roles in this Russian-centered strategy, the CPI received 
particular attention in this phase. Thus the CPI was subjected 
to both an intensified 'Bolshevisation' and an inappropriate, 
pragmatically and externally determined policy, at a point 
at which it was particularly vulnerable.
This compounded the Party's existing problems in 
the 1929-33 period - problems which the thesis studies in 
Chapter 7. The crisis of Party leadership in this period 
confirmed the necessity of revolutionary momentum for the 
development of a creative, 'proletarianised' and 'Indianised' 
communism. Just as the atypically favourable conditions of 
1927-28 had allowed the Bombay communists and working class to 
demonstrate their respective capacities to create a politicised 
mass movement, so the harsh conditions of 1929-33 demonstrated, 
in an extreme form, the great problems for Indian communism 
inherent in both its national and its international environments.
The extreme nature of the crisis in the 1929-30 period 
prompted a correspondingly extreme, bolshevist solution. This 
solution was based on a selective synthesis from the lessons of 
the past decade. It was formulated by the jailed 1920s leaders 
- who, because of the jail experience, became India's first 
united national leadership - and was implemented upon their 
progressive release from prison from late 1933. There was a 
slight improvement in industrial and political conditions from 
1934, but these remained much closer to the conditions of 1929-33
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than to those of the extra-ordinary 1927-28 phase. For this 
reason the environmental factors which produced both the 1929-33 
crisis and the jailed group's solution continued to operate.
This can be seen in the fact that it took until early 1937 to 
resolve the Party crisis. The extreme bolshevisation of the 
Party which took place between 1934 and 1937 was continuous 
with the bolshevist pattern of later Indian communism, outlined 
earlier in the Introduction. Because the reasoning behind the 
formulation of the mid-1930s solution was made explicit, and 
because the immediate problem it was designed to overcome was 
so extreme, we are able to see particularly clearly the 
various, inter-locking dimensions of the bolshevist syndrome.
In particular, we are able to see why bolshevisation was, 
under the prevailing conditions, the only method of forming 
a centralised, disciplined communist party - why there was a 
dilemma for the CPI inherent in its situation.
It is perhaps necessary to say something about the 
differing lengths of the chapters. The length of particular 
chapters has been determined by the importance to the main 
thesis of the sub-themes covered in them and by the complexity 
of these sub-themes. Chapters 2, 3 and 5 examine and inter­
relate elements in the communists' environment allowing and 
preventing the development of communist-led revolutionary 
momentum. As this issue was the ultimate determinant of the 
nature of the formation process and, in particular, of the 
extent of the Party's bolshevisation, and because an 
investigation of the issue is necessarily complex, these chapters 
are substantially longer than the others. The content of 
communist theory and ideology, also, is-treated at some length.
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This treatment is given not only because of the intrinsic 
importance of these dimensions as determinants of communist 
politics and of their results; theoretical and ideological 
developments also provide a useful index of the overall levels 
of autonomy, 'proletarianisation' and initiative attained or 
retained by the communist leadership during the successive 
stages of Party formation.
This thesis does not attempt to examine every
manifestation of communism in India during the Party's
formative period. It examines only that activity which is
relevant to the themes of the formation and bolshevisation of
the Party. These criteria exclude the proto-communist
groupings outside Bombay and Calcutta - such as those in the
Punjab and UP and, in the 1930s, Kerala - except insofar as
they were incorporated into the national Party structure
created between 1934 and 1937. Individuals from other centres
played a role in the CPI's formation. But the groups themselves
remained extremely weak, essentially undifferentiated from
their immediate political contexts, and isolated from Bombay
47and Calcutta, throughout the critical 1927-33 years. For the
47. See Chapter 7, fn.4. For the close relations between the 
terrorist and proto-communist groups of north India, see:
M. Harcourt, 'Revolutionary Networks in Northern Indian 
Politics 1907-1935; a Case Study of the "Terrorist" 
Movement in Delhi, the Punjab, the United Provinces, and 
Adjacent Princely States', (Ph.D., University of Sussex, 
1973), Chapter 6; B. Chandra, 'The Ideological Development 
of the Revolutionary Terrorists in Northern India in the 
1920s', in B.R. Nanda (Ed.), Socialism in India, (Delhi, 
1972), pp.163-89. For the emergence of the Keralan 
communists from Congress politics in the 1930s see 
R. Jeffrey, 'From Matriliny to Marxism' (forthcoming, 
Journal of Asian Studies).
saune reason I have not treated in great detail either the 
19120- 27 developments or the Party's political activity in the 
19134-37 period. As the most significant features of the 
period before 1927 were ideological, not organisational, I 
concentrated on the ideological development of India's 
fi:rst communists rather than on the details of the first 
pts to establish links between Europe and India and 
India. These details have, in any case, already been 
cowered by earlier studies48 (though it should be noted that 
these studies have not provided particularly perceptive 
accounts of the ideological theme).49 The CPI's political 
activity after 1934 is treated only tangentially, for it had 
onlly an indirect effect upon the way in which the Party was
For this period, therefore, I am interested primarily 
in the CPI's intra-Party politics.
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The historian of Indian communism in its formative 
pha.se is richly served by source material. This is so largely 
because of three of the communists' great problems: an effective
state intelligence system, the selective, legalistic mode of
2 ' 3 & 4 ;
andPe s s a y s  I n L  ^ n o M l ’ ''of the Communis; P Documents of the History
V.s. Budhrai's (1923-1925), (New Delhi, 1974).
Politics', in Hand! ^ E d T ^ o  In!:ernational Indian
little to'these account;!' PP-17-41, adds
occ^pL^with' the ceS e r n hiatrtheare Pre"analysis of how internatinn^l th ?ost of concrete India's future comun?lc I communism was perceived by
of Comintern ideological and °£eover( even their treatment 
be disjointed ?houah Adh"t the°r®tlcal themes tends to
corrects this 'imbalance'hisa^lvse6 CPI' s . f ioial historian) teleological approach. analyses are vitiated by a markedly
state repression, and Party factionalism.
Until the communists created an effective under­
ground apparatus in 1934-37, the Raj's intelligence apparatus 
maintained a very effective surveillance of their activities.
The intelligence reports and captured documents that I have 
used were found primarily in the Home Political files of the 
National Archives of India, the archives of the Bombay City 
Special Branch, and the Bombay Presidency Secret Abstracts of 
Intelligence. The Special Branch files were particularly 
valuable, especially for the 1930s. A number of files not 
available in the above locations were found in the Public 
Department files in the Tamil Nadu Archives. Unfortunately, 
almost all of the relevant Political Department and Commerce 
Department files in the West Bengal Archives have been destroyed, 
the files for each alternate year have been transferred to 
Dacca, and I was unable to obtain access to the Bengal 
Intelligence Branch's records. However, much of the Bengal 
information would appear to have been incorporated in the 
valuable series of Intelligence Bureau publications, noted in 
fn.l of this chapter, and in the Bombay and New Delhi 
intelligence files.
The Raj's preference in the 1920s for conspiracy cases 
rather than more summary modes of repression is responsible for 
the major source of communist documents for the second half of 
the 1920s - the several thousand carefully verified and explained
50
50. The special problems created for the communists by this 
mode of repression are studied in Chapters 2 and 5.
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pieces of evidence tendered in the massive Meerut Communist 
Conspiracy Case which was launched in early 1929. The 
evidence includes numerous police reports of communist 
activities. (However the records of the other provincial 
magistrate court cases that I attempted to locate have not 
survived). That India's communists met with less bloody 
modes of repression than their comrades in some other 
countries has also meant that a large number of the early 
communists survived to old age. I was fortunate enough to 
be able to interview several of those still alive, and I 
was assisted greatly by them.
Party factionalism and, particularly, the CPI 
split of 1964, are responsible for a large number of the 
many published reminiscences and claims and counter-claims 
about, and republished documents from, the Party's formative 
period. That much of the controversy centres on this period 
indicates its importance for the CPI's later development.
In addition to the above sources I also found a 
number of important Party documents in P.C. Joshi's excellent 
Archives of Contemporary History at the Jawaharlal Nehru 
University in New Delhi. A few others were found in the Marx 
Memorial Library, London, and in the British Museum's 
'Proscribed Indian Books' collection. Unfortunately I was 
unable to gain access to the documents in the CPI's archives. 
However the Party's historical project, under Dr. Adhikari's
51direction, has made a number of these available in published form.
51. See fn.48, above.
I relied primarily on the Marx Memorial Library and the 
British Museum for the Comintern and CPGB publications.
Because there are more archival sources available
for Bombay than for Calcutta there is an unavoidable unevenness
in the source material on the two communist groups. This
problem is compounded by the fact that the Calcutta communists,
being less integrated politically, kept less regular records
of their activities than did the Bombay branch. Moreover, it
is not possible to provide as complete an account of the
Calcutta communists' immediate political and industrial
environments. This is largely because the secondary work
available on the Bombay environment is more complete. But
the problem in the industrial sphere also arises from the
fact that there was less state interest in industry in Bengal
52than in Bombay. The Bengal government, therefore, knew less 
about the operations of industry. Thus, for example, the 
Bengal information in the Royal Commission on Labour volumes 
is less complete than Bombay's. Until Dipesh Chakrabarty's 
work on-the jute industry is completed we will not have the 
comprehensive information provided by Richard Newman and
52. This was partly because the jute industry, not having 
powerful competitors in Britain, was able to avoid 
having factory legislation imposed upon it. The 
Bombay millowners were less fortunate. An additional 
factor from the late 1910s was the fact that the 
Bombay millhands were not as controllable by the 
managements as were the jute workers. The Bombay 
government'therefore felt it necessary to maintain a 
more effective industrial intelligence system. This 
can be seen in the two governments’ accounts of their 
intelligence systems in their 1929 submissions to the 
Royal Commission on Labour in India: cf. Vol. 1(1), 
pp.151-54 and Vol. V(l), pp.167-9, for Bombay and 
Bengal respectively.
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Mo>rris D. Morris for the Bombay textile industry. These 
pr'oblems would have been more serious for this study if the 
Cailcutta communists had played the dominant role in the CPI's 
formation. In fact, however, the centre of gravity remained 
im Bombay throughout the period studied. But there is one 
seirious lacuna in the source material available for Bombay - 
thie records of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee were 
noit available. This means that we can only observe 'from the 
ouitside' an important arena of both communist and anti­
communist activity in Bombay.
The nature of state policy towards communist and 
raidical working class activity and the imperial and indigenous 
faictors conditioning this policy constitutes an important sub- 
thieme in this thesis. The sources for this were found primarily 
im the Home Political files of the Government of India and in 
thie Public and Judicial records and Private Office Papers in 
thie India Office Records and Library.
Because it was necessary to cast my net in several 
different directions in order to cover the central theme adequately,
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53!. Newman's study, 'Labour Organisation in the Bombay Cotton 
Mills, 1918-1929', (Ph.D., University of Sussex, 1970),
is particularly valuable for my study, and I have drawn 
upon it extensively. This is largely because of the 
immediate relevance of his work to my study of the 
communists in Bombay. But Newman also provides a set 
of necessary conditions for the building of effective 
trade unionism which can be used for comparative purposes. 
In the present absence of satisfactory work on Calcutta's 
industrial labour in the 1920s and 1930s, Newman's model 
provides a valuable set of criteria with which to begin 
to identify the reasons for the failure of trade unionism 
in Bengal. However I am also interested in several aspects 
of the Bombay situation to which Newman does not give very 
much attention: the Maharashtrian historical background
of both the workforce and the communists; the wider 
political context, and particularly the atypical political 
factors allowing the development of trade unionism in
Bombay in the 1920s; and the ideological dimension of 
communist-millhand relations. Moreover, my comparison with
and because the time available for my field trip was
limited, I had to be more selective in my choice of source
material than I would have preferred. In particular, it
was impossible to read the provincial newspapers for both
Bombay and Calcutta for the whole period covered by the
thesis. I have therefore used them only where there was
significant communist activity, likely to be reported in the
54press, which was not covered adequately by my main sources. 
Time factors also restricted my interviewing schedule. I 
was unable during my too hurried visits to Bombay and Calcutta 
to locate some of the communists who played important roles 
in the formation of the Party. In a few cases this was 
because we were not in the same place at the same time. Nor, 
for the most part, was I able to interview the communists' 
non-communist colleagues and antagonists.
Finally I have to acknowledge the serious limitation 
of not speaking or reading either Marathi or Bengali. This 
limitation has restricted my access to information. However 
this is substantially compensated for by the facts that much
53. Cont'd
Calcutta highlights the distinctiveness of the Bombay 
situation in a way that Newman's non-comparative approach 
does not.
54. In particular, the 1929-30 period, between the Meerut
Case arrests and the total collapse of significant communist 
activity. However the intelligence files and the Meerut 
Case evidence include large numbers of press clippings 
from other periods.
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55of the communists' business was conducted in English and 
that the various intelligence branches, and the prosecution in 
the Meerut Conspiracy Case, assiduously translated large 
quantities of printed and oral communist vernacular material.
I am particularly fortunate that these translations include 
mass-oriented literature, and even a few documents and speeches 
by working class figures. The more serious aspect of the 
language limitation is perhaps that, because of it, I have 
inevitably remained too much of an 'outsider', unable to 
enter far into the cultural world of my subjects or to 
grasp the nuances which are communicated only in the speakers' 
native language. I hope that, despite this limitation, this 
thesis makes a useful contribution to the subject.
55. Ironically, this is related to a language-imposed
problem for the Party. Because English was, essentially, 
and necessarily, the language of inter-provincial 
communication, the inherent difficulties of developing 
national-level leaders from among the working class 
Party members were greatly increased.
CHAPTER 2
INDIA'S FIRST COMMUNISTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT
In 1922-23, in the wake of the Non-Cooperation movement, 
small groups of young radical nationalist intellectuals in the 
two cities of Bombay and Calcutta began to formulate vaguely 
socialist ideologies and programs as alternatives to the 
prevailing and preceding nationalist modes.^ In both cities 
these young men were very largely from high caste and middle 
or lower middle class backgrounds and had been involved, in 
or sympathetic to, the extremist or revolutionary wings of 
the nationalist movement. They had been profoundly influenced 
ideologically by the international events of the War and post-War 
years. The 1916 Irish rebellion, and then the Russian 
Revolution, had captured their imaginations; but because the 
Russian.Revolution was poorly reported in the Indian press, and 
because there was no existing Marxist tradition in India, they 
had only barely perceived its social-revolutionary dimension.
Then, impressed with Gandhi's skills in mass anti-imperialist
1. The following three paragraphs are based primarily on govern­
ment Intelligence reports and interviews with, and published 
memoirs by, participants in the events. For fairly detailed 
chronicles of the events discussed, see: Overstreet and
Windmiller, op. cit., pp.37-79; & Haithcox, op. cit., pp.20-46
We will return below to an investigation of tKese developments.
2. I am including Muslims in this caste categorisation.
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mobilisation,if not with his insistence on non-violence or his 
'obscurantist' program, most of these radical nationalists had 
become activists in the Non-Cooperation-Khilafat movement in 
the early 1920s. The withdrawal of the movement had ended their 
experiment with Gandhism and catalysed a renewed search for an 
effective mass anti-imperialist model for India.
Their socialist tendencies were, from this point, 
encouraged and guided by the Comintern's new expert on Asian 
affairs, and its agent for India, the Bengali ex-terrorist,
M.N. Roy. Through the post,and through emissaries sent to 
India, Roy provided them with their first acquaintance with a 
Marxist analysis of, and program for, Indian politics. As they 
became more familiar with Marxism they became more impressed 
with its intellectual synthesis of a powerful political attack 
on imperialism, capitalism and feudalism, with a coherent 
rational analysis of society. 'Scientific socialism' provided 
them with a theoretical means to separate political militance 
from the obscurantist religious revivalism with which it had 
previously been associated, and to free rationalism from its 
previous liberal-moderate political associations. This was an 
exciting and satisfying intellectual discovery. It led to the 
convening of India's 'First Communist Conference' in Kanpur in 
December 1925, concurrently with the annual session of the 
Indian National Congress in that city.
These proto-communists of both provinces turned 
naturally to the industrial working class - at first in theory 
and later in practice - for the initial mass base for their new 
conception of revolutionary nationalism. On this basis they 
hoped eventually to develop a movement which could 'capture'
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the Congress and other nationalist organisations and convert 
them into vehicles for a socialist anti-imperialist movement 
based on the proletariat, the peasantry and the intelligentsia. 
However they soon came up against the determined opposition of 
the existing, conservative nationalist leaderships, and they 
were later to encounter great problems in making meaningful 
contact with their respective working classes. A third obstacle 
which soon confronted them was the vigorous opposition of the 
colonial state. The Raj was very anxious to prevent the 
development of a Marxist mass politics in India, and particularly 
one with connections with Soviet Russia. The Raj's opposition 
was underlined by its launching of the Peshawar and Cawnpore 
Conspiracy Cases in 1923 and 1924 against the first Indians to 
establish Soviet contacts - extremely limited though these 
contacts were.
From this outline of the background and environment 
of what were to become India's first communists, and of the 
timing and the process of their conversion, it is apparent that 
the two provincial groupings had much in common. The general 
similarities between the two urban environments of Bombay and 
Calcutta, to which early Indian communism was essentially to 
remain confined, appeared the greater when contrasted to the vast 
agrarian sea in which they were situated. They were the two great 
urban centres of the world's longest standing, largest and most 
important colony, and both were creations of the colonial period. 
Both cities had populations exceeding a million, largely made up 
of recent migrants settled in complex community patterns. Bombay 
and Calcutta were the two most important centres of trade - both 
internal and foreign - and industry in British India, and both
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served their very large hinterlands in both capacities. The 
industries of both cities were primarily in the manufacturing 
sector and, moreover, were dominated overwhelmingly by one 
industry in each case - the jute mills in Calcutta and the 
cotton mills in Bombay. The two cities were also the most 
important provincial administrative and strategic centres in 
India. Finally, they remained, in the early 1920s, the two 
major centres of nationalist politics.
But these correlations masked a number of quite 
profound structural differences between the two cities and 
regions - differences which presented correspondingly different 
combinations of possibilities for, and limits to, a communist 
politics. Of these, the most important for the communists were 
the following: the much weaker and narrower socio-economic base
for nationalist politics in Bengal than in Maharashtra; the far 
greater social and cultural distance between the intelligentsia 
and the masses in Bengal; the higher level of extra-provincial 
labour within, and social and cultural heterogeneity of, the 
industrial working class in Bengal; and the fact that Europeans 
dominated industrial capital in Calcutta, while Indian capital 
was predominant in Bombay. All of these differences were 
intimately related to the very substantial differences in the 
timing and intensity of the impact of colonialism on the two 
regions. We therefore begin with a brief investigation of the 
colonialisation process and the extent of its penetration into 
eastern and western India. We then go on to outline the dynamics 
of the process in the two regions and to establish the relevant 
features of the societies it sculpted from their pre-colonial
orders.
1. COLONIALISATION, AND THE UNEVENNESS OF ITS PENETRATION 
INTO EASTERN AND WESTERN INDIA
The dynamics of British imperialism in India were
complex, and moved through several distinct phases. But the
central function of Britain's Indian empire throughout the
period of the colonial presence was its export of surpluses
to serve Britain's global interests: as Anil Seal has put
it, Britain's colonial government in India 'was organised for
the power and profit of their imperial system throughout the 
3world'. And because the British 'wanted to pull resources
out of India, not to put their own into India... the administrative
and military system had to pay for itself with Indian revenue'.4
These were the London-imposed, 'twin imperatives' of the British
5presence in India; and, in Bagchi's words, 'in a colonial 
context, the mechanism for expansion of exports is that of g
export-led exploitation rather than that of export-led growth'.
Indian resources were made available for Britain's 
wider interests in a number of ways. In the days of the East 
India Company the means were simple: through trade in Indian
manufactures and raw products obtained at deflated prices, under 
increasingly direct British control, and largely through methods
V
51
3. A. Seal, 'Imperialism and Nationalism in India', in MAS,
Vol. 7(3), 1973, p.326.
4. ibid., p.327.
5. B.R. Tomlinson, 'India and the British Empire, 1880-1935',
in Indian Economic and Social History Review (hereafter IESHR), 
Vol. XII(4), 1975, p.338.
6. A.K. Bagchi, 'Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth in 
India During the Period of British Rule', in Bengal Past and 
Present (hereafter BPP) , Vol. XCV (Pt. 1 No. 180) , 1976 , p. 250.
52
of extra-economic coercion; and through heavy land revenue
demands. Subsequently, as British capitalism developed and
its global interests expanded, India's role, and the way it was
fulfilled, also changed. Bagchi has summarised its essential
7features from the late 19th century:
India occupied a special position in the British 
imperial order ... Up to 1914, India formed the 
biggest single foreign market for traditional British 
exports - particularly for cotton textiles, but to a 
lesser extent for engineering goods; India's exports 
to hard currency areas provided the critical balancing 
item in the current balance of payments of the British 
Empire and more particularly, of Britain, with the rest 
of the world; the payments for 'home charges', the 
profits on capital accumulated in India by British 
nationals and the payments for the financing and 
transport of Indian exports and imports served as the 
mechanism for the transfer of the surplus from India 
to Britain.
'India was useful', Bagchi concludes,
less as a field for the reinvestment of profits made by British nationals elsewhere than as a dependable 
source from which part of the needed surplus for 
maintaining the British-controlled gold standard 
and the political apparatus of Pax Britannica was 
derived.
As in the days of the East India Company, the needed surplus 
continued to be secured by political as well as directly 
economic means. Moreover, land continued to be the primary 
source of the revenue from which the empire for itself -
as well as for a significant portion of the exported surplus.
This regressive and inelastic source of revenue was retained 
because it was believed that direct forms of taxation would be
7. A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939, (London, 
1972), p.420. See also: ibid., Chapter 2; S.B. Saul,
Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870-1914,(Liverpool, 
I960), Chapters III & VIII; and Tomlinson, 'India and the 
British Empire', pp.339-342.
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politically too dangerous - and, thus, expensive. Land 
revenue demands on the peasantry were, therefore, particularly 
heavy.
During the 19th century the mechanism of 'export-led
exploitation' produced effects that were everywhere similar:
'under the impact of capitalist colonialism... all regions of
9India were underdeveloped'. Among the effects which colonial 
underdevelopment tended to produce, we posit the following:^
(1) The export of the available agricultural surplus from the 
countryside to the cities and abroad, and the intensification 
of pre-capitalist, 'feudal' modes of production and 
exploitation rather than their transformation into new,
more productive modes.
(2) The erosion of traditional industry (particularly spinning 
and weaving) and its displacement by modern capitalist 
industry in general, and the industry of the colonising 
country in particular.
(3) The pauperisation, heavy debt-bonding and, often, the 
dispossession, of much of the cultivating and artisan 
population through the processes outlined in (1) and (2).
(4) The exclusion of indigenous capital and personnel from 
major business activity, and particularly from export- 
oriented activity.
8. See ibid., p.343-4, & Seal, op. cit., pp.328-9. Taxation
of business enterprise would also reduce the remittable 
surplus: see Rajat Ray, 'The Crisis of Bengal Agriculture,
1870-1927 - the Dynamics of Immobility', in IESHR, Vol. X(3) 
1973, pp.256-7.
9. Bagchi, 'Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth', p.267.
10. For supporting evidence for this hypothesis see sections 2 
and 3 below.
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(5) A weak level of modern industrialisation, and the 
consequent failure of this sector to compensate adequately 
for the effects indicated in (3). Weak industrialisation 
would also heighten the problems of Indian capital outlined 
in (4) .
(6) A position of great weakness for labour vis a vis 
industrial capital - particularly the dominant colonial 
fraction of industrial capital - one of the results of 
which would be low wage levels.
(7) The creation of 'colonialised' elites, benefiting from, 
and dependent upon, the colonising power and colonially- 
induced changes in the society.
But the distortions introduced by colonialism were 
not everywhere of the same order: 'all regions of India were
underdeveloped, but some more than others1.^  In particular, 
eastern India was colonised earlier, and far more intensively, 
than western India. In fact these two regions stood at 
opposite ends of the underdevelopment spectrum in India. This 
fact makes a comparison of political activity in the two 
regions particularly interesting: communism was to fail in
both regions, but for different reasons and in different degrees.
There were two particularly important reasons for the
unevenness of the penetration of colonialism into eastern and 
12western India. The first was east India's greater export base. 
The East India Company was initially attracted to Bengal by the 
wealth of its luxury products; subsequently, rich export products
11. Bagchi, 'Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth', p.267.
12. See ibid., ps. 248 and 257.
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such as indigo, tea, coal and, most lucrative of all, jute, 
continued to make the region an extremely valuable colonial 
possession. Even after a thriving export trade in raw cotton, 
and then in cotton yarn, had been established in western India
1 ofrom the mid-19th century, its export base could not match this.
The second reason was the Maratha empire's successful military
resistance to the British until 1818, more than 50 years after
the Battle of Plassey. Even then, several principalities in the
region - such as Baroda and Kholapur - escaped formal annexation.
Unfortunately, because of the discrepancies in the
statistical criteria used in the two regions and the very limited
nature of existing comparative scholarship, we do not yet have
the statistics necessary for a comprehensive and systematic
comparative quantification of the colonialisation process and 
14its effects. However Bagchi has recently computed tables 
which provide an approximate comparative index (if not an 
absolute quantification) of the extent of colonial penetration 
into the two regions. Bagchi has used the regional figures for 
the surplus.of exports over imports of merchandise as 'first 
approximations to the burdens imposed by colonialism'.^^ This 
approach is based on the fact that the drive to remit export-
13. Eg. see Table 1 below.
14. The discrepancies in data-collection criteria are particularly 
marked in the case of agricultural statistics. For 
comparative quantifications we rely heavily on Bagchi's 
trail-blazing work.
15. Bagchi, 'Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth', p.254.How­
ever, as Bagchi points out (ibid., p.250), this index is 
likely seriously to underestimate the effects of 
colonialisation; see his discussion on the use of export- 
surplus figures as an index, in ibid., pp.248-55.
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earned profits - either directly to the metropolitan country 
or to those countries with which the colonial power had a trade 
deficit - was the central dynamic of colonialism. Profits 
earned by indigenous capital, in contrast, would tend to be 
reinvested in the colonised country, thus tending to lead to 
an increase in imports - for example, of industrial machinery.
Thus export surplus figures provide a reasonable comparative 
index of the extent of colonial political-economic control,and 
of its effects.
Bagchi estimates that in the early 19th century
Bengal's exports were approximately equal to the.combined exports
16of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies. For the period from the 
last quarter of the 19th century he has computed the following 
tables:
TABLE 1
FIVE-YEARLY REGIONAL AVERAGES OF TOTAL EXPORTS OF 
MERCHANDISE (Rs. '000)
Period Bengal Bombay
(excluding
Sind)
Madras
1876/77 to 1880/81 301,708 225,443 76,240
1881/82 to 1885/86 340,591 319,711 82,486
1886/87 to 1890/91 375,250 369,856 102,853
1891/92 to 1895/96 432,511 384,710 116,311
1896/97 to 1900/01 484,468 326,220 116,467
1901/02 to 1905/06 589,400 437,654 141,017
1906/07 to 1910/11 770,956 510,123 190,032
1911/12 to 1915/16 924,299 580,092 240,502
1916/17 to 1920/21 1,291,319 879,693 262,711
1921/22 to 1925/26 1,301,795 1,026,661 347,084
1926/27 to 1930/31 1,304,679 705,441 412,343
1931/32 to 1935/36 630,490 313,425 254,045
1936/37 to 1938/39 807,199 402,803 367,689
(3 yearly averages)
Source: Bagchi, 'Reflections on Patterns of Regional
Growth', p.251.
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TABLE 2
FIVE-YEARLY REGIONAL AVERAGES OF EXPORT SURPLUS 
(EXPORTS OF MERCHANDISE MINUS IMPORTS OF 
MERCHANDISE) (Rs. 'OOP)
Period Bengal Bombay
(excluding
Sing)
Madras
1876/77 to 1880/81 109,819 71,302 39,496
1881/82 to 1885/86 119,006 109,532 36,528
1886/87 to 1890/91 118,716 95,302 43,308
1891/92 to 1895/96 155,955 102,802 52,775
1896/97 to 1900/01 166,726 -21,470 53,701
1901/02 to 1905/06 214,400 105,626 60,300
1906/07 to 1910/11 272,776 82,204 85,520
1911/12 to 1915/16 303,256 58,120 83,924
1916/17 to 1920/21 275,331 40,744 103,945
1921/22 to 1925/26 399,914 118,437 143,845
1926/27 to 1930/31 502,749 -99,691 167,267
1931/32 to 1935/36 269,338 -208,923 95,566
1936/37 to 1938/39 336,967 -214,488 136,634
(3 yearly averages)
Source: ibid., p.252.
Table 1 shows that by the last quarter of the 19th century 
Bombay had developed an export trade (primarily in cotton twist 
and yarn and coarse cotton cloth) rivalling that of Bengal. 
Although by this time European capital dominated the Bombay 
export agencies, the cotton manufactures were produced primarily 
in Indian-owned mills. During the last quarter of the 19th 
century and the first two decades of the 20th century the export
16. ibid., p.280 fn.7. The figures are for the period 1813/14 - 
1822/23. The ratio was even higher in the 18th century: 
ibid. , p.249.
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trades of both regions increased, though Bengal's increase was 
at a faster rate. During the War and post-War boom from 
1916/17 the exports of both regions leapt ahead. However, 
after the boom, and during the Great Depression, Bombay's 
exports fell to a much greater degree, as the western Indian 
cotton export trade lost its markets to China and Japan while 
eastern India retained most of its markets and continued to be 
a strong export economy.
Table 2, however, shows that throughout there was a 
marked disparity between the two regions in the relationship 
between exports and export surpluses. While Bengal's surplus 
continued to rise at a roughly proportional rate until 1920/21, 
Bombay's surplus stayed more or less stationary until the 
1901/02 - 1905/06 quinquennium, then began to fall at an 
increasingly rapid rate. (The 1896/97 - 1900/01 import surplus 
for Bombay was associated with the serious famines and plague 
of that period.) From 1901/02, Bengal's export surpluses again 
equalled Bombay's and Madras's combined. Although Bombay's 
surplus.increase in the immediate post-War boom was significantly 
greater than Bengal's, this was a very temporary and contingent 
phenomenon. From 1926/27, the relationship between Bombay's 
exports and what was now, in fact, a consistent import surplus, 
became even more disproportionate than before when compared to 
Bengal. Bombay's import surpluses in the 1926/27 - 1938/39 
periods were closely related to increasing industrial investment 
in western India by Indian capitalists. The contrast between 
Bombay and Madras, whose economy was dominated by colonial 
interests, is also interesting in this regard. Although Madras's 
exports averaged between a half and a third of Bombay's up to
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1920/21, its export surpluses rose steadily until, in the 
1906/07 - 1910/11 quinquennium its surplus overtook Bombay's.
This tendency accelerated henceforth.
Bagchi's index of the uneven character of colonial 
penetration into eastern and western India is supported by the 
available, limited, comparative figures on some of those 
effects of colonialisation that we outlined above. For example, 
that the de-urbanisation associated with de-industrialisation 
proceeded much further in eastern India than elsewhere is 
apparent from the following figures: in 1891 the percentage
of urban population in the once relatively highly urbanised 
Bengal Presidency (then including Bihar and Orissa) was a mere 
4.8 percent; this contrasted with the Bombay Presidency's 19.5 
percent, the Madras Presidency's 9.9 percent and the North West 
Frontier Province's 11.3 percent.^ N.K. Sinha has calculated 
that by 1828 some 1,000,000 involved in the traditional cotton 
industry in Bengal-Bihar had been thrown out of employment by 
the changes attendant upon colonialisation.18 Bagchi, in a 
careful statistical analysis of Gangetic Bihar, calculates 
conservatively that during the 19th century the percentage of 
the population dependent for its livelihood upon industrial 
production was reduced from some 18.5 percent to approximately 
8.5 percent, most of the effect being felt by the textile industry19
17. Ray, op. cit., p.278 fn.65.
18. N.K. Sinha, The Economic History of Bengal 1793-1848,
Vol. Ill (Calcutta, 1970), p.7. “
19. A.K. Bagchi, 'Deindustrialisation in Gangetic Bihar, 1809- 
1901', in B. De et. al. (Eds.), Essays in Honour of 
Professor S.C. Sarkar, (New Delhi, 1976), pp.499-522, and m  particular ps. 509 and 512, Tables 3 and 4.
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20He estimates that the effect in Bengal proper was far greater.
We have no comparative figures on rural indebtedness 
or its increase during the colonial period. Nevertheless it 
seems safe to say that indebtedness was of far greater 
dimensions in Bengal than in Maharashtra. For example, a govern­
ment report on the Dacca district for the 1910-17 period found 
that the recorded indebtedness in the district - Rs. 4,76,00,553 
- was more than seven times the actual rental of Rs.64,50,000.
21The annual interest payable on loans exceeded Rs. 2,00,00,000.
Thus rural credit operations were of a much greater dimension
than rent collection. We do not have equivalent statistics
for western India, but it is apparent that rural credit there
2 2did not reach such levels.
The much weaker position of Indian capital and 
businessmen in eastern India compared to western India is 
indicated by the following tables:
TABLE 3
ADVANCES BY THE IMPERIAL BANK TO PURELY INDUSTRIAL CONCERNS
(Rs. ’000)
Indian European Total
Bengal 374 574 948
Bombay 850 65 915
Source: A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939,
(London, 19727"^  p. 17 3 (from evidence taken before 
The Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance 
(1926)) .
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Finally, we have some quantitative data on the real 
and money wages of industrial workers in eastern and western 
India which, though resting on very narrow bases, nevertheless
2 3establish a clear discrepancy in wage trends in the two regions.
In 1900 the average monthly money wages of jute mill workers
in Calcutta were marginally higher than cotton mill workers
in Bombay city and Ahmedabad (Rs. 12.0, 12.3 and 11.4 
24respectively). By 1939 these figures had risen to
Rs. 19.6, 35.4 and 35.0 respectively; ie., while the money
wages in the Bombay mills rose by 188 percent and in the
Ahmedabad mills by 208 percent between 1900 and 1939, those
of the jute mill workers rose by only 63 percent. A similar
trend occurred in real wages. The real wages of the Calcutta
jute mill workers were significantly higher than those of the
Bombay and Ahmedabad workers in 1900, but by 1939 they had
increased by only 40 percent in Calcutta compared with 186
2 5percent in Bombay and 188 percent in Ahmedabad.
20. ibid., pp.518-19. See also A. Sen, 'Iswarchandra Vidyasagar 
and His Elusive Milestones', Occasional Paper No. 1, Centre 
For Studies In Social Sciences, (hereafter CSSS), Calcutta 
(Aug. 1975), pp.72-76.
21. Ray, op. cit., pp.268-9. Moreover, only a small percentage 
of the credit was borrowed for use in production.
22. Eg., I.J. Catanach, Rural Credit in Western India, 1875-1930, 
(Berkeley, 1970), passim, and particularly Chapter T~. Catanach 
questions, for example, the conventional view that widespread 
indebtedness was the fundamental cause of the 1875 Deccan 
Riots (pp.11-24), and cites the Riots Commission's conclusion 
that only about a third of the occupants in the affected areas 
were seriously indebted (p.24). See also Bagchi, 'Reflections 
on Patterns of Regional Growth', pp.259-62.
23. See Bagchi, Private Investment, pp.121-4.
24. ibid., p.125, calculated from Table 5.3, p.126.
25. ibid., p.125, calculated from Table 5.1, p.122.
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Thus the above figures on de-industrialisation, rural 
indebtedness, the position of Indian capital in industry and 
the wages of industrial workers, though perhaps fallible as 
absolute quantifications, nevertheless establish clear regional 
differentials which accord with Bagchi's indices of the extent 
of the overall process of colonialisation. We will now look at 
those features of the structural differences between colonial 
Bengal and Maharashtra which would directly affect the potential 
for communist politics in the cities of Calcutta and Bombay.
2. EAST INDIA, BENGAL AND CALCUTTA
The events in Bengal during the second half of the 
18th century were critical for the way in which the region 
would be able to respond to the major social changes of the 
19th century. Its 19th century experience would, in turn, 
largely determine the character of its nationalist politics in 
the critical inter-War period in the 20th century.
The Early Colonialisation of East India
By the time the Marathas had been defeated, eastern
India had already been profoundly affected by the colonialisation 
2 6process. For example, because of the trading activity of the
26. The following two paragraphs are based on: N.K. Sinha,
The Economic History of Bengal, from Plassey to the Permanent 
Settlement, Vol.I, (Calcutta, 1956) , & Vol.II (Calcutta, 196 2), 
passim; B.K. Chowdhury, 'Political History, 1757-1772', in 
N.K. Sinha (Ed.), The History of Bengal (1757-1905),
(Calcutta, 1967) , pp. 2 2-5 6; N.K. Sinha, 'Administrative, 
Economic and Social History: 1757-1793', in ibid., pp.76-129; 
Ratna Ray, 'The Bengal Zamindars: Local Magnates and the 
State Before the Permanent Settlement', in IESHR, Vol.XII(3), 
1975, pp.263-92; Rajat & Ratna Ray, 'Zamindars and Jotedars: 
a Study of Rural Politics in Bengal', in MAS f Vol.9(l), 1975 , pp.81-90; A. De, Roots of Separatism in Nineteenth Century 
Bengal, (Calcutta, 1974), pp.3-4 and 15-17.
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East India Company and the free-traders and the associated
decline of the old Mughal urban centres, the artisan class
was greatly weakened. The weavers, in particular, suffered from
the disintegration of the Mughal courts, the low prices at which
they were forced to sell their products, and the wholesale
27restructuring of their market to serve the export trade.
The heavy revenue demands exacted from the Bengali population
were the more burdensome for their having to finance the
2 8extension of empire elsewhere in India. The extent of the 
exploitation of the labouring population in the years immediately 
following the Battle of Plassey was revealed by the 1770 famine, 
which took some 10 million lives.
The former Muslim ruling order, too, was seriously 
eroded during the second half of the 18th century. This process 
was facilitated by the availability of skilled groups of 
collaborators from among the Hindu traditional service, trading 
and banking castes - both Bengali and north Indian. They were 
economically, administratively and politically indispensable 
to the British during the entrenchment of their colonial 
position. For the collaborators, the colonial connection 
initially provided them with a new level of relative independence, 
and unprecedented opportunities for social mobility. Their 
opportunities were increased, at the expense of the Muslim
27. For the dynamics of de-industrialisation throughout
the colonial period, see also D.R. Gadgil, The Industrial 
Evolution of India, (Fourth Edition) (London, 1942), 
Chapters III & XII.
28. See: H. Furber, John Company At Work, (Cambridge, Mass., 
1951), Chapters VI & VII; Bagchi, 'Reflections on 
Patterns of Regional Growth', pp.260-61.
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aristocracy and the peasantry, by the radically new land 
legislation introduced by the British towards the close of 
the 18th century. Because of their greater economic strength 
and familiarity with the operations of British law, they were 
able in the following decades to purchase most of the new 
zamindari rights that now became available. They were able 
largely to exclude the landed Muslim families in the process - 
thus laying the foundations for a long-term conflict between 
the Hindu and Muslim elites. The cost to the peasantry,also, 
was high. The British land legislation, by vesting the landlord 
with alienable proprietary rights in revenue collection and the 
right to enhance rents and to subinfeudate his tenure rights 
as he wished, greatly enhanced his power over the peasantry.
Thus by the early decades of the 19th century British 
colonialism had created a new type of Bengali elite. It came 
to be known as the bhadralok (literally, 'the respectable people') 
because of the high premium it placed on its ritual status and 
cultural attainments. It would be the dominant indigenous social 
group in Bengali society for the next century.
By the early 19th century the bases of its recently
acquired power were in capitalist business activity, land-
holding, government service and the professions. All areas of
activity were associated with the colonial connection. The
bhadralok was, as a British official wrote in 1828, created and
sustained 'under our sovereignty, chiefly in our service, and
29entirely through our protection'.
29. Quoted in Sen, 'Iswarchandra Vidyasagar', p.4. Sen's study 
is a useful analysis of bhadralok characteristics and 
socio-economic bases as they developed during the 19th 
century.
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The Bhadralok and Colonialism
Elements of continuity can be established between the 
bhadralok1s characteristics and functions and those of the pre­
colonial social groups from which it was drawn. Under the 
Mughals the Hindu gentry had held most of the zamindari revenue 
collection rights, had occupied most of the administrative 
positions below the top levels and had exhibited considerable 
entrepreneurial, linguistic and literary skills. Moreover, 
the pre-colonial upper caste gentry had placed a high premium 
on its ritual status, with abstention from manual labour in 
general, and cultivating activity in particular, being central 
features of this concern. There was a wide social and cultural 
gap between the elite and the masses in pre-colonial Bengal. 
Broomfield and others have stressed these elements of continuity, 
and Broomfield incorporates them into his Weberian definition 
of the bhadralok as an open status group. He argues that the
bhadralok's preoccupation with its social honour constituted
30the 'cardinal fact' about this social group.
However this approach fails to recognise that the most 
significant facts about the bhadralok were that it was essentially 
a colonial creation, both socio-economically and culturally, and 
that the elements of discontinuity with the pre-colonial past 
were more significant than the limited continuities. Moreover, 
Broomfield's approach does not pose the question: what was it
30. J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society:
Twentieth-Century~Bengal~ (Berkeley, 1968) , p .13. For 
his discussion of the bhadralok as a status group see 
ibid., pp.12-18.
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about the dynamics of colonial Bengali society that made it 
possible for an elite with the 'feudal' status pretensions 
of the bhadralok to retain for so long its preeminent role, 
despite the profound changes introduced by colonialism?.
We can begin to answer these questions by examining 
the bhadralok culture and ideology developed during that 
profoundly important phase in its development known as the 
'Bengal Renaissance', and by matching these against the 
bhadralok's contemporary socio-economic and political position. 
The vigorous, and often brilliant 'Renaissance' was to provide 
the foundations of subsequent bhadralok culture and much of its 
mythology; and the main outlines of the bhadralok's socio­
economic bases and relations with the wider society were 
established in the first half of the 19th century.
The Renaissance has often been likened to the European
Protestant Reformation, and its 'founding-father' - Rammohan Roy
to Luther. Rammohan himself hoped that he was initiating a
31Bengali 'Reformation'. However there were a number of crucial 
features of this cultural movement which distinguished it in 
quite fundamental ways from the European phenomenon.
Culturally, the Renaissance has been seen as a 
decisive move forward , via European liberalism, from 'feudal' 
irrationalism to modern rationalism. However, Sumit Sarkar has 
argued, Rammohan's transition was of 'a limited and deeply
31. Sumit Sarkar, 'Rammohan Roy and the Break With the Past', 
Paper presented at a symposium on 'Rammohan Roy and the 
Modernisation of India', Nehru Memorial Library, New 
Delhi, 1972, p.ll.
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contradictory kind', to a 'colonial (one might almost add
compradore) framework' - a transition achieved, moreover,
'mainly on the intellectual plane and not at the level of
32basic social transformation'. It is significant that 
Rammohan's most militant rationalism appeared in his earliest 
work and that his later work was a retreat in this regard.
Both Sarkar and Pradyumna Bhattacharya argue that Rammohan's 
early rationalism owed more to rationalist trends in late
33Mughal thought than to the introduction of western liberalism.
In other words, the Renaissance's 'break with the past' appears
not to have been the clear progression to 'modernism' it has
characteristically been seen as. Moreover, the Renaissance
was distinguished from the European Reformation by its 'elitism'.
After a detailed textual analysis of Rammohan's writings,
Bhattacharya concludes that his prose was 'sundered from the
current of common speech' - 'From this point of view, there is
34a marked difference between Rammohan and Luther'. While Luther 
- himself of peasant stock - was intimately acquainted with, 
and drew constantly upon, the language of the peasants and 
artisans, Rammohan adopted 'an altogether different course'. He 
made the highly Sanskritised, elegant literary language of the
32. ibid., p .1.
33. ibid., pp.4-10; P. Bhattacharya, 'Rammohan Roy and Bengali 
Prose', Paper delivered at the symposium cited in fn.3l, p.
12. It is significant that Rammohan's earliest extant work, 
the Tuhfatul Muwahhiddin (ca. 1803-04) was written before he 
had a substantial knowledge of English (Sarkar, 'Rammohan Roy', 
p.4). Sarkar argues (p.ll) that for, bhadralok culture, the 
most significant feature of English education was not its 
contribution to Bengali rationalism, but its creation of
'an impenetrable barrier between the 19th century and the 
immediate pre-British past'.
34. P. Bhattacharya, op. cit. , pp.14-15;. also pp. 18-19.
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elite the foundation of his prose, and was neither closely
acquainted with,nor greatly interested in,the rhythms, idiom
and metaphors of the popular language and Vaishnava lyrics.
Sarkar and Bhattacharya note that the tendencies which they
identify in Rammohan Roy's work subsequently became entrenched
characteristics in bhadralok culture, particularly as English
35language education became more widespread. We can perhaps see 
in these Renaissance tendencies the foundations of the subsequent 
bhadralok ideological rejection - as 'inferior' and 'un-Bengali' - 
of popular Vaishnava and Muslim culture and the immediate pre­
colonial past, in favour of a distant, mythical, Brahmanical 
Golden Age.
These Renaissance cultural characteristics had a
specific historical context. In addition to being a great
intellectual Rammohan was, together with other leading
Renaissance bhadralok figures such as Dwarkanath Tagore, an
active businessman, and had extensive interests in money lending
and zamindari. But, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has stressed, the
range of their business activities was circumscribed by the
colonial framework: they were dependent on colonialism; and
3 6their material dependence had an ideological counterpart.
Both Chakrabarty and Sarkar have placed the Renaissance thinkers 
firmly within a free-trader ideological framework: the free-
35. Eg., Sarkar (p.2) characterises post-Renaissance bhadralok
culture as 'a story of retreat and decline', while 
Bhattacharya writes (p.20): 'Historically, this disjunction
between the living speech and the sadhu bhasa [elegant, 
highly Sanskritised literary Bengali] constitutes the basic 
contradiction, that has determined the development of Bengali 
prose in modern times'. See also Broomfield, op. cit., p.10.
36. D. Chakrabarty, 'The Colonial Context of the Bengal 
Renaissance: a Note on Early Railway Thinking in Bengal', 
in IESHR, Vol.XI(l), 1974, pp.92-111.
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trader critique of Company policy provided the limits of the
37Renaissance critique of colonialism. They accepted un­
critically that the British were performing a progressive role 
in India; or, as Chakrabarty has put it succinctly, the concept
of 'colonialism' as it is being used here was absent from the
3 8Renaissance ideological 'problematic'.
However colonial realities would prevent this ideology ^either
from leading/ immediately or subsequently, to a Reformation- 
style movement of social transformation in Bengal. The same 
realities would also impose very great problems for future, 
more radical ideologies and political leaderships. These 
colonial barriers operated at several levels.
The Bhadralok and Society: Business Activity, Agrarian Relations,
the Artisans, and the Industrial Working Class.
The first was the very fragile and temporary character 
of the bhadralok's expanding business activity. Once the British 
were economically and politically firmly entrenched the Indian 
capitalists were inexorably squeezed out from the major economic 
life of the region. By the end of the 1840s even the most
3Qcollaborative of Indian capitalists had been virtually eliminated.^
37. ibid., pp.100-02; Sarkar, op. cit., pp.17-18. See also 
A. Tripathi, Trade and Finance in the Bengal Presidency, 
1793-1833, (Bombay, 1956), p.191 & pp.233-35.
38. D. Chakrabarty, op. cit., p.103. Chakrabarty is using the 
concept of 'ideological problematic' in the sense of the 
inherent 'problematic themes which induce... [an ideology] 
to raise the kind of questions it raises'.
39. N.K. Sinha, 'Indian Business Enterprise: Its Failure in
Calcutta (1800-1848)', in BPP, Vol.LXXXVI, (Pt.II, No.162), 
(Diamond Jubilee No. ), 1967, pp.112-23.
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Henceforth, Bengal's commerce, finance and industry - and the 
economies of east and north India as a whole - were to come
40firmly under the control of the European managing agency system.
Indians, and Indian capital,were all but excluded from this
system. There was, therefore, no room for a bhadralok-led
social transformation in this direction.
The second reason was the nature of the bhadralok's
emerging relationship to the peasantry and agricultural production,
and the character of the mode of agricultural production in
41colonial Bengal. Under the zamindari system, and because of 
the dynamics of Bengal's colonialised economy, the (primarily 
bhadralok) landlords' relationship to the peasantry became a 
purely extractive-exploitative one. This created a structural 
barrier between the peasantry and their bhadralok masters, 
reinforcing the existing religious barrier between Hindus and a 
predominantly Muslim agrarian population. The problem became 
more accentuated during the century. Following the shrinking of
40. For an account of the workings of the managing agency 
system from the late 19th century, see Bagchi, Private 
Investment, pp.176-81.
41. This paragraph is based on: N.K. Sinha, The Economic
History of Bengal, III, passim; B.K. Chowdhury, 1 Agrarian
Relations in Bengal (1859-1885)', in N.K. Sinha (Ed.),
The History of Bengal, pp.237-336; Rajat & Ratna Ray, 'The 
Dynamics of Continuity in Rural Bengal Under the British 
Imperium: a Study of Quasi-Stable Equilibrium in Under­
developed Societies in a Changing World', in IESHR, Vol.X(2), 
1973, pp.103-28, and 'Zamindars and Jotedars', pp.90-97;
Ray, 'The Crisis of Bengal Agriculture'; B.B. Chaudhuri,
'The Land Market in Eastern India, 1793-1940, Part I: The
Movement of Land Prices', in IESHR, Vol.XII(l), 1975, pp.1-42; 
and Sen, 'Iswarchandra Vidyasagar', pp.62-80.
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entrepreneurial opportunities in commerce and, subsequently,
because of the exclusion of Indian capital from industry, the
agricultural sector was the only remaining profitable, secure
42and status-enhancing area for investment. Consequently 
there was a marked and increasing flow of urban capital into 
the countryside within a few decades of the Permanent Settlement. 
But this capital went almost exclusively into the unproductive 
areas of rental rights, usury and speculative trade, not into 
investment in improved agricultural productivity. This pattern 
also accelerated the flow of resources from the countryside to 
the city - and, from Calcutta, abroad. This situation arose 
because, under the prevailing economic and legal systems,
'feudal' methods of extraction of the agricultural surplus from 
the chronically debt-bonded tenantry were possible, and more 
profitable than capitalist investment in improved productivity. 
This was as true for European concerns, such as the Midnapore 
Zamindari Company, as for Indian investors. The situation was 
compounded, as the century progressed, by the large-scale 
landlord absenteeism associated with the bhadralok's increasingly 
urban orientation, the development of a complex, multi-layered 
system of intermediaries between the tenantry and the zamindars 
and the urban-based speculative merchants and suppliers of rural 
credit, and escalating subinfeudation of land ownership and 
rental shares. By the turn of the century almost all bhadralok 
families had an interest in landed rent, no matter how small 
and unproductive. As agricultural production did not increase 
markedly during the century, and because rent, usury and the
4 2 . On this point see also Bagchi, Private -Investment, pp. 203-05 
& 211-12.
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profits from speculative trade had to support an increasing
number of people, the burden on the majority of the tenantry
was greatly enhanced. The same forces, together with the wider
43colonial extraction of the agricultural surplus, greatly 
inhibited the emergence of a rich peasant-based intermediate 
intelligentsia. These were the massive structural impediments 
to bhadralok-peasant social, cultural and political interaction.
44The third factor was the collapse of the artisan class. 
Already greatly weakened by its 18th century experience, the 
artisan class of eastern India was, as we have seen, particularly 
vulnerable to the influx of British manufactured goods - through 
the, by now, well established importing and marketing networks - 
during the nineteenth century. Further, because of their 
westernised consumption preferences, the new elite did not 
provide a market to compensate for the loss of that provided 
by the old courts. With the erosion of the artisan class 
another of the intermediate levels in the traditional social 
structure had been undermined. This further reduced the 
possibility of the 'renaissance' becoming a Bengali Reformation. 
Further, the dispossessed artisans were thrown primarily into 
agriculture for their livelihood, thus greatly increasing the 
pressure on land and reinforcing the regressive, 'feudal-colonial' 
agrarian system of Bengal.
From the last quarter of the 19th century there was 
another, increasingly numerous mass force potentially available
43. For a summary of these mechanisms - from the purchasing 
policies of the jute industry to the taxation and monetary 
policies of government - see Ray, 'The Crisis of Bengal 
Agriculture', pp.256-74.
44. Bagchi, 'Deindustrialisation'; Sen, ' Iswarchandra Vidyasagar', 
pp.72-7; Gadgil, op. cit., Chapters III & XII.
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45for political mobilisation - the industrial working class.
Because of its immediate relevance to our study we will
investigate the nature of the working class in rather more detail.
In the colonial Asian context, India became a
comparatively highly industrialised country. Of the other
Asian colonies and semi-colonies, only China had a comparable
46level of industrialisation. Moreover, although only a very 
small percentage (approximately 0.5 percent in 1931) of the 
total population, the industrial working class, because of 
its concentration and strategic location, occupied a position 
of potential political weight out of proportion to its numbers. 
This was a fact of which the Raj, for one, was to become 
acutely aware: during the Non-Cooperation movement, for
example, its 'greatest fear' was the possibility of a general 
strike being coordinated with the mass agitation. ^  For the
45. The rate of growth of the industrial working class can be 
illustrated by the case of the jute industry - by far the 
largest employer of labour in the Calcutta region (see 
below). Mills began to be established in the 1850s and 
1860s, but the real expansion did not begin until the 1870s. 
By 1879 the mills employed some 27,500 workers. There were 
some 40,500 by 1881, 60,600 by 1889 and 73,700 by 1894.
There was a period of rapid expansion from 1895, and by 
1901 there were some 113,500 millhands. By 1921 it had 
more than doubled to 2 80,300; Ranajit Das Gupta, 'Factory 
Labour in Eastern India: Sources of Supply, 1855-1946,
Some Preliminary Findings', pp.280-81 and Appendix A.
46. By 1931 the average daily number of employed in organised 
industry (excluding plantations) was estimated to be
I, 630,037 (Bagchi, Private Investment, p.118). Chesneaux 
has estimated that the number of workers similarly employed 
in China in the 1920s was approximately 1,489,000:
J. Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement, 1919-1927, 
(Stanford, 19 6 8)~, p. 41.
47. D.A. Low, 'The Government of India and the First Non-Co- 
Operation Movement 1920-1922', in R. Kumar (Ed.), Essays 
On Gandhian Politics: The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919,
(London, 1971), p.322.
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bhadralok there was an additional advantage. Because Bengal's 
industry was overwhelmingly British-owned, there was no direct 
conflict of economic interest - as there was in the case of the 
peasantry - between the bhadralok and the working class. By the 
1920s there were some 450,000 factory workers in the Calcutta
48region, some 300,000 of them concentrated in the jute industry.
However a number of factors militated against the 
realisation of the Calcutta working class's industrial and 
political potential. Firstly, the Bengali intelligentsia's 
social and cultural divorce from the peasantry was replicated 
in the industrial sphere. This was because of its exclusion from 
any involvement in the world of industrial production and the 
fact that the working class was drawn primarily from peasant 
and artisan backgrounds. But, secondly, there were a number 
of inter-related features, specific to the nature of industrial­
isation in a colonial context, which posed formidable additional 
barriers against working class organisation and the development 
of intelligentsia-proletariat linkages.
As we noted earlier, India's colonial status permitted
only weak industrialisation within the country. This was
primarily because of colonial capital's predominant orientation
towards the export of raw or simply-processed materials, the
economic competition and political weight of metropolitan
manufacturing interests, the weakness of the Indian market
because of the permanent agrarian crisis, and the failure of
the colonial state to provide the necessary state protection
4 9and patronage for Indian industry. Simultaneously, colonial-
48. Royal Commission on Labour in India, (London, 1931) here- 
after RCLI) , Report, pp.8-9. See also Das Gupta, op. cit. , 
Appendix A, for the yearly figures on jute labour during 
the 1920s.
49. Bagchi, Private Investment, passim; Partha Chatterjee, 
'Stability and Change in the Indian Political System'
(unpublished paper, CSSS, Calcutta, 1977). The role of state patronage was, of course, crucial in the so- 
called 'second way' method of industrialisation adopted 
by the backward German and Japanese nations.
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isation created a very large population of pauperised or
dispossessed peasants and artisans, from which industry could
draw its labour. A major consequence of the combination of weak
industrialisation and large-scale pauperisation and dispossession
was a marked excess of supply over demand in the industrial 
50labour market. Another was a working class divided by the
complex social differentiation of the village. Secondly,
because of the technologically simple character of most of the
industry which did exist in India, there was little demand
51for skilled labour. This illiterate, untrained and depressed
majority of the labour force was, therefore, easily and
inexpensively replaceable; industry required a reliable supply
52of labour, but not, necessarily, a stable workforce. Thirdly,
labour was not recruited formally by managements in the cities,
but informally through intermediaries, with similar backgrounds
to the workers, who recruited primarily in the village or through
village connections. These intermediaries were known as 'jobbers'
in the Bombay mills and 'sardars' in Calcutta - in the interests
5 3of simplicity I will refer to them as jobbers in both cases.
The jobbers were also responsible for the immediate supervision 
and control of the labourers, and represented their workers' 
interests with the factory managements. Additionally, they acted
50. See, eg., Bagchi, Private Investment, pp.118-21 & 131-33, & 
p.150. Contingent factors, such as epidemics and famines, 
could, however, create short-term shortages in labour 
supply.
51. ibid., pp.150-56.
52. This point is made by Dipesh Chakrabarty in his 'Communal
Riots And Labour: Bengal's Jute Mill Hands in the 1890s',
Occasional Paper No. 11, CSSS, Calcutta, October 1976, 
(forthcoming, Past And Present), p.26.
53. For analyses of the role and operational methods of the
jobbers see: RCLI, Report, pp.22-4, Vol.I(l), pp.9-10 &
Vol.V(l), pp.3-4. For a detailed account of the jobber in 
the Bombay mills see Newman, op. cit., pp.30-8.
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customarily as suppliers of credit - both as moneylenders and
shopkeepers - and in other ways which met (and, often, exploited)
54the workers' day-to-day needs. Thus the jobber acted as a
composite labour contractor, foreman and working class
representative, and as a community leader, 'something analogous
55to'... the Patil or Headman of a village', in the workers'
wider social existence. Because of the multiplicity of crucial
roles which he performed in the workers' lives, both inside and
outside the factory, the members of a jobber's 'gang' were
highly dependent on him. The strength of his position was
reinforced by his importance to the management as a recruiter and
as an agent of social control. The toleration of jobber
corruption - which was widespread - by both managements and
workers, was symptomatic of his pivotal position: jobberism was
56almost universal. Consequently, the imported village community 
divisions of caste, religion and region were complemented and 
reinforced by those between jobbers' gangs: the workforce
54. Eg. Burnett-Hurst commented that the jobber 'endeavours to 
acquire an influence over his friends and acquaintances who 
live in the same or in neighbouring chawls [tenements].
He lends them money, advises them in family affairs and 
arbitrates in disputes. When labour is required, he uses 
the influence so gained ... [and] when he visits his village 
he paints the life of a mill worker in the brightest colours 
and endeavours to induce his relations and friends to leave 
their homes and fields for the more remunerative calling':
A.R. Burnett-Hurst, Labour and Housing in Bombay: A Study in
the Economic Conditions of the Wage-Earning Classes in 
Bombay-^ (London, 1925) , pp. 46-7 .
55. RCLI, Vol.I(l), p.10.
56. This was so in the wider colonial world, too. Eg., for
China, see Chesneaux, op. cit., pp.54-62; for Malaya (where 
the labour was primarily imported from India and China), see 
M. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the
Communist Revolt of 1948, (London, 1970), pp.1-6.
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was composed of a multiplicity of vertically organised sub-
57groups; it was not a homogeneous 'mass'. The community 
divisions were further reinforced by the workers' strong tendency 
to form community clusters - both occupational and social. The 
strength of the class organisation of industrial capital 
contrasted strikingly with this fragmentation. The working class 
was, therefore, in an inherently very weak bargaining position 
vis a vis capital.
There were many deep-rooted barriers against the
transformation of this fragmented, vertical, community mode of
organisation into the unified, horizontal, class mode of
organisation of modern trade unionism. The workers, in
conformity with the prevailing mode of their organisation,
exhibited a mode of consciousness which Chakrabarty has termed
'community consciousness': the worker would tend strongly to
identify himself as a member of his religious, caste or
regional community rather than as a member of the wider
5 8industrial working class. The community modes of 
consciousness and organisation were reinforced by the imperatives 
of the worker's everyday existence. For insecure rural 
immigrants in a highly competitive labour market and an
57. Eg. the manager of a Calcutta mill commented: 'The workers
are divided ]py race, religion and district of origin into 
many groups having little intercourse with those of 
different race or religion. The [solidarity of such a group 
from one small foreign district, and possibly connected more 
or less by family ties, is probably greater than that of
a works committee in occidental countries': quoted in
Newman, op. cit., p.10. Newman adds that the Bombay case 
was similar.-
58. Chakrabarty, 'Communal Riots and Labour', p.5. He uses the 
term to refer to 'a state of mind whereby the Muslim worker 
thinks of himself primarily as a Muslim, or the Hindu of 
himself firstly as a Hindu', and reserves the term 'communal' primarily to refer to overt Hindu-Muslim tension. This is a
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59alien and harsh urban environment, the community networks 
satisfied deeply felt material and psychological needs: the
community modes of organisation and consciousness were 
immediately functional, even though they were often exploitative, 
weakened the worker^' bargaining power and helped maintain their 
depressed condition.
Trade union organisations and would-be political mobilisers 
of the working class could develop a stable basis within the 
workforce, and begin to match the class organisation of 
capital, only by meeting the workers' complex needs more 
effectively than could the community networks and leaders - 
and particularly the jobbers. The path to the working class 
was not, therefore, an easy one for 'outsiders' (as they were 
called by the workers in Bombay) from the intelligentsia either 
to find or to travel. In particular, at some point the outsider 
would meet, and have to come to terms with, the jobber. In times 
of industrial stability at least, the jobber would be likely
58. Cont'd
useful conceptualisation, and it will be employed in this 
study. However I will use 'community consciousness' 
in a wider sense to refer to primary self-identification 
with any of the intersecting community forms - religious, 
caste or regional.
59. The harshness of existence in the urban environment - eg.
crowded, overpriced housing conditions, high mortality 
rates, absence from family, excessively long working hours 
in bad conditions, etc. - has been well documented: see,
eg., the sections under such headings in RCLI, Report; 
Burnett-Hurst, op. cit., passim; Newman, op. cit., p.21 & 
pp.42-4; Chakrabarty, 'Communal Riots and Labour', pp.26-32. 
Note also Chakrabarty's perceptive comments on the 
implications of these conditions for working class community 
consciousness and organisation. On this theme of the close 
correlation between insecurity among immigrant workers and 
high levels of community consciousness, see also W.L. Rowe's 
findings on north Indian workers in Bombay. His findings 
would be equally applicable to Calcutta: W.L. Rowe, 'Caste,
Kinship and Association in Urban India', in A. Southall (Ed.), Urban Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies of Urbanisation,
(New York, 19 73) , pp.211-245.
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to have the upper hand in that encounter.
These features were common to the industries of both
Calcutta and Bombay. However Calcutta's labour was in a
particularly weak position. This was primarily because of the
more extensive 'catchment area' from which Calcutta could
recruit its labour, and the greater organisational powers and
economic strength of Bengal's primarily British capital. We
will illustrate these factors with reference to the jute mills.
Colonialisation had produced a potential labour supply
throughout east and north India.^ In the first decades of
industrialisation the labour force - both unskilled and
skilled - was primarily Bengali. However during the second
half of the 19th century 'up-country' immigrants, mainly
from Bihar and UP, began to form an increasing proportion of
61the unskilled workforce. By the 1920s, immigrants born in
Bihar, UP, Orissa and Madras made up more than three quarters
of the unskilled workforce, though Bengalis continued to
6 2predominate in the skilled positions. Ranajit Das Gupta
has calculated that in 1895, Bengalis still constituted
approximately 55 percent of the total jute mill labourforce,
that by 1921 it had fallen to 24 percent,and by 1929 to 17 
6 3percent. However the remaining proportion of Bengali workers
60. For the effects of colonialisation in north India see, eg., 
C.A. Bayly, 'Town Building in North India, 1770-1830', in 
MAS, Vol.9(4), pp.483-504.
61. Das Gupta, op. cit., pp.285-6 & pp.295-6. The immigrants 
displaced Bengalis from existing positions as well as 
filling most of the new positions provided by the expansion 
of the industry.
62. See RCLI, Vol.V(l), pp.5-14.
63. Das Gupta, op. cit., p.297, Table 6.
01
was not evenly distributed throughout the jute workforce.
For reasons that have not yet been identified, the mill 
centres to the south of Calcutta, such as Bauria, Chengail 
and Budge Budge, continued to employ mostly Bengali labour.
64Most of this Bengali labour was recruited from local districts.
The 1921 Census computed the following provincial 
breakdown (in percentages) of the skilled and unskilled 
employment in the jute and other significant industries of Bengal:
TABLE 5
AREAS OF ORIGIN OF SKILLED AND UNSKILLED JUTE WORKERS , 1921
Province Skilled workers Unskilled workers
No. of Percent No. of Percent
workers of total workers of total
Bengal 38,890 31.31 26,558 18.32
Bihar 45,716 36.81 47,919 30.78
Orissa 8,762 7.05 23,218 14.92
United Provinces 28,030 22.56 36,988 23.77
Madras 2,062 1.66 10,786 6.93
Other parts
of India 600 .48 8,219 5,28
Outside India 161 .13 5 .00
Total 124,221 100.00 155,633 100.00
Source: reproduced in Ranajit Das Gupta, 'Factory Labour in
Eastern India: Sources of Supply, 1885-1946, Some
Preliminary Findings', in IESHR, Vol.XIII(3), 1976, 
p.298, Table 7.
Note: The 'skilled workers' category is widely defined in the
case of the jute workers. It is more accurately 
defined in Table 6.
64. RCLI, Report, p.ll; Das Gupta, op. cit., p.301.
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The reasons for this major change in the composition of the
Calcutta industrial labourforce have not yet been established.
It seems probable, however, that the immigrants were prepared
to work for lower wages than was Bengali labour, and that this
was an important reason for the change.^ Another factor may
6 6have been social control considerations. However, whatever
were the reasons, the organisational ability of the managing
agencies to provide such a diverse workforce was a striking 
6 7fact. Some agencies, such as Bird and Co., originally 
specialised in labour contracting for the Assam tea plantations 
during the 19th century. From the mid-19th century, recruitment 
of indentured labour for the plantations was further facilitated 
by government legislation. The same managing agencies managed both 
the jute mills and the plantations. Thus when the jute 
industry began rapidly to expand from the last decade of the 
19th century it had available a highly organised recruiting net­
work, drawing on a wide 'catchment area'.
The consequences for working class industrial and 
political organisation were profound. By the beginning of the 
2Gth century the Calcutta working class was particularly
heterogeneous, was drawn from particularly depressed backgrounds,
6 8and was existing in a particularly competitive job market.
Its linguistic internal divisions and the cultural separation
65. See Bagchi, Private Investment, p.136.
66. This was certainly the case for the Fort Gloster Mill at
Bauria in 1928: see the section on the Bauria strike in
Chapter 3(2) below.
67. See Bagchi, Private Investment, pp.133-36 and 179-80.
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of most of it from the surrounding Bengali population were 
two of the more obvious characteristics. Community conscious­
ness and organisation were correspondingly high, and it 
exhibited to a particularly marked degree all of the weaknesses 
as a working class outlined above. In the case of the 
industrial working class the preponderance of non-Bengali 
labour also added to the already considerable distance between 
the Bengali intelligentsia and the masses.
The organisational and economic strength of the
jute industry intensified the difficulties. The Calcutta
jute mills were in an inherently very strong position because
of their proximity to virtually the only source of raw jute
in the world, the availability of cheap labour with which to
6 9process it, and the strong world demand for the products.
They had a virtual monopoly control of the world market and 
were therefore in a strong position to dictate the prices of 
their products. They also had a monopsonistic control on the 
raw jute market and could therefore strongly influence the
68. See Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 310-325 and Appendix B for the
very great caste complexity of, and the high percentage of 
workers from very depressed backgrounds within, the jute 
mill workforce; see Chakrabarty, 'Communal Riots and 
Labour', pp.24-6, for statistics on the very competitive 
nature of the labour market. A.A. Yang, 'The Optimising 
Peasant: A Study of Internal Migration as an Option in a
Northeast Indian District',(Paper prepared for a workshop 
at the University of Pennsylvania, nd.), which studies the 
factors operating at the source to cause emigration from Saran 
district in Bihar, confirms Gupta's findings. Brij Lai's 
current ANU doctoral thesis on emigration from UP will fill an 
important gap in our understanding of the factors operating
in the source areas.
69. For this paragraph see: Bagchi, Private Investment, pp.
139-41, 262-79 & 284-87; D.H. Buchanan, The Development
of Capitalist Enterprise in India, (N.Y.,_1934) , Chapter XI.
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prices at which they bought their raw materials. The
organisational cohesion of the industry - a cohesion which
was facilitated by the racial-cultural homogeneity of the
70owners and managers - enabled the maximisation of these 
inherent advantages. The Indian Jute Mills Association (IJMA) 
was an extremely powerful controlling body, capable of 
implementing very effective restrictive trade practices and 
other coordinated policies. The industry was further strength­
ened by its political and racial proximity to state power at
71all levels - local, provincial, national and metropolitan. 
Broadly, there were two consequences of this situation for 
working class organisation. The first was direct - the IJMA's 
organisational power for social control, which contrasted so 
strongly with the organisational weakness of its divided work- 
force. The second followed from the industry's monopolistic 
position and economic strength. It was relatively free of the 
competition - national or international - or other economic 
difficulties which might lead to crises or structural changes 
within the industry; it was, thus, correspondingly free of 
the dangers of these possible catalysts of class combination 
within its workforce and worker-intelligentsia linkages.
70. A homogeneity which was the greater for the owners and 
managements being overwhelmingly Scottish.
71. For the power of the Calcutta British business community 
as a whole vis a vis the state at its various levels, see 
Broomfield, ojp. cit. , p.43.
Eg. see Buchanan's contemporary observations in op. cit.., 
pp.430-31 & p.434.
72 .
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The Elite, Politics and the Masses from the Late 19th Century 
to the Non-Cooperation Movement.
From the above survey of colonial Bengali society we 
can see that the 'cardinal fact' about the bhadralok, and the 
primary determinant of its role and fate, was not its pre­
occupation with its social honour; it was its structurally 
determined location, divorced from productive activity, in an 
intensively colonialised society. As Asok Sen has argued, in 
the 19th century at least, it was not in a position,as a group, 
to exercise hegemony over the labouring, productive sectors
of the population; it was structurally greatly inhibited from
7 3initiating a process of social transformation. Nor, in this
polarised and depressed society, were there any other social
groups in a decisively better position to make the attempt.
The Muslim intelligentsia, for example was not as linked to
landlordism and the other forms of agricultural exploitation. It
alsohad the advantage of a potential religious link,via the
ulema, with the majority of the peasant population and the
74approximately 30 percent Muslim sector of the workforce. 
Nevertheless, even those sections of the Muslim intelligentsia 
who were not dependent on zamindari were handicapped vis a vis 
the peasantry by their primarily urban orientation. Further, 
the potential for religion providing an ideological channel to
73. This is the central theme of Sen's 'Iswarchandra Vidyasagar'.
74. The ulema - the Muslim priesthood - were a powerful force
among the Muslim masses, both in the villages and among 
the working class. Through them the wealthy patrons of the 
Calcutta Muslim merchant community had, in fact, from the 
1890s, established a strong community network among the 
Muslim mill hands: Chakrabarty, 'Communal Riots and
Labour', passim.
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the rural population was considerably vitiated by the
pronounced - and increasing - caste consciousness of Bengali
7 5Islam, and its associated north Indian orientation: the
Muslim elite under colonialism exhibited many of the Hindu 
bhadralok1s characteristics, if not to such a pronounced degree. 
However the intense competition for the limited number of 
positions of power and influence in the colonialised Bengali 
economy greatly exacerbated relations between the Hindu'and 
Muslim elites.
What Broomfield has seen as the core characteristics
of Bengali politics were, then, largely symptoms of the deeper
reality. The socio-economic bases of indigenous politics in
Bengal were particularly narrow and weak. The Bengali bhadralok's
'vanguard' role in Indian nationalist politics masked this fact.
In politics as in education, the Bengali elite acted not as a
7 6filter to the masses, but as 'a jar hermetically sealed'.
For these reasons, the intelligentsia would tend to provide the 
'mass' base of nationalist politics as well as its main activists; 
and in Bengal the intelligentsia was overwhelmingly the Hindu 
bhadralok.
75. See: A. Roy, 'The Social Factors in the Making of Bengali
Islam', in South Asia, No. 3, 1973, pp.23-35; A. De, op. 
cit., pp.23-30; and Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in 
Bengal, 1903-1908 , (New Delhi"^  197 3) , pp. 4l5-l6 .
76. This expression was used by Lai Behari Day in 1868 to
refute the theory that the elite could act as an 
educational 'filter' to the masses: quoted in Sen,
'Iswarchandra Vidyasagar', p.19.
77. See the tables provided in Broomfield, op. cit., pp.9-10, 
fn.8; also Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement, pp.507-14.
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Valiant individual efforts to bridge the gap between
the elite and the masses were made during the second half of the
19th century and the first decade of the 20th century, but
they were defeated by the factors outlined earlier. For example,
Dipesh Chakrabarty has shown how Sasipada Banerjee's Brahmo-
style social reform activities among the jute millhands of
Baranagar in the 1860s and 1870s failed because of his near-
total lack of understanding of both the labourers' real problems
7 8and the concrete issues of colonial industrialisation.
Sasipada, in fact, 'discovered' the working class through the
influence of the English Christian social reformer, Mary Carpenter,
79wrhose approach was to 'seek and save the lost'. A major 
conclusion of Sumit Sarkar's study of the Swadeshi movement in 
the first decade of the 20th century is that that movement 
failed largely because of the bhadralok's failure to make
8 0substantial contacts with either the peasantry or the Muslims.
He traces the roots of this failure back to the 19th century 
phenomena we have outlined above. Even during the Non-Cooperation 
Khilafat agitation, when widespread rural unrest was coordinated
78. D. Chakrabarty, 'Sasipada Banerjee: a Study in the Nature
of the First Contact of the Bengali Bhadralok with the 
Working Classes of Bengal', in Indian Historical Review, 
Vol.II(2), 1976, pp.339-64. Chakrabarty has characterised 
Brahmo-style reformism in the following perceptive way 
(p.342): 'The 1860s saw the growth of something like a
"social conscience" in Bengal, at least among the "young" 
Brahmos. People like Keshub Chunder Sen [and Sasipada] 
began at this time to bring their own private sense of sin 
into public life, and made earnest and sincere efforts at 
removing "social evils" and reclaiming "fallen souls". ... 
The creed of reformism in Bengal of the 1860s and 1870s is 
couched in this language of personal sin-resolution, setting 
it apart from the broader social consciousness of, say, 
contemporary Bombay, which manifested itself on more 
impersonal questions like caste and civic reforms; perhaps 
this personalised flavour of Bengali reformism is what made 
it so prone to guidance - both divine and colonial.'
79. ibid, pp.345-7.
80. Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement, pp.333-5, p.359, pp.389-9 
& pp.514-16.
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with the movement against the Raj, rural agitation in most
districts depended heavily on the mediation of the Muslim
ulema, and the bhadralok-tenant contradiction acted as a
considerable brake on the Bengal Congress's enthusiasm for
81peasant organisation.
One consequence of the structurally determined,
inherently 'hermetic', narrowly based nature of bhadralok
politics, was its proneness to the 'fortuitous rivalry' of
8 2daladali factional politics. Bengali politics was extremely 
factious. But of particular significance was the fact that 
ideological differences between elite factions tended to be 
bereft of real socio-political content; the factional rivalry 
tended to be fortuitous. This had been true of the often 
fierce ideological debates between the so-called 'conservative', 
'reformist' and 'radical' Renaissance factions,^ and of
84bhadralok politics in the second half of the 19th century.
It remained so during and after the Swadeshi movement, in the 
early decades of the 20th century, despite the emergence of a 
more militant anti-colonialist ideology and tactics and the
81. Rajat Ray, 'Masses in Politics: The non-Cooperation Movement
in Bengal 1920-1922', in IESHR, Vol.XI(4), 1974, pp.362-63, 
393-94 & 403-10.
82. The term is Asok Sen's: Sen, 'Iswarchandra Vidyasagar',
p. 39.
83. See: S.N. Mukherjee, 'Daladali in Calcutta in the
Nineteenth Century', in MAS, Vol.9(l), 1975, pp.59-80, 
and particularly pp.78-79 (Mukherjee stresses the 
functional, integrative role of daladali, as well as its 
fissiparous tendencies); Chakrabarty, 'Colonial Context 
of the Bengal Renaissance', p.105; Sarkar, 'Rammohan Roy', 
pp.19-25.
Sen, 'Iswarchandra Vidyasagar', pp.38-40.84.
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beginnings of a 'mass' politics. With a few individual 
exceptions, even the leaders of the revolutionary-terrorist 
groups were unable to give their concept of political 
independence a socio-economic content which could clearly 
distinguish their program from those of the less militant 
leaderships; constitutionalism and terrorism were linked in 
the same continuum of elite politics. This situation 
reflected the particularly narrow and homogeneous base of 
Bengali politics into the third decade of the 20th century.
However by the early 20th century there were
greatly increased pressures on a growing section of the
8 6bhadralok to forge new political alternatives. These arose 
from a number of coinciding factors. Returns for individual 
families from the increasingly subdivided tenure system had 
be en greatly reduced with the growing bhadralok pressure for 
rental shares. The enhancement of rent collections was meeting 
with increasing resistance, particularly in eastern Bengal, from 
the jotedars - the substantial tenantry. The declining rental 
returns, increased the bhadralok pressure for service and 
professional employment. However the job market in this sector
85. Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement, Chapter 9, and particularly 
pp.488-9T] (The individual exceptions were men such as 
Hemchandra Kanungo and Bhupendranath Dutt, who realised 
the need to develop a program which could mobilise the 
peasants and workers by incorporating their specific 
needs. Dutt was later to become a Marxist); Broomfield, 
op. cit., pp.15-20 & 146-62.
For this paragraph see: ibid.., pp. 32-4 , 45-6 & 155-59;
Ray & Ray, 'Zamindars and Jotedars', pp.97-101; Sarkar, 
The Swadeshi Movement, p.25, pp.418-20 & 511-12; and 
Ray^ 'Masses in Politics', pp.343-4.
8 6 .
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began to decline rapidly in the last quarter of the 19th 
century, following the consolidation of the empire in India 
and the reversal of the colonial policy of employing Bengalis 
in the other provinces. The market became even more 
competitive from the first decade of the 20th century, when the 
British instituted a policy of discrimination in favour of the 
Muslim elite - a policy which was symbolised by the partition 
of Bengal and which added to the growing communal conflict 
between the two elites. Finally, two sharp waves of inflation — 
between 1905 and 1908 and from the War until 1920 — followed 
by an equally sharp slump beginning in the middle of 1920, 
added to the economic distress of the lower strata of the 
bhadralok as well as to that of most of both political and 
non-political Bengal.
These economic and political pressures were
accompanied by profound changes in elite ideological perceptions
of the character of British colonialism. As Sarkar has
stressed - chastising the economic reductionism of both
Marxist- and 'elite' theorists - the increasing hold of anti-
British ideology was no mere reflex of the economic pressures
sketched above: 'economic distress could lead to nationalist
politics only via the 'mediation' of an ideology - in this
8 7case the theory of British economic exploitation'. Nor was 
the Hindu bhadralok the only section of the Bengali elite
87. Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement, p.512. See also pp.23-30 &
507-12. In support of his argument Sarkar points out (p.26) 
that the mufussil areas which became the Swadeshi strong­
holds were those where 'a marked concentration of inter­
mediate tenures coincided with a relatively high level of 
English education'.
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affected by these combined economic and ideological changes.
A small but significant number of Muslims had joined hands
8 8with the bhadralok Swadeshi activists. During the second 
decade of the century a new type of urban politician, 
epitomised by Fazlul Huq, had, in the wake of the annulment 
of the Partition of Bengal, begun expressing its dissatisfaction 
with the Raj. By 1920 the north Indian inspired Khilafat 
agitation against allied plans to dismantle the Turkish Caliphate 
had also deeply affected the Calcutta Urdu-speaking community - 
and particularly its intelligentsia and merchant elements. The 
young radical journalist Ab^ ful Kalam Azad became the leading 
spokesman of this sentiment. Finally, the young radicals of 
the Marwari business community were also becoming responsive 
to the growing anti-British sentiment. The shifts in 
Bengal's political life were brought into the open during 
the prelude to the launching of the Non-Cooperation movement. 
Bengal's established Muslim and bhadralok political leaderships 
resisted the programs of Gandhi and the Ali brothers 
because of their fears of the unpredictable consequences of a 
call to mass action and their reluctance to relinquish the 
benefits of their positions in the professions, government 
service and legislatures. However the economic pressures upon,
88. ibid., Chapter 8. However the nationalist Muslims who
participated worked mainly as individuals, and did not 
attain substantial success in their efforts to establish a 
stable 'united front' nationalist organisation based on a 
Hindu-Muslim alliance: ibid,, p.440.
89. Broomfield, op. cit., pp.63-5 & 156-57; K. McPherson, 'The
Muslims of Madras and Calcutta: Agitational Politics in the
Early 1920s', in South Asia, No. 5, 1975, pp.37-9; & Ray,
'Masses in Politics', pp.346-47.
90. ibid., p.362.
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and the political fervour of,the radicalised intelligentsias
from the different communities, was sufficient for Gandhi and
the Khilafatists to be able to go over the heads of the
prevaricating leaderships and elicit an enthusiastic response
91from their followers. The leaders then followed.
Bengal's second attempt at a mass nationalist 
politics had begun. The hopes that it raised among several 
distinct groups of young Bengali radicals, then later 
disappointed, were to provide the background for the subsequent, 
tentative emergence of Bengal's first communists. The hopes 
were raised, in the tumultuous national and international 
events of the post-War years, by the unprecedented event of 
a joint Hindu-Muslim leadership launching a militant challenge 
to the Raj through a call on the radical intelligentsia to 
mobilise the labouring masses. They were disappointed by 
the sudden withdrawal of the movement, by the subsequent 
collapse of the Hindu-Muslim pact into communal bickering, 
and by the political impasse reached by the Bengal Congress and 
the Jugantar and Anushilan leaderships after the ending of Non- 
Cooperation and the death of C.R. Das. ^ 2
Gandhi's decision was the immediate cause of the 
collapse of the movement. But within Bengal the contradiction 
between, on the one hand, the bhadralok's need for a mass base
91. ibid., pp.347-59; Broomfield, o£. cit., pp.162-68.
92. For these sequels to the withdrawal of Non-Cooperation see:
Broomfield, op. cit., pp.227-80; J. Gallagher, 'Congress 
in Decline: Bengal 1930 to 1939', in MAS, Vol. 7(3), 1973,
pp.589-97; Laushey, op. cit., pp.21-27 & 30-35.
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with which to challenge the British and, on the other, the
great risks for the elite of mobilising a peasantry upon
whose exploitation its social position was based, were also
central to the collapse of Non-Cooperation in this province.
Even the contemporary strike activity of the industrial 
93workers, which greatly impressed the future communists, was
not as promising as it appeared on the surface. The Non-
Cooperation jute mill agitation, for example, was organised
94by Azad and his radical Khilafatists. For their (fairly
93. Strike activity in Bengal as a whole, and in the jute mills, 
reached peaks of some magnitude in 1921-22, as can be seen 
from the following figures from 1921 (the first year in 
which the Government of Bengal began recording strike 
statistics) to 1924:
Year No. of Disputes Numbers
Involved
Man-days
Lost
1. BENGAL
1921 150 254,982 2,990,253
1922 93 198,702 1,803,750
1923 67 137,529 1,247,569
1924 55 90,881 925,562
2. JUTE MILLS
1921 39 186,479 706,229
1922 40 173,957 1,079,627
1923 29 90,664 644,904
1924 18 69,488 346,756
Source: RCLI, Vol.V(l), ps.121 & 126.
94. Ray, 'Masses in Politics', ps.360 & 373; Broomfield, 
op. cit., p.156.
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95limited) successes in promoting political strike activity
they appear to have relied largely upon the Muslim community
network - linking Calcutta's Muslim elite to the up-country
millhands via the maulvis, ulema and Muslim jobbers - that
9 6had become established since the 1890s. Bhadralok labour
organisers had previously, during the Swadeshi campaign,
achieved modest results in fomenting strike activity among
9 7the inflation-affected jute and railway workers. But
these strikes had also been for economic rather than political
ends, and the working class response to their efforts had come
only from the minority Bengali working class community.
Moreover, in contrast to the permanence of the Muslim working
class community organisations, nothing of the bhadralok Swadeshi
activists' incipient labour organisation - nor of bhadralok
interest in trade union activity - survived the Swadeshi era.^
During the Non-Cooperation movement the non-Khilafat activists
who involved themselves in trade union work were almost all
99non-Bengali Gandhians. But the only jute industry trade 
unions which remained in 1922 were Khilafatist, with no 
bhadralok officials. During Non-Cooperation, an occasion 
of Hindu-Muslim unity, the Muslim community network had been 
utilised to coordinate working class strike activity with an
95. McPherson, ojd. cit. , p.42
96. Ray, 'Masses in Politics', p.373; Chakrabarty, 'Communal 
Riots and Labour', pp.66-9; see Broomfield, op. cit., 
p.156, on Azad's use of rumours of 'Islam in danger' in 
his agitational activity in the mill area.
97. See Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement, Chapter 5, for an account 
of the activities and results of the Swadeshi labour 
organisers - most prominent among whom was Aswinicoomar 
Banerji.
98. ibid., pp.241-43.
99. Ray, 'Masses in Politics', pp.372-73.
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anti-British campaign. But the same network could as readily
be made to serve the needs of overtly communal politics. The
1926 riots, as had the 1918 riots before them, were to
demonstrate that r e a l i t y . B e n g a l i  industrial unionism as
a whole remained very weak during the 1920s. For example the
great majority of the trade unions formed in the post-War/
Non-Cooperation period were clerical unions, and the same
102pattern was retained during the decade.
This was the rather unpromising background to, and 
context of, the emergence of communism in Calcutta. But 
before tracing that process we will outline the background 
against which Bombay communism developed.
3. WESTERN INDIA, MAHARASHTRA AND BOMBAY
One consequence of the weaker colonialisation of 
western India was that this region retained a much higher degree 
of continuity with its pre-colonial past than did eastern India; 
it was not as completely broken adrift from its traditional 
moorings. Another was that its social order retained a much 
higher level of internal continuity, functional differentiation
100. IB, G of Ben.: 'List of Labour Unions and Associations in
Bengal, 1922'. (I owe this source to Dipesh Chakrabarty.)
101. See Chakrabarty, 'Communal Riots and Labour', pp.66-7, 
on this.
102. See fn. 100; RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.119. The Bengal government 
reported that the ratio between clerical and manual workers 
unions was approximately three to two, and that most of 
the latter were extremely unstable and often little more 
than ephemeral strike committees.
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and autonomy; its intermediate social structure was not as
severely eroded, nor the society as polarised nor as subjugated
to the colonial order. This was particularly the case in
10 3Gujarat. Maharashtra was more deeply affected. But
Maharashtra, too, was much less colonialised than was Bengal. 
Bombay, which drew its capital primarily from Gujarat, its 
labouring population primarily from Maharashtra, and its 
intelligentsia(s) from both, epitomised much that was distinctive 
in the region as a whole, while constituting a discrete entity 
in its own right.
Colonialisation in Western India
An obvious contrast with eastern India was the survival 
of much of western India's pre-colonial capitalist strata.
These capitalist elements were able, together with the new 
comprador (primarily Parsi) capitalists who emerged under 
colonialism, to move into and dominate large-scale industry - 
particularly the cotton spinning and weaving industry in Bombay, 
and then, Ahmedabad. This industrial foothold provided a fairly 
solid basis for the future survival and expansion of Indian 
capital, despite the severe constraints under which it operated
103. See: Bagchi, 'Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth',
pp.259-60; Omvedt's figures on agrarian relations in 
Maharashtra and Gujarat, in G. Omvedt, 'Development of
the Maharashtrian Class Structure, 1818 to 1931', in EPW,
Vol.VIII(31-33), 1973, p.1426, Table 6; R. Kumar,
Western India in the Nineteenth Century; A Study in the 
Social History of Maharashtra, (Canberra, 1968), Cf. Chapters 
I, V & IX; and K. Gillion, Ahmedabad, A Study in Indian 
Urban History, (Canberra, 1969) , passim  ^ for the remarkable 
degree of continuity between traditional and modern Ahmedabad
104. See Bagchi, 'Reflections on Regional Growth', pp.256-59, for 
a description of the contours of the pre-colonial Gujarati 
capitalist class and its relations with other classes.
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105in the colonial context. The survival of indigenous capital
until the period of modern industrialisation was due very
largely to the fact that the British remained dependent on
its collaboration during and, for some time, after the
campaign against the Marathas - into the first quarter of the
19th century. However the comparative strength of Indian
capitalism in western India was also an index of the greater
integrity retained by the society as a whole. As Bagchi has
arqued, the survival of indigenous capital was linked - and
in a mutually reinforcing way - with the comparatively high
survival levels of the artisan class, traditional agrarian
relations and the old ruling oiider. For example, the artisan
class, apart from not suffering as intensively the directly
colonial pressures faced by the artisans of east India, also
retained more of its traditional market (for example in the several
106princely states) and the support of indigenous capital. The
105. Eg., Bagchi, (ibid., p.267) has written: 'However
significant the differences in the processes of formation 
of capitalist classes in eastern and western India, they 
are not enough to make any tall claims for industrial growth 
in western India, for the colonial regime shaped the growth 
patterns of all regions in certain fundamental ways. Out
of all the possible tableaux that are conjured up by the 
constellation of class forces in British Gujarat, for instance, 
the colonial constraints ultimately allowed only one to 
surface: many of the important bankers and traders emerged
to form the core of a tightly-knit industrial bourgeois class 
in Ahmedabad (and Gujarat in general) , either directly as 
pioneers or in collaboration. But their growth was limited 
by the low level of development of productive forces in 
agriculture, by the low level of innovative ability built 
into the industrial organization and by the overall lack 
of dynamism of the home market'.
106. The larger scale urban artisans had provided an important 
class of clients for the traditional capitalists (see, eg., 
Gadgil, op. cit., pp.173-74), and it was therefore in the 
capitalists' interests to resist this class's destruction 
(see Bagchi, 'Reflections on Regional Growth, p.257). The 
cotton mills initially developed by supplying coarse yarn
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survival of the principalities also reinforced the traditional
capitalist strata, and later they were to provide capital for
Indian industrial ventures and favourable political conditions
for investment within their borders. The less colonialised
agrarian relations of western India also provided a more
favourable context for indigenous industrial development in 
10 8the region. Conversely, the availability of alternative
profitable investment opportunities (such as in industry) 
reduced the flow of urban capital into exploitative, 
unproductive forms of agricultural investment. The overall
contrast with eastern India could be seen clearly in the 
survival of several substantial urban centres - both industrial 
and non-industrial - in the region, and in the vigorous political 
life which developed in each of these centres.
106. (Cont'd)
to handloom weavers: Bagchi, Private Investment, p.220.
See Gillion, op. cit., pp.47-9, on the high survival rate 
of the GujaratX weavers into the- 20th century because of 
the weakness of the colonial impact on their traditional 
market. The most serious competition, in fact, came 
eventually from the Ahmedabad mills. However the mills 
also provided an alternative source of employment for 
displaced artisans.
107. ibid., p.257; Bagchi, Private Investment, p.210 & pp.214-15. 
Bagchi argues (ibid., p.2l5) that *The political separateness 
of the native states from British India was more important 
for industrial growth than the semi-feudal structure of 
administration within many of those states, given the 
discrimination practiced against Indian businessmen under 
the imperial system'.
108. See Bagchi, 'Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth', 
pp.262-3, for evidence of rich peasant capital being 
invested in industry (though to a limited extent) and of 
the greater rural retention of the agricultural surplus in 
the region providing a stronger market for regional industry.
109. Catanach, 0£. cit., p.25 & pp.78-87. For Gujarat see Gillion, 
op. cit., pp.79-80. In fact west Indian indigenous 
capitalists helped finance rural cooperative credit societies. 
Moreover, under the ryotwari system, unlike the Permanently 
Settled areas, the government had a direct interest in 
attempting to maintain the cultivator's viability; for government revenues were supposed to vary directly with
the peasant's revenues.
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Industrial Capital and Labour in Bombay
These distinctive regional features were also
reflected in the character of the Bombay cotton industry
which began to be established in the second half of the 19th
century, and in the character of the workforce which it
attracted. The industry began when a Parsi, Cowasji Davar,
opened a spinning mill in 1856 .^° In 1858 a group of Bombay
businessmen started a composite spinning and weaving mill. By
1874 there were 17 mills, and by 1900 there were 86. By 1884
the industry was employing some 40 thousand workers, and twice
that many by the end of the c e n t u r y . B y  1920 the figure was
140,898. Between 1920 and 1928 some 145,000 to 150,000 workers
112were employed in approximately 80 mills. Newman calculates
that by this time perhaps half of Bombay's population was
113dependent to some extent on the textile industry. In the
1141920s Bombay had a total factory population of about 190,000.
The three railway workshops at Parel and Matunga employed the 
second biggest concentration of labour - by the 1920s there were 
19,500 workers, divided approximately evenly between the three 
workshops.
110. M.D. Morris, The Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in
India: A Study of the Bombay Cotton Mills, 1854-1947
(Berkeley, 1965), pp.23-26.
111. The employment figures are taken from the table in ibid., 
Appendix II, pp.217-18.
112. Estimates of the numbers vary between these two limits for 
the years up to 1928, after which mill employment began to 
fall. See the figures provided in RCLI, Vol.I(l), p.12, and 
Morris, op. cit., pp.213-14. The 1921 Census, however, 
provides the unrealistically low figure of 117,100:
Newman, op. cit., p.5.
113. ibid., p.6 .
114. RCLI, Report, p.9.
115. RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), pp.8-9.
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Although Bombay's industry shared many of Calcutta's 
industrial features, there were also some crucial differences - 
most notably in the composition of the workforce and the 
organisational and economic strength of industrial capital.
Whereas Calcutta's workforce was primarily non-Bengali 
and was highly heterogenous in regional and caste composition, 
Bombay's labour was overwhelmingly Maharashtrian and was much 
more homogeneous. The 1921 Census gave the following breakdown 
for the regions which supplied significant numbers of cotton 
mill workers:
TABLE 7
DISTRICT/PROVINCE OF ORIGIN OF BOMBAY CITY COTTON MILL WORKERS
District/Province Numbers
Ratnagiri 54,570
United Provinces 14,467
Satara 10,183
Poona 9,490
Kolaba 6,870
Ahmednagar 4,585
Hyderabad 3,510
Kolhapur 2,836
Nasik 1,761
Sholapur 1,558
109,820
Source: Reproduced in Newman, op. cit., p.54, Table V.
Notes: The number of workers represented in this table is
significantly less than the 117,100 listed in this 
Census as full-time millhands, and substantially less 
than the actual number of workers employed. Nevertheless 
it is highly unlikely that any important source of supply 
is missing - apart, perhaps, from those who were born in 
Bombay city - and the figures almost certainly provide a 
reasonably representative picture of the composition of 
the total workforce: see Morris, op. cit., p.228.
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Thus workers from Maharashtrian districts constituted more than
80 percent of the total mill workforce. Moreover, the cultivating
116Maratha-Kunbi caste cluster accounted for 52,650 of the simple -
i.e., approximately half. From five to seven percent were
117Muslims, and approximately 13 percent were Untouchables. The
Marathas tended to be concentrated in the weaving departments,
the Untouchables in the spinning departments, and the Muslims in
a few Muslim dominated mills - primarily in the Madanpura area.
As in Bengal, there had initially been a higher proportion of
local labour in the workforce, the proportion of 'up-country'
118labour increasing over time. But the rate of increase was
nothing like that in Bengal.
Broadly, there appear to have been two factors
contributing to the Bombay situation. In line with our argument
about the effects of colonialisation, there would not have been
as intense or as widespread a pressure to move from the land
and the traditional industries to the city in western India
119compared to eastern and northern India. But what was probably
116. I will term this caste cluster 'Maratha' for the sake of 
brevity.
117. These figures and percentages are taken or calculated from
the caste figures provided in Newman's Table V. A survey 
conducted by the Bombay Millowners' Association in 1940 also 
provides percentages for the respective caste categories of 
the order of those given here: see Morris, ojd. cit., pp.
74-5, including Table XI.
118. Eg., according to Morris (ibid., p.63, Table VII), the UP's 
share in the workforce increased from 3.05 percent in 1911 
to 9.42 percent in 1921 to 11.82 percent in 1931 (though 
our sample indicates 13.2 percent in 1921).
119. For example, this would help to explain the fact that there 
was virtually no labour from Gujarat and very little from 
other contiguous provinces employed in the Bombay mills, 
despite the accessibility of Bombay. The existence of 
cotton mills at both Ahmedabad and Sholapur (both of which 
employed mainly local labour - see' RCLF, Vol.I(l), p.4 & pp. 
8-9) and, probably, the fact that there was less pressure
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more important was the fact that the Bombay millowners1 had
a much narrower recruiting network than their European
counterparts in Bengal. Not having to hand an equivalent to
the Europeans' managing agency recruiting system throughout
eastern and northern India, the Bombay millowners simply did
not have the available means readily to reproduce Calcutta's
12 0heterogenous workforce. Thus, while community modes of
organisation and consciousness prevailed among Bombay's workers 
as in Calcutta, there was not the same pronounced degree of 
community fragmentation nor as marked an impetus towards 
heightened community consciousness. Of particular significance 
were the facts that more than 80 percent of the Bombay workforce 
was Marathi-speaking and that half of it belonged, broadly, to 
one community - the Maratha caste cluster. For these reasons 
the barriers to the formation of horizontal linkages across 
the workforce, and linkages with a Marathi-speaking 'outsider' 
intelligentsia, were, though considerable, not nearly so great 
as in Calcutta. The predominance of the Marathi-speaking 
categories, and particularly of the Maratha group, had a further 
significance: their sharing with each other and, to a
considerable degree, with the Brahman elite, of a unique and 
still live cultural tradition, which was distinguished by its
119. (Cont'd)
on the land in western India than in Bengal's contiguous 
provinces, would have combined to produce this result. That 
much of the immigration from Hyderabad was diverted from 
Bombay to Ahmedabad after the establishment of the 
Ahmedabad textile industry supports this contention (see 
ibid., pp.6-7). Had the high degree of landlessness in 
Ratnagiri and of dwarf-holdings in Satara (see Omvedt, 
op. cit., p.1427, Table 7 Part II), the two major source 
districts for Maharashtrian labour, been more widespread 
in western India, the picture may well have been very 
different. The de-population caused by periodic epidemics, 
and the famines to which the Deccan was prone, also acted to produce short-term labour scarcity.
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assertiveness and by a significant element of egalitarianism.
The significance of each of the above features of the
Bombay working class was exemplified in an event in 1908 which
could not have occurred in contemporary Calcutta - the week-long
strike in most of the mills, and demonstrations by very large
numbers of millhands, in protest at the trial and conviction of 
122Tilak. There is reason to doubt the claims made by some -
123including Lenin - that this was a clear demonstration of
rising class consciousness, for the event appears to have been
engineered primarily by jobbers in contact with the Tilak
124political organisation. Nevertheless the point remains
valid; for the event was evidence of the potential cohesiveness 
of the predominant Maratha working class community, of the 
preparedness of the Maratha workers to be drawn into militant 
nationalist actions, of a significant degree of cultural 
sharing between the Brahman Tilakite leaders and the Maratha 
workers, and of the ability of the Tilakites to establish
125organisational links with the Maratha jobber intermediaries.
120. Attempts by J.N. Tata in the 1880s and 1890s to institute 
a formal system of recruitment in north India - precisely 
in order to undermine the potential for working class 
combination - failed. The increasing numbers of UP migrants 
arrived informally, not as a result of a BMOA recruitment 
policy or system: Morris,op. cit♦, pp.54-5 & p.64.
121. This will be gone into below.
122. For a detailed account of the strike, see A.I. Chicherov, 
'Tilak's Trial and the Bombay Political Strike of 1908', 
in I.M. Reisner and N.M. Goldberg, Tilak and the Struggle 
for Indian Freedom, (New Delhi, 1966).
123. V .I. Lenin, 'Inflammable Material in World Politics',
(Aug. 5, 1908), in his Collected Works (1963), Vol.XV, p.184.
124. Newman, 0£. cit., p.122.
125. For Tilak's working class activity, see Cashman, op_. cit. , 
Chapter VIII.
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The 1908 strike contrasts with the results of the Swadeshi
activists' working class program in 1905-08 in all of these
respects. The greater assertiveness and cohesiveness of
the Bombay workers was also evidenced in the strikes which
occurred in the post-War period of high inflation. The Bombay
127unrest led to two extended general strikes in 1919 and 1920.
Although strike activity was substantial in Calcutta, nothing
12 8like a general strike occurred.
This inherent sociological potential for the formation
of class modes of working class organisation and consciousness,
and for the political mobilisation of the proletariat by a
radical intelligentsia, was further increased by the political
129economy of the cotton textile industry. The industry was,
economically and politically, in a much weaker position than 
was the jute industry. The Bombay mills were not in the jute 
industry's position to establish either a monopsony control 
over the purchase of its raw materials or a monopoly control over 
its markets. In its purchase of raw cotton it had to compete 
with the Indian mills at Ahmedabad and elsewhere and, occasionally, 
when American supplies were disrupted, with international 
purchasers as well. In its national and international markets 
it faced the competition of Lancashire and Japan as well as that
126. A point made by Sarkar, in The Swadeshi Movement, pp.244-46.
127. Newman, op. cit., Chapter V; R. Kumar, 'The Bombay Textile 
Strike, 1919', in IESHR, Vol. VIII(l), 1971, pp.1-29.
128. RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.126.
129. The following information on the economics and organisation 
of the industry is taken from Morris, op. cit., Chapters
II & III; Bagchi, Private Investment, Chapter 7;
Buchanan, op. cit., Chapter X; Newman, op. cit. , Chapter 
III; and A.D. Gordon, 'Bombay City Businessmen and 
Politics, 1918-1933: The Politics of Indigenous Colonial 
Businessmen in Relation to Rising Nationalism and a 
Modernising Economy' (Cambridge University Ph.D., 1975), 
pp.250-54.
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of the other Indian textile centres.'*'^ Bombay's competition-
created problems - including the gradual loss of its export
market - increased rapidly during the first two decades of the
20th century and, though temporarily alleviated by the War/
131post-War boom, returned in the 1920s. Although the Bombay
millowners had a great deal of influence upon the provincial 
132government they were not able to mobilise sufficient 
political weight to force the colonial state to implement 
substantial, compensatory tariff barriers and other forms 
of state protection and patronage. Finally, Bombay's problems 
were compounded by the poor management, under its often
133inefficient managing agency system, of many of its mills.
Two consequences for working class organisation flowed 
from the textile industry's comparatively weak economic position. 
The first was that it did not have the jute industry's inherent 
capacity to establish a tight monopsonistic-monopolistic 
regulatory organisation. Therefore the Bombay Millowners'
130. See Bagchi, Private Investment, p.234, Table 7.4 and p.238, 
Table 7.5.
131. In fact, except for 1927, between 1924 and 1929 the industry
as a whole experienced annual gross losses ranging between 
Rs. 19,540,908 and Rs . 29,877,920 . Only a few mills (notably 
Tatas and Wadias) remained reasonably strong: Gordon,
op. cit., pp.253-54, including Table 5.4.
132. See ibid., passim.
133. Bombay's efficiency problems were not shared by the jute 
industry because of the scope for inefficiency allowed by 
its wide, monopolist, profit margins.
134. That economic stability and lack of competition were
important for the establishment and maintenance of the 
IJMA's regulatory powers was evidenced during the 
Depression and subsequently, when economic difficulties 
and increasing competition from non-IJMA mills in the 
Calcutta region led almost to the breakdown of the IJMA's 
agreement on restricted production. The agreement was 
saved only by the government's intervention: Bagchi,
Private Investment, pp.47-50.
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Association (BMOA) did not have the IJMA's inherent organisational 
capacity to respond to working class resistance in a highly 
concerted manner. This problem was further compounded by 
nationalist considerations - particularly at times when the 
industry was in conflict with the state - for these considerations 
would tend to inhibit (though by no means to prevent) the 
repressiveness of the responses of Indian managements to 
Indian working class combination and agitation. The second 
consequence was the industry's inherent pronounced vulnerability 
to economic crisis and structural change, and thus to major 
working class resistance to, and organisation against, the 
millowners. In the 1920s the Bombay mills were, in fact, to 
enter a particularly severe, decade-long marketing crisis 
leading to structural changes which would have this effect.
The Brahman Intelligentsia and Colonialism in Maharashtra
The contrast between the two regions could also be 
seen in the respective intelligentsias' different characteristics 
and relations to the wider societies. The differences were in 
part pre-colonial in origin, in part a consequence of the quite 
dissimilar nature of the encounters between the respective 
Hindu elites and the British, and in part they reflected the 
contrasting effects of colonialisation on the two societies as 
a whole.
As in Bengal, the colonial intelligentsia of 
Maharashtra was drawn primarily from the high Hindu castes that 
had provided the traditional intelligentsias and administrators. 
But whereas the Bengali bhadralok's pre-colonial ancestors had
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been politically subordinate to the Mughal power, Maharashtra's
Brahmans - and particularly the Chitpavan Brahmans - were,
135politically and ideologically, the dominant group. Thus
the imposition of colonialism involved the displacement of the
Brahmans, not, as in Bengal, their 'liberation' from the rule
of the Muslims. For this reason the Maharashtrian
intelligentsia was initially more resistant to the new Raj.
Much of this resistance was disarmed by the new
opportunities provided under British rule. Brahmans were the
first to move into and dominate the government service and
136professional positions which became available. However these
opportunities were not as great as they had been for the bhadralok 
during the expansion of empire in Bengal and elsewhere. Further, 
the ryotwari system did not allow the Brahmans or other elite 
groups to become as systematically a landed class as did the 
zamindari system the bhadralok. Nor did the Brahmans benefit
significantly from the new business opportunities which became 
available, particularly in Bombay, under the British. These were 
captured primarily by Gujaratis and Parsis. Moreover, these
135. Eg., Kumar (op. cit., p.39) has written: 'The control of
political and social power by the chitpavans through 
their connection with the Peshwas, and the intellectual 
hegemony which they exercised by virtue of their caste, 
created a degree of brahmanical dominance in Maharashtra 
to which there existed no parallel in the rest of India'. 
(The Peshwas - literally 'ministers' - were the Chitpavan 
Brahman rulers of the Maratha empire for the century prior 
to 1818.)
136. C. Dobbin, Urban Leadership in Western India: Politics
and Communities in Bombay City, 1840-1885, (London, 1972) 
Chapter II; Kumar, op. cit., Chapter VIII.
137. This point is reinforced by a similar contrast within the 
Bombay Presidency. While most of the Marathi speaking 
areas were settled under the ryotwari system, the Konkan 
districts of Ratnagiri and Kolaba were settled under the 
zamindari-type khoti system. There was also a significant
109
groups began during the second half of the 19th century to
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produce their own, fairly distinct, Bombay-based, intelligentsias.
Thus the material incentives for the dominant section
of the Maharashtrian intelligentsia to become wholehearted
supporters of colonialism were not nearly as great as for the
bhadralok. Consequently the Chitpavans' response to colonialism
and ideological Westernisation contrasted - in its ambivalence
at least - with the bhadralok's enthusiastic endorsement. The
initial resistance, the extent of Brahman hegemony in
Maharashtrian society, and the absence of an adequate
alternative collaborationist elite in the mufussil, were
sufficient for the Bombay government to tread very carefully on
Chitpavan sensibilities. One aspect of this caution was
Elphinstone's transitional policy of continuing to subsidise
traditional scholarly pursuits in Poona, through the old Peshwa
institution of the dakshina, in the hope of gradually winning
139the Chitpavans to the colonial viewpoint. Throughout the
19th century, Brahman ambivalence towards the British remained 
pronounced enough for influential sections of the government to
137. (Cont'd)
flow of urban capital into land speculation in these 
districts. That the Konkan districts had a much higher 
incidence of landlessness (except perhaps for West Kandesh, 
which had a high proportion of tribals in its population), 
dwarf-holding and non-cultivating landlordism (see Omvedt, 
op. cit., p.1427, Table 7) suggests the debilitating 
effects of this form of land settlement. See also 
R. Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and Mass
Politics in Maharashtra, (Berkeley, 1975) , p .135.
138. Dobbin, op. cit. , pp. 154-72 ; Gordon, op_. cit. , pp. 69-72.
139. Kumar, op. cit., pp.47-56. The traditional shastris 
mounted considerable resistance to the introduction of 
western learning.
no
continue to entertain dark - if exaggerated - anxieties about
Poona-based Brahman 'conspiracies' to regain their lost 
140power. In fact Poona did remain, into the 20th century,
a centre of alienated Brahman opposition to the Raj - in 
contrast with the Bombay elites' profitable collaboration; and 
within Bombay, the Maharashtrian Brahmans remained, to a 
significant extent, 'outsiders' in a city dominated by the 
Gujarati, Parsi and other business communities. ^
The Intelligentsia and Maharashtrian Tradition
It was not until the second half of the 19th century 
that a substantial westernised Maharashtrian intelligentsia 
was formed - Kumar's 'new B r a h m a n s ' H o w e v e r ,  even the 
most Westernised sections of the 'new Brahmans' sought to 
retain strong links with the pre-colonial Maharashtrian 
tradition and with contemporary popular culture. This 
contrasted with the bhadralok rejection of the immediate, 
Mughal past in favour of a distant and highly romanticised 
mythical past, and with its contempt for popular, quietist 
Vaishnavism.
The Maharashtrian contrast was exemplified very 
clearly even in the case of the leading exponent of Western- 
inspired reform of Indian society - M.G. Ranade. For example,
140. Cashman, op. cit., Chapter II and pp.140-41.
141. See ibid., Chapter VII, which contrasts the politics 
of the two cities.
142. See his op. cit., Chapter VIII. In the mid-19th century 
the westernised intelligentsia remained a small 
proportion of the Brahman intelligentsia.
Ranade's keenest interest during his university days was
18th century Marathi poetry; and in his later The Rise of
the Maratha Power he found the potential cultural roots of
regeneration, and the ideological foundation for a unified
Maharashtrian society, firmly within the Maharashtrian
tradition of the not-too-distant past.^^ The role of this
tradition was to be asserted even more vehemently by the extremist,
Poona-based, Tilak - especially in his Shivaji festivals and
his 'political recruitment of God Ganapati' . The Brahman
terrorists, such as the Sarvarkar and Chapekar brothers, drew
14 5on the same cultural heritage for their political ideology.
Another example - which serves as an interesting contrast with 
Rammohan's prose style - reinforces the point we are making 
here: while Rammohan displayed an ignorance of, and lack of 
interest in, popular idiom, and a preference for the 
Sanskritised sadhu bhasa, G.H. Deshmukh (an important figure 
in early modern Marathi prose) did not sharply demarcate the 
written from the spoken form, frequently used idiom, and 
attacked the use of Sanskritised prose.
The Brahmans' return to the past, and their concern 
to maintain a cultural bond with the masses - if partly to
143. See: E.E. McDonald, 'The Growth of Regional Consciousness
in Maharashtra', in IESHR, Vol.V(3), 1968, pp.225-39;
I.Rothermund, 'Gandhi and Maharashtra: Nationalism and the
Provincial Response', in South Asia, No. 1, 1971, pp.56-7; 
Cashman, 0£. cit., pp.9-10, 43-4 & 103-04.
144. This apt phrase is the title of Cashman's Chapter IV (ibid.) . 
For Tilak's development of the Shivaji festival see ibid., 
Chapter V.
145. ibid., p.91 & 114-15.
146. M.L. Apte, 'Lokahitavadi and V.K. Chiplunkar: Spokesmen
of Change in Nineteenth-Century Maharashtra', in MAS, 
Vol.7(2), 1973, pp.197-8. (Deshmukh was known popularly
as 'Lokahitavadi' - 'the advocate of the people's welfare'.)
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provide an ideological justification for their continued 
hegemony in Maharashtrian society - could fairly readily be 
harmonised. This was because of the unique quality of the 
Maharashtrian tradition and because colonial Maharashtrian 
society had not been sundered from it.
Pre-colonial Maharashtra was distinguished from
the other sub-continental societies by the relatively much
higher level of cultural integration between the elite and
the masses. The contrast with Bengal in this regard appears
to have been particularly marked. In fact Kumar, in his survey
of Maharashtrian society on the eve of the British conquest,
places the following emphasis on this feature:
The key to the vigour of Maharashtra lay in the 
secular and spiritual values which inspired the 
people of the region ... and which affiliated the 
elite castes, like the brahmans, and the lower and 
middle castes, like the kunbis and mahars, to a 
common corpus of religioui ideas. ... Maharashtra
was able to bridge a gulf which bedevilled Hindu 
society elsewhere and prevented it from offering 
effective resistance to Muslim rule.147
Very broadly, this integration rested culturally on 
two foundations: the devotional, spiritually egalitarian and
quietist bhakti tradition; and the militant 'Kshatriya' Shivaji
14 8tradition. The bhakti movement's contributions were its
147. Kumar, op. cit., pp.6-7; Also E. Zelliot, 'Mahar and Non- 
Brahman Movements In Maharashtra', in IESHR, Vol.VII(3), 
1970, pp.397-415, and particularly p.408. While Kumar 
may have accorded values too central a role in determining 
the uniqueness of traditional Maharashtrian society (see, 
e.g., Satish Chandra, 'Social Background to the Rise of the 
Maratha Movement during the 17th Century in India', in 
IESHR, Vol.X (3), 1973, pp.209-17), his emphasis on the 
uniqueness of the society, and on the importance of its 
cultural and social cohesion,are warranted.
See: Kumar, op. cit. , pp.6-11; Cashman, ojd. cit. ,
Chapter I.
148.
translation of the philosophy of Brahmanical Hinduism into 
an accessible vernacular poetry, its stress on devotion, 
rather than more intellectual modes, as the most effective 
path to salvation, and its insistence on the equality - or 
at least the spiritual equality - of high and low castes.
The bhakti movement was responsible for a remarkable, burgeoning 
tradition of vernacular poetry which sustained, in a popular 
form, the values it sought to transmit. The bhakti saints 
included both Brahmans and non-Brahmans. The S.hivaji tradition 
also contributed to the cultural integration of Maharashtrian 
society, while complementing the particular value system of the 
bhakti tradition. The latter had in fact facilitated Shivaji's 
efforts to mobilise a resistance, based on the Maratha peasants, 
against the Mughal intruders. In throwing off the Mughal 
domination Shivaji - himself of lowly caste - created a movement 
and a state which had 'every semblance of mass support', and 
which bequeathed a militant tradition of popular armed struggle 
against invaders. These Kshatriya values became an integral
149. S. Chandra, op. cit., p.211; Kumar, op. cit., p.4. There 
is perhaps a useful parallel to be drawn here with Vietnam 
Vietnam's tradition of armed resistance to foreign 
domination played an extremely important role in the 
development of 20th century Vietnamese nationalism. More­
over, France's final defeat of Vietnamese resistance and 
establishment of a formal empire came relatively late 
(1885), and a succession of militant patriots managed to 
keep the tradition alive until a significant nationalist 
movement began in the late 1920s. (See Marr, Vietnamese 
Anticolonialism.) Compared to Bengal, Maharashtra 
exhibited similarities with Vietnam in both its militant 
tradition and the relative lateness of its coloniaü sation
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part of the Maharashtrian tradition. Both cultural 'poles' 
included significant egalitarian tendencies. The egalitarianism 
was limited in scope - for example it did not attack the caste 
system as such, and the Brahmans retained spiritual and social 
dominance. After Shivaji's death, they also attained a 
formidable political power which often brought them into 
conflict with other sections of the society. But the 
Maharashtrian ideology did legitimise an unusual degree of 
social mobility within the varna scale, and its culture 
remained, to a remarkable degree, common to both the elite 
and the masses.
Intelligentsias and Society in Colonial Maharashtra and Bombay
The major changes of the 19th century attenuated this
social and cultural bond. Brahman exploitation of the
cultivating and artisan classes appears to have increased
150markedly under colonialism. Brahman relations with non-
Brahmans became further complicated because of a process of 
increasing socio-economic mobility within the peasantry.
Kumar argues that by the last quarter of the 19th century a 
class of 'rich' peasants had emerged and that this upwardly 
mobile class increasingly opposed the dominance of the Brahmans.
150. Omvedt, op. cit., pp.1418-22. Omvedt cites, in particular. 
Brahman money-lending activity and the associated Brahman 
alienation of non-Brahman agricultural holdings. Brahmans 
were also prominent in the legal apparatus which 
sanctioned the land transfers.
151. Kumar, op. cit., p.298 and pp.313-17. Kumar has been 
criticised for overstating the 'rich peasant' case for the 
19th century (see Catanach, op. cit., pp.224-25; Omvedt, 
op. cit., ps.1423 & 1428). There is evidence, nevertheless, 
of significant upward mobility of sections of the peasantry. 
Twentieth centu-ry literacy statistics for certain of the 
artisan and menial castes also suggest considerable mobility; 
see the relatively high and increasing literacy figures for 
1921 and 1931 in Omvedt, ojd. cit. , p.1418, Table I.
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Concurrently, a few non-Brahman urban intellectuals from
substantial peasant or small scale commercial backgrounds
began actively to agitate against Brahman dominance. Their
ideology claimed that the 'bahujan samaj1 (the ’majority
community' or the ’masses') was systematically oppressed
by the 'shetjis' and the 'bhatjis' (literally, the merchants
and priests, but in fact referring more widely to the merchant
152and financier classes and the Brahmans). Jotirao Phule's
Satyashodhak Samaj, founded in 1873 in opposition to the
Brahman-dominated Sarvajanik Sabha, initiated this anti-Brahman
challenge. Phule attacked Brahman elitist arrogance and
dominance of the bureaucracy and professions, and charged the
Brahmans with having betrayed their social responsibilities to
the masses. The non-Brahman movement gathered momentum in
the first decades of the 20th century. Under the leadership
of the urban non-Brahman intelligentsia and businessmen and the
more prosperous peasants, the movement attracted considerable
support from the non-Brahman masses, and gained additional
strength from the support of certain Maratha princes - most
notably the Maharaja of Kholapur. Paradoxically, the movement
was reinforced ideologically by the Brahmans' resurrection of
the Shivaji tradition, which accorded a central role to the 
154Marathas.
152. Omvedt, op. cit., p.1430; Zelliot, op. cit., pp.397-415; 
Kumar, op. cit., pp.304-08 and 313-16.
153. See Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and Nationalists in Poona', in 
EPW, Vol. IX (6-8) , 1974 , pp.201-16, for subsequent non- 
Brahman elite grievances against the Brahmans, and for 
the gathering momentum of the non-Brahman movement.
Zelliot, op. cit., p.408.154.
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But despite this conflict the Brahmans and non-Brahmans
155remained linked by a strong cultural bond. For example, the
non-Brahman movement adapted to its own ends the same tradition-
based ideological vehicles that had earlier been developed by
156their Brahman opponent Tilak: the conflict was at least
being fought in the same language. Moreover, the Brahmans
were far from completely alienated from non-Brahman audiences.
From the early 20th century Brahmans, as well as non-Brahmans,
began to adapt the traditional tamasha (a popular, earthy dance-
drama) and hari-kirtan (a one-man recital of bhakti devotional
157poetry) to convey modern political messages. Tilak's
success in working class mobilisation, even though it was
limited and ambiguous, was further evidence of the continuing
possibilities for Brahman communication with the masses.
The bond persisted largely because the Brahman
intelligentsia, unlike the bhadralok, did not become
completely divorced from productive activity - nor, therefore,
from the social and economic life of the masses. The
Chitpavans, for example, had traditionally engaged in a wide
range of occupations, including agriculture, and were able to
15 8continue to demonstrate this adaptability under colonialism.
159For example, they continued to engage in cultivation
155. Kumar, op. cit., pp.316-17 & p.332.
156. Cashman, op. cit., Chapters IV and V.
157. G. Omvedt, 'The Satyashodhak Samaj and Peasant Agitation', 
in EPW, Vol. VIII(-4), 1973, pp.1973-74; McDonald,
op. cit., pp.230-31.
158. M.L.P. Patterson, 'Changing Patterns of Occupation 
Among Chitpavan Brahmans', in IESHR, Vol. VIII(3), 1970, 
pp.375-96.
159. ibid..
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largely, perhaps, because the virtual absence of zamindari-type
systems in Maharashtra prevented a large-scale move into
rentier landlordism.. .Brahmans did not become significantly
involved in the ownership or management of industry. Nevertheless
the Brahman intelligentsia in Bombay did at least participate
in a milieu in which Indian industrial entrepreneurship was
dominant, and it was in close contact with intelligentsias
16 0drawn from the industrialist communities. For this reason
Bombay's Brahman intelligentsia, though not in immediate 
contact with the industrial world, was not separated from it by 
the structural barriers between the intelligentsia and industry 
which existed in Bengal.
The vitality developed by the non-Brahman movement 
from the late 19th century attested to the continuing relative 
strength and assertiveness of the intermediate levels of the 
Maharashtrian social structure, and to these intermediate
161classes' ability to produce an intermediate intelligentsia.
This middle level vitality and assertiveness posed a 
considerable barrier against 'elitist' attempts to mobilise a 
subordinated mass following, yet it also provided a potential 
bridge to the labouring population for an elite leadership with 
an egalitarian political program. Bombay city's 20th century 
industrial working class inherited a late 19th century legacy 
of labour reform work by non-Brahman movement activists such ad
160. See, eg.: Dobbin's section on 'Shetias and Intelligentsia', 
op. cit., pp.154-72; J.C. Masselos, 'Bombay in the 1870s: 
a Study of Changing Patterns in Urban Politics', in
South Asia, No. 1, 1971, pp.29-55.
161. See Zelliot, op* cit.., p.414 on this.
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the mali (gardener caste) intellectual, N.M. Lokhande.
Lokhande's work, though very limited in its effectiveness,
contrasted with that of his Bengali contemporary, Sasipadu
Banerjee, in that its inspiration was indigenous and in that
it attempted to resolve concrete industrial problems as
perceived by the labourers. Whereas Banerjee left behind
no legacy of reform work, nor a significant place in the
collective memory of the millhands, Lokhande's work was to
be continued into the 20th century and, as late as the 1920s,
16 3his name was being invoked in the mill area. This tradition *
was a potential legacy for subsequent labour organisers of what­
ever caste background or political persuasion.
The non-Brahman movement was not ideologically and 
164politically homogeneous, and this enhanced the possibilities 
for Brahman mass politics. Non-Brahman elite figures - such 
' as the government minister and non-Brahman Party leader
B.V. Jadhav, the wealthy Jedhes of Poona and the prosperous 
Bombay merchant G.R. Shinde - led the anti-Brahman campaign.
They argued in strictly communal terms; but for significant 
sections of the movement, particularly at its base, the 
ideological thrust was not so narrowly defined. Rather, they 
expressed a broader antagonism to all forms of elite exploitation.
162. Chakrabarty makes this point, as well as stressing the 
very different social origins of the two contemporaries: 
in 'Sasipada Banerjee', p.347, fn.6.
163. G. Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and Communists in Bombay', in 
EPW, Vol.VIII(16), 1973, ps. 752 and 755.
164. ibid., pp.749-50; Omvedt, 'The Satyashodhak Samaj', pp. 
1972-80; and 'Non-Brahmans and Nationalists', passim; 
Rothermund, op. cit., pp.57-8.
This antagonism threatened non-Brahman as well as Brahman 
elites, and hence could possibly be harnessed by a radical 
Brahman intelligentsia.
Bombay in the Post-War Period
The complex pattern of indigenous politics in Bombay 
in the post-war years reflected the distinctively high levels 
of both differentiation and continuity in the western Indian 
social order, and the contradictory effects upon this order 
of the great changes attendant upon the First World War.
These effects were magnified by the city's geographical constriction 
and the consequent pressure upon its resources, and by the very 
serious epidemics which broke out in 1918. The new mass 
nationalist politics which developed from this background 
rested on quite different socio-economic bases to the nationalism 
of contemporary Calcutta - a difference highlighting the 
underlying structural differences between the two regions. One 
consequence of the Bombay situation was the increasing viability 
during the. 1920s of a radical mass politics based on the 
industrial working class.
Bombay's politics in the post-War period were shaped 
by a great variety of social classes and communities: the
industrialist and merchant princes, and the leading professionals 
who were closely associated with them professionally, socially 
and politically; the smaller merchants and businessmen; the 
lower-level professionals, the office workers and the students; 
and the working classes. The pattern was made more complex by 
the community and cultural divisions which cut across this 
occupational stratification. The 'modernising'•industrialists,
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and particularly the Parsis who predominated, were highly 
westernised and were culturally close to the British colonisers* 
The primarily Gujarati and Marwari smaller merchants, and the 
minority of Maharashtrian merchants and contractors, were 
markedly 'traditional' - socially, culturally and in their 
business methods. The poorer elements of the educated middle 
class were drawn mainly from the high caste Maharashtrian, 
the Parsi and the Gujarati communities, with Maharashtrian 
Brahmans being the major component. The working classes, as we 
have seen, were overwhelmingly Maharashtrian and Hindu, though 
the Muslim minority was to become a significant element 
politically.
Prior to the First World War an alliance of the 
leading industrialists, merchants and professionals held 
almost unchallenged dominance over the economic and political 
life of B o m b a y . T h i s  position of dominance was reflected 
in the unchallenged hegemony of their organisation, the Bombay 
Presidency Association, in the city. Due to the impact of 
World War I, however, this situation began to change, and the 
underlying cleavages began to be exposed.
Although the industrialists and the merchants were
bound together by their common interests as capitalists, there
were substantial inherent conflicts of interest between them,
166especially over control of the marketing networks. It was
165. J.C. Masselos, 'Some Aspects of Bombay City Politics in 
1919', in R. Kumar (Ed.), Essays on Gandhian Politics:
The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919 (London, 1971) , pp. 149-50.
The following two paragraphs are based on Gordon, op. cit., 
Chapters I, III and V.
16 6.
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in the industrialists' interests to secure the flow and 
prices of their raw materials by replacing the traditional 
speculative trading network into the mufussil with a modern 
capitalist system under their control. This conflict came 
to a head during the War-post-War boom, when speculation in 
the trade of now scarce commodities became rife - an activity 
which contributed to the escalating inflation of the period.
The industrialists' need to control the markets was increased 
by the millowners' economic difficulties after the post-War 
boom.
The government supported the industrialists against
the merchants on this issue. Alarmed at the political unrest
which the spiralling inflation promoted, the government
introduced a number of measures, such as the imposition of legal
controls oh the marketing system, which benefited the
industrialists but curtailed the merchants' freedom and
profitability. The relationship between the state and the
two groups was further complicated by other effects of the War.
In particular, the great demands placed upon the government's
financial resources by its war-time imperial commitments could
167no longer be met by the inelastic, land-based revenue system. 
Accordingly, new sources of revenue were drawn upon, despite 
the political risks involved. Prominent among these new 
sources were direct taxation of the urban business groups and 
increased customs duties. For the industrialists the new taxation 
burden was offset by the competitive advantage gained vis a vis
157 See also Tomlinson, 'India and the British Empire', pp. 
351- 58.
imports from the customs duties and by government promises of 
subsequent fiscal autonomy and a more satisfactory tariff 
policy. There were no such immediate or future compensatory 
advantages for the trading community. In fact those traders 
involved in importing were further hurt by the tariff increases. 
Consequently these government innovations increased the 
alienation of the merchants from the colonial state. These 
economic considerations contributed to the merchant community's 
positive response to Gandhi's post-War agitations against the 
Raj. Moreover, the economic factors were reinforced by a 
cultural sympathy with the religious mode of Gandhi's ideology 
and a political sympathy with his careful, non-violent tactics.
For the industrialists, however, the risks of social and 
political upheaval attendant upon the Gandhian agitations 
confirmed the wisdom of a close relationship with the government: 
the great majority of the industrialists actively opposed the 
Rowlatt and Non-Cooperation campaigns, choosing instead to 
grasp the limited concessions embodied in the 1919 Mont-ford 
reforms-. However their political stance changed again in the 
early 1920s. Because of its wider imperial commitments the Govern­
ment of India was unable to honour its earlier economic promises 
to the industrialists - who were now, additionally, in a 
state of economic crisis. Simultaneously, the nationalists' 
abandonment of agitational politics in favour of constitutional 
politics removed the industrialists' earlier inhibitions about 
opposing the colonial state. Consequently they moved from their 
traditional politics of influence to direct pressure group 
activity, in alliance with the Swarajists, to secure the desired 
fiscal, tariff and monetary policy changes. ’They maintained
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this stance throughout the 1920s.
The political divergence of the industrialists
and the merchants during and from the War years altered the
previous political balance of the city to a very marked
extent. But the responses of the other classes to the War
and post-War changes also contributed to the differentiation.
By the end of the 1910s the Besant Home Rule League,
which was based primarily on the middle and lower-middle class
Gujarati community, had become Bombay's most active political 
16 8organisation. To a large extent this development reflected
the politicisation of the merchants. The merchants also
provided the backbone of the Congress's support in Bombay
during the 1919 Rowlatt Satyagraha and the Non-Cooperation 
169movement. However the non-merchant sections of the Gujarati
middle and lower middle class were also very important
participants in both the League and the mass agitations. Prior
to the Non-Cooperation movement, in contrast, the Tilak Home
Rule League, and the Maharashtrian intelligentsia who supported
170it, played a more subdued role in the city's political life.
The Maharashtrian business community supported the anti-Congress
171non-Brahman movement rather than the Congress. The non-
Brahman movement's lines of support extended into the non-Muslim 
section of the working class, adding a community dimension to
168. Masselos, 'Bombay City Politics', pp.154-60.
169. loc. cit. ; Gordon op. cit, pp.228-42; R. Kumar, 'From
Swaraj to Purna Swaraj: Nationalist Politics in the
City of Bombay, 1920-32', in D.A. Low (Ed.), Congress 
and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1917-1947
(London and New Delhi, 1977), p .85.
170. Masselos, 'Bombay City Politics', pp.153-54.
171. Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and Communists', pp.749-50; 
Rothermund, 'Gandhi and Maharashtra', pp.63-4.
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the class factors inhibiting proletarian participation in
the middle class nationalist agitation.
Nevertheless the Non-Cooperation movement did touch
both the Muslim and the Hindu sections of the workforce. In
the Muslim case, community bonds worked against the class
factors inhibiting working class involvement in the Gandhian
movement. Shaukat Ali, who set up his national Khilafat
headquarters in Bombay in the poor Muslim locality, politically
mobilised the Muslim workers and urban poor of the city for
172the first time. The Gandhians' cautious appeals to the
Maharashtrian mill workers brought large numbers of them on to 
the streets for the demonstration against the Prince of Wales 
in November 1921. But these links between the nationalist
middle class and Bombay's labouring population remained tenuous. 
The Muslim poor were soon to end their brief appearance on the 
nationalist stage, following behind their community leaders after 
the post-Non-Cooperation collapse of the Congress-Khilafat 
alliance. The even more brief Gandhian experiment in mobilising 
Maharashtrian millhands collapsed in mutual disillusion 
immediately after the Prince of Wales demonstration: Non-
Cooperation produced no tangible benefits for the workers; and 
Gandhi's earlier fears that the Maharashtrian millhands' would
172. Kumar, 'From Swaraj to Purna Swaraj', pp.79-82. The 
wealthy Muslim patrons of the city had not previously 
made any attempt to organise the Muslim poor - in striking 
contrast to Calcutta. This contrast was probably directly 
related to the structural differences between the two 
cities and, therefore, reflected the very different 
nature of politics in Bombay and Calcutta.
173. ibid., pp.92-3.
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prove not to be amenable to controlled non-violent politics
17 4in the Congress's cause were confirmed by their violent 
response. When Non-Cooperation receded, nationalist contact 
with, and organisation among, the millhands was virtually as 
negligible as before, despite the opportunities for outsider 
intervention provided by the 1919 and 1920 general mill 
strikes.
However one group of middle class nationalists who
participated in the Non-Cooperation movement did take a more
abiding interest in the proletariat. One of Gandhi's Non-
Cooperation successes in Bombay was his ability to attract the
support of Tilak's primarily upper caste, middle caste
17 6Maharashtrian followers. Despite Gandhi's concerted
campaign to win him over, Tilak had reacted ambivalently to 
Gandhi's program prior to the launching of the movement.
Tilak's death in August 1920 came at a critical moment in the 
preparations for Gandhi's movement. Following his death the 
Gandhians won over the suddenly leaderless Tilakites, achieving 
a particularly significant success among the radical 'Young 
Tilakites' who were students at Wilson and Elphinstone Colleges. 
These students became active non-cooperators, and they were 
prominent in the nationalist politics of Bombay after the
174. Eg., Gandhi told the Bombay Commissioner of Police in 
April 1919, during his Rowlatt satyagraha organising, that 
he intended not to bring the millhands into the movement 
'for many a long day': in G of Bom, Source Material for
a History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. II, 
(Bombay, 1958), p.743.
175. Newman, o£. cit., pp.164-67.
176. Kumar, 'From Swaraj to Purna Swaraj', pp.85-7;
Rothermund, op. cit., pp.62-3.
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withdrawal of the movement. These student radicals included 
among their leading elements those who would become Bombay's 
first communists.
Through their participation in the Non-Cooperation 
movement the Maharashtrian radicals were able to establish 
themselves as a substantial minority in the Bombay Provincial 
Congress Committee (BPCC). There they found themselves in 
conflict with the business-oriented majority - with BPCC figures 
such as the prominent Gujarati lawyer, Bhulabhai Desai, who 
was close to the city's merchants, and Jamnadas Mehta, the
177organisation's leading representative of the industrialists.
For the time being this radical intelligentsia's conflict with 
the 'shetias' and their representatives could be little more 
than ideological. The radicals' only firm support against the 
'business faction' came from the Maharashtrian intelligentsia - 
particularly in Girgaum. They had very few points of contact 
with the working class to whose eventual leadership the 
socialistically inclined among the BPCC radicals aspired.
But developments in the textile industry augered well 
for the future. The general strikes of 1919-20 were the 
beginning of a decade of industrial strife during which the 
existing rudimentary forms of trade union organisation were 
transformed.
During the first two decades of the century a number
of organisations and individuals competed for the allegiance of
17 8the millhands and other workers. Prior to the 1919 strike
177. For an analysis of the relationship between the BPCC and 
business in Bombay between 1922 and the mid-1920s see 
Gordon, op. cit., pp.250-69.
178. Newman, op. cit., pp.122-29; Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and 
Communists', p.752.
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two organisations claimed to represent the millhands - the
Kamgar Hitawardhak Sabha (KHS) and the Social Service League,
both of which had been founded in 1909. The KHS had been
founded by the non-Brahman political leader, S.K. Bole, and
was a welfare and community organisation which sought particularly
to mobilise a following among Bombay's Maratha workers, both in
the mills and elsewhere: 'a vehicle for politicians and
philanthropists, dependent upon the cooperation of the
179traditional leaders'. The Social Service League was the
social welfare organisation of the Servants of India Society.
Its driving force was the moderate Brahman welfare worker,
N.M. Joshi. Joshi - a man of unquestioned integrity, great
ability and unrivalled knowledge of Indian industrial issues -
became India's leading moderate, non-political trade union
leader. The League sought to maintain its independence from
the community organisations and the jobbers, and so had even
less influence that the KHS. Two new organisations were
formed during the 1919-20 strikes - the Besant Home Rulers' Girni
18 CKamgar Sangh and the Tilakite Home Rulers' Indian Labour League. 
These 'front' organisations, which sought to increase the 
influence of their parent bodies by gaining recognition as 
labour's spokesmen during the strikes, established links with 
jobbers in a few mills. The Girni Kamgar Sangh managed to 
survive as an organisation - though barely - after the strikes 
and political agitation of the period in which it was born.
179. Newman, op. cit., p.125.
180. ibid., Chapter V, passim.
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But neither of the Home Rulers' organisations had significant
influence on the millhands and very little in negotiations with
the mill managements. The founding of the All India Trade
Union Congress (AITUC) in Bombay in July 1920 did nothing to
change the situation, except to encourage factional competition
181and realignments among the contending organisations.
All of these labour organisations maintained a
conciliatory approach towards the millowners, seeking
improvements within the existing industrial framework only.
The Social Service League was, additionally, dependent on
millowner financial and moral support for many of its
activities. The activity of these proto-unions was marginal
to the lives of the millhands and the outcome of strikes.
But they did have a limited basis for their existence because
the millowners, who at that stage were continuing to reap
large profits, were prepared - though only under the pressure
of strikes - to grant wage increases and other limited 
182concessions.
From 1922 the situation in the textile industry
changed markedly. The interest of several of the outsider
groups in mobilising labour in the nationalist cause began to
wane with the ending of the Non-Cooperation movement. At the
same time the ending of the industry's economic boom transformed
18 3the character of industrial relations. The changed conditions
181. ibid., pp.165-67.
182. ibid., p.144
183. ibid., Chapter VI.
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began to make the conciliatory approach of the various moderate
labour organisations even less relevant than before, and the
gap between their moderation and the workers' militancy began
to widen. A succession of strikes erupted in the mills
throughout the 1920s, and in each major strike the outsiders
followed rather than led. Nevertheless each strike contributed
to the progressive development of trade union organisation in 
184the industry. In 1925 a new union - the Bombay Textile
Workers' Union (BTLU) - was formed, under N.M. Joshi's
initiative, through the amalgamation of all of the existing
18 5unions except for one which will be discussed below. The
BTLU was the first mill union to have the clearly delineate^, 
centralised, bureaucratic structure of a modern trade union. 
During the next two years the BTLU had an average paying 
membership of some 5,000, making it by far the biggest union 
in the industry's history. But its strength was limited 
because of its continued dependence on the mediation of the 
traditional community leaders, because of its regional 
limitations within the mill area, and because, in the growing 
economic crisis, the millowners were much less prepared than 
before to grant the concessions essential to the credibility 
of reformist trade unionism.
In this context the union which did not amalgamate 
into the BTLU - the Girni Kamgar Mahamandal (GKM) - was in a 
better position to meet the challenges of the second half of
184. ibid., p.105.
185. ibid., pp.200-09.
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18 6the decade, despite its relative lack of numbers and funds.
The GKM was formed during a strike in 1923. Unlike the other 
mill unions, the impetus for its formation came from within 
the workforce itself. Its emergence demonstrated the relative 
assertiveness of the intermediate levels of the Maharashtrian 
social structure. Its leaders were D.R. Mayekar, a Bhandari 
caste mill clerk and storekeeper, and D.A. Bhatavdekar, a 
Brahman jobber. However, a number of militant, mainly 
Maratha, workers were also active in the union's leadership. The 
most prominent of these were A.A. Alve, a Maratha weaver, and 
G.R. Kasle, a Maratha fitter. These men came from the more 
skilled and influential section of the workforce and, in common 
with the other leaders, occupied positions of community 
influence among the workers of their area outside the mills.
Alve came from a peasant family of Santvari state and had 
served in Mesopatamia in the British army during the war - 
an experience which developed in him a level of independence, 
political awareness and distrust of authority unusual among 
millhands. On his return to India he had participated in the 
Non-Cooperation movement. Kasle came from a family of Ratnagiri 
tenants forced from the land to the mills by high rents. The 
GKM, under Mayekar's personal and authoritarian mode of 
leadership, initially followed in the welfare-humanitarian- 
reformist mill union tradition. However as the decade progressed 
the Maratha militants became more interested in the economic issues
186. For the formation, development and characteristics of 
the GKM see ibid., pp.181-85, and Omvedt, 
'Non-Brahmans and Communists', pp.752-53.
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underlying the millhands' worsening situation. Another 
characteristic of the new union was its determination to 
maintain its independence from the outsider leaderships 
which traditionally had dominated labour organisations in 
the textile industry. In part this reflected the anti- 
Brahman legacy of the old KHS, whose former social base 
the GKM incorporated. The GKM was a weak union, without 
an effective central structure, dependent upon the support 
of the jobbers, and with its influence in the mill area limited 
to a few localities. But because of its particular 
characteristics it possessed a potentiality for development 
not possessed by the larger BTLU.
The character of the GKM made it a promising point 
of contact with the working class for the young Maharashtrian 
socialists in the BPCC. The problem of the radicals' 'outsider' 
status, compounded by their mainly Brahman caste composition, 
would have to be overcome, and this would not be an easy task. 
But their militant conception of politics was unburdened by 
Gandhian inhibitions, and ideologically they went beyond 
humanitarian paternalism to challenge the fundamentals of the 
existing order. These features provided a potential basis for 
cooperation with the GKM militants. Moreover, although Bombay's 
emerging Marxists shared with their Calcutta counterparts the 
problem of initial distance from the working class, the very 
existence of recognisable trade union organisation?, and of 
outsider contact with the working class through them, made the 
problem of bridging the gulf much less formidable than in 
Calcutta. This contrast with Bengal reflected the overall
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structural differences between the social orders of western 
and eastern India that we have outlined in this chapter.
In Bombay, therefore, greater potential existed for linking the 
new Marxist ideology to the social classes that could give 
it real content and rescue it from the fate of becoming simply 
one more ideological, factional trend in middle class politics.
4. INDIA'S FIRST COMMUNISTS
In both Bengal and Maharashtra the young, largely
university-educated intellectuals who became communists in the
1920s hdd, by the beginning of that decade, already reached a
fundamental turning point within the intellectual and political
18 7streams within which they had previously participated. In
both cases, mopdver, their arrival at this watershed coincided
with the momentous international and national ideological
transformation of the War and post-War years. The atmosphere
was both highly political and, as one Calcutta communist
18 8described it, 'bohemian'. Dange has attested that a similar
18 9ambience prevailed in Bombay. In both regions most of those
187. The bio-data on the communists is taken from: interviews 
with several of the participants; IB, Communism, (1927), 
'Who's Who', pp.293-346; BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: educational 
qualifications of Bombay communists; and the bio-data on 
communist leaders collected by Professor S.K. Sen and 
associates, and very kindly supplied to the author by 
Prof. Sen. Most of the communists were about 20 years
old in 1920.
188. Interview with S. Lahiri, 9/8/74.
189. S.A. Dange, 'Comrade Ghate - Our First Secretary', in (CPI), 
S.V. Ghate, Our First General Secretary, (New Delhi, 1971), 
pp.2-3. Dange even describes Ghate ashaving been a 
precursor of the modern 'hippie'.
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who were later to become communists were attracted, in varying
degrees, by this 'bohemian' element of the ideological-cultural
environment. Through this transitional 'bohemianism' the
young radicals sought to resolve two inter-related sets of
problems. The first was essentially personal - the problem for
radical intellectuals of casting off the outmoded, irrational
and constricting orthodoxy of their backgrounds to make way
for freer and more rationally-based conceptions. The second
was the problem of finding a new political philosophy, adequate
to the challenges of the new world that was revealed after the
War had disintegrated the old. Dange has recalled that:
All of us of that generation had to begin with such 
revolts [against religious and social orthodoxy], 
challenging "established" values in some way or 
other. Some halted there with growing age. A few 
went further, to politics and revolution, each in 
his own way.190
A small minority of this searching and highly
suggestible generation discovered Marxism and the Soviet
experience. For them Marxism - 'scientific socialism' - provided
an intellectual resolution of both the personal and the
political dimensions of their dilemma, while the Russian
Revolution provided a practical political model for the
struggle ahead. Each of these features - the 'bohemianism',
the openness to new ideological currents, and the distinct
attractions of Marxism and Soviet Russia - are highlighted by
191Somnath Lahiri's rather idiosyncratic experience. Lahiri,
190. ibid., p.3.
191. Interview with S. Lahiri.
1 34
who joined the Bengal Party and became one of its leaders in 
the early 1930s, was strongly influenced by the atheism and 
the Bakuninite anarchist philosophy popular in intellectual 
circles in post-War Calcutta. Through Bakunin he discovered 
the anarchist's foe, Karl Marx. The more he learnt of Marx's 
analysis and politics the more impressed he became. Then, 
subsequently:
As a science student I noticed that [the Soviet 
scientist] Mendeleyev had used Sanskrit characters 
to designate the missing elements in his Periodic 
Table. In those days it was unthinkable for 
Europeans to use "inferior" Sanskrit, and so I 
thought to myself that these Russians must be good 
fellows. I then began looking for Russian literature 
and books about Soviet Russia.192
Lahiri, like others, was sufficiently impressed by what he
discovered of Marxism and the Bolshevik model, and sufficiently
unenthusiastic about the other available political choices in
India, to adopt communism as his politics. But until 1926-27
the political progression of India's first communists was
restricted essentially to the ideological level. Marxist
theoretical texts were very scarce in India - mainly because of
the Raj's censorship - and it took time for these budding
Marxists to digest what was available. Moreover, there were
few opportunities in this period to implement a specifically
Marxist political practice.
But the similarities in the evolution of the two 
groups of communists were matched by considerable contrasts. 
Firstly to describe the communists of both Bombay and Calcutta 
as 'middle' or 'lower middle' class misses an important 
distinction. The Bombay group could adequately be described by
192. ibid..
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the Marxist category of 'petty-bourgeois', for the social
groups from which most of its members came did occupy an
intermediate class position between a bourgeoisie and a
proletariat. The Calcutta communists, in contrast, did not
occupy such a position, for their class existed essentially
outside capitalist productive and social relations. Secondly,
the Calcutta group that began to be formed in the mid-1920s
was composed of politically more diverse elements than its
Bombay counterpart. This was related to the wider crisis of
Bengali politics - a wider cross section was seeking an
alternative. One of the consequences in the 1920s was that
while 'The group in Bombay formed so close a corporation that
the records of their individual activities made a more or less
connected story, ... the Bengal group was much less of a happy 
19 3family'. Finally, for the Bengalis the search for a Marxist
alternative was fuelled, by and large, by a sense that they 
were seeking to break with moribund political traditions. There 
was little continuity between, for example, the terrorist and 
the Marxist conceptions of politics. The young Tilakites of 
Bombay, in.contrast, felt a strong sense of continuity in 
the transition from the old to the new ideological and political 
modes. Paradoxically, however, the Bombay communists were to 
make a much more definite break with the past than would their 
Bengali comrades. The roots of this apparent paradox lay in 
the very different social structures of the two regions.
193. IB, Communism, (1935), p.122.
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Bengal
Four aspects of the Non-Cooperation-Khilafat movement 
and its aftermath in Bengal had a direct bearing on the 
development of communist politics in Calcutta in the 1920s.
The first was the impact of this unprecedented mass movement, 
and then of the manner of its withdrawal, on several young 
bhadralok revolutionaries who had already been strongly 
influenced by the example of the Russian Revolution. The 
second was the drawing of a number of Muslim radicals into 
the joint mass movement against the British, the ideological 
impact upon them of Azad and, following the collapse of Hindu- 
Muslim unity, their later disillusion with community-based 
politics. The third was the politicising effect of the 
national and international events of the period on a group of 
Muslim radical literary figures. The fourth was C.R. Das's 
ideological radicalism - his propagation of the ideals of 
'Swaraj for the 98 percent' and Hindu-Muslim unity - and the 
failure of his main lieutenants to take up these themes in 
the factional struggles which followed his death.
The future bhadralok communists were primarily the sons
of poor east Bengali families, and most were members of the
194revolutionary organisation, the Anushilan Samiti. The economic
impulsions towards new political alternatives appear to have 
been particularly strong for the contemporary east Bengali
194. ibid., p.232-5. Those in the Jugantur group who were
attracted to revolutionary mass action tended to join up 
with the north-Indian based Hindusthan Revolutionary 
Army - later to become the Hindusthan Socialist Republican 
Association.
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195bhadralok, and this may partly explain the ideological 
openness of these young Anushilan members. Nor should we 
forget the internationalist, 'socialist' legacy, stressed
196by Sarkar, of earlier revolutionaries in the Swadeshi period.
But the most immediate catalysts were the World War, the Irish
rebellion, the Russian Revolution and the failure of the
revolutionaries’ war-time plans (in which they had been
involved) to stage a coordinated armed uprising across north
197and east India. At the time of the Russian Revolution
they were under detention following the Raj's crack-down on
the revolutionaries. While they were contemplating the
failure of the attempted armed uprising, news of the Revolution
began to filter into the detention centres. Among those whose
imaginations were fired by this news were Gopen Chakravarty and
Dharani Goswami. Chakravarty, who was from Dacca, recalls that
he first heard of the Russian Revolution through the
Statesman, the 'mouthpiece of British imperialism', which was
'abusively fulminating every day against Soviet Russia,
particularly Lenin. This convinced us that something really
progressive had taken place'. They became 'near-convinced that
this was the way forward for us too', though they could not see
19 8very clearly what that way was. News of the Revolution led
Goswami, from Kishoreganj, and an important member of the
195. Ray and Ray, 'Zamindars and Jotedars',pp.98-101.
196. See fn.85, above, on Dutt and Kanungo.
197. See Laushey, op. cit., pp.10-16.
198. G. Chakravarty, interview with G. Chattopadhyay et_. al. ,
(hereafter, Chakravarty, Interview) in G. Chattopadhyay, 
Communism and Bengal's Freedom Movement, Vol. 1, (1917-29),
(New Delhi, 1970), pp.127-28.
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19 9Anushilan Samiti, to ask himself: 'how could such a miracle
happen? ... We only knew that Lenin had done it'.^^
The advent of the Non-Cooperation movement soon
after their release in 1920 wrought further changes in their
thinking. Although disagreeing with Gandhi's doctrine of 
201non-violence Goswami, for example,
... joined the movement nevertheless because I saw 
before my eyes the unprecedented event of peasants, 
workers and intelligentsia - all the people, 
including a section of the upper class - joining ... 
with enthusiasm. This was a turning-point in my 
thinking - such a gigantic movement we had never 
seen before.202
The effect of the Assam-Bengal Railway strike during the exodus
of the Assam tea plantation coolies made a particularly strong 
2 0 3impression. In the Non-Cooperation movement the Anushilan
revolutionaries now had an Indian precedent to synthesise with 
the Russian model. The ideological progression was furthered 
by visits from two of M.N. Roy's associates in Europe - Nalini 
Gupta and Abani Mukherji - who managed to catalyse a further 
polarisation between the conservative, and now inactive,
204Anushilan dadas and their radicalised youthful followers. 
Chakravarty, and a few others, were sufficiently impressed to
199. IB, Communism, (1927), p.126.
200. Interview with D. Goswami, 8/8/74.
201. For example Goswami was part of the contingent of 
revolutionaries recruited by C.R. Das to attend the Nagpur 
session of the Congress in 1921 in order to defeat Gandhi. 
Goswami sought particularly to defeat the non-violence 
proviso (interview with Goswami).
202. ibid..
203. ibid..
204. IB, Communism, (1927), pp.10-11, p.40; interview with
Goswami; Chakravarty, Interview, p.128; G. Basak, 'Face 
of Nalini Gupta that I Did Not See', in Chattopadhyay, 
Communism, pp.157-62; NAI, H.Poll, 253/1925: statement
of Nalini Gupta to the police, Jan. 1925; NAI, H.Poll, 
300/1924: note on Abani Mukherjee by Kaye, 20/8/22.
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205set out in 1923 surreptitiously for the Soviet Union.
He arrived with doubts: 'why should not intellectuals lead
the revolution? how can workers and peasants effectively run
2 0 6a state?', he asked Roy after reaching Europe. He returned
from Moscow, after two years of work with the Comintern there, 
a convinced communist.^ ^
By that time the withdrawal of the Non-Cooperation
movement, the malaise in Congress and terrorist politics, and
Roy's propaganda material sent from Europe, had produced a
2 08significant group of dissenters in the Anushilan Samiti.
Goswami and Chakravarty decided in 1926 to break with the
209leaders and form a separate, Marxist group. They maintained
contact with the Comintern through Roy, and made unsuccessful 
attempts to send representatives to Moscow. The Intelligence 
Bureau subsequently described this schism as 'a landmark 
in the history of terrorism in Bengal' - the forerunner of the
210large scale defections of the 1930s from terrorism to Marxism.
Goswami and Chakravarty then moved to Calcutta to establish the
headquarters of a Bengal communist group. They hoped to win
other intellectuals from the terrorist organisations and elsewhere
211and to establish a working class base.
205. IB, Communism, (1935) , 
Interview, pp.128-9.
ps. 234 and 2 38; Chakravarty,
206. ibid., p.129.
207 . ibid., pp.130-32; IB, Communism, (1935) , p.235.
208. IB, Communism, (1927) , pp.12 2-2 3; H.W. Hale, Political
Trouble in India, 1917-37, (republished) (Allahabad, 1974), 
ps. 12 and 14; NAI, H.Poll, 253/1925: Note on activities 
of revolutionaries in Bengal from 1/9/24 to 31/3/25.
209. IB, Communism, (1927), ps. 124 and 126; IB, Communism, 
(1935), p.239; interview with Goswami; Chakravarty, 
Interview, p.133. The Anushilan dadas resisted their 
efforts vigorously - to the point of making death threats.
210. IB, Communism, (1935), p.240.
211. ibid., p.239; Chakravarty, Interview, p.134.
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Prominent among the young Muslim nationalists who were
influenced by Maulana Azad during Non-Cooperation were two who
were to become communists - Abdul Halim and Abdur Rezzak Khan.
Rezzak Khan came to Calcutta from Hakimpur in the 24 Parganas 
212district. He was from a family with a remembered Wahabi
background - an important factor contributing to his anti­
imperialist sentiments. With Abdul Halim, from Birbhum, and 
other Muslim students, he formed a group of radical nationalists.
They maintained contact with bhadralok revolutionaries such as
213Santosh Mitra of Anushilan. On joining in the Non-
Cooperation-Khilafat movement they met Azad, with whom they
began working closely. Through discussions with him they
became greatly interested in the Russian Revolution, the
Bolshevik policy of synthesising the Muslim minority movements
with the wider social revolution, the careers of the north Indian
Muslims who left India for Soviet Russia during the hijrat
movement in 1919-20,^  ^and in Azad's work with the local 
215working class. They also met M.N. Roy's emissary, Nalini
212. Interview with Abdur Rezzak Khan, 7 and 8/8/74.
213. ibid.; IB, Communism, (1927), p.293.
214. The hijrat (literally 'flight', particularly flight from 
religious persecution) movement was a post-War Muslim 
protest against current British policy on a range of 
Muslim issues. India was declared to be a land unfit for 
Muslims, and a number (mostly students) left India for 
the neighbouring Islamic countries. These emigrants were 
known as the muhajirs. A number of them went to Tashkent 
and elsewhere in Soviet Russia. They were impressed with 
Soviet policy towards the Muslim minorities of central 
Asia. Several of the muhajirs were recruited by M.N. Roy 
into an expatriate CPl"^  founded in Tashkent in 1921. The 
Tashkent CPI had little direct bearing on the formation of 
the CPI proper, but it did help to attract Muslims towards 
communism in India. For an account of these events see
M. Ahmad, The Communist Party of India and Its Formation 
Abroad, (Calcutta, 1962).
215. Interview with Rezzak Khan.
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Gupta, who furthered their interest in the Soviet Connection.
Rezzak Khan says that at that stage
... my main interest was in advancing the cause of 
Indian independence and my experience was leading me 
more and more to the conclusion that the present 
nationalist leadership would not be able to deliver 
the goods - what was needed was an alternative 
revolutionary leadership. How far would M.N. Roy 
and the Comintern be capable of supplying such an 
alternative leadership? ... all in all, I was still 
a firm nationalist .... I was starting to look 
towards the [international] communist movement as a  ^
dependable and good ally - nothing more than that yetf
The Muslim radicals' great disillusion with Gandhi's decision
to call off the Non-Cooperation movement added urgency to their
search for a socialistic, revolutionary nationalist alternative -
a search which Roy then began to guide.
In early 1922 these radicals also made contact with
a small group of Muslim radical litterateurs centred around
Muzaffar Ahmad and Kazi Nazrul Islam. Ahmad was soon to
acquire fame through his inclusion, as M.N. Roy's principal
Bengal contact, in the 1924 Cawnpore Conspiracy Case, and he
subsequently remained a crucial figure in Bengali communism.
Islam was then beginning to make his name as a talented,
217radical poet, soon to be recognised by Tagore. Muzaffar's
background was quite different to those of any of the other early
communists. He came from the isolated island of Sandwip, in the 
218Bay of Bengal. His family was descended from the Muslim petty
216. Rezzak Khan, interview with G. Chattopadhyay et. al., 
(hereafter, Rezzak Khan, Interview), in ChattopadKyay, 
Communism, p.154.
217. G. Haidar, Kazi Nazrul Islam, (Calcutta, 1973), pp.34-6 and 
p. 42.
218. The following account of Ahmad's background is based on
M. Ahmad, Myself and the Communist Party of India, 1920-1929, 
(Calcutta, 1970) , pp.1-2 7 and pp.79-82 .
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aristocracy and was devoutly religious. This contributed to
Muzaffar's great interest in the Muslim contribution to Bengali
culture and to his desire to escape family constrictions. His
father was an impecunious official at the Sandwip court and
Muzaffar had, therefore, to struggle to attain the English
education he ardently desired. In 1913 he moved to Calcutta
to begin his tertiary education. In Calcutta he became
involved in the Muslim literary association, the Bangiya
Mussalman Sahitya Samiti, which was formed as a Muslim
counterpart to the bhadralok literary association, the Bangiya
Sahitya Parishad. Its goal was to resurrect and 'present before
the Bengalis, especially the Bengali Hindus, different aspects
219of Muslim civilisation'. In 1919 he became assistant
secretary of the association and editor of its journal. In 
this capacity he made contact with Nazrul Islam, quickly
2recognised his youthful talent, and began publishing his poetry.
Muzaffar, who had been alienated from the Swadeshi 
movement by the communal overtones of the revolutionary 
organisations, had not previously become politically involved. 
But events from 1919 began to politicise him, though only 
gradually. C.R. Das's efforts to bridge the communal divide 
between Bengal's Hindu and Muslim intelligentsias, and the 
agreement reached between the Muslim League and the Congress, 
partially offset his objections to the hitherto bhadralok- 
dominated Bengali nationalist movement. After several years of
219. ibid., p.25.
220. See also Haidar, op. cit., pp.14-15.
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attending nationalist demonstrations and following the
industrial strikes of the period with interest, and having
been greatly impressed by the 1917 Revolution, he decided in
2211920 'to make politics the profession of my life'. In
particular, he sought out whatever literature was available
to further his knowledge of socialism, communism and the
Russian Revolution. However, with few political contacts, he
had no idea how he was going to translate this knowledge into
political activity. A possible answer emerged in late 1921
when Ahmad and Nazrul Islam met Nalini Gupta. They expressed
their willingness to work with Roy and the Comintern, and Gupta
222returned to Europe with their names. Muzaffar, through his
diligence as a correspondent, subsequently became Roy's main 
contact in Bengal.
The communist activists of the 1920s were drawn
essentially from these three directions. The organisation in
which they eventually came together, however, had different
origins. The organisation was formed as the 'Labour Swaraj
Party of the Indian National Congress' (LSP). Its founding
fathers were Hemanta Kumar Sarkar and Kutubbin Ahmad. Sarkar
was a Swarajist MLC and had previously been C.R. Das's private
secretary, the editor of Das's newspaper, Bangla Katha, a leader
223of the Press Workers' Union and of a peasant association.
He became a CPI member later in the 1920s but never played an
221. Ahmad, Myself, p.27.
222. ibid., pp.84-103; Chattopadhyay, Communism, pp.59-60.
223. IB, Communism, (1927), p.338; IB (Bengal), 'List of 
Labour Unions', op. cit..
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active role. Kutubbin Ahmad was one of Azad's radical Muslim
followers, had ambitions for the Legislative Council, and had
224become marginally involved in trade unionism. They formed
the LSP in November 1925, in the impasse reached by Bengal
225Congress politics after the death of C.R. Das. It
attempted to preserve the Hindu-Muslim unity fostered, and
the ideological radicalism propagated, by Das: of the 22
22 6members of its Executive Committee, 14 were Muslims,
and the party took a radical stand in the contemporary debate
227on tenancy legislation. In practice it functioned -
2initially at least - primarily as an anti-Sen Gupta faction,
and it directed its attention mainly towards Legislative
229Council politics.
224. IB, Communism, (1927), ps. 128 and 158.
225. MCCC, P.52: Peasants' and Workers' Party, EC Report for
1927-28. (This report includes short histories of the 
LSP and its succesor, the PWP.) For the state of BPCC 
politics at this time see: Broomfield, op. cit., pp.
226-75; Gallagher, op. cit.., pp. 593-97 .
226. MCCC, P. 549 (8): Executive Committee of the LSP/PWP for 1926 .
227. Chattopadhyay, Communism, pp.94-5, which contains excerpts 
from the 1925 Atmasakti polemic between Sarkar and the 
BPCC on this issue.
228. For example it had the support of T.C. Goswami, one of
Calcutta's 'Big Five', an opponent of Sen Gupta and a 
supporter of Subhas Bose: NAI, H.Poll, 112/1925: Bengal
FRl, Dec.; see also IB, Communism, (1927), p.129.
229. Eg., there were three other MLCs on the Executive besides 
Sarkar, and two of these were Muslims (MCCC, P.549(8): 
op. cit.). Moreover, Kutubbin Ahmad had previously been 
defeated in his attempt to win election to the Legislative 
Council (IB, Communism, (1927), p.128). During 1925 
Sarkar attacked the Sen Gupta faction for representing 
only the 'vested interests' and betraying those of 'the 
people' (NAI, H.Poll, 112/1925: Bengal FRl Dec.; fn.227). 
The Sen Gupta faction responded by branding Sarkar as
a police spy because he was supporting the government on 
the Tenancy Bill and in its policy of promoting peasant 
organisations. Sarkar responded by resigning from the Swaraj 
Party and the AICC: Chattopadhyay, Communism, p.95;
Ahmad, Myself, pp.414-15.
The LSP, which changed its name several months
later to the Peasants' and Workers' Party (PWP), drew in
others besides those preoccupied with Legislative Council
and BPCC politics. Kutubbin Ahmad had connections with the
Halim/Rezzak Khan group of Muslim radicals and with the
2 30literary group around Muzaffar Ahmad and Nazrul Islam.
Halim and Islam joined soon after the party's formation and 
Islam became the editor of Langal (the Plough), the party's 
organ. Muzaffar joined in early 1926, soon after his release 
from jail. Rezzak Khan came in some time later. Another group 
of litterateurs, of which the Calcutta High Court advocate,
Naresh Sengupta was the most prominent, also joined. 
Saumyendranath Tagore, a grand-nephew of Rabindranath, was
2 31another. The party's membership grew to about 40 during 1926.
The LSP/PWP based itself on a populist ideology.
Citing Aurobindo Ghose as an authority, the party's program
declared that 'the salvation of India ... lies in the
combination of young declassified intellectuals and the workers,
2 32industrial and agricultural'. Thus,
... the only means yet left for enforcing the 
demands of the people ... lies through the 
organisation of labour and peasantry ... so that 
they ... may become conscious of their political 
rights and wrest freedom from the unwilling hands 
of vested interests by their own might and for 
their own interest.233
The party's declared object was 'the attainment of Swaraj in 
the sense of complete independence of India based on economic
145
230. IB, Communism, ps. 32 & 128; Ahmad, Myself, ps. 291 & 358.
231. ibid., pp.414-16; MCCC, P.52: op. cit. .
232. MCCC, P.549(13): Policy and Programme of the LSP.
233. ibid..
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and social emancipation and political freedom of men and
women', through 'non-violent mass action [as the] ... principal 
2 34means'. But despite its stated goal of organising the
masses, the program gave almost no attention as to how this 
was to be done. Instead, it provided a set of tactical 
guidelines for work in the Legislative Council. Moreover, 
Congress membership was a necessary pre-condition for membership 
of the party.
The party initially made some impact in Calcutta
through its journal, which carried a dedication'by Rabindranath 
2 3 6Tagore. For example, all 5,000 copies of its first issue
were sold. But this popularity appears to have been largely
due to that of its 'rebel poet' editor, Nazrul Islam, who
published a series of long populist pieces in Langal. Much
of Langal's content was literary, and there is no evidence of
a revolutionary Marxist class analysis - even in Muzaffar's
article calling for the building of a communist party, or
in the series of articles on great Marxist leaders. M.N. Roy
decided, nevertheless, that the PWP was the most promising
available basis for a Bengali Marxist party, and encouraged its
2 39further development. In 1926 he directed the Anushilan group,
234. ibid..
235. ibid.: Constitution of the LSP.
236. Adhikari, Documents, Vol. 2, p.680.
237. ibid., p.676. English translations of 'Samyavadi', the 
poem Nazrul Islam published in this issue, and of his 
subsequent Bengali translation of the Internationale, 
appear in the MCCC evidence: P.49-T and P.519-T respectively.
238. See the synopsis of the first eight numbers of Langal (Dec. 
16, 1925 - Feb. 11, 1926) in Adhikari, Documents, Vol. 2, 
pp.676-79, and the extract from Muzaffar's article on pp. 
622-23.
IB, Communism, (1927) , ps. 98 & 129. See also Roy's Mar.
1926 article, 'Langal', in Adhikari, Documents, Vol. 2, 
pp.6 8 7- 8 9.
239 .
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with whom he had maintained separate contact until then, to 
merge with the PWP.^^
The PWP began its career under unpromising circumstances:
'The nationalist movement was still in a state of apathy and
disorganisation, and funds being short and the political level
of the membership low, the Party was able to make little 
241progress'. The shortage of funds encouraged the party to
look (largely unsuccessfully) to M.N. Roy as a potential
financier. It also encouraged bickering and suspicions over
the use - and misuse - of the limited funds which Roy did 
242provide. In addition to the PWP's financial problems, it
was badly affected by the escalating communalism leading to,
and aggravated by, the April 1926 Calcutta riots, which also
sealed the fate of C.R. Das's rapprochement with Calcutta's 
2 4 3Muslim elite. The communal hostility affected Langal's
sales so badly that it had to cease publication.^ ^
But through Muzaffar's correspondence it had developed
240. Interview with Goswami; Ahmad, Myself, pp.426-27.
241. MCCC, P.52: 0£. cit.; see also NAI, H.Poll, 112/1926:Bengal FR2 Feb.
242. IB, Communism, ps. 99, pp.101-02, ps. 129 & 133. Part
of the reason for the suspicions about the misuse of 
overseas remittances was that, unknown to the communists, 
Intelligence regularly intercepted sums which Indian 
communists knew had been sent from Europe. Resentment at 
Roy's not sending significant amounts of his substantial 
Comintern-supplied funds ran high in Bengal. For 
example in April 1926 one group wrote to Europe: 'The 
boss [Roy] and family are living as Princes ... and the 
boys here - real, sincere workers - are starving. You 
hypocrites mean no business; you are simply exploiters' 
(quoted in ibid., p.99). According to Charles Ashleigh, 
who worked with Roy in Berlin, Roy did live like a 
'Prince': interview with C. Ashleigh, 18/1/74.
243 . See Broomfield,’ o£. cj_t. , pp.276-9, for the riots, their 
context and their consequences.
244. MCCC, P.52: o£. cit.; Ahmad, Myself, p.417. Ahmad says that,
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2 4 5its international communist and inter-provincial contacts
and, through the Anushilan group's merger with it, it was now
in closer contact with Bengali revolutionary circles. In
late 1926 it also began a new organ, Ganavani ('Voice of the
Masses'). By this stage the Intelligence Bureau could describe
the PWP as 'to all intents and purposes the Bengal branch of the
2 4 7Indian Communist Party'. All of Calcutta's existing proto­
communists were now gathered together in one organisation. This 
marked a certain advance towards the establishment of a 
specifically communist organisation.
Nevertheless, the PWP, in early 1927, was still not 
in a very promising position. As a small faction existing 
largely outside the ambit of the provincial Congress organisation, 
it exercised little influence on Calcutta's nationalist politics. 
Nor had its members taken any significant steps to bridge the 
enormous gulfs which separated the Bengali middle class from the
peasantry and the industrial working class the party intended 
248to organise. Moreover, the PWP maintained only a fragile unity.
244. Cont'd
in particular, Hindu patronage declined markedly because 
the paper's editor was a Muslim.
245. Eg., MCCC, P.1140: Ahmad to Joglekar, 19/1/26, which is 
typical of many such letters; MCCC, P.447(5-12): a series 
of letters to and from the Kresintern (the Comintern's 
Peasant International), Mar.-Jun.1926.
246. The old Anushilan group claims that the PWP became a 
political force of any significance at all only after its 
group merged with the party: interview with Goswami.
247. IB, Communism, (1927), p.129.
248. Bhadralok inhibitions appear to have been partly responsible
for this. Lahiri, eg., has said that the communists' 
becoming involved in labour organising led to very serious 
conflicts with their families, who were unhappy about their 
children mixing with 'coolies' (interview with Lahiri). See 
also Spratt's comments in: MCCC, P.527(8): 'The Split in
the W.P.Party' (Feb. 1928); Blowing Up India; Reminiscences 
of a Former Comintern Emissary^ (Calcutta, 1955) , pp.5Ö-5I.
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The older patron-figures such as Naresh Sengupta had little 
in common politically with the aspiring Marxists. But, more 
seriously, there was an unresolved political division between 
the former terrorists and those who had not been involved in the 
revolutionary nationalist organisations. The consequent 
tensions were strongest between Muzaffar Ahmad, on the one 
hand, and Goswami and Chakravarty on the other. The central 
difference was over the question of what relationship the 
party should adopt towards the terrorists and, more specifically, 
towards those who were disillusioned with the terrorist way 
and who wanted to join the party. This question would remain 
a live one into the 1930s.
Maharashtra
The original nucleus of the Bombay communist group
emerged from the radical young Tilakite students who joined the
Non-Cooperation movement from Wilson College. The chief figure
in this nucleus was S.A. Dange, the 'John the Baptist of Indian 
249Communism'. Others who were prominent were R.S. Nimbkar,
R.V. Nadkarni and V.D. Sathaye (the son of the prominent Home 
Ruler, Dr. D.D. Sathaye). The Wilson College group were in 
contact with another group at Elphinstone College which included
249. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: Note on the Girni Kamgar Union, 
1928-1934. The following two paragraphs are based on: 
Dange, 'Comrade Ghate', pp.2-10; 'Who's Who', in IB, 
Communism, (1927), pp.293-346; BSAI extracts, 1920-24; 
and interview with S.S.Mirajkar, 19 and 22/8/74.
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S.V. Deshpande, who in the early 1930s was to become one of 
the CPI's leaders. The Bombay group also made contact with 
students outside Bombay, such as K.N. Joglekar at Poona and 
Lalji Pendse at Baroda. These contacts later moved to Bombay. 
Others gravitated towards the group after Non-Cooperation:
S.V. Ghate, a St. Xavier's College student and an escapee from 
an orthodox Mangalore family; S.S. Mirajkar, a young Shimpi 
(tailor caste) bank clerk; a group, prominent among whom was 
V.H. Joshi, who had been Non-Cooperators in the satyagraha 
against the Tata hydroelectric works at Mulshi; and C.G. Shah, 
a Gujarati Jain. As with the Bengal communists, these students' 
evolution to communism also began with the first, filtered 
reports of the Russian Revolution, the impact of the working 
class strikes of the post-War period, and the launching of the 
Non-Cooperation movement.
Bombay's 1920s Marxists were overwhelmingly Maharashtrian 
Hindus, and most were Brahmans. Some were born in Bombay, others 
were from the Deccan, and several were from the Konkan districts. 
Most came from comfortable middle class families while others - 
like Joglekar, who was the son of a postman and the brother of 
a millhand - were not so comfortably off.
The interesting exceptions to the general pattern were
Shah and Mirajkar. Shah, from Gandhi's home state of Kathiawad,
was an intellectual in whom 'familiarity, powerfully aided by
250Marxism, had bred a deep contempt for the Mahatma'. He
became Bombay's most learned Marxist, and was the only Gujarati
250. Spratt, Blowing Up India, p.33
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in the Bombay group. Nor did any Parsis become communists,
although one - S.H. Jhabvala - became an important trade union 
251contact. In the late 1920s a number of working class
figures - most notably Alve and Kasle - moved close to the 
middle class Marxists, but in this decade Mirajkar was the only 
person from a lower-caste or peasant background who became a 
communist. Mirajkar's career - as with those of Alve and, 
to a lesser extent, Kasle - is also interesting in that it 
exemplifies the vitality of the intermediate levels of the 
Maharashtrian social structure; it is significant that there 
were no Bengali communists equivalent to Mirajkar, nor any 
working class allies equivalent to Alve and Kasle.
Mirajkar came from a Kolaba family which had moved
252from its traditional occupation of tailoring into land-ownership. 
His father became a rich peasant, but was later ruined by 
litigation. The impoverished family devoted itself to Mirajkar's 
education nevertheless. He was supported by his postman brother, 
by his mother, who took a job as a mill worker in Bombay, and 
by himself working as an apprentice tailor. Eventually he 
attained a secondary education in both English and French. He 
then got a job in the local French bank, where he remained until 
becoming a full-time communist activist in 1927. Mirajkar's 
politicisation began during a three months long postal strike 
in 1915 when he was still in his village. The extreme hardship 
this caused his family led him to the question '"Why so? Why
251. This will be seen in Chapter 3.
252. The following is based on my interview with Mirajkar.
should some people starve and some people enjoy comfort?"'. His 
political awareness was greatly stimulated when he moved to 
Bombay after the War. He was impressed by the contemporary 
nationalist agitations - the Tilak and Besant Home Rule League 
activities, and then the Non-Cooperation movement. He left 
school and became a Congress volunteer during Non-Cooperation.
He then discovered the concept of socialism through the writings 
of Upton Sinclair. It was therefore a natural step for the 
young Mirajkar to contact Dange's group when he heard of its 
activities and to begin making trade union contacts. These were 
the first steps in a long political career which led to - among 
other achievements - his becoming Mayor of Bombay.
But Mirajkar and Shah were the exceptions. The 
communist group emerged overwhelmingly from the militant Brahman 
nationalist tradition of Maharashtra. We will examine the career 
of Dange, who was the group's most prolific writer as well as 
its most prominent member, to see what this background meant for 
the development of communism in Bombay.
Dange's background was very different to that of
Mirajkar. He was from a reasonably wealthy family descended
from a 'landlord-cum-banker' family established by the Maratha
2 5 3rulers in Nasik. His father was employed in a solicitor's
firm in Bombay and, additionally, made money by share-dealing 
during the War/post-War boom. As a child in Nasik city Dange 
had been strongly influenced by the exploits of such Maharashtrian
253. S.A . Dange, 'Dange on "Gandhi Vs Lenin"', in Adhikari, 
Documents, Vol. 1, p.305.
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revolutionaries as the Savarkar and Chapjfiekar brothers.254
Above all, however, his political consciousness was moulded
by Tilak's example. Dange and his radical colleagues were
attracted by Tilak's reshaping of Maharashtrian tradition to
fashion a militant anti-imperialist ideology and politics,
his challenges to both the British and the Indian moderates,
and his efforts to mobilise the peasantry and the industrial
workers. Their interest in the Russian Revolution stemmed in
part from Tilak's. Several of the student radicals worked
with his relief organisation in the mill area during the 1918
epidemic, and Tilak 'instructed' them to involve themselves in
long term working class organisation and in the founding of the 
256AITUC. The student organisation that they formed in 1917
campaigned openly for Tilak, and against his moderate opponents.
In his recent study of Tilak's political career, Cashman 
has stressed the deeply ambiguous nature of his political legacy.25‘ 
After his death most of Tilak's followers interpreted this 
legacy in centrist or right-wing terms. But for the student
254. B. Deshpande, 'Editor's Note', in S.A. Dange, Selected 
Writings, Vol. 1, (Bombay, 1974), pp.11-22.
255. For an example of Tilak's response to Lenin and the Russian
Revolution see his 1918 Kesari article 'The Russian Leader, 
Lenin', in, D. Kaushik and L. Mitrokhin (Eds), Lenin: His
Image in India, (Delhi, 1970), pp.4-5. See also the Aug. 
1920 Kesari article 'Moral Victory of Lenin', in ibid., 
pp.58-9. The articles reproduced on pp.49-146 of this 
volume present a useful index of how Lenin was perceived
in the sympathetic nationalist press. See also: P.C. Joshi
et. al., Lenin in Contemporary Indian Press (New Delhi);
P.B. SinhiT^  Indian National Liberation Movement and Russia 
(1905-1917), (New Delhi, 1975), Chapter 5.
256. S.A. Dange, Origins of Trade Union Movement in India, (New 
Delhi, 1973), p.61; BSAI, 1920, para.390.
257. Cashman, op. cit., Chapter IX.
258. ibid., p.217.
and theyradicals Tilak was an 'instinctive socialist',
believed that they were following the trajectory that he
would have taken had he remained alive. Dange's writings of
the period (and since) constantly offer this interpretation
2 6 0of Tilak as a socialist. Dange attempted to synthesise the
Lokamanya's ideology - or, rather, certain elements of his
ideology - with his own early conceptions of Marxism and
aspects of the new politics of Gandhism. Dange's 1921 booklet,
Gandhi Vs Lenin, was his earliest such attempt. This study did
not achieve the desired resolution of the three philosophies.
Although it strongly suggested that, for Tilak's followers,
Lenin was more relevant than Gandhi, the book did not get far
beyond a syncretic cataloguing of the respective merits of the 
2 61two men. It finally recommended a social democratic path
2 62forward. Nevertheless Gandhi Vs Lenin was a creative attempt
259
259 . Joglekar, quoted in Newman, op_. cit. , p.213.
260. Eg. the following piece, written in 1921: Tilak 'became a 
joining link between the intellectuals and the masses.
Through him the intellectuals came to realise their duty 
and to lead the masses and love them. The yawning cleavage 
was filled up. He taught the masses their individual rights 
to freedom, to free speech, to be left alone in their land 
and not to be exploited for the sake of foreigners' (from 
Gandhi Vs Lenin, in Dange, Selected Writings, pp.56-7). For 
an example of Dange's retrospective interpretation of Tilak 
in this light,see Dange, Origins of Trade Union Movement, 
pp.39-62.
261. See particularly the comparative list of Gandhi's and 
Lenin's respective merits, in Dange, Gandhi Vs Lenin, pp.93-5
262. Eg.: 'We cannot accept the communist plan, in all details,
because it is too much fraught with coercion and violence.
It must be accepted to this extent that great concerns like 
railways, mines and vast factory plants may be nationalised' 
(ibid., p.121). This was a constant theme in Dange's 
writings. Eg. in Dec.1922 he wrote that socialism could be 
brought about by non-violent evolutionary means. This would 
be the only possible method in India, because the masses 
were 'dumb and illiterate', and the 'national temperament' 
was peaceful and conservative (quoted in BSAI, 1923, para.
155 .
to relate Leninism, as Dange saw it, to the 'socialist'aspects
of Tilak's ideology. In the process he was attempting,
implicitly, to synthesise Leninism with Tilak's interpretation
of Maharashtrian tradition. Dange was very conscious of the
political importance of Tilak's experiments in linking modern
political themes with traditional forms. He wrote, for example,
that one of the reasons for Tilak's greatness was 'his treasure
of independent philosophy':
[Through] his masterly treatise on the Geeta, [Tilak]
... put before the people ... a new conception of 
Man's action. ... The people of India are always 
in a mood to accept anything that came from a religious 
source. Geeta was the only source through which any­
body could speak to the people. ... he revealed to 
the world ... the underlying principle of continuous 
Karma, without egoistic covetousness for the fruits 253 
of it, ... for the realization of the divinity in man.
Thus the continuing vitality of the pre-colonial tradition in
Maharashtrian politics meant that the question of 'Indianising'
received Marxist doctrine was present from the beginning in 
264Bombay. Partly for this reason, the Bombay group were critical
of Roy's attempts to 'direct' the Indian movement from afar, 
believing him unable to understand Maharashtrian conditions
265and incapable of adapting Marxist doctrine to these conditions.
262. Cont'd
58). The BPCC 'socialist faction' - perhaps echoing Tilak - 
also advocated council-entry after the withdrawal of Non- 
Cooperation: BSAI, 1922 , para 1232(b). He reiterated a 
similar point of view in 1927 (MCCC, P.2311: police report 
of a communist public meeting, 28/8/27) .
263. From Gandhi Vs Lenin, p.59.
264. Further evidence of this concern is provided by many of 
the editorials in his journal, Socialist, between 1922 and 
1924 (in Dange, Selected Writings, pp.137-294) . See 
especially the piece titled 'The Geeta Supports Marx's 
Economic Determinism', in ibid., pp.147-51.
Eg.: Socialist, 16/12/22 and 12/3/24: in BSAI, 1923, para.
5 8, and 1924 , para 435/ respectively; a .letter by Dange to 
a friend in early 1923 (in BSAI, 1923, para. 294) in which
265.
Initially the Dange group's activities centered on 
a journal called the Socialist, which Dange began in August 1922. 
It was this activity which attracted Mirajkar and several others 
to the group. The Socialist devoted itself, in the context of 
the Gandhian failure, to a search for a left-wing nationalist 
alternative. The editorial of the first issue outlined this 
alternative:
With nothing to offer the toiling masses we cannot 
move forth. ... The cause of our misery lies in two 
things: the foreign domination and the indigenous 
vulture, the class that preys upon the wealth of 
the nation and the bread of the toiler. ... The 
conscious and the cultured must take this new 
message to their unconscious and unknowing comrades.
Let the educated and the cultured be fired by the
new creed, to preach it to the masses, and the hostS2gg
of India will win true Swaraj for them and for all.
Of the 'indigenous vultures', Dange identified the capitalists
as the primary target. 'And who are the Indian capitalists?',
he asked rhetorically in his Gandhi Vs Lenin
Most of our trade, foreign and inland, is centred in 
the hands of the Shethias of the Gujarati community, 
the Marwaris, the Parsis and the Bohras. Allied as 
their interests are with the foreign Government and 
foreign capitalism, these capitalist communities of 
• our society are naturally opposed to our attempts 
at emancipation. And they in turn exhibit all the
265. Cont'd
he commented on Roy's efforts to get Indians to go to 
Europe for a communist conference: 'I think it is a mad
venture for Indians to go hunting Communism in European 
conferences; whatever has to be done must be done in India. 
Moreover, there must be less talk of revolution than what 
Roy indulges in; when even the preliminary rights of labour 
are not obtained it is a dream to talk of proletarian 
revolutions'. However Range's public criticism was also 
a response to the political liabilities in Congress circles 
of association with Roy's name: see the section on 'The 
Raj and 'Communism'', below.
266. In Dange, Selected Writings, pp.139-40. See also the police 
report of a contemporaneous meeting held to rally support 
for this political alternative (in BSAI,. 1922), para.1224).
At the same time the Socialist took up the cause of the tram- 
waymen who were then on strike: Socialist, 23/9/22, in BSAI, 
1922, para.1328(e).
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greediness, idleness, cruelty, luxurious and 
demoralized life consequent upon capitalism in 
every ... country. The capitalist landholders ruin 
the middleclass-man by cornering large land-areas 
and then charging exorbitant rentals for the tenants. 
Some of them make a sham of starting industries for 
public benefit... . 267
Dange later absolved Indian capital from the charge of complete
compradorism, but the force of the critique remained:
If the differences between [colonial and Indian 
capital]... come to a head ... the Indian capitalist 
class will ally itself with the popular mass-movement, 
and try to squeeze out concessions. If the British 
bourgeoisie distracted by other circumstances just 
chooses to give in, that bourgeois wing will leave 
the mass-movement ... though it may profess some 
sympathy ... Then the mass movement will have to 
... face an opposition of the Foreign and Native 
Bourgeoisies Allied together. 268
These excerpts provide interesting examples of the
first, tentative, Marxist-inspired critique of Indian society.
This level of analysis was absent in contemporary Calcutta.
One of the reasons for this contrast was, undoubtedly, the
Maharashtrians' relative proximity to an actual bourgeoisie,
which allowed them to develop their Marxist perspective by
269applying it to a situation it 'fitted'. These excerpts also
show that in the eyes of this young Bombay Maharashtrian,
267. p.72.
268. Socialist, 28/10/22, in Dange, Selected Writings, p.191.
269. For example Dange who, during his youth, assisted his 
father in his share-dealings in Indian companies, has 
written that 'It is because of this that I began to know 
what the mills were, how profits were made and what 
speculations by the big bourgeoisie on the exchange 
meant to finance and industry. This knowledge helped me 
in my work in my later days and was reflected in the 
writings in the Socialist and the struggle of the 
textile workers' ('Dange on"Gandhi Vs Lenin"', p.306).
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indigenous capital was not only exploitative, decadent and 
collaborative, but essentially foreign to Maharashtra as 
well. We can perhaps see here a continuation of the old 
Poona critique of Bombay, as well as the influence of the 
Marxist critique: Marxism fitted well with the militant
Maharashtrian viewpoint of these youthful members of an 
'outsider' element in Bombay's elite society. An alliance 
with Bombay's Maharashtrian working class, too, made sense 
in these terms as well as Marxist ideological terms.
Resistance to Gandhism grew from the same perspective. Thus, 
in a real sense, Marxism was a natural progression from 
'Tilakism' - in a way that it was not for other Indian nationalist 
trends - while at the same time going beyond it. This may help 
to explain why Bombay's early communist movement was overwhelmingly 
composed of Maharashtrian Brahmans.
Ironically, in the light of the Dange condemnation
of Indian capitalism, the progress of the socialist group was
aided considerably by a wealthy, middle-aged flour mill owner
and merchant called R.B. Lotwala. Lotwala, a capitalist with
27 0Arya Samajist convictions and socialist tendencies, provided 
the patronage that made a number of the young proto-Marxists' 
ventures possible. He employed Shah as his secretary, financed 
the Socialist and other publishing efforts, and provided a 
library stocked with socialist (though not Leninist) literature
270 . BSAI, 1922, para.1714.
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2 71and a hostel for those in need. Apart from playing an
important role in the Bombay group's development, Lotwala's 
'big and generous purse' allowed it to look less towards the
272Comintern for financial support than was the case elsewhere. 
Earlier, the Wilson College student group, too, had received
. 273aid from a capitalist - the nationalist millowner, Umar Sobhani. 
Sources of support of this kind were not available for the 
comrades in Bengal.
All of the young socialists were active Congressmen
and their political activity until 1927 was conducted primarily
within the BPCC. In this, too, they contrasted with the
Calcutta communists. The Bombay group sought to win over adherents
to their left faction and to transform the Congress's Labour
274Sub-committee into a viable organisation, and attacked the
275BPCC 'merchants', 'whose God was Capitalism'. In 1923, during
a major mill strike, they also attempted seriously, for the 
first time, to make direct contact with the working class.
271. Dange, 'Comrade Ghate', pp.5-11; S.S. Mirajkar, 'Comrade 
Ghate - the Leader of Leaders', in (CPI) , S.V. Ghate, 
p.31; BSAI, 1922, para. 1659 and 1923, para. 1232. The 
Bombay group's other publishing ventures included a 
'Socialist Series' of reprints of Marxist and socialist 
works such as The Communist Manifesto, R.P. Dutt's 
Communism, W.fT Hay's The Logic ~of~he Machine and 
Lucien's The Coming of Socialism.
272. Dange, 'Comrade Ghate, p.ll.
273. Dange, Origins of Trade Union Movement, p.66.
274. BSAI, 1924, para. 454; Socialist, 20/2/24.
275. These were the terms of a 1922 attack on prominent BPCC 
figures, by Dange;for their alleged manipulation of the 
Tilak Swaraj Fund for their personal gain (BSAI, 1922, 
para. 409(23) - which also reports that the 300 present 
at the meeting were 'mostly Deccani Hindus').
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However the attempt met with millhand resistance and was 
27 6unsuccessful. But Joglekar did form a relationship with
the GKM's Mayekar which was to bear fruit later in the decade.
Dange and Mirajkar also began working with some of the existing
outsider trade unionists. The socialist group's activity was
disrupted by Dange's arrest in 1924 for the Cawnpore Conspiracy
Case and his imprisonment between 1925 and 1927, and it was
inhibited by the political quiescence of the mid-1920s. Little
progress was made. Even the Socialist did not long survive
Dange's arrest. An attempt to intervene in the 1925 strike
2 77did not produce tangible results. The group remained only
2 7 8a faction of left-wing Congressmen.
From 1923 the Bombay socialists began, under Roy's
urgings and together with like-minded individuals in other
provinces such as Ahmad in Calcutta and Singaravelu Chettiar in
Madras, tentative attempts to establish an all-India organisation.
Before Dange's arrest this 'correspondence club' produced little
279more than vague plans for a social-democratic-type party.
276. V.H. Joshi was deputed to work in the mill area during the 
strike in order to establish influence there. The Socialist 
(Feb. 20) advertised him as 'an educated "de-classed" 
intellectual with a decisively proletarian outlook'. 
'Unfortunately', comments Newman (op. cit. , p.185), 'the 
millhands saw him as a Brahman and the representative of an 
alien middle class, conspicuous in white khaddar '. Several 
of his meetings broke up in a shower of stones.
277. ibid., p.216; IB, Communism, (1927), pp.94-95.
278. ibid., pp.134-35.
279. The description is Petrie's: NAI, H.Poll, 109/1934: Petrie 
to Hallett, 7/10/33. See also: BSAI, 1923, paras, 755, 943 
and 1041; IB, Communism, (1927), p.33, pp.42-44 and 63-5; 
NAI, H.Poll, 25/1923: Bengal FRl Feb.. For the continuing 
(and inconclusive) Bombay debate on the question after 
Dange's arrest, see the correspondence in the Socialist 
till the end of 1924, in Dange, Selected Writings, pp.396- 
416.
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Then, in December 1925, after the conclusion of the Cawnpore
Case, a utopian socialist in Cawnpore named Satyabhakta took
the initiative by convening a 'Communist' conference to
coincide with the Cawnpore session of the National Congress.
Satyabhakta intended to establish a legal, open party,
independent of Comintern direction. A contingent from the
Bombay group went to Cawnpore and, with others from other
provinces, 'captured' Satyabhakta's organisation on the grounds
2 80that they disagreed with his conception of a communist party.
However they retained its legal, open character and, despite
Roy's pleadings, made no attempts to have it affiliated with
the Comintern. The CPI founded in December 1925 was to have
2 81only the most nominal existence in the following few years.
Its formation made no discernable difference to either the 
modes or the results of the Bombay or Bengal groups' political 
activity. The most definite outcome of the early attempts at 
inter-provincial and international communication was that the 
Raj used them as a pretext to launch a conspiracy case against 
several-of those involved.
5. THE COMMUNISTS AND THE RAJ - THE FIRST PHASE
The nature of the Raj's response to political opposition
280. IB, Communism, pp.157-65; interview with Satyabhakta, 23/ 
10/74. The documents of this conference, together with an 
introductory article by Adhikari, are reproduced in 
Adhikari, Documents, Vol. 2, pp.591-670.
281. IB, Communism, (1927), pp.99-103, 106-07, 110-17;
MCCC^ P.1207(1): CPI, Executives' Annual Report, May, 1927.
in general, and militant mass politics in particular, was 
crucial to the future of Indian communism. The nature of 
the response would determine the extent to which the 
communists' organisations could function openly, the extent 
to which the communists would need wider pölitical support 
to help counter repression and, to a large extent, the level 
of support that the communists could attract as a consequence 
of their repression.
The Raj's Strategy Towards Opposition
The Raj was both very discriminating in its response 
to opposition and very sensitive to radical mass activity.
Its characteristic approach to the latter was to isolate and 
repress. It proved to be particularly sensitive to communist 
activity - both because of the possible domestic consequences 
of communist politics and because of the international 
connection with that arch foe of British imperialism, Soviet 
Russia. Each of these features of state policy were demonstrated 
in the first half of the 1920s, before an Indian communist 
movement had actually come into being. In a sense, indeed, 
the Raj's 'Bolshevik' conspiracy cases against India's first, 
tentative explorers of the road to Marxism, created India's 
first 'Communists'.
The Raj's overall political strategy was determined 
very much by its need to make the empire pay for itself and,
2 8 2thus, by its need to collect revenue as cheaply as possible.
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282. For this paragraph see: Seal, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', 
pp.328-32; Tomlinson, 'India and the British Empire', 
pp.338-49; Gordon, 0£. cit., Chapter I.
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The inexpensive collection of the land revenues upon which 
its administration was based required Indian agents and a 
minimum of opposition to its rule. The Raj was therefore 
obliged to foster an extensive system of collaboration among 
the more dominant elements of Indian society. As Britain's 
wider imperial demands upon Indian revenue increased, so did 
the Raj's need to extend the system of collaboration - either 
to forestall potential resistance to to neutralise opposition 
by isolating it. But the extent to which collaboration could 
be bought was limited by the Raj's need to satisfy the wider 
imperial demands upon its resources. This situation of dual 
responsibility - to ensuring inexpensively maintained political 
stability in India and to meeting its imperial commitments - 
was one of inherent tension for the Raj. The 'liberal' character 
of the colonial state in India - its exphasis on, and careful 
commitment to, the rule of law, and its periodic devolution 
of certain of its powers to Indians - was largely a product of 
this imposed dynamic. So, too, were the frequent conflicts 
over policy priorities between the different levels of the 
administration. But that a considerable tension between imperial 
and Indian demands did exist was also testimony to the strength 
- actual or potential - of Indian opposition to colonial 
exploitation. More precisely, it attested to the strength of 
those politically dominant elements of Indian society whose 
opposition could be - and often was - bought off (if only 
temporarily) with concessions by the state. In other words 
the tension was in part an index of the relative strength of
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2 8 3what the communists categorised as 'bourgeois' nationalism.
In contrast to 'bourgeois' nationalism, communist revolutionary 
mass demands would be inherently non-negotiable, for there would 
be no grounds for compromise with imperialism.
The Raj and Post-War Political Opposition
The tension between imperial demands and Indian
resistance approached breaking point during and after World 
284War I. The Raj exemplified its strategy towards Indian
opposition by granting the constitutional concessions embodied
in the Mont-ford reforms in order to win over the moderate
elements (including the industrialists), while passing the
Rowlatt Act to repress the (hopefully, isolated) militant
opposition. However the Government of India revised this broad
strategy in 1920, when it became apparent that nationalist
opposition had reached unprecedented levels and that 'stern
repression was likely to cause a great deal more trouble than 
285it was worth'. The brutal Punjab repression of 1919 was not
to be repeated. The spirit of the Rowlatt Acts, which had
culminated, logically enough, in General Dyer's undiscriminating
repression, was replaced by New Delhi's policy-makers with a
far more liberal and discriminating policy. New Delhi made
this tactical shift despite its deep anxiety about the situation
2 86and despite considerable pressure from London and some of
283. This theme will be taken up in Chapter 5.
284. Tomlinson, 'India and the British Empire', pp.349-65.
285. Low, 'The Government of India and the First Non-Co-Operation 
Movement', p.300. The remainder of this paragraph is 
based on this article.
286. See also Tomlinson, 'India and the British Empire', p.362.
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the provinces. The new policy recognised that although 
Gandhi led the challenge to the Raj, his stated commitment 
to non-violence was genuine. Given the violence of the 
passions that had been aroused among very large numbers of 
Indians, it would be politically unwise, New Delhi reasoned, 
prematurely to suppress this non-violent leadership. Moreover, 
repression would alienate the moderates' support upon which 
the government had become, for the present at least, very 
dependent. Guided by the Home Member, Sir William Vincent,
New Delhi charted an initial course of careful non-interference, 
watching at the same time for signs of the emergence of 
autonomous mass revolt, independent of the Gandhian leadership. 
Gandhi's sudden suspension of the movement after the violence 
at Chauri Chaura saved the Government of India from the 
incalculable consequences of the repressive policy urged 
upon it with increasing insistence by both London and the 
provinces. The government was then free to recover its 
political authority and to make its point about the illegitimacy 
of mass agitation - by arresting Gandhi - without having to 
face the earlier hazards.
The first repression of India's proto-communists took 
place against this background and accorded with this pattern.
It was both a foötnote and a counterpoint theme to the 
government's response to the political unrest of the post-War years.
The Raj and 'Communism', 1919-24
The Government of India implemented a sequence of 
anti-'Bolshevik' measures between 1919 and 1924. They were 
taken largely in response to pressure from an anxious Home
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2 87Government. In November 1919 New Delhi reluctantly
instituted the first such measure - the establishment of a
'Special Bureau of Information', whose function was to
prevent an influx of Bolshevik agents and propaganda, to watch
for signs of emerging Bolshevism in India, and to prepare
2 8 8anti-Bolshevik propaganda to discourage its emergence. The
Bureau set about its work with enthusiasm and imagination: for
example it warned government officials that 'the Bolshevik
agent' was 'not necessarily a surly individual in dirty clothes',
and it saw in the current political unrest 'the danger, to use
the language of electric science, of an induced current of 
2 89Bolshevism'. But by the end of 1920 the Director of the
Bureau, Colonel O'Connor, was forced to agree with the Home
Department that its investigations had proved that 'Bolshevism
2 9 0is non-existent' in India. Accordingly, the Special Bureau
was abolished and its surveillance functions were subsumed by
291the central and provincial Intelligence branches.
However the India Office continued to display anxiety, 
particularly after M.N. Roy began his work in Europe. Apart 
from the dangers posed by the Comintern's new program, the 
Secretary of State informed New Delhi, he was under considerable
287. NAI,H.Poll, 103/III/1923: Note by Hailey (Sec., HD), 17/
12/22, who wrote: 'We were ... entirely opposed to this ...
it was started mainly to satisfy the Secretary of State.'
288. NAI, H.Poll, Progs, Feb. 1920, Nos. 398-412: Viceroy 
(hereafter V) to Secretary of State for India (hereafter 
S of S), 28/1/20.
289. NAI, H.Poll, Progs, Feb. 1920, No. 52: Director, CID, 
Weekly Report, 19/1/20.
290. NAI, H.Poll, A, Jan.1921, Nos. 45-46: DIB (Kaye) to 
McPherson, 25/10/20.
291. ibid., Notes in the HD, 3 & 16/12/20. *
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domestic pressure to ensure that the existing anti-communist 
measures in India were adequate. Moreover, the matter was 
'of world-wide interest to all Governments' and the British 
government had a corresponding international responsibility
292to take all necessary measures against the Bolshevik danger.
In particular, the Government of India should investigate the
feasibility of legislating to make it an offence to be a
29 3communist or to propagate communism.
New Delhi believed that London, through failing to
understand both the real character of the Non-Cooperation
movement and the government's strategy towards it, was taking
2 9 4an 'unduly alarmist' view of the situation. But New Delhi,
in assuring the Secretary of State that the post-Non-Cooperation
situation was under control and did not contain any significant
potential for 'Communist' advances, decided that it was necessary
295to 'give proofs that our assurances are well founded'. More-
292. NAI, 103/III/192 3: S of S to V, 3/12/22.
293. ibid.: S of S to V, 15/12/22; Ferard (Sec., P & J Dept., 
India Office) to G of I, 18/1/23. This was possibly 
desired as a legal precedent for use elsewhere.
294. ibid.: Notes in the HD, 17 & 18/12/22; V to S of S, 
21/12/22; G of I to all Local Governments (hereafter,
LGs), 1/3/23. The India Office failed to understand, 
the Home Department believed, that the chances of a 
future, unchallenged, mass agitation equivalent to NCO, 
or of a serious communist-led agitation, were minimal.
This was for three reasons: the government's need to 
woo the moderates during a critical period was most 
unlikely to be as great in the future, and the government 
would therefore have much more freedom to repress; the 
masses were disillusioned and made passive by the failure 
of NCO; and because even if a communist program developed 
momentum it would alienate the 'respectable classes' and 
so could be much more readily isolated and more safely 
repressed than the Gandhian movement.
295. ibid.: Note by Crerar (Sec., HD) , 6/1/23.
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over the Home Department, after further consideration,
discovered certain domestic advantages in taking anti-'Bolshevik'
measures: it could use the Bolshevik issue to warn Indians of
the government's firm intention not to allow further mass 
2 9 6agitations. The Home Department wished, in particular, to
discourage the political extremists - and particularly the
Bengali revolutionaries, and 'C.R. Das and the extreme left
of the Congress Party' who were seeking to 'organise the
proletariat' - from making tactical alliances with M.N. Roy
2 97and his representatives. It was also hoped that an anti-
'Bolshevik' action would 'open the eyes of the public, the
men who have any stake in the country ... including ... the
small zemindar and ryotwary profitor (sic.), the tradesmen
and the intellectuals' to the hazards of 'Bolshevik' mass 
298politics. Finally, New Delhi was sensitive to its wider
imperial responsibilities - it believed that an anti-'Bolshevik' 
action would be 'additionally opportune' in that it would 
provide ammunition for the Home Government's current
299propaganda attack on Soviet and Comintern activities.
The government's first initiative was imaginative.
In 1922 Roy prepared a manifesto to attempt to influence the 
proceedings of the Gaya session of the National Congress.
296. There was, therefore, a partial parallel between the 
reasoning employed by the government in its arrest of 
Gandhi and that behind its anti-'Communist' measures.
297. NAI, H.Poll, 261/1924: Note by Crerar, 2/6/23.
298. ibid., Note by B.N. Sharma, 7/6/23.
299. ibid.: Note by Crerar, 2/6/23. For the British government's 
propaganda campaign against the Soviets see: Government of 
Great Britain, Papers Dealing With Relations Between His 
Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, 1921-27. 
Parliamentary Papers, 192? , CmcL 2Ö9ü> (London , HMSO , T9 2 7) , 
pp.20-24.
300. IB, Communism, (1924), pp.53-54.
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The government was concerned to dampen Congress radicalism during
this transitional period. It was particularly concerned about
C.R. Das's recent propaganda for 'Swaraj for the masses and
not for the classes' and about Roy's possible influence upon
him.^^ To minimise the effect at Gaya of Roy's manifesto,
New Delhi arranged with Reuters to have it published in the
302press in December. The government hoped thereby to discredit
it by having it categorised as 'Bolshevik'. This temporary
lowering of the Raj's rigid censorship blockade against
communist literature appears to have been very effective in
achieving its goal. The public ridicule of Roy's program
was sufficient for an embarrassed Dange - who had recently been
30 3selected by Roy as his main contact in India and who had
published the program in his Socialist - to publicly dissociate
3 04himself from both it and Roy. And there were no Royist
305echoes at the Gaya Congress.
New Delhi's second initiative was more substantial.
Around this time a number of the Muslim youths who had gone to
Russia during the hijrat movement began to return to India,
306ostensibly to establish a communist movement. Although
their revolutionary potential was not rated very highly by the 
Home Department, New Delhi decided in January 1923 to launch
301. Eg. NAI, H.Poll, 18/1922: Bengal FRl Nov. & FR2 Dec..
302. See NAI, H.Poll, 128/1922: passim.
303. BSAI, 1922, para. 1659.
304. BSAI, 1923, paras 2 & 58.
305. IB, Communism, (1924), p.53. See also Z. Imam, 'The Rise 
of Soviet Russia and Socialism in India, 1917-1929, in 
Nanda (Ed.) Socialism, p.54.
306. see fn.214, below.
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307a conspiracy case against seven of them. The government
decided to use a conspiracy case, rather than the simpler
executive action under Regulation III, because the former
was more amenable to propaganda purposes. The Home Department
chose Peshawar as the site of the trial because under the
North West Frontier Province's legal system conviction would
30 8be certain there. Despite the particularly shoddy nature
309of the case, the convictions were secured. Having established 
a legal precedent, New Delhi then proceeded to prepare another 
conspiracy case against a number of Roy's emissaries and 
correspondents in India. From an original list of 168 names 
the Home Department selected eight for inclusion in the trial.
Of these only four were eventually brought to trial in the 
Cawnpore (Bolshevik) Conspiracy Case of 1924. Again, the 
conspiracy case method was chosen, despite the fragility of 
the 'conspiracy'. This was because a conspiracy case provided 
the propaganda platform that Executive action could not, 
because it was a more satisfactory method of producing a firm 
legal finding against Indian communism, and because it was less
31likely to risk a wider Indian protest on constitutional grounds.
307. NAI, H.Poll, 103/1923: Note by Crerar, 6/1/23.
308. loc. cit..
309. In the Legislative Department's view the Peshawar judge
used an 'extraordinary process of reasoning' to arrive 
at his verdict. Among other lapses, when he was unable 
to legally establish one piece of evidence crucial for 
the government's case he pronounced that 'in the interests 
of the State a certain latitude must be allowed to the 
Prosecution': NAI, H.Poll, 261/1924: Legislative Dept.,
Opinion, 5/6/23.
310. ibid.: Hailey (Home Member) to S.R. Das (Govt. Advocate) 
11/2/24. Hailey wrote that 'our main object is less to 
obtain a heavy sentence ... than to thoroughly expose the 
whole conspiracy'; also Note by Crerar, 2/6/23.
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Section 121-A of the Penal Code defined 'conspiracy' in very 
wide terms, and the government was confident of conviction.
The government chose Cawnpore, on the grounds of Shaukat 
Usmani's activities there, rather than the other cities 
(Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore and Madras) from which the original 
eight defendants came. It selected Cawnpore because it was 
politically less sensitive and because a jury trial was not 
mandatory there.
The case against Usmani, Muzaffar Ahmad, Dange and
Nalini Gupta took from March 1924 until the hearing of the
appeals in November. The court sentenced the accused to
four years Rigorous Imprisonment each. The government had
secured its convictions and legal precedent with ease and,
this time, unimpeachable legality. It was also happy with the
effect of its propaganda: the case had been justified, 'not
only legally but politically' in that it had met with a
favourable response from moderate opinion, had had a sobering
effect on the press and had not provoked any significant
311nationalist protest. Moreover, although the launching of
the case publicised the existence of 'Communist' activity in 
India, the defendants did not use the case as an effective
311. NAI, H.Poll, 272/1925: Petrie (DIB) to HD, 20/1/26.
For the government's exaggeratedly propagandists 
approach, see Judgement of the High Court of Judicature 
at Allahabad in the Revolutionary Conspiracy Case,
Cmd. 2309 (London, HMSO, 1924).
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TI Tpropaganda platform for communism.
The Cawnpore (Bolshevik) Conspiracy Case was, thus, 
little more than an exhibition of shadow boxing, arranged 
by the government primarily for purposes other than that of 
defeating a perceived communist threat. The unfortunate 
and tentative 'conspirators' themselves became the victims 
of a complicated, wide-ranging plot, the consequences of 
which they could hardly have anticipated. With the conclusion 
of the Cawnpore Case the government had no further need 
of the communists - for the time being at least.- But the 
repression of the early 1920s served as a warning to India's 
future communists: the Raj would, for a number of reasons, be
very interested in the development of their movement, and it 
could be expected to respond severely, if periodically. Further, 
the repressive mode would be of a distinctive kind. The cautious, 
discriminating and legalistic approach adopted by New Delhi after 
the 1919 excesses might allow the communists more leeway initially 
than would a more extreme policy; but it also facilitated the 
isolation of communist politics from the nationalist mainstream.
On balance, it was to the communists' disadvantage that Dyer's 
Jalianwala Bagh massacre was an aberration in British political 
policy and not a harbinger of the future.
312. The accused were not anxious to increase the risks of
conviction or heavy sentences by proclaiming from the dock 
their full commitment to a doctrine, and an international 
connection, the potentials of which they had only recently 
and uncertainly begun to explore. (See, eg., the Socialist, 
12/3/23, which declared that Dange knew Roy to be 'an 
objectionable person' and 'had given the CID ... to 
understand that he received certain communications from [Roy] 
... though he did not want his contact at all': in BSAI,
1924, para.435.) This reticence was understandable enough 
in the circumstances. But Roy was incensed: 'Poor fellows',
he fulminated, 'If they could only have put up a better 
defence, four years in jail would have been worthwhile.
We must have better Communists than this lot; ... the Cawn­pore case could have been an epoch-making event': quoted in IB, Communism, (1927), p.89.
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6. HELP FROM ABROAD: THE COMMUNISTS* RECEIVED MARXISM
During the early and mid-1920s the Indian proto- 
communists passed through an ideological transition from a 
'pure' nationalism, in its various guises, towards a Marxist 
perspective. However, they did not develop, even in Bombay, 
a systematic Marxist theory of Indian politics. For this reason 
they could not judge precisely where or how their politics 
should fit into the existing situation. As S.V. Deshpande put 
it in late 1924, 'socialist thought in our country has hardly 
advanced so far as to be capable of being embodied in the 
practical programme of ... [a communist] party'. Therefore
energies were directed, during the politically quiescent mid- 
1920s, into the necessary Marxist 'educational spadework'.
But the paucity of Marxist texts in India greatly 
limited the possibilities for theoretical advance. Routine 
censorship measures prevented most Marxist and all Leninist 
works from reaching the bookshop shelves. The communist 
literature which did arrive did so primarily through underground 
channels. M.N. Roy, India's main point of contact with the 
outside communist world and communist commentator on the Indian 
world, despatched an avalanche of printed material during these 
years, a significant amount of which reached its destination.
But for the most part Roy restricted his despatches to his own
313. S.V. Deshpande, Letter to the Editor, Socialist, 3/12/24, in Dange, Selected Writings, p.411.
314. The phrase is T.V. Parvate's: Letter to the Editor,
Socialist, 15/10/24, in ibid., p.401.
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315prolific writings. Roy played an important role in the
316early ideological development of the Indian communists.
But until 1926 his writings - even his several books on 
Indian politics - did not have a sound theoretical basis. 
Moreover, the additional literature that he did send was 
limited primarily to the Comintern's 'agit-prop' and news 
publication, International Press Correspondence (Inprecor), and
Stalin's theoretically impoverished observations and prescriptions. 
In particular, he sent little of the limited Comintern theoretical 
work on the colonial issue which did exist. For example, he did 
not make known in India the important 1920 Second Comintern 
Congress debate on the 'national and colonial question'. In 
this debate Roy and Lenin had taken opposing stands. The 
documents adopted by the Second Congress provided the ostensible 
theoretical basis of subsequent Comintern policy on the colonial 
question. But Lenin's position, and the fact that there was
318cause for debate, remained hidden from the Indian communists.
From 1926 the theoretical situation in India began to 
change. One reason was that India's overseas specialists 
finally developed a systematic theory of Indian politics. Another 
was that, for the first time, international communist specialists 
began working in India, helping the Indian Marxists to develop
315. The many H.Poll files on intercepted communist literature 
show this. See also IB, Communism, (1927), pp.12-13,
22-24, ps. 47 and 60.
316. This has been acknowledged by all of the early communists 
that I interviewed. For most of them Roy's 1922 book,
India in Transition, was their introduction to a Marxist 
perspective.
317. See fn.315. Only a few copies of the Comintern's theoretical 
journal, Communist International, were located in the 
searches accompanying the 1929 Meerut Conspiracy Case arrests 
(see the exhaustive MCCC search lists). These searches un­
covered the communist literature that had accumulated during the decade.318. This was confirmed by my interviews. For example P.C. Joshi,
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theory and policy and guiding their political activity.
Finally, from 1927 new political opportunities became available, 
thus allowing the development of theory through practice. The 
question of the quality of the Indian communists' received 
Marxism became, thereby, a much more pressing one than 
before, for it began to have a direct bearing on the communists' 
political fate. In this section we will examine the important 
question of the Indian communists' international theoretical 
inheritance and leadership.
Until the mid-1920s M.N. Roy remained the undisputed
international leader of Indian communism. ' However the
1924 Fifth Comintern Congress resolved that the communist
parties of the colonising countries should play a much more
active role in guiding the respective colonial communist 
320parties. Roy and the CPGB maintained a somehwat uneasy
321coexistence as joint-guides until late 1926, when Roy was
318. Cont'd
the CPI's General Secretary from 1935 to 1948, reported 
that he did not see a copy of the debate until 1950 (inter­
view with P.C. Joshi, 3/9/74). This is confirmed for the 
1920s by the MCCC search lists. None of the communists had 
a copy of the 1920 debate or of Lenin's contribution to it.
319. M.N. Roy's role in this early.period is covered by Overstreet 
and Windmiller, op. cit., Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and Haithcox, op. cit., Chapters 1, 2 and 3.
320. Overstreet and Windmiller, ojp. cit. , p.70.
321. Eg., a meeting between the Roy group and CPGB representatives 
in Amsterdam in July 1925, called to discuss work in India, 
revealed that considerable tension existed between the two 
groups on the question of the foreign leadership of the CPI 
(Great Britain, Parliament, Communist Papers, Parliamentary Publications, 1926, Vol. 23, Cmd.2682, (London, HMSO, 1926), 
pp.80-88: captured records of the conference). The Roy group 
and the CPGB subsequently constituted themselves as a joint 
leadership called the 'Foreign Bureau' of the CPI, in which 
Roy played the leading role. However the CPGB began 
independent organisational work in England during 1925-26, 
(ibid., pp.75-6, and pp.76-105) culminating in the despatch 
of agents to India.
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322sent by the ECCI to work in China. Concurrently, the Indian
communists' resistance against Roy's leadership had reached a
sufficient level to undermine much of his personal influence
3 2 3in the country. When the CPGB managed during 1926-27 to
get three of its members - Goerge Allison, Phillip Spratt and
Ben Bradley - into India, its leadership role was secured. That
these activists were Englishmen and were prepared to work with
the Indians as comrades, on an equal footing and under the same
conditions, had a great impact on the thinking of the Indians.^ ^
The CPGB's view of the Indian situation now held sway.
But although the CPI's international leadership had
changed,the perspective on Indian politics had not. During 1926
both Roy and the CPGB's Rajani Palme Dutt, published studies of
the current state of Indian politics, and Dutt adopted the
3 2 5Royist rather than the Leninist perspective.
The Second Comintern Debate: Royism and Leninism
India figured prominently in the debate on 'the National 
and Colonial Questions' at the Second World Congress of the 
Comintern in 1920: India, the largest colony of the world's
322. See ibid., pp.90-94 and Haithcox, op. cit., pp.62-73 for 
Roy's interlude in China during 1921.
323. We noted earlier some manifestations of this resistance. 
Additional evidence is provided by the CPI's annual report 
in May 1927, which rejected the Foreign Bureau's claimed 
directive powers. The report defined the Bureau as simply 
the CPI's 'representative in Europe', and it should 'not in 
any way work inconsistent with the Party's Programme and 
resolutions': MCCC, P.1207(1): op. cit..
324. Eg. Mirajkar recalls that 'the solidarity that they exhibited 
with us, being British comrades, was very important. In jail 
and outside they lived with us just like Indians. They did 
not behave like "Tommys", and that was a big thing': interview 
with Mirajkar. It was also a factor which disturbed the
Raj's officials. •
325. There is no evidence of the directness of Dutt's debt to Roy, 
but it would appear to have been substantial.
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dominant capitalist power, was accorded a role of considerable
importance in Lenin's theory of imperialism; and at the
Congress it was the Indian, M.N. Roy, who challenged Lenin.
Lenin presented a set of theses on politics in the colonies
based on his analysis of the dynamics of imperialism and of
32 6Russian politics. He argued that nationalist politics in
the 'backward', weakly industrialised colonial countries, 'in 
which feudal or patriarchal, and patriarchal-peasant relations 
predominate', would inevitably be dominated by 'bourgeois 
democratic' movements. He argued, further, that the colonial 
bourgeoisies were 'objectively' revolutionary vis a vis 
imperialism, for the interests of the two were in conflict.
Because the proletariat was weak the colonial communist parties 
wouldfinitially at least, also be weak, and they would be able 
to increase their influence only by participating in the bourgeois- 
democratic nationalist movements. The communists of the colonial 
countries should therefore adopt a 'united front' strategy: they
should involve themselves in such nationalist movements and play 
the most revolutionary roles within them; simultaneously they 
should seek to mobilise an independent mass base among the workers 
and the peasantry and the intellectuals, both to radicalise the 
nationalist movement against colonialism and to prepare for a 
subsequent social revolution. Roy presented a diametrically
326. Lenin, 'Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial 
Questions', in Collected Works, (Moscow, 1966), Vol. 31, 
pp.144-51. Bipan Chandra provides an excellent analysis 
of the relationship between Lenin's theory of colonial 
revolution and his general theoretical position: 'Lenin
on National Liberation Movements', in India Quarterly,
Vol. 27(1), 1971, pp.40-56.
178
327opposedleft-sectarian' position. In relatively industrialised
colonies such as India, he argued, the interests of imperialism
and the colonial bourgeoisie were not contradictory and, moreover,
strong mass movements, and 'organised socialist or communist
parties, in close relation to the mass movement', already 
32 8existed. The bourgeois democratic nationalist movements,
he argued on the eve of Non-Cooperation, 'are limited to the
small middle class, which does not reflect the aspirations of 
32 9the masses'. 'Consequently', Roy concluded, 'in the colonies,
330we have two contradictory forces; they cannot develop together'.
The communists, therefore, should not support the bourgeois
democratic nationalist movements. Rather, they should devote
all of their energies to the mass movement. Roy supported his
argument that Indian politics were being polarised into two
antagonistic movements by exaggerating the size of the
industrial proletariat (he claimed that it numbered five
million), by arguing that the vast majority of the peasantry
had been converted into an agricultural proletariat, and by
suggesting that the British had recently reversed their earlier
331policy of obstructing the industrial development of India.
327 .
328. 
329 .
330.
331.
Roy's draft theses, reproduced in Adhikari, Documents, Vol. 
1, pp.178-88. This is the first time that Roy's draft 
theses have been published.
ibid., p .186.
ibid., p .184.
ibid., p .188.
Minutes of the Commission on the National and Colonial 
Questions, reproduced in H.d'Encausse and S. Schram,
Marxism and Asia (London, 1969), pp.150-51; Roy's draft 
theses, in Adhikari, Documents, Vol. 1, p.182; the Second 
World Congress of the Communist International, Proceedings, 
(Moscow, 1920), p.118.
The level of industrial and agricultural proletarianisation,
Roy argued, and, as the post-War strikes demonstrated, its
political consciousness, were now sufficient for the emergence
of a proletarian alternative and opposition to bourgeois
nationalism. The 'rapid development' of capitalism in India
and other colonies since the War ensured that the new trends
332would become permanent.
At the Second Congress Lenin cut and amended Roy's
theses to remove the dichotomisation of the bourgeois
democratic and the mass movements, and to mute the proletarian 
333revolutionism. The Second Congress then adopted the amended
document as a set of 'supplementary' theses to highlight the 
distinctiveness of the situations in the relatively industrialised 
colonies. In the light of Roy's arguments Lenin, also, revised 
his theses, thereby emphasising more strongly the 'dual' 
character of the strategy of the bourgeoisie. He distinguished 
between non-revolutionary and revolutionary bourgeois nationalist 
movements - between, that is, those that did not oppose colonialism
332. loc. cit.. Roy claimed that capital investment in Indian 
industry had increased by 2,000 percent.
333. Roy has since described Lenin's amendment of his theses
as 'verbal alterations' (M.N. Roy, Memoirs, (Bombay, 1964), 
p.381). In fact the revision was basic ("see Adhikari' s 
juxtaposition of the original and amended theses, in 
Documents, Vol. 1, pp.178-88). Lenin regarded Roy's views 
to be 'to a large extent unfounded' and, in criticising 
his 'left-sectarianism', pointed out that the Bolsheviks 
had 'supported the liberation movement of the liberals when 
it acted against tsarism. The Indian communists must support 
the bourgeois-democratic movement, without merging with it': 
reproduced in d'Encausse and Schram, op. cit., pp.151-2.
334. Second Congress, Proceedings, ps. 109 and 574.
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and those that did. The communist parties should support and
participate in bourgeois democratic nationalist movements only
when they remained revolutionary, and only as long as they did
not attempt to block the communists' independent mass work.
These schematically outlined and universalist
principles were the guidelines for subsequent Comintern policy
335on the complex 'national and colonial question'. However
Roy, apart from not publicising Lenin's position in India, soon
began to revert to his 'non-dialectical' characterisation of
the politics of the Indian bourgeoisie and to his exaggeration
of the significance of the proletariat. From 1925 he also
had the support of Stalin's widely publicised declaration that,
in India, capitalism and the proletariat were 'developing rapidly'
and that the bourgeoisie had formed a 'coalition' with 
3 36imperialism. This was the perspective which guided the early
ideological development of the Indian communists.
Between 1920 and 1926 Roy felt his way towards a 
stronger theoretical foundation for his arguments. In his 
1922 book, India in Transition, he argued that during and since 
the War there had been a 'very rapid' development of industry, 
an 'enormous' extension of commerce and a 'spectacular' growth
335. For the evolution of Comintern policy, in the 1920s, on 
this question, see D. Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the 
National and Colonial Question, (Geneva, 1^57) .
336. Stalin declared that the 'national bourgeoisie' had
split into a 'revolutionary' 'petty-bourgeois section' and 
a 'compromising' 'great-bourgeois section', and that the 
latter had 'wholeheartedly thrown in its lot with the 
irreconcilable enemies of the revolution, has made common 
cause with the imperialists against the workers and peasants'. 
Stalin contrasted the Indian and Chinese 'compromising' 
bourgeoisies: in China the bourgeoisie had 'not yet made
common cause with imperialism'. (Stalin, ^ Speech to students 
of the Communist .University of the Toilers of the East’, 
18/5/25: reproduced in Adhikari, Documents, Vol. 2, pp.572-78) 
Many copies of this speech and of Stalin's Leninism, m  which 
it was reproduced, were found in the MCCC searches: see
MCCC search lists.
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337of India's bourgeoisie and proletariat. These developments
had occurred because the Indian bourgeoisie's increased strength
during the War period had enabled it to force the British into
a 'remarkable' change in long term policy on the issue of
industrialisation. In his 1926 study, The Future of Indian
Politics, Roy provided this argument with a theoretically (if
not empirically) stronger foundation: the 'remarkable' change
in colonial policy, he now reasoned, was determined not so
much by the political situation in India as by the post-War
3 38dynamics of British metropolitan capitalism.
R.P. Dutt's Modern India: The CPGB's Royism
R.P. Dutt adopted the same argument and the same
339theoretical basis in his 1926 book, Modern India. Because
from this point the CPGB took over the role of international 
mentor to the CPI, it was Dutt's version of the argument which 
had the greatest influence on the Indian Party's theoretical and 
political development. For this reason, and because Dutt's and 
Roy's versions were, apart from minor tactical differences, 
essentially the same, we will confine our attention to Modern India.
337. (Calcutta, 1971) (Republished), pp.39-40.
338. (Calcutta, 1971) (Republished), p.14.
339. (Bombay, 1926). A version of this political analysis 
(though not including its theoretical underpinning) had been 
published earlier by Dutt's brother: C.P. Dutt, 'Indian 
Politics: an Analysis', in Labour Monthly (hereafter, LM), 
Vol. 7(7), 1925, pp.399-409.
The most significant difference was that Dutt did not 
regard the need to form a new revolutionary nationalist 
party to be as pressing as did Roy.
34 0 .
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Dutt, the son of a Bengali doctor resident in England 
and his Swedish wife, was a First Class Honours graduate from 
Oxford. Rajani and his brother Clemens became foundation 
members of the CPGB. R.P. Dutt became the CPGB's main 
theoretician and, with the publication of Modern India, he also 
began a long career as theoretical guide to the CPI. In 
Modern India Dutt, like Roy, argued that British capitalism, in 
common with the other imperialist metropolitan economies, had 
entered a crisis which could only be resolved by the export of 
capital into industrial investment in the colonies: 'Today
Industrial Development is the keystone of British Government 
policy' in India (p.37), and 'it is taking place with as definite 
a purpose as the previous opposition to industrial development'
(p.50) . Thus, Dutt argued, the industrialisation of India was 
taking place not as a short-term response to political 
contingencies, but as a long-term policy initiated by British 
capital for structural economic reasons. Thiswas one aspect 
of a 'new Imperialist policy'. The startling consequence was 
that 'one of the most important facts of the post-War world' was 
'the lightening development of modern industry in India' and 
in other Asian colonies and semi colonies (pp.37-8). As part 
of this policy British imperialism was seeking to incorporate 
the rising Indian bourgeoisie into a 'junior partnership'. It 
was doing so partly to gain an additional source of capital, 
partly to increase political stability by splitting the 
bourgeoisie from the nationalist movement, and partly to 
establish the Indian bourgeoisie as imperialism's 'parasitic 
agents' in the country (ps. 2 and 6). Thus the 'new Imperialist 
policy' had a political dimension as well as the economic dimension:
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the British were initiating a process of political devolution 
which would find eventual expression in Dominion Status (p.2). 
Under Dominion Status the Indian bourgeoisie would act as the 
agents and junior partners of imperialism. This was an offer 
they could not refuse, for it offered a great deal and it 
obviated the otherwise necessary and dangerous game of mobilising 
the masses in order to win concessions from the colonialists.
Several important conclusions followed logically from
this analysis. The first was that the Indian bourgeoisie was an
objectively counter-revolutionary, pro-imperialist class. In
1926 Dutt remained ambiguous on this, but in a 1927 edition
341he firmly drew the conclusion. However even in 1926 he
was unambiguous about the second conclusion: ’if the future
of India lies with large-scale industry, then the political future 
equally certainly lies with the industrial proletariat' (p.48). 
Thirdly, capitalist relations were spreading increasingly into 
the countryside, transforming the old 'feudal' social relations: 
'while the older social forms increasingly decline (sic.) , 
Capitalism spreads more and more rapidly ... and it is from 
Capitalism, and not from the earlier social forms, that the 
new stage [of politics] must be expected to come' (pp.180-81).
Thus the peasantry was being increasingly 'proletarianised' and 
was, therefore, becoming increasingly amenable to a revolutionary 
alliance with the industrial proletariat. The other objectively 
- though, in practice, vacillating - class was the 'petty- 
bourgeoisie'. The 'petty-bourgeoisie' was defined as an 
aggregation of the small artisans, traders and merchants and,
341. R.P. Dutt, Modern India (London, 1927), *p.17.
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most significantly, the 'petty-bourgeois intellectual elements'.
The latter contributed the majority of the Congress organisation's
personnel. The class interests of most of the 'petty-bourgeois
intelligentsia' lay with the masses, but in practice they
'feared to break with the propertied interests of the bourgeoisie'
(p.78) , and tended to collapse during periods of crisis. This
had happened under Gandhi's leadership during the Non-Cooperation
movement. The Gandhian 'betrayal' proved that the Congress
leadership, though not directly controlled by the bourgeoisie,
had nevertheless been under bourgeois hegemony and, therefore,
was ultimately aligned with imperialism:
Gandhi failed as a leader ... because he could not 
cut himself loose from the upper-class interests 
and prejudices in which he had been brought up.
... The "spirituality" of Gandhi is only the 
expression of this class interest ... [and serves 
to obscure] the practical bourgeois policy in every 
actual question that lies behind it. From this 
class alignment inevitably follows his cooperation 
with the Imperialist Government (pp.76-8).
The collapse of Non-Cooperation constituted, Dutt continued, the
'final' collapse of Gandhi and Gandhism. Likewise, the
Swarajists,
who had begun with the language of a revolutionary 
movement ... ended as the direct apostles of upper 
class interests against the national cause and the 
defenders of the government against the masses. The 
bourgeois forces ... had overcome the weak and 
uncertain popular elements' (pp.84-5).
Swarajism, too, was dead as a nationalist force.
Thus, Dutt argued, the lessons of the past were 
clear. Because of the capitulation of the bourgeoisie and the 
collapse of the proxy-bourgeois Congress leaderships,the only 
possible way forward for the Indian nationalist movement was 
the formation of a new 'Peoples' Party' (later called the 
'Workers' and Peasants' Party' (WPP)) based on the workers,
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peasants and revolutionary elements of the petty bourgeoisie.
It would have a program of revolutionary mass action against
the Raj and Indian exploiters, and a goal of Complete Independence.
It was not important to attempt to determine in advance the 
way in which the Peoples' Party would come into being or the 
precise form it would take. It was even possible that the 
Congress could be captured and transformed into such a party.
The immediate task was to 'carry on a battle of clarification 
within the existing movement and organisations. Within both 
the Congress and the Swaraj Party the left Nationalist elements 
should gather themselves around a popular national programme'
(p.175). The workers and peasants should then be mobilised 
around programs of demands based on the immediate issues affecting 
their daily lives.
Finally, a disciplined, centralised vanguard working 
class party would 'organise and centralise' the wider 
nationalist struggle, while simultaneously preparing for the 
social revolution subsequent to the successful anti-imperialist 
struggle. India's political future lay with the working class; 
the establishment of a communist party was 'the supreme point 
of working class organisation, and the necessary prerequisite 
for reaching to the workers' society of the future' (p.196).
The Roy-Dutt arguments about the economic and
political changes of the War and post-War periods did have a certain 
342plausibility. The War did lead to a significant expansion of
industrial output (though not of industrial investment) to a
342. For the economic changes, see: Tomlinson, 'India and the 
British Empire', pp.349-65; Bagchi 'Private Investment', 
p.70-89.
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modest growth of import-substitution industries under Indian 
capital, and to government concern to win the 'loyalty' of the 
Indian Moderates. The post-War period had witnessed a spurt.of 
industrial investment in which British capital had been involved. 
Moreover there had been a major strike wave and major rural unrest 
in the post-War period, and Non-Cooperation had indeed been called 
off largely because of the Congress leadership's concern that it 
was getting out of control. Finally, it could conceivably have 
been argued during the political lull of the mid-1920s that 
Gandhi's and the Swarajists' retreats were permanent and not 
tactical.
But the central argument of the (Stalin-supported) 
Roy-Dutt 'new Imperialist policy' thesis was fanciful - if 
imaginative. By exaggerating a short-term tendency arising 
from the exigencies of the extraordinary War/post-War situation, 
and by then extrapolating that tendency as a permanent trend, 
it produced an analysis which was virtually diametrically 
opposed to both imperial and Indian realities in the 1920s.
Largely by misjudging the nature of British policy towards 
India, the 'new Imperialist policy' thesis provided a very 
misleading, 'undialectical' and 'left-sectarian' view of the 
logic of Congress nationalism and the strategy of the Indian 
bourgeoisie. It would therefore prove to be an equally mis­
leading guide to communist strategy in relation to the Congress. 
Dutt's analysis was in obvious trouble soon after it was 
published: the British government's hard-line attitude towards
Indian demands for representation on the proposed Statutory 
Commission, and the bitter 'bourgeois' response in India, could 
not easily be accommodated into the 'new Imperialist policy' 
thesis. The only mitigating factor in Dutt's version of the
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analysis was that, for the moment, communist participation in 
the Congress was recommended.
But perhaps even more serious than its 'left-
sectarianism' was its extreme 'proletarian orthodoxy'. By
arguing that India's proletariat was rapidly increasing, and
that the traditional pre-capitalist agrarian relations had been
undermined by capitalist relations, the Dutt analysis encouraged
a complacent, urban-proletarian oriented communist strategy and
ideology. To argue that 'the future of Indian politics lies
with the proletariat' was greatly to underrate the importance
of developing a specifically peasant strategy and a peasant-
oriented ideology. Thus, Dutt could write:
The social conditions which gave rise to the old 
conceptions [pre-capitalist ideology] have passed 
away. The endeavour to build upon the past means 
not only to follow a socially reactionary policy,
... but ... also to build upon a foundation of 
sand. ... The relics of obsolete forms remain long 
quiescent until the moment of crisis comes, and 
then they are thrown off in an instant ... (ps. 122 & 124) .
This led Dutt to conclude that 'The spiritually reactionary 
propaganda of Gandhism is an enemy of the masses. ... The ideology 
of the future is and can only be the proletarian ideology' (pp. 
124-25). That is, there was, in Dutt's view, nothing that the 
communists could learn from the remarkable relationship that 
Gandhi had developed with the rural masses. This viewpoint would 
also have serious consequences for the communists' program for 
the 'semi-peasant' working class. Because of the strength of, 
and the functional role played by, pre-capitalist community 
consciousness and organisation among the industrial working class, 
Dutt's 'proletarian orthodoxy' provided a particularly inadequate 
ideological approach even to the proletariat.
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Finally, we need to note the extremely mechanistic 
character of the conceptual categories employed by Dutt.
Modern India was vitiated not only by its linear, dichotomous 
and erroneous political-economic analysis, but also by the crude 
reductionism and 'Westernism' of its concepts. Dutt presented 
political and ideological levels as mere epiphenomena of 
economic class categories - as is evidenced by the above 
quotation on the 'false consciousness' of the 'old conceptions'; 
and the conceptualisation of Indian classes was a direct 
transposition from a western Marxist manual. These features 
were particularly inadequate for Bengal, where intensive 
colonialisation had reinforced pre-capitalist modes rather 
than transforming them. The social bases of Bengal provincial 
Congress politics, for example, could be described as 'bourgeois' 
only in the most metaphorical of senses.
But despite the shortcomings of Dutt's analysis and 
conceptualisation, Modern India found a receptive audience among 
India's mid-1920s transitional Marxists. In large part this was 
because of its clearly stated and apparently plausible logic and 
its bright and readable style. But it was also because the 
book's categorisation of the bourgeoisie and Gandhian and 
Swarajist politics as 'objectively' pro-imperialist and in 
retreat from the masses, and its promise of a proletarian 
revolutionary future, corresponded with the Indians' own, less 
clearly rationalised, conceptions and hopes. This was particularly 
the case for the Bombay communists, who had already formulated 
an analysis of the roles of the Indian bourgeoisie and Gandhism.
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The correspondence between Modern India and the early writings
of Dange, for example, was close. Thus when the British
communists arrived in 1926-27 with these guidelines there was
little resistance: as the program adopted by the Bombay party
in March 1928 stated, 'An almost correct interpretation of the
Party's views ... is lucidly put forth by Comrade Palme Dutt
• 343in his "Modern India". The Bengal party formally adopted
344a similar position.
British Communists in India
The first of the CPGB visitors to arrive was the
Scottish coal miner, George Allison. He landed at Bombay in
April 1926, and during the remainder of the year he devoted
himself primarily to making trade union contacts and surveying
the trade union situations in Bombay and Calcutta. Towards the
end of the year he began working more closely with the communists,
345helping them constitute themselves as definite Marxist groups.
In December the BPCC leftist faction formed itself into the 
'Congress Labour Party' - remaining within the BPCC.
343. MCCC, P.1373(19): Resolution on Congress and Labour 
leaderships, adopted by the Bombay WPP at its annual 
conference, Mar. 1928. The Dutt analysis was also apparent 
in the program adopted by the WPP at its foundation conference 
in Feb. 1927: MCCC, P.1016.
344 . Eg.: MCCC, P.2510: Program of the Bengal PWP, adopted at 
its annual conference, 19 & 20/2/27; MCCC, P.523: 'A Call
to Action' - a lengthy statement of the Bengal WPP's 
political position, adopted at its annual conference,
31/3/28 - 1/4/28. The documents of both the Bombay and 
the Bengal parties incorporate the Dutt analysis from early 
1927. Eg.: MCCC, Ps. 1013, 1980, 1325, 441 and 23: pamphlets 
titled 'What the Workers' and Peasants' Party Stands For'
(ca. Mar. 1927), 'Contemporary Political Situation in India' 
(Äug. 1927), 'The National Congress' (c_a. Nov. 1927), 
'Manifesto of the Workers' and Peasants' Party to the 
Indian National Congress, Madras, December * 1927 ' , and 
'Manifesto of the Workers' and Peasants' Party of India',
(Jan. 1928) .
345. IB, Communism, (1927), pp.103-4, p.126, pp.135-6; Spratt
Blowing Up India, p.32; MCCC, P.1144: Allison to Joglekar,____
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It formally adopted a constitution and program based on Modern
346India's outline for the 'People's Party'. However Allison's
work was terminated in January 1927 when he was arrested, and
347then convicted, for entering India with a false passport.
But his place was immediately taken by Spratt, who had arrived
34 8in Bombay at the end of December. Spratt, who entered
India legally, was to stay much longer than Allison and to
achieve more substantial results.
Spratt was the son of a school teacher and was
formerly a scholarship student at Cambridge. A shy and
intellectual man, his transition to Marxism in the post-War
ferment of ideas he discovered at the university was further
encouraged by his alienation from the exclusivist Cambridge 
349social world. He joined the CPGB while still a student and
began working as a researcher for the Party after graduation.
The Party selected him for its next Indian mission because he
was unknown to the police. He was offered the opportunity to
be the CPGB's 'messenger and reporter' there for six months.
'I was 24', Spratt has recalled, 'with no ties, and in the
350full flood of enthusiasm for the cause. I jumped at it'.
345. Cont'd 
26/11/26.
346. MCCC, P.1354(4).
347. IB, Communism, (1927), p.104.
348. ibid., p.104.
349. See Spratt, Blowing Up India, Chapter 1, titled 'Clothes 
and Communism': a psychoanalytical account of his 
intellectual and emotional conversion to communism at 
Cambridge. (Spratt writes (p.35) that he was 'Oppressed 
by my fear of social and intellectual failure' and, on 
discovering Marxism, 'grasped what was presented to me as 
the master-key to all knowledge'.) Also: interview with 
Spratt's widow, Mrs. S. Spratt, 18/8/74.
350. Spratt, Blowing Up India, p.29.
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It was a fateful decision, for he was to remain in India not
for six months, but for the rest of his life.
Spratt prepared for his mission by 'hastily read[ing]
two or three books for background, fixing firmly in my mind
that Bombay is on the west coast and Madras on the east', and
left with Clemens Dutt's warning 'not to take the Indian
bourgeoisie too seriously: they were just putting up a show
351of opposition to deceive the masses'. He was joined in
September 1927 by Bradley, the son of a communist working class
family and an activist in the Amalgamated Engineers Union in 
352London. Bradley's arrival, also, was legal. Spratt's and
Bradley's strengths were complementary. Spratt was an able
theoretician and, despite his innocence of Indian realities,
a valuable guide in the formulation of Marxist conceptions of,
and programs for, party activity. Moreover, his 'new
Imperialist policy' dogmatism was tempered by strong eclectic
35 3tendencies, and he was eager to learn about India. His
education began soon after arrival: he was surprised to find
that although the nationalist press's nationalism 'might be
354
bourgeois, there was not much I could teach them about imperialism':
351. ibid., p.31.
352. IB, Communism, (1935), p.115; MCCC, Judgement, p.162.
Bradley arrived claiming to represent a firm with the 
imaginative name of the 'Crabb Patent Underdrain Tile 
Company'.
353. Interview with D. Goswami and P.C. Joshi. Spratt traces 
his eclectic intellectual biography in Spratt to 
G .A. Hutt, 19/2/36, in NAI, H.Poll, 7/2/1936.
Spratt, Blowing Up India, p.31.354.
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but it would be some years before he resolved to his satisfaction
the discrepancy between his theory and Congress practice. Spratt,
3 5 5however, was not a particularly effective organiser. This
was the forte of the eminently practical Bradley. An
experienced and effective trade union organiser, his contributions
356in this field during the next two years were considerable.
Spratt was instructed to encourage the Indian
communists to form Workers' and Peasants' Parties and to engage
more actively in the trade union sphere. He began a survey of
local trade unions, contacted the Bombay group and began working
35 7with them, soon after arriving. There was a marked upswing
in activity soon after his arrival. The Congress Labour Party
became the Workers' and Peasants' Party on February 8, 1927, and
immediately began planning its future work. At that point it
3 5 8claimed the allegiance of about 20 of the BPCC's 75 members.
355. This point was made by several of the communists that I 
interviewed and by Mrs. Spratt. Spratt frequently chastised 
himself on this score in the letters he wrote to the CPGB.
356. Interview with Mirajkar.
357. MCCC, P.1006: Spratt's diary; MCCC, P.1954 and 1955: Spratt 
to R. Page Arnott, 18/2/27 and 10/3/27; MCCC, Judgement,p. 97 .
358. MCCC, P.1942: BSB Report, 23/1/27; MCCC, P.855: Mirajkar 
to Thengdi, 26/1/27; MCCC, P. 1355 (7)E: Agenda for CLP 
meeting, 8/2/27; MCCC, P.1355(7) A & B: Notice of and 
agenda for WPP meeting, 13/2/27; MCCC, P.851: Notice of 
formation of WPP in BC, 24/2/27; MCCC, P.1344: EC of WPP, 
minute book, meetings 30/4/27 and 4/5/27; Spratt, Blowing Up India, p.35.
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Only a quarter of the WPP members were communists; but 
these few were keen to begin work after their period of 
ideological transition. Spratt first made contact with 
representatives of the Calcutta group during an AITUC session 
in March and found them enthusiastic and responsive, but 
he did not move to Bengal until 1928. Bradley remained in Bombay 
throughout. The period of direct CPGB involvement in Indian 
communist activity - the'new Imperialist policy'/WPP phase - 
and the formation of the CPI, had begun.
359. MCCC, P . 2 3 2 8 (P 2) : Spratt to C.P. Dutt, 14/6/27.
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CHAPTER 3
'TAKING MARXISM TO ITS CLASS
In the preceding chapter we followed the uneven 
ideological transition of a small number of Indian intellectuals 
from a 'pure' nationalism to a vaguely Marxist socialistic 
nationalism. The British communists who had arrived during 
1926 and 1927 had assisted them in forming, first in Bombay 
and then in Calcutta, the first Indian proto-communist groupings 
with clearly formulated programs of action based on Marxist- 
Leninist theory. These results achieved, the next task was the 
implementation of the new programs.
Two distinctive features of the situation in the late 
1920s enhanced the prospects for the first stage of this 
exercise. The new Marxist mass programs were drawn up at the 
beginning of India's second great working class upsurge, arising 
from the intensified economic constraints on industry in the 
second half of the 1920s. The sporadic and spontaneous strikes 
of 1926 and 1927 began to gather force; 'By the end of 1928', 
the Director of the Intelligence Bureau later wrote, 'hardly
1. The phrase is taken from an interview with B.T. Ranadive 
(Bombay, 15/8/1974). He used it to characterise the 
significance of this phase of the Party's development.
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a public utility service or industry remained which had not
been affected by the wave ... which swept the country during 
2the year' . Secondly, this upheaval coincided, for most of
its course, with an atypical 'moratorium' on extreme state
repression of communists, allowing a period of relatively
3uninterrupted leadership development. Here was an 
opportunity for the miniscule communist groupings in India's 
two major industrial centres to begin to implement the 
working class section of their recently formulated mass 
programs - to begin the project of 'taking Marxism to its 
class'.
The outcome of this attempt, at this time, was, for a 
number of reasons, crucial for the later fortunes of Indian 
communism. An independent mass base was the essential pre­
requisite for communist influence in Indian politics, and the 
building of a working class base was, necessarily, the first 
step in the communists' overall mass program. Their theoretical 
perspectives predisposed them to begin there. But a number of 
situational factors reinforced this theoretically-based choice. 
In 1927 the communists were still limited to urban centres, 
their (marginal) links with trade unions constituted their 
only mass contacts and, without an urban base, they did not 
possess the manpower or material resources to attempt to 
extend their activities to the peasantry. These factors,
2. I.B. Communism (1933), p.98. (This account characterised 
it as a wave of 'communism'.)
3. The reasons for this contingent 'moratorium' will be 
investigated in Chapter 5.
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combined with the currently higher level of working class 
unrest, made trade union work the logical starting point.
Success among the working class during these two years 
could lead, in turn, to success elsewhere. Conditions were 
more favourable than usual not only for working class activity, 
but also for the expansion of communist influence in nationalist 
politics. A working class base might improve their weak, 
provincially-limited position within the National Congress, 
during a period when its rank-and-file was increasingly 
expressing its discontent with the conservative leadership.
If an alternative, mass-based nucleus could be established in 
the Congress during this transitional phase the communists 
would be in a better position to challenge the policies of the 
existing leadership, attract rank-and-file radicalism, and 
initiate alternative programs in the subsequent social and 
political upheavals.
The most important of these potential initiatives was 
the attempt to extend communist operations to the villages, at 
a time when new opportunities for doing so were starting to 
become available. The turn of the decade was a period of 
increasing agrarian radicalism, and the limited political 
'space' available for agrarian revolutionary activity in India 
had not yet been further reduced by the consummation of the urban 
capitalist-rich peasant alliance. A working class base would 
provide, through the 'semi-peasants' who made up much of the 
industrial workforce, one possible point of entry to the 
villages, as well as new resources for making that step. A 
mass-based position of strength in the Congress could augment
1 97
these resources, and further increase village contacts as that 
organisation became more involved in rural agitation. Further 
- and also very importantly - it would considerably reduce the 
Party's existing vulnerability to repression by the colonial 
state. The movement would no longer be as extremely dependent 
upon the original few leaders, and the state would find it more 
difficult to make, for the purposes of selective repression, 
the propagandistic distinction between 'Communists' and 
1 nationalists' .
A working class base would also provide the Indian
communists with their first opportunity to become 'Indianised'
and 1proletarianised' Marxists. This new context would allow
them - indeed force them - to confront theory with practice,
and the 'elitist' consciousness of their backgrounds with the
very different cultural world of the working class and, given
the latter's rural origins and contacts, of the peasantry.
These confrontations were essential for the creative adaptation
and re-shaping of received doctrine into a concretely Indian
Marxism, for the development of an ideology, culture and
political practice which would be accessible and relevant to
the workers and peasantry, and for building an intermediate
cadre structure from within the working class itself. A
working class base would also provide quite a different context
for factionalism within the leadership; factional differences
would no longer be, in the words of a subsequent Party critique
4mere 'paper differences'.
4. MCG:2.
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The timing of the communists' first attempts to 
implement a working class program was crucial for another 
reason - it was contemporaneous with the penultimate phase 
of the Comintern's bolshevisation. The nature of the CPI's 
relationship with the fully bolshevised Comintern in the 
following decade would be determined very largely by the 
prior level of success achieved by the communists in each of 
the above dimensions.
Success in building a working class base in the 
uniquely favourable interaction of socio-economic and political 
conditions of the late-1920s was the key to these wider 
communist achievements in India, and hence to the possibilities 
for a strong, non-bolshevised, Indian Communist Party. Such 
a favourable conjuncture would not reappear in the future.
This chapter examines the attempts of the Bombay and Bengal 
WPPs to implement their working class programs in the two 
years from early 1927. Following chapters will look at the 
wider consequences for the communists' political methods, 
organisation, theory and consciousness, and for the Party's 
positions in Indian and Comintern politics.
The first attempts to implement Marxist-inspired 
working class programs in India were also to demonstrate for 
the first time the much greater difficulty of doing so in 
Bengal than in Bombay. The industries of both provinces 
shared major working class upheavals, but these upheavals 
occurred within social structures which, as we saw in Chapter 
2, exhibited some marked differences. Of these the most
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crucial for the communists' programs were: the much greater
economic, political and organisational strength of industrial 
capital in Calcutta than in Bombay, and the additional racial 
factor of non-Indian ownership and management of Bengal's 
industry; the far greater distance in Bengal between the 
intelligentsia and the masses, and the 'psycho-cultural' 
characteristics of the Bengali intelligentsia associated 
with this separation; and the far higher levels of extra­
provincial labour within, and heterogeneity of, the working 
class in Bengal - a factor which, additionally, increased 
the distance between the Bengali intelligentsia and labour.
All of these distinctions between the two regions had arisen 
primarily from the far more profound and extensive colonialisation 
of east India than of the west. The British colonial political 
economy had produced in Bengal a socio-economic and political 
structure which not only made it more difficult than in Bombay 
for a socialist intelligentsia to 'take Marxism to its class'; 
it had also made it much less likely that its working class 
would 'recognise' and accept the ideology and politics of 
class struggle.
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1. BOMBAY
The Bombay WPP developed its theory and tactics of 
revolutionary trade unionism in the course of the general 
discussions on theory and policy initiated by Spratt in early 
1927. The trade union plan was based on Spratt's theoretical 
perspectives, his preliminary survey of trade unionism in 
Bombay, Allison's observations, and the Bombay. group1s own 
limited experiences. Although modifications were later
5introduced, in the light of experience, the guidelines 
developed in these discussions remained the basis of the 
party's working class policy from this point until the Meerut 
Case arrests two years later.
The Bombay WPP's Theory and Policy of Working Class Organisation 
The WPP's theory of working class organisation, 
based on Marxist-Leninist principles and using the role of the 
industrial workers in the Chinese revolution as a model, held 
that trade unions performed two main functions.^* The first was
5. Most notably, the 'thesis' adopted by the All-India WPP 
conference in December 1928: MCCC, P.51.
6. This account of the WPP's trade union theory, strategy and
tactics is based on the following documents, all of which 
were drawn up by Spratt, in early 1927: MCCC, P.1108:
'Program of Trade Union Work'; P.1981: 'Trade Union Work';
P.1982: 'Trade Union Question'; P.801: 'Lesson 6 -
Trade Union Work'; P.1013: 'What the WPP stands for'; and
P.1003: 'The Organisation of the International'.
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the politicisation and organisation of the workers for their
fight for their immediate demands in the factories. The
unions were, potentially, 'schools of Communism' for the
workers, enabling them to realise the class realities of
the industrial world, the fundamental irreconcilability of
the class interests of labour and capital, and the consequent
necessity of class struggle and working class discipline.
The second function of the unions was to extend this awareness
and activity into the field of politics, and to prepare the
working class for its eventual 'vanguard' role, in alliance
with the peasantry and the revolutionary sections of the
'petty-bourgeoisie', in the anti-imperialist struggle. Trade
unions introduced the workers 'in the best possible manner'
to the underlying realities of politics, 'i.e. the class
aspect', and thus to the political struggle for state power
7led by the revolutionary party. Sometimes the unions could 
become direct instruments in this wider struggle.
• Based on this theory, the communists' trade union
strategy was accordingly two-fold - they were to promote the
political education and organisation of the workers for action
at both the industrial and political levels.
We must use them to the fullest extent as a means of 
educating the members, and as a recruiting ground for 
the party (they are the most desirable type of members). 
And we must assume the leadership in action, even of 
the most partial kind, as a preparation for action on 
the whole front. 8
7. MCCC, P.1981: o_q. cit.
8. ibid.
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To promote these strategic goals in the most
effective manner the WPP decided on a combination of
organisational forms. Contrary to the existing Indian
practice of unions being 'organisations of leaders', divorced
from the mass of the workers, the WPP's trade unionism was to
be a 'natural organisation of the masses'. It was to be
organised 'from the bottom upwards', 'taking the social life
of the masses, their real aspirations, as a starting point,
and encouraging them to unite in groups according to their
9real interests in society'. This form of organisation, the
WPP believed, developed 'a unity of purpose ... out of their
miningnatural differences in life and occupation', under/'trivial 
and largely imaginary' divisions such as communalism. 
Accordingly, the mass membership of the unions was to be 
organised into factory committees and branch committees. 
Organised at these levels the workers would have the means 
to collectively formulate their demands and to assert them 
against-both the existing reformist union leaderships and 
the employers. These committees would also bring new strength 
to the unions where it was most needed.
The mass committees were to be integrated with central 
trade union structures based on the principle of industrial 
unionism - i.e., one union only for each industry. This 
principle was adopted in preference to alternative forms such as 
craft unionism, and in opposition to the growing tendency in
9. MCCC, P.1003: op. cit.
10. MCCC, P.1013: op. cit.
Individualthe bigger industries to form rival unions, 
unions were to be affiliated to federations at the local, 
provincial, national and international levels. This would 
maximise the bargaining strength of the Indian workers as a 
whole as well as assisting the formation of a unified national 
working class. Unions and federations were also to be affil­
iated to political organisations at each level to politicise 
the trade union movement, bring a 'mass character' to 
nationalist organisations, and mutually reinforce the strength 
of the unions and nationalist politics.
The communists would seek to enter existing unions 
and federations as 'fractions', or where industries were not 
unionised, to establish new unions - 'we are faced with the
task for being not merely the agitators and galvanisers, but
12the originators, almost, of the movement'. At first, work 
within the unions and federations would be primarily agitational 
and propagandist. Clearly defined programs of demands were to
11
11. Both forms were rejected on the grounds that they created 
within union organisation a division, overlapping and 
resulting weakening that could be avoided in industrial 
unionism. Unions covering more than one industry were 
rejected because they were too generalised to represent 
adequately the specific needs of each industry. Rival 
unions, which had tended to develop from the mid-1920s, 
were particularly vigorously opposed. The textile 
industry had several unions, and both of the railways had 
two competing organisations. (See, eg. RCLI,Vol. 1(1), 
p.106.) None of these were clearly differentiated 
ideologically. But as political rivalries became more 
intense in the late 1920s, this form of union rivalry 
developed also. Multiple trade unionism was facilitated 
by the social fragmentation of the workforce, and it became 
more possible with the growing unrest in the late 1920s. 
However the communists in this period (in contrast to the 
next), with few exceptions, avoided establishing new 
unions and sought to amalgamate those which existed. They 
adhered conscientiously to the principle of 'one union for 
each industry'.
12. MCCC, P.1982: op. cit.
204
be drawn up 'for organising and fighting purposes' in the
factories, unions, and the National Congress. The programs
of immediate economic, organisational and political demands
were to be based on a careful survey of the workers' expressed
13grievances, and set within a Marxist ideological perspective.
They would be used to promote an awareness of common class
interests and the tactics and organisational forms of united
class action. Finally, the 'leading elements', of the working
class were to be brought into the party, which would become
the hegemonic leadership of the workers.
Great importance was attached to the work methods of
the cadres. They were to be constantly aware that the most
important goal of their activity was the activisation of the
workers themselves. They were not to seek simply to replace
the existing 'reformist' leaderships by 'militant' leaderships.
Rather, they were to transform the whole structure of trade
unionism in India by creating leadership from within the
working- class itself. An important part of this process was
the 'proletarianisation' of the middle class party members -
they were to 'sincerely adopt a working class political 
14outlook'. The cadres were to function as members of a
13. Examples of the programs which were developed are:
MCCC, P.720: 'Programme of Immediate Demands'; and
'Programme of the WPP' in MCCC, P.1013: op.cit. The 
demands were based on the conditions and rights 
currently enjoyed by the European working class, and 
incorporated the notion of a minimum 'living wage' set 
at Rs. 30 per month.
14. MCCC, P.1013: 0£. cit.
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disciplined party, adhering to agreed procedures and goals
andreporting regularly on their activity, and not as
15undisciplined individuals. Finally, the communist
'fractions' were to operate openly within the unions:
The members should never hide their Party 
membership, nor take any precautions to hide 
fraction work. Though this should not be 
advertised ... it should be always justifiable
and should never have any doubtful motives
This strategy was a total challenge to the community 
forms of organisation and leadership which were dominant among 
the industrial working class in India, and to the existing 
reformist unions which were superimposed upon them. The new 
unionism required the transformation of all of these modes.
Four overlapping, though distinct phases were involved in this 
transformation: the first would lead to the communists' becoming 
influential as a disciplined and clearly differentiated group, 
within the existing structure of working class organisation; 
the second to their recognition by the majority of an industry's 
workforce as the main union leadership within this structure; 
the third to the workers' joining the union en masse, and 
providing much of the leadership at both the base and apex of 
a radically new, class-based structure led by the communists;
15. A great deal of emphasis was given to the need to 
introduce regular and accountable procedures into 
Indian trade unionism. For Spratt's very critical 
observations on existing practices, see: MCCC, P.2328:
Spratt to C.P.Dutt, 18/1/27; MCCC, P.1956: Spratt to 
R. Page Arnott, 31/3/27.
16. MCCC, P.1982: op. cit.
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and the fourth to this new union structure being integrated 
with the party through a covert political cadre system, 
consisting of both workers and middle class communists, 
established throughout the workforce. The magnitude of the 
task which lay ahead was increased by the negligible resources 
and influence, and the essentially 'elitist' consciousness, 
with which the communists - 'the originators, almost, of the 
movement' - began.
The first two phases, leading to the WPP's becoming
the dominant working class leadership, required first a
temporary alliance with its much stronger rivals for working
class hegemony, the jobbers and the reformist union leaders,
and then their neutralisation. As Newman has shown in his
detailed study of the development of labour organisation in
the textile industry, the formation of a mass trade union
'could only be the result of the elimination of the jobbers
17or their incorporation into a wider form of organisation'.
This was the precondition for the communists' subsequently 
gaining direct leadership of the workers rather than merely 
an indirect influence over them, mediated through the jobbers. 
And this form of direct leadership was the prerequisite for 
decisively outstripping the communists' reformist rivals in 
the union movement.
As neither the employers nor the government was
18prepared to countenance the elimination of the jobbers
17. Newman, op. cit., p. 345.
18. See for example the Bombay Government's comments on the 
jobber system in RCLI, Vol.I(l), pp. 9-10.
207
they would have to be incorporated, at least temporarily;
and incorporation 'depended upon circumstances which would
unify the millhands and drive the jobbers into an alliance
19with the unionists'. This required a sharp and generalised 
discontent with management, throughout the industry, among 
both the workers and the jobbers. Further, it would have 
to be of such a character, and of sufficient dimensions, for 
the jobbers to perceive an alliance with the communists, rather 
than the reformists, as the most fruitful method of counter­
ing the millowners. The available evidence suggests that, 
given the pervasiveness of the jobber system and its equivalents, 
the requirements for communist success identified by Newman
20for the mill industry applied in most of Bombay's industries. 
Thus success in gaining the leadership of the industrial 
working class depended not only on the communists' skills in 
applying their trade union strategy, but also on the develop­
ment of these particularly favourable 'objective conditions'.
Success in the third and fourth phases - bringing 
workers into positions of leadership within class-based mass 
unions, and into the party - required the prior political 
neutralisation of the jobbers and reformist unionists. Until
19. Newman, op. cit., p.345
20. See RCLI, Vol. 1(1), pp.9-10 for the general role of 
jobbers in Bombay industry, and Vol. VIII(1), ps. 5, 11,
14 and 193, for recruitment and supervisory methods in 
the railways. On the railways there appears not to have 
been a formal jobber system. Foremen and recruitment 
officers undertook these functions. Nevertheless, like 
the jobbers, these officers held a great deal of power 
over the men, served as indispensable intermediaries with 
management, and were liable to engage in corrupt practices 
at the labourers' expense. Though their direct hold over 
the workers was probably not as powerful as that of the jobbers, their role was analagous.
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that was achieved the communists would not have the necessary 
free contact with the workers. Nor would there be sufficient 
political 'space' within which the workers could assert their 
own leadership and institutionalise, through new forms of 
organisation at the factory level, a relative autonomy from 
the jobbers, factory managements, and 'outsider' trade union 
leaderships.
However these external factors were not the only 
constraints upon a communist-promoted development of leader­
ship from within the labour force. The low cultural level 
of the working class, characterised by its widespread 
illiteracy, was a very real barrier. This meant, for 
instance, that the workers would be dependent for the 
foreseeable future upon English speaking outsiders for 
mediation between themselves and the wider political world.
The wide cultural gap between the workers and the communist 
outsiders was another serious obstacle, initially at least. 
Finally, though not as extreme as in Bengal, the labour force's 
deeply ingrained, particularistic community consciousness, and 
its low level of political confidence, inhibited the develop­
ment of class organisation and working class participation 
in its own leadership. This consciousness was neither 
'trivial' nor 'largely imaginary'. Community consciousness 
was closely related to the functional role of the community 
net-works in the workers' lives, and the lack of political 
confidence to very real featuresof their daily experience, 
such as victimisation of activist 'trouble-makers'. Over­
coming these inter-related external and internal constraints
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to the third and fourth phases of the communists' strategy 
also depended, therefore, on propitious 'objective 
conditions'. Only a fundamental dislocation of the system 
could rupture the existing web and provide the opportunities 
and motivations necessary for the creation of the new order.
The conditions in the crucial textile industry in 
this period did favour the communists' strategy at the expense 
of the reformists. The millowners' attempted to offset their 
declining profits by introducing major changes in the production
process, and in the relations between management and labour.
21This antagonised both the millhands and the jobbers. 
Rationalisation of the technical organisation of the mills, 
wage cuts and retrenchments, ensured the militant opposition 
of the workers. The millowners' announced intention to 
standardise wages, and working conditions and procedures, 
aroused the hostility of the jobbers, for standardisation 
encroached directly upon the traditional functions and 
benefit's of the jobber's position. The opposition of both 
groups was particularly intense because the changes led to 
much more than economic disadvantage. The millowners' 
policies, if implemented, would very rapidly transform the 
social relations of the industry from the relatively informal 
basis on which it had hitherto existed, to a more impersonal 
and regularised system; the workforce was being wrenched,
21. See Newman, op>. cit., pp. 264-71, for a concise summary 
of the owners' schemes and their implications for the 
millhands and jobbers.
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involuntarily, from tradition, into the unknown world of 
modern capitalist industrial organisation.
This situation provided virtually no scope for the
moderate concessions upon which the viability of reformist
22trade unionism depended. This form of unionism was based 
on the ideology of the fundamental unity of interests between 
labour and capital, and of the 'independent' stance of the 
state. The reformists believed that the proper role of trade 
unions was to maintain a fair balance between the legitimate 
interests of the employers and the employed. They saw them­
selves as intermediaries, not as labour's 'vanguard'. Because 
they accepted that capitalism was not inherently exploitative 
they limited their efforts to winning economic concessions 
and more congenial conditions for the workers and resisting 
'aberrant', 'unjust' exactions by the owners. When the 
employers proved impervious to their efforts at the 
negotiating table they called upon the state to intervene as 
an impartial arbiter. They sought to avoid strikes at almost 
all costs. They eschewed the 'importing' of 'politics' into 
trade union activity, particularly the politics based on the 
ideology, diametrically opposed to theirs, of the inherent 
antagonism of capital and labour. The reformists were 
familiar with the negotiating table, but not with the 
mechanics of militant mass mobilisation against the employers. 
Their strategy could produce results only if management was
22. See, eg., the BTLU's complaints in RCLI, Vol.I(l) 
pp.353-4.
prepared to concede, or the state to intervene to assure 
this result, without the application of hostile organised 
mass sanctions by a politicised working class.
The reformists, and particularly N.M. Joshi, had a
fair record in securing such results in the first half of
the 1920s, and an unblemished record of honesty and
humanitarian, if somewhat patronising concern for the
interests of the workers. But in the late 1920s the mill-
owners, because of the severity of their crisis, were not
prepared to volunteer concessions as they had earlier. Nor
was the state prepared, for some time, to intervene; apart
from its awareness of the economic constraints upon the mill-
owners, and the absence at that point of any legal machinery
for either compulsory arbitration or the suppression of
'political' trade unionism, it did not anticipate any serious
23'law and order' problems arising from the situation. In 
these conditions there were no bases for the winning of 
concessions through a reformist strategy or, in the short­
term at least, for the elimination of a politically inspired 
trade unionism which stayed within the boundaries of the 
existing law. Nor, in these conditions, was the reformists' 
ideology likely to inspire confidence among the beleagured 
workers. Here was an ideal opportunity for the exponents 
of the ideology of class struggle to demonstrate their 
relevance to the Bombay millworkers and, through them, to the 
increasingly discontented working class of the area in general.
23. The changing attitudes of the provincial, central and 
metropolitan administrations towards the situation is examined in Chapter 5.
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The First Phase
At the point at which the WPP was drawing up its 
trade union policy the Bombay communists were little more 
than a socialist faction within the city's Congress Committee. 
The party's only significant point of contact with the working 
class was Joglekar's role as one of the Girni Kamgar 
Mahamandal's advisors. Further, the communists faced 
established reformist unions in the textile industry and 
on the GIP and BB & Cl railways, Bombay's three major 
concentrations of labour. Most of the remaining labour force 
remained unorganised.
A year later the communists were in quite a different
position. They exerted much more influence on the GKM and,
in association with this union, had participated for the first
time in a strike. Joglekar was on the executive of the
important GIP Railwaymen's Union (GIPRU) and Bradley, the
British communist who had arrived in September 1927, sat on
the executive of the BB & Cl Railway Employees' Union (BB &
CIREU). The WPP had formed several unions among previously
unorganised workers - the Municipal Workmen's Union, of which
Nimbkar became the Secretary, the Tramwaymen's Union under
Dange, Mirajkar had formed a union from the different branches
of the dock workers, and Joglekar a Press Workers' Union.
Finally, several of the WPP activists sat on the executive of a
newly formed local federation called the Bombay Trades Council,
24and on the executive and a sub-committee of the AITUC.
24. RCLI, Vol.I(1),pp.104-13; MCCC, P.826: Bombay WPP's Annual 
Report, Mar.1928; P.1344: (WPP Minute Book), Trade UnionLeaders' Report, 1/4/28.
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The party had also organised an impressive mass working 
class demonstration against the arrival of the Simon Commission 
in February 1928. The WPP, in the first year of its existence, 
had taken the first step towards becoming the major working 
class leadership in Bombay.
This advance was won through the dual tactics of
entering existing unions or, where none existed, establishing
new unions, while simultaneously addressing themselves directly
to the mass of the workers. Both tactics were facilitated by
a somewhat unlikely alliance with a formerly moderate trade
unionist, the Parsi S.H. Jhabvala. Jhabvala was a curious
figure. A 'professional outsider' union leader par excellence,
he proudly proclaimed himself 'the father of fifty trade
unions'. He held more union offices than any other leader, and
in 1927 was on the executives of some twenty unions or
federations. Something of an eccentric, he was capable of
erratic emotional and ideological changes - 'a queer, dreamy
25but energetic person' was Spratt's description. Jhabvala 
decided that he stood to gain from an alliance with these 
radical aspirants to working class leadership« In the space 
of a few months he changed the ideological content of his 
public pronouncements to a militant anti-imperialism and anti­
capitalism, joined the WPP, and began introducing the communists 
to his working class constituencies and to local and national 
trade unionism. The alliance proved to be unstable. Jhabvala
25. Spratt, Blowing Up India, p.36; see also RCLI, Vol.I(l) 
p.112, and Newman, op. cit., pp.221-2, for accounts of 
Jhabvala's unionism.
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was disinclined to accept the dictates of party discipline
or the implications of his new ideology and, by October
2 6of the following year, tensions were severe. By the end
of 1928 Jhabvala had resigned, was engaging in public conflict
2 7with the party, and had begun an open ideological retreat.
Though the alliance was unstable and introduced
later problems for the party it proved to be of great
immediate value. Apart from the communists' independent
influence on the GKM it was primarily this contingency which
2 8enabled them to take their first step. It was also
Jhabvala's influence which enabled Spratt and five other
party members to attend the Seventh AITUC session at Delhi
in March 1927, even though, not being union officials, they
2 9had no formal right to attend as delegates. This was the
26. MCCC, P.1344: op. cit. , 21/10/28 & 15/11/28.
27. ibid., 15/11/28, 15/1/29 & 3/2/29; MCCC, P.421: Ghate 
to M. Ahmad, 11/11/28; Kranti, 13/1/29 & 20/1/29.
Jhabvala's political change of heart did not, however, 
save him from the Meerut Case. During the case his 
ideological retreat continued, and his eccentricity 
remained undimmed. He sought to convince the Magistrate
of his 'hermetic temperament' and 'true Christ-like spirit' 
and of his consequent abhorrence of militance. However, 
despite his political liabilities for the communists, 
Jhabvala's eccentricities did provide them with some
welcome entertainment during a protracted and exceedingly 
boring trial. H.L. Hutchinson, Conspiracy at Meerut, 
(London, 1935), pp.95-6.
28. MCCC, P.2328 (P.2) : Spratt to C.P. Dutt, 14/6/27;
RCLI, Vol.I (1), p.112.
29. MCCC, P.1955: Spratt to R. Page Arnott, 10/3/27;
Spratt, Blowing Up India, p.37.
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beginning of the communists' later advance within the AITUC.
From these local union bases the communists began
their 'agit-prop' activity among the workers around their
programs of demands and the new ideology of 'Workers' Raj'.
They made themselves accessible to the labourers at the 
31workplace, organised public meetings and demonstrations,
attended popular cultural functions, and attempted to reach
the workers through the pages of their new weekly vernacular
newspaper, Kranti (Revolution).
The party, with Jhabvala's assistance, established
the nucleus of a working class base among the labourers at
32the Municipal workshops. It decided to use this base for
its first attempt to organise a mass rally - the first
celebration of May Day in Bombay and the communists' first
33public demonstration of their presence. They began a 
march, complete with red flags, banners and a band, from the
30. The communists' work in the AITUC will be looked at in 
the following chapter. Here we may note that their 
growing influence in the AITUC did not significantly 
benefit their mass work.
31. eg. see Kranti, 9/7/27 (MCCC, p.909-T), for an account 
of a typical meeting between WPP activists and workers 
in the Municipal workshops to formulate a list of 
grievances. See also MCCC, P.2328; op. cit.; and 
P.1010: Mirajkar to Spratt, 21/8/27.
32. Recruitment at the workshops was undertaken by the 
mechanical engineer, not directly by jobbers or foremen. 
(RCLI, 1(1), p.567). This reduction of the jobbers' 
hold over the workers may have facilitated this early 
communist success.
33. The following account of May Day is based on: H. Poll, 
32/1927: Bombay FR1 May 1927; Spratt, 'The Indian Trade 
Union Movement', LM, V.9(10), Oct. 1927, pp.616-17;
and S.S. Mirajkar, Interview, Bombay, 19 & 22/8/74.
21 6
workshops through the main mill area, timing it to coincide
with the change of shift in the mills. Four hundred
municipal workers, with Spratt and the other activists at
their head, emerged from the mills with over 2,000
enthusiastic millhands, attracted by the spectacle, in
procession. 'Until then the workers had not seen such an
organised procession' Mirajkar, one of the organisers, later 
34recalled. Nor, presumably, had they previously seen a
European participate in this way in their activities.
'There had been textile strikes, but not such an organised
35march-past. They joined us'. The procession ended with a
mass meeting presided over by N.M. Joshi, the leading trade
union moderate, who had agreed to co-operate. Speeches and 
3 6pamphlets explained the significance of May Day, condemned
the Trade Disputes Bill, presented a program of workers'
demands, and called on the workers to join unions for their
own protection. The communists could describe the results as
'quite successful', while noting that although the WPP leaders
and the idea of working class solidarity had been honoured in
the workers' 'continual chant of "ki jai's"', Gandhi had been,
37'unfortunately, the chief hero celebrated in this way'.
34. Mirajkar, Interview.
35. ibid.
36. eg. MCCC P.1985: a pamphlet titled 'The Meaning of May Day'.
37. MCCC, P.1974: Spratt to R. Page Arnott, 6/5/27.
It was apparent to the leaders that the concept of 'Workers'
Raj' was as yet imperfectly understood.
Nine months later, on the occasion of the arrival
of the Simon Commission on February 3, the party organised
another, but more impressive working class demonstration.
Once again, it used its current 'stronghold1, the Municipal
workshop employees, as its base, and relied upon Jhabvala's
working class contacts to facilitate the organisation of a
3 8one-day strike. The planned working class action was
projected as being 'not so much against the Commission, as
a preparation for the day when the organised workers shall by
39direct action win Swaraj for India and themselves'. Labour
was participating in the demonstration as an 1 independent
force', not as a mere adjunct to 'bourgeois nationalism'.
After extensive preparations in the industrial area of the
city in the preceding weeks some 25,000 to 30,000 Municipal,
textile and railway workshop workers struck work and marched
from Parel to the anti-Simon rally, contributing more than
half of. the crowd at the first of the series of demonstrations
40against the Commission throughout India. The working class 
hartal was an index of both the progress which the communists 
had made towards finding and mobilising a working class base 
and the remaining limits to their access to the workers. The
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38. MCCC, P.826: op. cit.
39. MCCC, P.548(5): a collection of WPP letters to the 
Bombay press.
40. MCCC, P.544(1): WPP notes of a planning meeting; MCCC, 
p .2096(P); Spratt to M. Ahmad, 16/1/28;IQR, 1928,
Vol.l, p.2? NAI, H. Poll, 18/XVI/1928: BCP to G of Bom. 
17/8/28, reporting that the hartal's success was due 
mainly to the WPP's working class mobilisation.
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numbers involved in the Simon demonstration - a ten-fold
increase on the May Day rally - and the explicitly political
subject, indicate the former; the continuing reliance upon
Jhabvala and his contacts the latter.
The WPP leaders began to participate in the workers'
cultural life. Joglekar, for instance, frequently addressed
gatherings for traditional festivals and tamashas. In the
same month as the May Day procession a similar.function was
organised by the GKM to celebrate the tercentenary of
Shivaji's birth. Joglekar, Spratt and others participated,
calling on an audience which had gathered to watch a play on
Shivaji's life to follow his example by fighting for Swaraj,
41but with 'the sword of the general strike'. This tentative
experiment in synthesising traditional Maratha symbolism
with the themes of nationalist and, implicitly, class
struggle, was to be developed and extended in the following 
42year.
• At this stage the experiment in communicating 
Marxist ideology to the workers remained very uncertain.
This is apparent in the ideological modes employed in Kranti
41. Newman, op. cit., p.225.
42. This early experimentation by one group of 'young 
Tilakites' with the Shivaji tradition, as a possible 
vehicle of the notion of working class participation 
in the nationalist struggle, can be viewed as 
continuous with Tilak's earlier efforts to mobilise 
Bombay's industrial labour. The communists had not yet 
developed from the Shivaji symbolism an unambiguous 
conception of class struggle. Cf. Cashman, op. cit., 
Chapters VIII & IX, (pp.172-217).
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in 1927. Kranti1s format was based on the principles of
'agitational journalism' decided upon at the same time as
the party was drawing up its overall policy. It was intended
that national and international items and labour and political
news be presented together, within a simplified Marxist
perspective, in such a way as to 'convey the impression that
the fight is going on in a militant manner', and that 'they
43are the same fight'. " In practice, international events
predominated, and although some pieces managed to find a level
that may have been intelligible to the workers, the overall
impression is one of irresolution in choosing the appropriate
44level of abstraction. This reflected the communists' still
45limited contact with the cultural world of the workers, and 
their doubt about the wisdom of expending the party's meagre
43. MCCC, P.1013: op. cit.
44. See the selection of Kranti articles in MCCC, P.1375-T.
45. This is evident from the following selection from an 
article on the Sacco-Vanzetti trial in the USA. While 
it demonstrates an imaginative skill in explaining an 
international issue in familiar terms and in developing 
domestic implications from it, it also reveals the 
communists' continuing pre-conception that community 
differences were 'trivial and largely imaginary' for a 
supposedly completely 'proletarianised' labourforce.
... a Purbhaiya of Banaras, (or) a Punjabi 
of Lahore has to set aside his manners and 
customs after beginning work as a labourer in 
Bombay and he belongs to no province ... his 
religion and his language consists in strikes,
... (and) the owner who squeezes him out is his 
God? the condition of labourers in America is 
like this. In such a cosmopolitan flood Sacco 
and Vanzetti ... (came) from Italy to America for 
the sake of making a living. ? from Kranti, 27/8/27.
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resources, at that stage, on a vernacular organ for the
workers rather than an English language weekly directed
46at an educated audience. No attempts were made to mould
Marxist revolutionary content with popular forms, such as
poems and songs, which could then be transmitted orally to
increase the ideological impact upon a predominantly illiterate
audience. Kranti was eventually suspended towards the end
of the year after reaching the discouraging circulation
47figure of only 400, with most being distributed free.
Although Kranti was suspended another newspaper
directed at a working class audience had, under communist
influence, begun partially to fulfil the same ideological
purpose. Through 1926 and 1927 the GKM's vernacular organ
Kamkari progressively introduced Marxist concepts. In April
1927, for example, it described the state as essentially an
instrument of the ruling classes designed to facilitate their
exploitation of the masses, and declared communism to be the
48goal of 'the workers. This ideological progression, 
undoubtedly due in large part to Joglekar's influence, 
indicated a growing militance among the working class 
activists who constituted the union's managing committee.
46. MCCC, P.1011: Ghate to Spratt, 22/8/27; and MCCC, P.1009: 
Spratt to C.P. Dutt, 4/9/27.
47. BCP, 1036/B/IV/1935: report, 17/10/27; and MCCC, P.1010; 
Mirajkar to Spratt, 21/8/27.
48. Newman, op* cit., p.224-5
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This emerging working class radicalism was
crystallised further during the GKM's participation in
two strikes in the Sassoon mill group, in August 1927 and
January 1928, and was directed subsequently towards the
democratisation of the union. In March the managing
committee, dissatisfied with Mayekar's conduct of the
union's affairs and particularly his dominating style,
misuse of funds, and compromising policy during the strikes,
expelled him from his position as secretary. The result was
'the rise of ordinary millhands to positions of real
49responsibility in the union'. From this point militant
workers, such as the weaver A.A. Alve and the fitter G.R.
Kasle, were to be the leaders of the union. This also
provided a firmer basis for a WPP-GKM alliance. Alve's
joining the party in late March, at the time of Mayekar's
expulsion from office, symbolised the growing strength of 
50this link. Two other GKM militants, Kasle and K.A. Desai,
51joined later in the year. Having reinforced its alliance 
with the GKM leaders it only remained for the communists to 
forge direct contacts with the ordinary workers. This 
possibility, too, was enhanced by the rise of the new GKM
49. ibid., p.236. See also pp.225-37 for an account of these 
two strikes and the associated developments in the GKM.
50. MCCC, P.1344: op. pit., 25/3/28.
51. ibid., 22/8/28 & 7/12/28.
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leadership, which was more responsive to the sentiments of 
the workers than had been Mayekar.
The Sassoon mill conflicts also provided the 
communists with invaluable practical experience. This was 
their first opportunity to participate in strike activity. 
Moreover, the issue which sparked these strikes - rational­
isation - was the same as that which led to the 1928 general 
strike. The communists, through participation in a joint 
strike committee and negotiations to settle the conflict, 
came into contact for the first time with the technological 
and social complexities of the industry, the rationalisation
issue, and the conduct of a strike. Dange, mystified, began
52a detailed private study of these issues. This was to prove 
invaluable during the general strike.
The strikes also led to increases in the 
organisational strength of both the GKM and the WPP. This 
was another invaluable preparation for the general strike.
The union was able to expand its organisation through the 
affected mills during the course of the conflict. This 
extension of its influence, combined with the democratisation 
and radicalisation of the managing committee, placed the GKM 
in a much better position to initiate and organise future 
strike activity, rather than simply responding to spontaneous 
strike outbreaks as previously. The strength of the WPP was 
increased because the Sassoon strikes brought it into textile
52. Newman, op. pit., ps.232 & 237.
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unionism as a party for the first time. Until the second
strike Joglekar had remained almost the sole point of contact
between the WPP and the GKM, and he had acted more as an
individual/ often in conflict with the party, than as a party
53representative. The party's dissatisfaction with Joglekar's 
conduct led to increased concern for party discipline, and 
the WPP participated more collectively, if still imperfectly 
so, in the January strike and subsequently.
When, at its first annual conference in March 1928,
the WPP assessed the progress of its working class program
during its first year, it was sufficiently satisfied to
reconfirm the general principles and tactics it had established
54at the beginning of 1927. It had effectively implemented 
the first phase of its strategy. With its membership in 
several trade unions, including the important railway unions, 
its demonstrated capacity to mobilise large numbers of workers 
for political goals and, most importantly, the developing 
strength of its alliance with the GKM, the Bombay WPP was in 
a promising position to benefit from the approaching convulsion 
in the textile industry. The strikes in the Sassoon mills 
against the first attempts to introduce rationalisation had
53. MCCC, P .1010: qp>. cit. The conflict in this case was 
around the issue of industrial unionism - Joglekar 
resisted the WPP's efforts to amalgamate the GKM and 
the BTLU.
54. MCCC, p.826: op. cit.; P.831: 'Thesis on the Trade Union
Question'. Nevertheless, criticisms were voiced on the 
issues of party discipline and worker-recruitment to the 
WPP.
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been merely the prelude to a conflict which was to set new 
records in India's industrial history. The general textile mill 
strike was to absorb most of the party's energies in the 
following six months.
The Textile General Strike of 1928 : the Second Phase.
The communists contributed only indirectly to the
55launching of the general strike in late April 1928. It was 
a direct and spontaneous consequence of the generalised and 
accelerated introduction of the millowners* 1 new economy 
measures in the early months of 1928. In the final fortnight 
of April separate strike protests within individual mills or 
departments became endemic throughout the industry. Outrage 
at a fatal police firing on a strikers' demonstration completed 
the process and by the end of the month all but a few outlying 
mills had shut down. At this point the pattern of the conflict 
was directly continuous with the general strikes in 1919-20
and 192'4-25 - it was initiated and established by the millhands,
55. The following account of the relevant features of the 
1928 textile general strike is based on Newman's 
comprehensive study in o jd .  cit., Chapter VIII, pp. 238-90.
I am using his study to establish the most significant 
features of the process of ideological and organisational 
transition within the workforce during the strike, and 
the communists' role in these changes. I am not attempting 
a detailed history of the strike. Besides Newman's work, 
summary accounts of the conflict appear in RCLI, 1(1), 
pp.122-24; Report of the Bombay Strike Enquiry Committee, 
(Bombay, 1929), pp.1-8; and, from the communists' 
perspective, in a series of articles in LM, Vols.l0(7) to 
10(11), (Jul. - Nov., 1928).
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and it was little more than an aggregation of essentially 
discrete stoppages. It was not the result of the WPP's call 
for a general strike, nor was it an expression of class 
solidarity.
Nevertheless two new factors did distinguish this 
strike from its predecessors. The first was the systematic 
character of the underlying cause - the millowners' rapid 
introduction of policies leading to profound structural changes 
throughout the industry. The second was the presence from the 
outset of a new type of working class leadership, determined 
to co-ordinate the disparate individual struggles against 
particular managements and convert them into a unified conflict 
with the millowners•as a whole. For both reasons the 1928 
strike possessed unprecedented opportunities for creating class 
awareness and organisation among the millhands.
The communists were the first of the working class 
leaders to call for a general strike. They retained the 
initiative in mill unionism from this point. Even before the 
strike had become established the party had set out to imple­
ment its trade union policy of creating a strong and unified
56central union structure from the existing labour leaderships,
56. The GKM had special need of an alliance with the BTLU 
apart from the general principle of creating the 
strongest possible working class leadership for the 
confrontation with the main enemy, the millowners. Most 
of all it needed access to the moderates' much more sub­
stantial funds to finance the organisation of the strike, 
and N.M. Joshi's influence with the millowners and the 
government for the negotiations which eventually would 
become necessary. The alliance would also facilitate 
access to the mill areas where the BTLU was influential, 
thus helping to overcome the GKM's regional limits.
The BTLU too, once it decided to participate in the 
strike, needed the GKM - for the latter reason , and 
because of the GKM's rapidly increasing
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and an active and organised mass foundation. By the end of 
the year they had succeeded, largely, in achieving this goal, 
even though on the eve of the strike they were no more than 
advisers to a union with very limited resources and influence 
in only one district.
To create a strong central strike organisation
which included themselves the communists pursued two tactics
- that of gaining a firmer footing in the GKM and securing its
commitment to a militant promotion of the strike, and that of
bringing the BTLU into a 'united front' joint strike organ- 
57isation. The first advance began in early April when 
Joglekar, and the intransigence displayed by the millhands 
in a number of partial strikes at that time, persuaded the 
GKM1s managing committee to call for a general strike and to 
take the initiative in forming a joint strike committee. The 
Joint Mill Strike Committee (JMSC) was formed in the GKM's 
Prabhadevi area on April 18, and as union membership was not 
made mandatory the 'outsider' communists were able to stand
56. Contd.influence over the mass organisation of the strike. 
Ironically, two contributions from Russia (totalling 
Rs.35,000) to the strike funds did not lessen their 
dependence on the moderates, for these were received 
either by N.M. Joshi, or by Jhabvala after he had begun 
to break with the WPP: NAI, H.Poll, 10/22/1928, 18/6/1928; 
and 1/1928: Bombay FR1 May and September? Newman, op. cit.,
pp.280-81.
57. The WPP's policy of a 'united front' was ratified, after 
some conflict over the issue in the party, on April 29: 
MCCC, p.1344, op. cit., 29/4/28. This general policy 
subsequently became official for all WPP's in India at 
the Calcutta All-India WPP Conference in December 1928.
The 'thesis' adopted there is the fullest available 
statement of the 'united front' trade union policy:
MCCC, P.51: 'The Trade Union Movement - Thesis'.
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for election. Bradley, Mirajkar, Nimbkar and Dange were 
elected to the JMSC, along with GKM activists and ordinary 
strikers from Prabhadevi. The party was now in a position 
to exert a more direct, if still very limited influence on 
the course of events. However this position was still very 
tenuous. Even the GKM leadership, concerned about the 
militance of the communists' public speeches, initially gave 
only qualified support to its allies in the JMSC. But by mid- 
May, when it had become clear that the communists had correctly 
gauged the mood of the workers and had predicted the course of 
events, the managing committee dropped its caution by expanding 
its advisory committee and bringing in four more communists. 
Dange, Mirajkar, Nimbkar, Ghate, Joglekar and Bradley now sat 
on this committee.
These gains were consolidated in late May. On May 
21 Mayekar, the deposed secretary of the GKM, made a last-ditch 
attempt to recover his influence by registering a small regional 
branch 'of the GKM as the official Girni Kamgar Mahamandal, with 
himself as its secretary. The main branch of the union in 
Prabhadevi responded to this appropriation of its name by 
forming a new union, the Girni Kamgar Union (GKU), with a 
constitution allowing outsiders to become union members.
The constitutional change was a major break with the union's 
past, and it provided the communists with their first opportunity 
to become bona fide officials in an existing union. It was a 
measure of the level of good faith that they had won. This 
was confirmed at the public meeting on May 22 at which the new 
union was formed, when communists were elected as five of the
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eleven officers, while another was elected to the managing 
5 8committee. The new union was registered on May 23 with an 
initial membership of 174. The prolonged efforts of the 
communists to break down the traditional barriers of distrust 
of outsiders , and to become union members in their own 
rights, had finally been rewarded. Even so an implicit warning 
to the communists was served at the May 22 meeting. A signifi­
cant number of GKM members expressed their doubts about the 
wisdom of allowing the new outsiders to become members.
This hesitation was overcome only after Alve 'managed to 
convince /~themJ7 ... that the communist outsiders were 
"selfless unionists" and Congressmen, necessary to the mill-
hands because of their administrative abilities and knowledge 
59of English'. The communists were now, in effect, on 
probation.
The second tactic - that of bringing the BTLU into 
the strike organisation - was effected in two stages. The 
JMSC, before the strike had become general, invited the BTLU 
leadership to join. The moderates, who desired neither a
58. The five were: Bradley and Nimbkar as two of the four 
Vice-presidents (Jhabvala was third), Dange as Secretary, 
Joglekar as one of the three Assistant Secretaries,
Ghate as one of two Joint Treasurers, Mirajkar, along 
with Pendse, was elected to the twelve-man Managing 
Committee. Alve was elected as President of the union: 
MCCC, P .958-T: Minute Book of the GKU.
59. Newman, op. pit., p.256.
22 9
general strike nor an alliance with the militants, declined. 
But once the strike had become a fact the moderates had little 
choice. With their own followers on strike they were forced 
to participate and to seek as favourable a settlement as 
possible. Both sides now shared the same immediate goal.
At the end of April a second Joint Mill Strike Committee 
(JMSC) was constituted from ten millhands and five outsiders 
nominated by each union. Four of the GKM's outsiders - 
Dange, Nimbkar, Mirajkar and Bradley - were communists, and 
the fifth was Jhabvala.
The JMSC immediately set about drawing up a list of 
demands as a basis for possible negotiations with the owners. 
The demands were based on the workers' specific grievances.
But it was also stated that the JMSC was prepared to consider 
particular rationalisation proposals on their merits and 
the committee advocated the principle of standardisation of 
wages and working conditions throughout the industry, with 
wages fixed at the levels of 1925. The JMSC also appointed 
three sub-committees to undertake negotiations, organise the 
picketing of mills, the exodus of strikers to their villages, 
and the distribution of relief to the strikers.^ The JMSC
60. These three functions were crucial to the success of the 
strike. Picketing was necessary to discourage strike­
breaking but it also served the very useful psychological 
role for the strikers of 'dramatising their hostility to 
the owners' (ibid., p.275). The exodus of a large number 
of strikers was necessary to limit relief expenditure.
It was made possible because of the large number of workers 
from agriculturalist families relatively close to the city, 
and according to the government's calculations some 50,000 
left Bombay for their villages. (NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928). 
More must have left in later stages because an average of 
only 24,000 were receiving relief during the second half of the strike, when dependence on relief must have become
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remained the central organisation throughout the strike's 
61duration. Its organisational connection with the strikers 
was exercised through the relief and picketing sub-committees. 
These mass contacts were further extended when the jobbers gave 
their full support to the strike organisers from early July, 
soon after the Millowners' Association had published their 
Standardisation Scheme.
Another important function of the mass committees 
was to reduce the possibility of communal conflict. The GKU 
issued special appeals to the North Indian strikers to sustain 
their participation when signs that they were wavering appeared 
in May. Specific appeals were also directed at the untouchables, 
for Ambedkar's Depressed Classes Association had recently begun 
a campaign against the exclusion of Untouchables from the higher 
paid positions by the caste workers and the Muslims. Both the 
GKU and the BTLU also felt it necessary to address the Muslim 
strikers in Madanpura regularly to ensure their support. But, 
overall, the JMSC's careful concern to anticipate and contain 
conflict between the communities, and the level of commitment 
of all groups of workers to the strike, were sufficient to 
maintain its solidarity. Ambedkar and the Untouchable workers
60. Contd.
fairly general (Newman, op. cit., pps.278-9). Although 
the strikers had to depend to a large degree on traditional 
sources of credit during the strike, the relief system 
did much to lessen the debt burden and the suffering, and 
thus to maintain the strike for a much longer period than 
any previous general strike.
61. In line with the policy of temporary alliance for the 
duration of the strike both unions refrained from separate 
activity outside of the JMSC. There was no competitive 
recruitment campaigning until the strike's termination.
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did decide to support the JMSC, and the Muslims also continued
their participation. Although some tension developed between
the relief committee, which was manned mainly by Maratha
volunteers, and both the Untouchables and the Muslims, who
6 2had less access to alternative income, this did not become 
serious.
The most important immediate task for the JMSC was 
mass organisation to consolidate the strike, for attempts to 
negotiate favourable terms with the millowners would be point­
less until this was achieved. The militants took the lead in 
this field, and it was their success at this level which was 
the basis for their later rise to almost unchallenged leadership 
of the textile workers. They dominated the picketing and relief 
activity from the beginning, partly because of the moderates' 
diffidence about this type of work. This placed them in direct 
contact with the ordinary strikers and gained the communists 
far more recognition and good will than their rival outsiders , 
the moderates. Because of this strategic location it was also 
the militants who gained most directly from the contacts and 
communication networks which the incorporated jobbers brought 
to the strike organisation. The GKU leaders consolidated 
their mass influence through their general accessibility to 
the workers, their organisation of and participation in a 
constant round of mass meetings designed to politically 
educate and involve the strikers, their willingness to share
62. Neither the Muslims nor the Untouchables had agricultural 
incomes to fall back upon, the lower wages of the Untouch­
ables meant lower financial reserves and credit worthiness 
with the moneylenders, and the Muslims' wives, being in 
purdah, could not look for alternative casual work. These 
groups were therefore the most dependent on relief, and the main recipients of the doles.
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the strikers' situation by, for example, courting arrest, and
through their printed strike news and propaganda. The WPP
revived Kranti as a bi-weekly in late-June and it quickly became
the main printed source of strike news, with a circulation
exceeding 2,000. Selling at a pice, by September it was
returning a monthly surplus of Rs.50, thus becoming the first
6 3self-supporting Indian communist newspaper.
The consolidation of the mass base of the strike 
reinforced the bargaining position of the JMSC vis a vis the 
millowners and, at the same time, the position of the militants 
within the negotiations sub-committee. For both reasons the 
JMSC became more determined to resist the millowners' new plans, 
and more capable of mobilising sufficient force to bring them 
to the negotiating table.^ The first significant result of 
these sanctions was the Millowners1 Association's reluctant pub­
lication of their Standardisation Scheme. This was the first 
time that the owners, as a group, had produced a comprehensive 
scheme and made it public. In addition to mobilising the 
jobbers' support for the strike, the publication of the scheme 
allowed the strikers to see much more clearly the systematic 
nature of the measures they had struck against and the class 
character of their opposition. This new awareness did much to 
consolidate the strike.
63. MCCC, P.526(39): Spratt's notes of an inter-provincial WPP 
conference, Bombay, 6/9/28. Dange became the editor, 
assisted by Mirajkar and Pendse. As Indian newspapers 
were generally widely circulated, and because Kranti's 
content was no doubt transmitted widely to the illiterate, 
the paper's audience would have been much more than its 
circulation figure.
64o The details of the negotiations during and after the strike 
are reproduced in the Report of the Bombay Strike Enquiry 
Committee, op. cit.
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Periodic rounds of negotiations continued from this
point. After the failure of attempts to reopen the mills on
the owners' terms, and on the verge of a collapse of both the
mills and the strike, a compromise settlement, which was a
65considerable victory for the workers, was finally reached
at a government-convened conference on October 4, and the
6 6mills reopened on October 6. The strike had lasted more
than five months, several times longer than any previous
general strike, cost 22,000,000 man-days and Rs. 3^ crores 
6 7in wages, and demonstrated an almost unbelievable capacity
to resist on the part of the millhands. As Newman has 
68commented: 'What began as an apparently suicidal gesture
succeeded'.
69The communists 'had gained most of all', in both 
political influence and political education. Their later claim 
that 'the main policy /~in the strike_7 was considered and 
decided upon by the Executive Committee' of the WPP was, from 
the point at which the jobbers had joined at least, essentially
65. eg. see the Government of Bombay's comment in RCLI, 
Vol.I(1), p.109.
66. Both sides agreed to have an independent government- 
nominated body, the Bombay Strike Enquiry Committee, 
investigate the situation. Until it gave its report 
wages were to be returned to the rates in operation in 
March 1927 except for those departments and mills which 
had already introduced rationalisation schemes, where 
wage rates were to be those applying in March 1928. 
Despite this acceptance of existing rationalisation 
schemes and the associated wage cuts, the strike was a 
victory, if only a defensive victory, for the workers. 
It had forced the owners to negotiate and finally to 
accept terms they had previously rejected.
67. RCLI, 1(1), p.124.
68. Newman, op. cit., p.288. 
ibid., p.289.69.
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70correct. The GKU emerged from the strike with the prestige
among the workers that followed from this role within a
successful strike, a communication network potentially capable
of superseding those of the jobbers, influence in areas where
previously it had had none, organised groups of working
class volunteers who could form the nucleus of a union and
party cadre structure, a much more intimate knowledge of the
industry and the conduct of a strike, and the recognition by
the millowners which was necessary for independence from the
moderate leaders in future conflicts.
The prestige of the communists in the eyes of the
workers was clearly demonstrated at the mass meeting on
October 5 at which Nimbkar and Mirajkar explained the terms
71of the compromise settlement. It was attended by more than
20,000 strikers, a significant proportion of those remaining 
72in Bombay. The speakers described the terms as a victory 
for the workers and a defeat for the owners. The strikers had 
managed to defend the status quo against the attacks of their 
powerful enemies. Nevertheless, they continued, the settlement
70. MCCC, Joglekar's Defence Statement (which was a collective 
statement on behalf of the entire Meerut communist group), 
p.1936. Once the close WPP-GKU alliance had been estab­
lished, and the GKU had become the main directive force
in the mass committees of the strike, the WPP was in fact 
the decision-making body for this level of the strike and 
thus, increasingly, in the negotiations sub-committee as 
well. As early as the beginning of May the communists 
were convinced that the GKU was the undisputed leader of 
the strike in the eyes of the workers (MCCC, P.129: 
Mirajkar to Aftab Ali, 5/5/28).
71. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928, KW XI.
72. See fn.60.
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was merely a defensive 'truce'. The owners' attacks would
be resumed after the enquiry committee handed down its report.
It was therefore essential that the millhands use the temporary
reprieve to recover their strength, build a strong mass union,
and collect a large reserve strike fund. Further, in order
to consolidate the present gains it was imperative that the
workers develop the capacity to launch an offensive strike in 
73the future. These themes were to be repeated constantly in 
the following months.
The audience acclaimed the speakers with enthusiasm. 
The descriptions of the strike's achievements and the tasks for 
the future were hailed with shouts of 'Victory to the Red Flag', 
'Victory to the Girni Kamgar Union', 'Long Live the Workers' 
Fight', and 'Victory to the Workers' and Peasants' Party'. Red 
flags were, in the words of a police reporter, 'enthusiastic­
ally displayed' and, 'where they were not available, the
74workers even used their red turbans as flags'. The meeting
was followed by a 'huge' procession to the GKU office, 'where
it saluted the Red Flag amidst cheers'.
The leaders had won this acclaim and confidence
75through their 'intense effort' during the strike. The 
enthusiasm for the red flag at the October 5 mass meeting 
suggests that the WPP's ideology, also, was crucial to 'a few
73. NAI, H .Poll, 18/VII/1928, KW XI.
74. ibid.
75. RCLI, Report, p.319.
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Communist leaders' being able 'to capture the imagination
V 6of the workers'. The specific role of ideology thus 
requires more detailed investigation.
The Role of Ideology
The party devoted a great deal of attention to
propaganda during and after the strike. Kranti was revived
in late June after the WPP executive decided that 'the need
77for Party propaganda was ... urgent at this stage'. During
the strike it was 'actually a strike bulletin' rather than a
78conventional 'agit-prop' organ. However, frequent ideolog­
ical pieces were interspersed with the strike news, a format
which was also used in the party's speeches at the daily 
79meetings and in their handbills. This intermingling of 
propaganda and news enhanced the process of making a Marxist 
ideology relevant to the workers. As in Kranti in 1927, the 
WPP sought to communicate an analysis of the context of the 
working class's condition in terms related to its everyday 
experience; but in 1928 the attempt was more successful. This 
was because of the communists' closer contact with the mill- 
hands' world as a result of the strike and their close collabor-
76. loc. cit.
77. MCCC, P.1344: op. cit., 24/6/23. (The fact that this was 
the point at which the jobbers gave full support to the 
strike, thus providing the leaders with new communication 
networks, may not have been coincidental to the WPP's 
sense of urgency.)
78. MCCC, P.526(39): op. cit.
79. See the police reports of these meetings in the MCCC 
records. Bradley considered the daily meetings to be 
the medium having the greatest educative effect on the 
strikers. (MCCC, P.2412: Bradley to J. Potter Wilson, 
26/10/28). The following Kranti selections represent 
this oral propaganda also.
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ation with workers such as Alve, as well as the much more 
favourable political context within which it was read in 
1928. The worker-leaders also contributed to the paper. The 
new Kranti was much more definitely a working class paper than 
its predecessor.
The central concepts in the party's working class 
propaganda were class and class struggle, the state and 
revolution, and the nature of the 'Workman's Raj' of the 
future. The basic reality of Indian society, Kranti argued, 
was the class-based exploitation of the workers and the 
peasants:
If we ... glance around us we shall find that a 
struggle is going on amongst all classes. We shall 
find the owner class struggling against the workers 
for safeguarding their own interests. We find a big 
landlord struggling against a poor peasant. We shall 
find that the khot has opened his mouth wide to swallow 
the tenant. We shall find that the house owner is 
sitting thinking over how to ... get his rent enhanced. 
All these examples lead us to say that two classes of 
people with conflicting interests are always struggling 
against each other and that one class keeps all author­
ity in his own hands and lords it over the other. ... 
This power lies in political authority.80
This exploitation was conducted by an alliance of 
the Indian and British 'owners', and the political authority 
of the state was exercised, particularly through the police 
- 'the helpers of the owners' - on both their behalfs:
80. Kranti, 3/3/29, in MCCC, P.989-T. The following selections 
from Kranti are taken from MCCC, P.930-T, P.953-T, P.986-T, 
P.989-T and P.1263-T. I am quoting fairly extensively 
from Kranti in order to communicate the form as well as 
the conceptual content of the WPP's working class propa­
ganda. Clearly the former was a crucial factor in the 
propaganda's effectiveness.
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Both are speculators and profit makers. But the 
Indian owners have no guns, troops or much power.
That lies in the hands of the English owners. But 
both of these want to squeeze the workers and to 
get possession of the heap of gold, earned as profits, 
raised on the blood of the workers. For this purpose 
the Indian owners have agreed to give a share of 
their profits ... to the English owners and they in 
turn took the help of the guns and troops of the 
English and both of them in partnership have come 
forward to take the life of the workers.®-'-
These exploitative social relationships were inherent to the
'Capitalists' Raj':
... the struggle between the capitalists and the 
workers can never be finally settled. There is no 
necessity of the capitalists for the working of our 
society. Factories, railways etc. are worked by the 
labour and intellect of the labourers. But the 
owners exercise their authority wrongfully and them­
selves appropriate the profits derived therefrom and 
employ the workers in suffering and filth. The 
workers will remain poverty stricken and will not get 
happiness as long as the profiteering owners exercise 
possession ...
Only the 'Workman's Raj', based on the workers' control of
their own lives, could provide a decent and dignified life
for the exploited and impoverished masses:
Profiteering is given a go-bye and the Workman's Raj 
manufactures goods of the quality and in quantity 
suited to the convenience of all and supplies it to 
the workers. ... He establishes his own power and 
works the machines of capitalists their system of 
accounts, ... and the factories of capitalists, in 
the interests of the working class and ... of the 
country.83
81. i^id., 12/8/28
82. ibid., 3/9/29.
83. ibid., 30/8/28
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But the 'Workman's Raj1 would not be volunteered to
the workers. It could only be won through protracted class
struggle by an alliance of the workers, peasants and 'poverty-
stricken educated people' against the owners and the state, a
struggle going beyond immediate economic demands and culmin-
84ating in the revolutionary seizure of state power. Striking
for improved working conditions was only the first step, though
an important one, towards this eventual goal.
... if demands are not granted by resorting to strikes 
the working class takes a more dangerous weapon into 
its hands. ... He sets aside the owner class and takes 
the power into his own hands and destroys Capitalism by effecting a revolution.85
Because the struggle was necessarily protracted,
Kranti stressed, strong revolutionary organisation was
imperative. Immediately after the conclusion of the strike
the WPP urged the workers to create 'a huge Union ... of one
lakh and fifty thousand members' and to expand the 'Red Army'
of volunteers established during the strike; 'Do not remain
8 6idle and be misled by this victory'. But trade union
organisation was not enough:
Just as fire is necessary for baking bread, and air, 
water and food are necessary for life, so it is 
necessary to have a party of real workers for 
strengthening the organisation of the workers and 
to bring into the hands of the workers the economic 
and political power that has been usurped by the 
capitalists ... .87
84. ibid., 23/8/28.
85. loc. cit.
86. ibid., 5/10/28.
87. ibid-/ 3/3/29.
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The workers should therefore join the WPP 'without fear, and
secure their demands and happiness by co-operating with that 
88Party'. Kranti assured its audience that the WPP would
'train up workers to become leaders and thus make preparations
89for the establishment of the Labour Raj 1. The communists 
would educate the workers in Marxist theory. This education 
was essential for two reasons: communism was both the 'creed
of the workers' and the irreplaceable 'science' which guided 
their struggle.^
With the workers united in their unions and
through a party based on Marxism, the communists could then
lead them decisively in the struggle for their immediate and
long-term demands - a minimum wage of Rs.50, an eight hour
day, two rooms per family, paid holidays of four days per
month and one month per year, 'at least one visit to a theatre
or a cinema every month' and, finally, the 'Destruction of
profiteering Capitalism'. 'You demand this much ... Every
91Communist demands this and fights for it'. But tactical 
flexibility was required to counter the wide range of 
measures which would be employed by the owners and the 
government against their struggle: 'we must devise rules to suit
the enemy's strength, ... we must gather our strength first 
and avoid provocation', eschewing violent responses to violent
88. ibid., 23/8/28
89. ibid., 5/10/28.
90. ibid., 23/8/28.
91. ibid., 20/8/28.
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92repression until the time was ripe for revolution. But
throughout this changing struggle the workers should remember
their 'very lofty' goal: 'continue to repeat the mantra:
"Establish Labour Raj and destroy Capitalism" a thousand times 
93every day'.
Kranti argued that the masses could expect little
help from existing political organisations in India. The
National Congress in its present form 'belongs to the owners
... They go a-begging before the English ... /Tand help_7 the
Tatas and other owners'. The workers should therefore join
the Congress: 'Bring the National Congress under your control
94and beat down the dominance of the owners'. The workers
should also be wary of those outsiders who were 'actuated by
philanthropic motives' but sought to ensure that 'the workers
and peasants may not be disposed to become revolutionaries and
95dig out capitalism root and branch'. The Indian masses could, 
however, rely on international support from the workers and 
peasants of the world, and particularly from the Soviet Union.
It was many times emphasised that while the BPCC had voted 
against providing significant financial assistance to the 
striking millworkers, Russian and British trade unions had 
contributed generously. The workers of India should therefore 
participate actively in this international solidarity - for 
example by preparing to oppose any attempts by the British 
capitalists and government to wage war against the Soviet Union.
92. ibid., 12/7/28. 96. ibid., 2/8/28
93. ibid., 27/9/28.
94. ibid., 29/7/28
95. ibid., 3/3/29.
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The party also resumed and extended its earlier
experiment in synthesising Marxist ideological content with
traditional cultural symbols, but this time the concept of
working class struggle for its own specific interests was more
developed. The following example is taken from an article by
Alve in which he used the Bhagavad Gita to develop a very non-
97Gandhian theme. The capitalists, Indian and British, he 
wrote, 'live in wealth and glory like that of Indra, ... 
become rich like Kuber, ... their wives become likewise like 
Rambha'. The workers, on the other hand, remained in the 
same pitiable condition. But, Alve warned, they were becoming 
more demanding. He warned the capitalists and their 'ally', 
the Government:
You may be proud of your wealth, you may think much 
of your army; but proud Ravana was fully prepared ... 
like you, but you must have heard what the unarmed 
monkeys did to him when he exceeded all bounds. The 
workers will strike again if necessary.
The communists' ideology began to evoke ,a definite
working class response. In Bradley's view, the development of
the 'wonderful consciousness' of the workers had been the
98strike's most important achievement. It is clear that the 
strikers' concerns had not been limited to immediate economic 
issues and that a significant ideological shift had occurred 
between the May Day procession in 1927 and the strike settlement 
mass meeting in October 1928. There is sufficient evidence to 
show that in this shift a working class understanding and 
acceptance of the essential Marxist concepts had occurred.
97. 'The Capitalists Have Grown Fat But the Worker Is Still 
Starving', in Kranti, 29/1/29.
98. MCCC, P.2412(P): Bradley to J. Potter Wilson, 26/10/28.
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Alve's articles demonstrate that this was the case for the
99leading working class elements; a long narrative poem 
authored by two Maratha workers and published by K.R. Arsekar, 
one of the millworkers in the GKU's managing committee, is one
indication that the new ideology had permeated even further
. . -.100 downwards.
The poem is a remarkable document. It is in the 
form of an epic, and depicts the strike and the GKU's subse­
quent struggles as a battle between two class armies, the 
workers' army being led by the GKU and the party. Again, 
symbols from the Mahabharata are used as vehicles for the 
ideology of class struggle: 'Just as a mighty struggle was
waged between the Kauravas and the Pandavas in the Dwapar age, 
in the same manner the workers fought in a terrible manner with 
the capitalists in Bombay. ... Just as the monkeys fought with 
the demons in Lanka, ... the workers struggled against capital­
ism in Bombay'. The Marxist concept of the inherent antagonism 
of capital and labour is recognisable: 'The capitalists thought
of effecting a cut in the wages of the workers, ... /" who J 
were greatly enraged /~ and said J what a curious justice is 
this that they take away what belongs to us'. So too are the
99. eg. Alve's 'How should the Workers Fight?', in Kranti, 
12/7/28; and see also Alve's and Kasle's Defense 
Statements in the Meerut Case records.
100. MCCC, P.940-T: 'Girni Workers' Phatka (poem)', by
Ganga Ram Devag and Jayaram Pandu Devag. The poem 
reproduced in the Meerut Case records was only one of 
a series, selling at ^ annas each. It was published
in February 1929. Because of the rarity of working class 
documents I am quoting from it at some length.
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concepts of the international scope of capital, and of the 
state: 'Owners join hands with owners, they exercise authority
over the world, governments have made common cause with them, 
there is no end to misery'.
Great stress was placed upon both the possibility 
and the necessity of united working class action in class 
struggle against the capitalists and the state: in response to 
the millowners' plans the workers 'assembled ... as if it was 
another National Congress'; they resolved to 'take revenge 
upon the capitalists ... let us unite and declare a general 
strike'; a 'straggle of the class war' began and the workers 
formed a united army under the leadership of invincible 
heroes, distinguished by 'the lustre of heroic sentiments' - 
Alve, Joglekar, Pendse, Ghate, Kasle, Arsekar, 'Bradley Saheb'; 
'the sword of Mirajkar does not rest satisfied in its scabbard, 
that of Dange is really electricity ... better than lightning 
... Mr. Alve ... is like the great serpent Takshaka in swallow­
ing the enemies'. United, and under this leadership, the 
workers-, 'Soldiers ... of the new spirit and new discipline', 
possessed great power: 'You have weapons in your hands, the
machines are in your hands, ... the Red Flag is in our hands, 
now we have no fear of anything'. The workers had the addition­
al strength of international solidarity: 'workers and peasants
have become united all over the world' for the struggle 
against international capitalism, and 'Russia and other foreign 
countries' had sent money to the Bombay millhands to help them 
sustain their strike. For good measure, the potency of this 
secular unity was reinforced by the protection of partisan 
divinities: 'the workers went to invite King Shivaji to have
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a look at the fight'; the poets called 'to the Lord of the 
World to protect us'. But this support would be of little 
value unless the workers' unity did not cross community 
barriers and was not consolidated through disciplined class 
organisation: 'Look, brother workers, what harm has been
effected by disunity ... Let there be no such distinction as 
this is a Mussalman /*orJ  this is a Mahar, let there be 
unity ... we are children of the same mother'; 'increase the 
power of organisation ... To whom do you show the fear of 
arms, machines and armies when the workers possess the 
invincible powers of strikes and organisation? ... organised 
power is feared all over the world'.
Finally, the workers' struggle was for more than
'bread' - it was a struggle by 'the protectors of the world'
for 'the regeneration of the world', and would have to be
conducted in a spirit of love:
... cries of liberty are reverberating. 0, manly 
people, rise in an organised manner for breaking 
the bonds of oppression, give cheers to the authority 
of the workers ... Who can now tolerate their 
impertinent orders? ... lead a life of manliness and ... 
let others lead a life of manliness. This song ... is 
really for loving brother workers'.
The workers' fight, being universal in scope, was therefore,
identified with the national struggle against the British,
even if it went far beyond the National Congress's conceptions
and aims: the workers 'see before their eyes the example of
the Satyagraha of Bardoli', 'Brothers, cry out "Victory for
India"'.
The poem reveals a masterly synthesis of 'modernity' 
and tradition. Traditional millenarian themes were fused with 
the new conceptions of class and class struggle to provide a
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world-view with which to cope with the present crisis, and 
a striking vision of future possibilities. Both the militant 
Shivaji tradition of justified warfare against*oppressors, for 
righteous aims, and the devotional-egalitarian bhakti ideals, 
were drawn upon as inspirations for a self-sacrificing struggle 
for a future world of harmony, free from exploitation; a faith 
in the efficaceous power of heroes and the protection of Shivaji 
and the Gods was linked to an equal faith in labour's capacity 
to establish its own autonomy and dignity, through the volun­
tarist assertion of organised working class power and with the 
assistance of the oppressed in India and throughout the world. 
Marxist categories were integrated comfortably with the workers' 
culture and daily experience. Traditional cultural modes
provided a framework for new conceptions and for using them,
101'the weapons of words', to grasp new possibilities.
The concepts expressed in the poem show a very close 
correspondence to those propagated by the communists in Kranti 
and at public meetings. This correspondence and Kranti's 
circulation figures suggest that, to a very significant degree, 
the communists' ideology had provided a comprehensible, 
holistic and persuasive explanation to the workers - or to the 
Maratha workers at least - of the determinants of their exper­
ience: their initial dispossession from their landholdings and
their forced move to the cities and the factories, their 
chronically miserable working and living conditions, the wage 
cuts, increased work-loads, retrenchments, and the police
101. ibid.
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actions against their attempts to resist these changes- It 
had been presented in a form which made the poets' creative 
integration of Marxist ideology possible. This analysis made 
more sense to the millhands in 1928-29 than the reformists' alter­
native based on the notion of the 'partnership' of labour and 
capital, and appears to have begun displacing community ideology. 
It possessed the added attractions of a militant, unambiguous 
attach on the hated 'owners', and the promotion of the ideal of 
'workers' control'.
Equally importantly, the party now had a network 
through which it could distribute its printed propaganda, 
ideology was linked to a clear strategy for social change, and 
the exponents of the ideology actively involved themselves 
with the workers in effecting the strategy. And this strategy 
had led to an immediate success - the millowners had been forced 
to suspend the introduction of their scheme. Ideology, in the 
opportunities available in 1928, had received apparent confirm­
ation in action. The workers could now believe that the 
communists' overall goals were possible. This was further 
demonstrated, unambiguously, by their response to the GKU 
leaders' call to build a mass union and the way that they
defended it against a series of counter-attacks in the first 
102half of 1929. z
Building the Girni Kamgar Union: the Third Phase.
Despite their widespread indebtedness to the money
102. The following schematic account of the building of the 
GKU is based on Newman, op. cit., pp.291-318.
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lenders the millhands, as soon as they received their first
wages, flocked to the GKU to pay their 4 annas membership
fees and the special Rs 1 contributions to the strike fund,
103and to seek 'help in all things' from the union. The
following months saw a dramatic increase in the union's member­
ship figures and financial reserves. Within a month there
were 27,000 paying members, which was about a third of those
104who had returned to work. By the end of the year 50,000
had enrolled, and in January the union had a paying membership
of more than 100,000, or more than two thirds of the normal
workforce. This had declined to about 80,000 by March because
of communal riots in February and a shorter working month,
providing lower wages, in that month. Nevertheless, the
average membership of 58,000 for the six months between the
end of the strike and the Meerut arrests made it by far the
largest union in India and astounded veteran trade union 
105leaders. By March the union had a balance of more than
Rs.70,000, freeing the militants, for the first time, from
106financial dependence upon the moderates.
The GKU's membership figures and financial resources, 
convincing in themselves, are only a partial indication of its
103. MCCC, P.2412(P): op. cit.
104. The membership figures are taken from Newman, op. cit., 
p.300.
105. N.M. Joshi told Bradley that he would previously have 
thought the membership figures 'impossible': MCCC, 
P.2417: Bradley to J. Potter Wilson, 2/2/29.
106. MCG: 2 & 3. The union's new financial resources also 
allowed the militants to make their first act of inter­
provincial material solidarity - a Rs.1000 contribution 
to the striking jute workers at Bauria, in Bengal: MCCC, 
P.958: GKU Minute Book, 16/1/29.
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significance; it was also the union's structure and modes of
operation that made it a radically new type of Indian working
class organisation. The communists' vigorous promotion of
the idea of factory committees, the key concept in their theory
of trade union organisation, found a ready response among the
workers. They were a natural extension of the pattern of mass
organisation the GKU leadership had established during the
strike, and the conditions in the textile industry after the
settlement favoured their development. Despite the settlement
there continued to be a high level of dissatisfaction with the
107mill managements among the workers. Further, because the
millowners were anxious to rebuild depleted stocks as quickly 
as possible they were keen to negotiate over disputes in order 
to maintain production. This combination of factors provided 
the GKU leadership with a great many opportunities to intervene, 
organise the aggrieved millhands, and win further recognition 
as working class representatives from both the workers and the 
managements. The immediate post-strike situation also sustained 
the GKU.' s fruitful alliance with the jobbers for, in addition 
to their continuing fear of the millowners' standardisation 
plans, they often found that they were being used by the 
managements to introduce changes in contravention of the strike 
settlement terms, and as scapegoats for disturbances created 
by the millhands. The GKU found that the jobbers 'greatly
107. Ambiguities in the settlement terms, surreptitious 
attempts by certain mills to introduce further 
rationalisation or to victimise activists, genuine 
misunderstandings, and new types of conflict between 
management and an increasingly assertive workforce, 
all combined to create this continuing unrest.
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assisted' its early development/ and decided to maintain the
alliance despite its fundamental opposition to the jobber
. 108 system.
With the momentum carried forward from the general
strike, the tireless involvement of the GKU leaders in the
large and small details of negotiation, union organisation
and ideological activity, and under the opportune conditions
of the post-strike situation, the mill committee movement
flourished. By December the system was established, and by
April committees were functioning in two thirds of the
industry's mills. Each committee, consisting of some 30 to
40 departmental representatives, elected delegates to one of
1097 branch committees. Each branch was under the secretary­
ship of a central leader, and co-ordinated the union's work 
in its area. The mill and branch committees and the workforce 
at large elected delegates to the central managing committee. 
This reached the size of approximately 80. Each level of the 
union led a lively existence. The mill committees were
particularly vigorous, more than fulfilling the functions
110anticipated for them in the communists' theory. They
108. MCCC, P.2412(P): op. cit.
109. The figures are taken from Newman, op. cit., ps.303 & 306.
110. The mill committees were especially important to the 
union- They actively involved the millhands, promoted 
rank-and-file enthusiasm, confidence, and organisational 
and leadership skills. They provided channels for the 
two-way flow of information between the factory floor 
and the leadership. They also provided the central 
leadership with organisations to which authority could 
be delegated. This strengthened the mass base of the 
union as well as relieving the enormous pressure of work 
which fell to the small, over-taxed executive. The mill 
committees were soon taking responsibility for many of 
the routine union matters which arose in the mills, and 
educating the leaders in the detailed technical matters 
of the industry.
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began to take considerable initiative within the mills in
their dealings with the jobbers and management. Both the
jobbers and management, to their increasing discomfort, were
forced progressively to recognise the authority of the mill
committees, if not their legitimacy. The committees also
developed a significant level of autonomy within the union.
They were not passive units subordinate to the leadership.
The rise of the GKU meant the decline of the BTLU.
The moderates remained divorced from the millhands and the
mill committee movement, and thus from the forces which
111produced the mass GKU. Because of the BTLU's declining
influence over the workers the owners, in their desire to 
maximise immediate production, were forced to pass over the
heads of the 'legitimate' trade unionists and deal with the
i i 2 113GKU. This further weakened the moderates' position.
The BTLU's membership declined from 8,400 in November to
1145,400 in April. Its paying membership was even less.
111. For instance Bradley commented in October that while 
the workers were flocking to the GKU, 'Joshi and the 
others cannot hold a meeting in the mill area': MCCC,
P.2412(P): op. pit.
112. The moderates were scandalised by this behaviour of the
millowners: See the BTLU submissions in RCLI, Vol.I(l),
pp.353-4, and (2), p.261.
113. The growing impotence of the BTLU, relative to the GKU, 
in all areas of textile trade unionism is illustrated 
in an incident during a November sitting of the Strike 
Enquiry Committee. After the GKU representatives had 
walked out in protest on a procedural point the BTLU 
representative, Bakhale, 'explained rather pathetically' 
to the committee that although he disagreed with their 
action, 'unless he followed ... he would lose his 
influence' over the workers, and so walked out also:
NAI, H.Poll, 1/1928: FR2, Bombay, November.
114. Newman, op. cit., pp.319-20; RCLI, 1(1), p.167
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However, the new industrial order profoundly upset
the existing political balance in Bombay. No sooner had the
foundations of the GKU's lively class-based organisation been
established than it had to face, during the first half of
1929, a sequence of concerted attacks which were to prove a
115severe test of its strength: the non-Brahman movement
launched a concerted campaign to discredit and replace the 
communists and resurrect their disintegrating working class 
community; a fracas between the workers and Pathan strike­
breakers and moneylenders was used by communal politicians 
in an attempt to promote a hostile, generalised Hindu-Muslim 
division among the millhands; the state ended its 'moratorium' 
by arresting the leadership, along with activists in Bengal 
and elsewhere, for the Meerut Conspiracy Case; and the mill- 
owners, once freed from the temporary constraints imposed by 
depleted stocks, and increasingly concerned about the mill 
committees, began to confront the new union structure.
Moreover, these attacks coincided with the progressive 
collapse of the alliance between the GKU and the jobbers.
This added to the gravity of the situation. As the mill 
committees became established they began to usurp many of the 
jobbers' functions, then to attack the abuses of the system, 
and finally to confront the system itself. The implicit 
ambiguities of the alliance became overt and, although some 
of the jobbers (such as G.L. Kandalkar, who later became an
115. The background of these attacks will be examined in 
Chapter 5.
116. Newman, op. cit., p.305 and pp.307-8.
important GKU leader) remained with the union, for most the 
GKU became a more immediate threat than the millowners' 
intended standardisation scheme. A potentially dangerous 
new opposition, waiting for opportunities to reassert its 
recently held but rapidly vanishing power, now existed within 
the workforce. The attacks upon the union in the first half 
of 1929 provided opportunities for this attempt.
The union's response to all of these attacks demon­
strated the high degree of unity, resilience and independence 
from the jobbers that it had achieved after only a few months 
of existence as a mass union. Neither of the two communal
campaigns was able seriously to erode the GKU's base or the
117authority of the communists. After the Meerut arrests the
membership immediately rallied under a relatively unknown and
inexperienced leadership, including a new group of middle
118class outsider communists. But the most impressive
demonstration of the character of the GKU was the membership's 
response, in the wake of these attacks, to the new leadership's 
April 1929 call for a general strike to defend the union 
against the millowners' attacks on it. As Newman has shown, 
this strike 'marks a turning point in Bombay's industrial 
relations' :
Never before had the millhands struck work on a 
union's orders to defend a union's existence. Their 
discipline was impressive. ... The ... managing 
committee issued orders and explained its decision; 
the mill committees saw that it was obeyed.
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117. ibid., pp.321-7.
118. ibid., pp.328-9.
119. ibid., p.332.
Two months later, the Government of India noted, the Bombay
millhands, in contrast to the workers in other industrial
centres, were 'still ... infected with the Communist spirit',
120despite the absence of definite party activity. It is
clear that within the Bombay mill workforce a major transition 
from an insular community consciousness towards class conscious­
ness and organisation had occurred during the previous two years. 
The strikingly new conceptions expressed in the millhands' poem 
appeared to have taken root.
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The Expansion of Communist Influence in Other Industries
The communists' success in the mills enhanced their 
prospects elsewhere. The party followed essentially the same 
tactics in other unions as it had in the textile industry 
prior to the strike. From its existing footholds within 
union executives it sought to increase its influence at that 
level while agitating and organising directly among the workers 
for the goals of strong industrial unions based on active and 
organised mass memberships. It introduced new forms of 'agit­
prop' such as contesting the February 1929 Municipal Corpor­
ation elections with a working class program, a campaign having
121an appreciable effect upon the workers. It decided to
extend the circulation and content of Kranti to cover a wider 
working class audience. The WPP managed to consolidate its
120. NAI, H .Poll, 179/1929: G. of I. to all Local 
Governments, 24/6/29.
121. MCCC, P.2417: op. pit.; Mirajkar, Interview. Bradley 
commented that although the WPP candidates did not win 
any seats, the great majority of the workers not being 
enfranchised, they 'polled well, ... created a good 
impression and ... /"got J the workers to take an 
interest in the affair, at the same time pointing out what the Corporation as a body really is'.
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position in most of the small unions that it had entered
1 22during 1927 and 1928, but most effort was directed into 
the strategically important railways, particularly the GIP 
railway, the second biggest single employer of labour in the 
Presidency.
The GIP workers shared the pattern of grievances
common to railway workers throughout India at this time -
longstanding dissatisfaction with low wages, long hours,
racial discrimination, and victimisation of union activists,
was aggravated from 1927 by a range of new threats arising
123from the gradual introduction of economy measures. 
Rationalisation and retrenchments of workshop staff, follow­
ing the recommendations of the 1926 State Railway Workshop
Committee, had been introduced on other lines during 1927 
124and 1928, and there wäs the added possibility of wage cuts.
Major strikes against these measures had occurred in Bengal 
1 26and Madras. When the WPP turned its attention to the GIP
122. Although the party lost the Dockworkers1 Union to the 
moderates (MCCC, P.1344: op. cit., 29/8/28), and was 
unable to make their Bombay Trades Council any more 
active or influential than its reformist counterpart 
(RCLI, Vol.I(l), p.107), they did consolidate their 
positions within and extend the membership of their 
unions (see the figures provided by RCLI, Vol.I(l), 
p.170).
123. RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), pp.450-55 & 257-8, & (2), pp.232-48; 
V.B. Karnik, Strikes in India, (Bombay, 1967), pp.216-17.
124. RCLI, Vol. VIII(1), pp.17-18.
125. For an account of the South Indian Railway strike in 
Madras in July 1928 see David Arnold, 'Labour, Police 
and Politicians: the South Indian Railway Strike of 
1928', Paper presented to the ASSA Conference, Melbourne, 
May 1976. The Bengal strikes are covered below.
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in the second half of 1928 unrest on the railway, already
high, was increasing. The discontented included not only the
labourers in the urban workshops and along the line but also
middle level, educated officials such as station masters.
Two individuals from this level - D.B. Kulkarni and V.B. Puran-
dare - were to become prominent activists in the GIPRU and
127important WPP members. They provided an extremely useful
bridge to the lower level workers for the communists and a
natural 'vanguard' for worker participation in the union's 
128affairs. The GIP railway provided fertile grounds for
militant unionism.
Joglekar was detailed to GIP work from April and
Bradley was able to contribute his considerable organisational
skills more fully after he could be spared from textile
129unionism, at the conclusion of the strike. After assessing
the workers' expressed grievances they prepared a program of
immediate and long-term demands, finalised at a conference of
workers and union officials organised by Joglekar at Bhusawal,
130in East Kandesh District, in June. The 'Bhusawal Demands'
126. RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), p.163.
127. Kulkarni, an Assistant Station Master at Parel and 
described by Intelligence as 'a man of brains and 
intelligence' (NAI, H.Poll, 10/19/1929: Home Depart­
ment meeting, 6/6/29) became a particularly important 
activist for the communists. He joined the WPP in 
March 1928 and the CPI a year later, and became a 
Vice-president of the GIPRU. Purandare joined the WPP 
in November 1928 and became General Secretary of the 
union: MCCC, P.1344: op. cit. 25/3/28 & 15/11/28; P.1296: 
CPI meeting, Bombay, 17/3/29; MCG:2.
128. For communist appreciation of the value of this bridge 
see MCCC, P.653: a pamphlet by Bradley titled 'Worker 
Leads Deputation to the Agent'; also MCG: 1 & 2.
129. MCCC, P.1344: op. cit., 8/4/28; P.2412 CP): op. cit.
130. MCCC, P.1348(2): Report, June 1928, P.1344: op. cit., 
2/8/28.
formed the basis of further agitation among the workers
to involve them in the union and to overcome the dominance
of the moderates in its executive. Following the Railway
Board's November response to these 'ill-considered and
impossible demands' they were also used for more concerted
131agitation and organisation for strike action. The party
envisaged an eventual general strike, but only after the
workers and the union had been sufficiently prepared.
Premature strikes, especially before the workshop and traffic
132workers had been integrated, were eschewed. The communists
attached great importance to the amalgamation of the existing
133three unions on the line. Their campaign had its first
success in August when two of these unions merged. The new
GIPRU was registered in October. Although moderates continued
to dominate the official positions four party 'members were
134elected to important positions.
By the time of the Meerut Case arrests the 
communists' agitation in the railways was showing definite 
results. The union, with a membership of 41,000 and regarded 
by the communists as one of their best organised sections, 
had established many active branches in the urban workshops
131. RCLI, vol. VIII(1), p.163; P.653: op. cit.; MCCC,
P.1344: op. cit., 2/8/28.
132. ibid., 22/5/28, 2/8/28 & 29/8/28; P.2078(P): Joglekar 
to Spratt, 30/11/28; NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: Home 
Department, G of Bom., meeting on 18/8/18, & Home 
Member, G of I, to Viceroy, 29/7/28.
133. MCCC, P.1344: op. cit., 8/7/28, 15/7/28, & 22/7/28 -
at these meetings the issue of amalgamation was discussed 
at great length, and Kulkarni's proposal to form a new 
militant union was rejected.
134. RCLI, Vol.VIII(1), p.163, & Vol.I(l), p.105. Bradley and 
Kulkarni became Vice-presidents, Jhabvala General Secre­
tary, and Joglekar Organising Secretary. See also MCCC, 
P.2078: op. cit.
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135and along the line. The militants were gaining the growing
allegiance of the rank-and-file members/ the reformists were
on the defensive, and a bitter conflict between Jhabvala and
the party developed from this situation because of the former's
increasing concern about the communists' erosion of his
136personal following in the union. Despite the arrests the
communists and their militant allies continued to increase
their influence. At the union's annual meeting at Chalisgaon
in May they, including the recent WPP recruit B.T. Ranadive,
were elected to a majority of the official positions, and the
137moderate Ginwala was not re-elected as President. The sub­
sequent secession of Ginwala and other moderates to form
another rival union was a reflection of their declining
138influence in the union and among the workers. With the
success of the militants at Chalisgaon, and the continuing 
intransigence of the Railway Board during 1929, the outbreak 
of a major strike, which might provide the communists with 
opportunities similar to those of the textile general strike, 
was only a matter of time.
135. RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), p.163; MCG: 1 & 2. Unfortunately, 
in the absence of a study of Bombay railway unionism 
equivalent to Newman's work on the textile industry, we 
do not have any information on the precise nature of the 
union at this stage. Presumably it was, roughly, in 
'phase 2' as defined above.
136..MCCC, P.1344: op. cit., 3/2/29; P.2417(P): op. c-it.
137. RCLI, Vol.l(l), p.105; NAI, H.Poll, 10/XIX/l929: op. cit., 
& 17/1929: Bombay FR2 Nov.; MCG:1.
138. As Kulkarni had believed less than a year previously that 
the radicals should secede, because of their impotence, 
from the moderate-dominated union (see fn.133) the 
moderates' secession is a particularly clear index of 
the rise of radical influence.
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Remaining Structural Weaknesses.
In the GKU the communists had built a working class 
base with an impressive degree of strength and unity and, as 
their progress in the GIPRU demonstrated, it provided a power­
ful nucleus for the further extension of their political 
influence among the industrial labour of the province. Never­
theless, despite this remarkable achievement, the security of 
the WPP's new working class base was by no means absolute.
The ideological transition of the mill workforce, the found­
ation of the communists' base, and the institutionalisation 
of this transition within a class-based organisation, were 
still far from completed. In this transitional state the new 
structure remained vulnerable at certain points in both 
dimensions of the dual role - trade union, and mass base for 
a revolutionary party - which the GKU performed. First, 
potentially divisive community distinctions continued to exist 
within the workforce, posing a continuing threat to the union's 
class solidarity and placing community limits on its mass base. 
Second, the problems of integrating the two basic levels of 
the GKU's structure, and of consolidating the relationship 
between the communists and the working class leaders, were not 
completely resolved. And finally, the workforce had not been 
linked structurally to the revolutionary party. The absence 
of a working class political cadre system/ trained and organised 
to provide an alternative leadership, and the resulting high 
level of dependence of the union on the existing leadership, 
heightened the vulnerability of both the union and the party 
to state repression.
The first two problems were inter-related. The 
success and novelty of the combination of structures that
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constituted the GKU lay in the degree to which it had super­
seded the roles of the jobbers and other traditional community 
leaders - the degree to which they had been made redundant for 
the workers. The point reached in this process was determined by 
the extent to which the inter-dependent mill committees and 
central organisation were integrated, fulfilled the total needs 
of the millhands throughout the workforce more satisfactorily 
than the traditional modes, and politically neutralised the old 
leaderships. This required the extension of the grass-roots 
organisational structure throughout the industry, across the 
multiplicity of religious, regional and occupational communities. 
It was equally dependent on the central leadership's capacity 
to link itself organically with the union's mass structure, 
-provide an effective co-ordinating and directive role, and 
mediate between the workers and the wider industrial and 
political worlds. The communists' ability to 'de-class' and 
'de-caste' themselves to overcome the deep-seated working class 
distrust of their social group, was a crucial element of this 
overall-leadership requirement.
At the end of the strike the unity achieved during 
its course was only very informally organised, and thus vulner­
able. The class links across the cleavages which traditionally 
had separated the workforce were still very tenuous. The 
emerging 'class community' had not yet replaced the aggregation 
of traditional communities built upon patron-client relation­
ships - it had merely been superimposed upon them. The 
organisation of the millhands was, at that point, a rather 
fluid and unresolved combination of the old and the new. Nor 
had the GKU leadership completely displaced the jobbers from
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their role as occupational and community leaders, as the
latter's important recruiting role in the first stage of the
building of the union demonstrated. For these reasons it
was urgent that the relatively informal unity created under
strike conditions be fairly rapidly transformed into a more
permanent, organised form. As the GKU poets emphasised,
only strong organisation could prevent the recently won
solidarity from fracturing along the only partially dissolved
139community interfaces within the workforce.
The urgency of the task of organisation was increased
by the fact that the millhands' ideological transition was
uneven. All sections of the workforce participated enthusi-
140astically in the strike and joined the union subsequently.
But the Maratha community, on which the old GKM had.been
141based, provided the leading elements during the strike, 
and thus the strongest base for the GKU's recruitment and 
mill committees after its conclusion. The unevenness of the
139. The poem was in fact written during the communal crises 
of February, when the class solidarity of the union 
faced the most serious risk of community-fracturing.
140. This is clear from the maximum membership figure of 
100,000 reached by the union. This must have included 
significant numbers of the minority Muslim and Untouch­
able communities. Newman has identified Muslims in 10% 
of the union's managing committee positions but does not 
say whether or not Untouchables were represented at this 
level.
141. The leading role of the Maratha weavers is suggested, for 
example, in a report of the strike, sent from Bombay to 
London, which described the original GKM as 'the 
weavers' union' (in LM, Vol.l0(7), Jul.1928, p.439).
The relative militance of the weavers, already the most 
activist section of the mill workforce despite their 
relatively priviliged wage conditions, was further in­
creased by the millowners' schemes, which hit the 
weavers hardest. This ensured that the Maratha weavers 
would be the leading element in the strike.
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union's base was reinforced by the important recruitment 
role played by those jobbers who had formed an alliance with 
the union- Many of the union's members joined in blocs from 
departments where these jobbers held influence. The overall 
community pattern of the union was strong organisation in the 
majority of weaving departments, in which the Marathas were 
dominant, under-representation in the spinning departments, 
in which the Untouchables and north-Indians were the majority 
of the workforce, and particularly weak organisation among 
the Muslims. The GKU was essentially a Maratha 'class- 
community' . Because of the regional concentration of the 
mills in which most of the Muslims worked, and the fact that 
those mills were manned almost totally by Muslims, the mill 
district of Madanpura remained largely outside the GKU's 
organisation. Although no section of the workforce was un­
represented in the GKU it proved much more difficult than for 
the Marathas to rupture the community relationship between
the Muslim workers and their jobbers, religious leaders and
142politician patrons. The BTLU, acting through these inter­
mediaries, remained the dominant union in Madanpura. 
Fortunately for the GKU, the Marathas formed a majority of 
the workforce and the Muslims a particularly small minority.
142. This failure, which arose primarily from the greater 
strength of the Muslims' community bonds, also arose 
partly from GKU-WPP policy shortcomings. For example, 
the party did not initiate a culturally-specific 
policy of winning over the Muslims until just before 
the Meerut arrests; and after the February communal 
riots the WPP came to the conclusion that the GKU and 
the party had shown 'a definite Hindu bias' (MCCC,*
P.1170: minutes of WPP meeting, 17/2/29). Attempts 
to counter this bias, eg. by launching an Urdu paper, 
Pyam-i-Mazdur, under a Muslim editor (Shaukat Usmani), 
and to cultivate influence in Madanpura - significantly, 
through the mohalla leaders - were soon terminated by 
the Meerut arrests (MCCC, P.1085: S.S. Josh to Usmani, 7/3/29; Newman, op. cit., pp.325-6; MCCC, P.1170: op. cit.)
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Grounds for conflict between the workers as a 
class and their leaders, both working class and 'outsider' 
communist, also existed. The leaders' advocacy of a standard­
isation scheme, albeit one far more generous to the workers 
than that of the millowners, was one potential source of 
disaffection. The strike was initially a reaction - a 
rejection of the effects of the millowners' attempts to
reorganise the industry, in favour of the informality and
143protective paternalism of the traditional jobber system.
During the strike the force behind this reaction was harnessed 
to the communists' forward strategy and after the strike it 
had developed spontaneously into an attack on the jobber 
system itself. However the popularity of the communists' 
policy depended on the millhands' continuing to perceive it 
as preferable to the old system or to non-communist alter­
natives. The only ways in which the party leaders could 
prevent or contain disaffection were persuasion, the develop­
ment of closer links with the workers, the recruitment of 
ordinary millhands into leadership positions, and continued 
success in the advancement of their policy.
143. Newman has explained this situation in the following way, 
(op. cit., p.271.):
‘In the widest sense the 1928 strike had been launched by 
the millhands against their exposure to market forces 
and in favour of a return to the old paternalistic 
management, exercised in practice by the jobbers, which 
informally cushioned the workers against redundancy, 
helped them to bargain for higher wages and treated their 
individual preferences with a certain indulgence. To 
this extent the strike was reactionary and the jobbers 
were the exemplars of reaction. Paradoxically, the trade 
unionists, both moderate and militant, had accepted the 
principle of standardisation in order to negotiate details 
more favourable to the men'.
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These tasks remained urgent even after the
formation of the mill committees. The GKU was still very
young and remained only imperfectly integrated. In practice
it often functioned as two distinct unions: 'the union of
144the militant workers and the union of the leaders'.
Ironically, the millowners and the central leadership shared
a common concern, if from very different perspectives, in
their respective relationships with the committees- Both
desired an orderly workforce, and sought to control the
impetuous tendencies of the emerging factory-level organis- 
145ations. This relationship between the union's apex and
base contained obvious potential for serious conflict within 
the GKU should 'the union of the militant workers' be persuaded, 
rightly or wrongly, that 'the union of the leaders' was acting 
against their interests. The communists, being non-worker 
outsiders , were even more vulnerable than the other leaders- 
This vulnerability as outsiders existed within the GKU 
leadership and the WPP as well as in the wider union. The 
communists' hard-won alliance with the working class militants 
was not inviolable. The probationary period had not yet been 
completed.
The third area of weakness - the relationship between 
the union and the revolutionary party organisation - was due to 
a combination of factors. Two of these were inter-related: the 
political 'backwardness' of the workers, reinforced by their
144. ibid., p.318
145. ibid., p.295
fear of victimisation by the employers; and, in Spratt's 
words, an initial tendency among the communists, and shared 
by their comrades in Bengal, to 'exaggerate' this 'backward­
ness' and thus 'to look upon themselves as groups of "leaders",
146who need not get any membership around them'. The first
problem had initially been a serious obstacle to involving 
workers actively in the organisation of their immediate 
industrial life, and it was an even bigger inhibition to 
their participation in a wider political sphere. However 
the political and intellectual achievements of militants such 
as Alve and Kasle, and the qualities of leadership and assert­
iveness which the ordinary workers were demonstrating in the 
mill committees once the traditional constraints had been 
removed, showed that their initial 'backwardness' was not an 
insuperable barrier to the creation of working class political 
cadres in Bombay. Further, the political education of the 
communists during the strike and the building of the union and, 
very importantly, the novel political imperatives imposed by 
'the union of the militants' on 'the union of the leaders', 
also did much to transform the consciousness of the communists.
They were neither as able nor as inclined as before to assume
147that 'the masses will follow when required'. Nevertheless,
although increasing attention was being given to the issue, no 
concerted campaign to recruit workers into the WPP or to develop 
a working class political cadre system was implemented before 
the Meerut Case arrests. This problem merged with the wider
146. MCCC, P.546(10): Spratt to F.C. Mallonie, 26/8/28.
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issue of Communist Party organisation and discipline which,
also, was taken up in a serious manner by the Bombay
148communists only belatedly. Thus by March 1929 the
communists had become a revolutionary trade union leader­
ship, but were not yet the leadership of a Communist Party; 
the organised millhands constituted a mass base for the 
communists, but not the mass base of a Party.
Each of these three areas of vulnerability produced 
problems for the union and the party during the early months 
of 1929, particularly under the strain of the political 
reaction against them following the first phase of the GKU's 
development. But in the first half of 1929 these tensions 
appeared to be little more than the inevitable 'growing pains' 
accompanying the process of class formation. The leadership 
was able to recognise and contain them, thus confirming the 
very considerable advances of the previous two years. In 
the second half of the year this changed. Under the new 
leadership, and continued class and communal attacks and 
state repression, the tensions within the GKU increased. 
Eventually they were to become systemic. By the end of the 
year the union was broken and the communists' mass base 
dissipated. From this later perspective what, in the earlier 
context, were the growing pains of class formation, become 
the prefigurements of class dissolution. The tensions within,
148. The factors contributing to these problems in the 
organisation of the revolutionary party, are 
investigated in Chapter 4.
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and the community and political limits of the GKU revealed 
in early-1929 will be re-examined, from this longer-term 
perspective, in Chapter 5 .
Conclusion
In the two year period between Spratt's arrival and 
the Meerut arrests the Bombay communists successfully completed 
three of the four phases necessary for the formation and con­
solidation of a revolutionary working class movement. This 
was, despite the remaining limitations, a remarkable success.
It had been achieved through the communists' ability to develop 
and apply a clearly formulated Marxist policy of trade unionism 
in a situation providing real possibilities of success. The 
favourable situation was provided by an interaction between 
the existing social structure in Bombay, the economic and 
political conditions of the period, and a number of fortunate 
contingencies facilitating communist intervention in local 
working class politics.
The most important features of the social structure 
were the existence - and predominance - of the Maratha 
community, with its special characteristics, within the working 
class, and the relative social and cultural proximity of the 
Maratha workers and the Maharashtrian middle class from which 
the communists were drawn. Meaningful contact between the 
markedly independent Maratha workers and a 1proletarianised1 
Maharashtrian intelligentsia was possible. Further, the worlds 
inhabited by the communists and industrial capital were not 
totally divorced. The relative fluidity of local nationalist
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politics, and the prior history of negotiations between 
millowners and labour leaderships, facilitated the 
possibility of direct negotiations between the communists and 
the BMOA. This contact, too, was important for a sustained 
trade unionism, of whatever political hue, in a pre­
revolutionary situation. The previous history of significant 
trade unionism in the city was both an indication of the 
possibilities provided by the industrial social structure of 
Bombay, and an important foundation upon which the communists 
could build the necessary bridges to both the workers and the 
millowners.
The depression in the mill industry favoured a 
militant trade union leadership and, because it deeply 
affected all millhand communities and the jobbers, provided 
a unique opportunity for beginning the process of class 
formation within the working class. Further, because the 
economic crisis had been protracted, a significant nucleus of 
militant working class organisation had already been estab­
lished by 1928. The communists did not have to start from the 
beginning. Their task was eased further by certain contin­
gencies, and particularly the following: the successful entry
into India of the British communists, despite a vigilant and 
usually effective Imperial intelligence system, and thus the 
introduction of invaluable theoretical and practical experience; 
the unusual opportunity to work openly and continuously, free
from serious repressions, for a two year period coinciding
149with the major crisis point ; and the fortuitous alliance
149. The freedom from immediate repression was, it should be 
stressed, due to a very significant degree to the
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with Jhabvala which, though temporary, and despite the 
ambivalence of his motives, provided a significantly easier 
entrance into local unionism than would otherwise have been 
the case.
The above conditions provided the possibilities for 
building a mass working class movement and politically 
educating the leadership. But it was the skill, energy and 
dedication of a very few communists and radical allies that 
translated potentiality into actuality. With a. strategy 
appropriate to the situation, and maintaining a close 
correlation between theory and practice, the Bombay communists, 
assisted by their British comrades, developed and vigorously 
applied the skills for the combination of roles necessary for 
success: militant ideologists to a working class audience and 
patient analysts of the complex industrial and political 
details of the situation; revolutionists for the eventual 
'Workers' Raj' and cautious, pragmatic negotiators of today's 
political alliances and tomorrow's wage rates. The communists' 
ability -to grasp the available opportunities created a situation 
in which two types of intellectuals - both working and middle
149. Contd.
communists' success as mass organisers - the remarkable 
degree of order maintained by the strikers greatly 
reduced the level of police 'law-and-order' actions.
Eg., the DIB commented in Aug.: '... discipline is
being carefully reinforced to prevent any premature 
outbreak and it is remarkable that up to the present 
time rioting and the outbreak of serious violence has 
been avoided', despite the constant speeches proclaiming 
revolution to be the final goal: (NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVT/
1928: note by F. Isemonger, 29/8/28, after a visit to 
Bombay.) This situation frustrated the Bombay Government 
in its efforts to find a justification for intervention 
against the communists and the strike. (ibid., G of Bom. 
to G of I, 27/7/28 and 5/8/28.)
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class - could meet and complement each other, providing a 
radically new mode of political leadership for an emerging 
mass politics based, to a significant degree, on class. Though 
this complex process was far from completed or consolidated 
by the time of the Meerut arrests there appeared to be no 
inherent socio-economic or cultural barriers to its further 
development. The significance of all of these features will 
become even more apparent when compared with the Bengal WPP's 
experience in Calcutta.
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2. CALCUTTA 
150
The Bengal WPP in 1927 faced the approaching wave of 
industrial unrest from an even more humble starting point than 
its fraternal party in Bombay. Sharing with all forms of 
Bengali industrial trade unionism the relatively more dis­
advantageous location of industrial politics within the region's 
socio-economic and political structures, it also shared the 
same debilitating syndrome of characteristics arising from and 
reinforcing this position of weakness.
This was immediately obvious to Spratt during a brief 
visit to Calcutta at the end of 1927, on the eve of the great 
strikes of 1928. In his preliminary survey of Bengali trade
unionism he confirmed Allison's conclusion a year earlier that
151it was 'not very convincing'. 'It is far weaker than Bombay',
Spratt reported to London, 'and suffers far more from bad 
152leadership'. He found primarily bhadralok leaderships, riven 
by factional rivalries, competing for the 'control' of unions
150. Although the Bengal party did not change its name from 
the Peasants' and Workers' Party (PWP) to the WPP until 
March 1928, I will use the latter title throughout this 
chapter in the interests of simplicity.
151. MCCC, P.1144: Allison to Joglekar, 20/11/26.
152. MCCC, P.526(29): Spratt to C.P. Dutt, Ca.Feb. 1923. 
Spratt's impressionistic survey tends to be supported 
by the available evidence on Bengali trade unionism in 
this period - see e.g., the G of Ben.'s summary in RCLI, 
Vol.V(l), pp.119-21; and MCCC, P.544 (3): a list of trade 
union office bearers and membership figures prepared 
in late-1928.
2 7 2
153
and the provincial federation. The factionalism was motivated
by personal ambitions and hostilities, expressed in some cases
154
in a communal form, rather than by serious political incompat­
ibilities; and it was dominant enough within the BTUF to 
prevent that body from formulating definite policy alternatives. 
Further, neither the unions nor the federation commanded 
significant support from industrial labour - trade unions in 
Bengal were even more pronouncedly 'organisations of leaders', 
operating above an even less organised workforce, than in 
contemporary Bombay. Finally, he was unable to identify any 
clearly differentiated Marxist trade union influence, even at 
this relatively late stage. Although he found the WPP- 
affiliated Bengal Jute Workers' Association at Bhatpara, led 
by Kalidas Bhattacharya, 'quite a good union, in its way', the 
membership was very small and the leadership made the factional 
mistake of 'keeping aloof from the other unions'.
Thus Bengali trade unions, 'reformist' and 'revolut­
ionary' alike, faced the imminent working class upsurge from 
a less advantageous position from which either to exert an
153. The much more serious rivalries for power within the BTUF, 
compared to the politics of Bombay's Central Labour Board, 
were probably symptomatic of the relative weakness of the 
bases of trade unions in Bengal - the attractions of 
office in the federation were correspondingly greater.
154. The emergence of the new communalist politicians, such as 
H.S. Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq, as leaders of Muslim trade 
unions, and the 1926 riots' legacy of intensified 
communal division among the working class of the Calcutta 
region, compounded the problems of developing sustained 
non-communalist trade union organisation in Bengal. See 
MCCC, P.52: Bengal WPP, Annual Report 1927-28; Punekar, 
op.cit., pp.129-30.
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appreciable immediate influence upon it or to gain rapidly 
during its course. They were further disadvantaged by the 
fact that in the jute industry, the province's major industry, 
the economic context of working class unrest - and therefore 
the character of the unrest - was of a different order to that 
in the Bombay cotton industry. The growing economic constraints 
upon the industry before 1930 did not reach crisis proportions 
and so did not lead to the profound structural changes attempted 
by the Bombay mill-owners, nor, therefore, to the correspond­
ingly more favourable opportunities for militant trade unionism 
which arose there. Further, the jute industry's constraints 
were of more recent origin and so had not provided an equival­
ent stimulus during the preceding decade for the development of
155working class resistance and organisation.
WPP Organisation and Trade Union Policy in 1927: Some Problems 
In 1927 the Bengal WPP remained very weakly 
integrated as a party. Intra-party politics intruded directly 
into its working class activity, hampering its initial attempts 
to take an independent initiative in local trade unionism. We 
saw in the previous chapter how the Bengal WPP was formed from 
more diverse elements than the Bombay party. At the end of 
1927 this diversity was still reflected in a 'polar' quality 
in the party's organisation - one group being centred around
155. The economics of the jute industry in the late-1920's 
will be examined in more detail in the section on jute 
mill strikes below. It should also be remembered that 
the greater geographical dispersion of industry in the 
Calcutta region, compared to Bombay, was also a 
significant problem for TU organising.
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Muzaffar Ahmad, the editor of the party's organ, and another
around the former Anushilan Samiti members Gopen Chakravarty,
156the Moscow returnee, and Dharani Goswami. The WPP entered 
the decisive year of 1928 with considerable tension still 
dividing these two groups. The division adversely affected 
the party's trade union activity.
The Chakravarty group continued to retain close 
contacts with their former terrorist comrades, sought to bring 
larger numbers of them into the WPP, and attempted to develop 
direct working class influence - primarily through their 
membership of Kalidas Bhattacharya's BJWA. By the end of 1927 
they had established a close personal and working relationship 
with the BJWA leaders Bhattacharya and Shibnath Bannerji, and 
had brought them into the party and affiliated the union. The 
BJWA became the party's de facto labour committee, though it 
continued to maintain its autonomy from formal party direction. 
Muzaffar, 'legitimised' as 'Bengal's first communist' by his 
inclusion in the Cawnpore Case and his continuing contact with 
M.N. Roy, retained his distrust of this group and its extra­
party associates. Suspicious of their credentials as bona fide 
communists because of their Hindu-bhadralok social origins and 
terrorist political backgrounds, and concerned about their 
attempts to develop independent and potentially competitive 
contacts with the Comintern, he resisted the entry of more of
156. The following information on intra-party politics is 
drawn from - MCCC, P.527(8): 'The Split in the WPP'
(written by Spratt Ca. Feb. 1929); IB, Communism, 
(1935), p.239; G. Chakravarty, Interview, pp.134-5; 
Ahmad, Myself, pp.429-31; D. Goswami, interview; and 
A.R. Khan, interview.
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their comrades into the party. He participated only marginally 
in their trade union activity, but did not, however, establish 
significant alternative avenues to the working class. Instead, 
he devoted himself primarily to secretarial correspondence with 
other groups in India and Europe, seeking finance from the 
latter, and producing the WPP organ Ganavani when resources 
permitted - running it, M.N. Roy chided him, as if it was 'his 
personal business' and producing it in a mode intended 'more 
for "Tagorian" literary effect than for saying something to the
157workers and peasants'. The conflict between the 1bhadralok
petty bourgeois' BJWA group and the 'autocratic sectarian'
party secretary, as they regarded each other, remained only
covert. But its adverse effects were primarily responsible
for the party's labour organisations' having functioned 'only
in an unorganised manner' up until the annual conference in 
158March 1928; and for provoking Spratt to comment soon after:
If the Party could become, from a Party of theorists, 
a Party of newspaper boys, it would have the most 
beneficial effect, not only on the paper's circulation, 
but on the influence, organisation and efficiency of 
the Party.159
157. NAI, H .Poll, 190/1928: 'J' (M.N. Roy) to the CPI, Central
Committee, 30/12/27. Despite Roy's critique, however, 
Ganavani continued to exhibit the same predilection for 
'Tagorian' effects during 1928. Unlike Kranti in 1928, 
it did not become a paper seriously directed towards a 
working class audience: see, e.g. the selection of Ganavani 
articles in MCCC, P.369-P.371, P.518, P.553 & P.594.
158. MCCC, P.52: op.cit.
159. MCCC, P.526(32): 'Selling Ganavani1. In addition to his
concern about the effects of factionalism Spratt was 
critical of the Bengali communists' 'petty-bourgeois' 
inhibitions about selling the paper in the street. See 
also his Blowing up India, pp.50-1.
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The WPP did manage to establish a formal Labour Group in May
1928, but as four of its five members were from the BJWA that
organisation remained the WPP's de facto labour committee.
This organisational obstacle to concerted party
involvement in working class politics was paralleled by
another, related problem: although the overall political
program in 1927 ^  was the same as that of the Bombay WPP, it
was not able to develop a trade union policy of equivalent
clarity and detail until its annual conference in March 1928.
In the absence of a coherent party centre, and without the
guiding influence of an experienced international comrade 
163during 1927, no clear policy was developed; and without a 
definite Marxist policy there could be no distinctively Marxist 
working class activity. These were the factors underlying the 
essential continuity, observed by Spratt, between the BJWA and 
other Bengali trade unions, despite the greater 'militance' of 
the former.
Thus, not only did the situation in Bengal not
160. MCCC, P.446(1): Abdul Halim to Labour Group, 16/5/28. The 
members were: Goswami, Chakravarty, Bhattacharya, Pyari 
Mohan Das and Aftab Ali - the first four being in the 
BJWA group. That the WPP held its 1928 annual conference 
at Bhatpara, the BJWA's base, and that the BJWA group did 
much of the organisational work for it, also attest to 
the weight of this group within the party.
161. MCCC, P.2510.
162. 'Resolution on the Trade Union Movement', in MCCC, P.523:
'A Call To Action'. This set of guidelines was essent­
ially the same as that adopted by the Bom.WPP at its AGM 
earlier in the month, embodying the principles developed 
in Bombay through 1927: see the sub-section on the Bom.
WPP's TU theory and policy,above.
163. Spratt took up residence in Bengal only in late March 
1928.
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provide the same opportunities as in Bombay for a Marxist alter­
native trade unionism; even by early 1928 no clear Bengali 
Marxist alternative, capable of maximising the opportunities 
that did exist, had yet been formed. Compared to Bombay the 
Bengal party faced the additional problem of forging a definite 
organisation and policy at a later stage in the industrial 
upheaval. But, given the essentially similar forms of working 
class structure intthe two provinces, particularly the jobber- 
community forms of occupational and social organisation, it 
would have to pass through the same four phases outlined in the 
preceding section to become a hegemonic trade union and political 
leadership of a class-based organisation of industrial labour.
The following section traces the WPP's involvement in the strikes 
from late 1927 till mid-1929 in order to assess comparatively, 
against this criterion, the progress it achieved.
Beginnings
By mid-1927 the BJWA activists exercised a modest
164influence at the strategically important jute mill centre of 
Bhatpara. By theniits influence among the workers of the area 
exceeded that of its rival, the reformist and loyalist 
Kankinarrah Labour Union, based in neighbouring Kankinarrah.
This was for a number of reasons. The BJWA maintained a
164. There was a particularly heavy concentration of jute mills 
in the Jagatdal-Bhatpara-Kankinarrah area, north of 
Calcutta, and it was subsequently to become the 'storm- 
centre' of a very extensive jute mill strike in 1929.
RCLI, Vol.V(l), ps. 127 Sc 129.
'continuous existence', and a'close interest' in the workers'
165welfare - for example by pressing compensation claims. It
actively involved itself in the day-to-day life of labour.
Chakravarty, for instance, who spoke Hindi, worked as a mill-
hand and lived in the chawls for nine months - an impressive
attempt by one bhadralok to bridge the gulf between intelli-
166gentsia and masses. Finally, and very significantly, the
Kankinarrah Union had conducted a long-standing 'crusade against
corrupt sirdars' and this had mobilised the jobbers of the area
167against their union, with telling results. From its Bhatpara
base the BJWA, through its 'roving propagandist-cum-organiser',
Chakravarty, began agitating in the neighbouring jute mill areas
168and across the Hooghly at Chandernagore. It also adopted the
policy of 'suddenly descending on any area where trouble had
169broken out' further afield. In this way the BJWA group in
the WPP involved itself during late-1927 in three separate attempts
165. RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.145.
166. Chakravarty, Interview, p.135.
167. The Kankinarrah Union reported that their campaign had 
'antagonised hundreds of sirdars... who .... openly 
dissuaded the mill-hands from joining the union, with the 
connivance of the managers', (RCLI. Vol. V(l), p.271). In 
late 1928 the BJWA claimed a membership of 8,778 of the 
50,000 workers employed in the area, though this claim was 
almost certainly inflated, while the registered Kankinarrah 
Union submitted to the RCLI that it had 1,000 members.
MCCC, P.544 (3): p£._cit. ; RCLI, Vol.V(2), pp. 119-20.
168. Chakravarty, Interview, p.135. Chakravarty says that he 
became widely known as 'the Union Babu'.
169. RCLI/ Vol.V(l), p.145. Chakravarty claimed that this 
policy was one of fighting 'the entire employing class' and 
was based on Marxist theory (MCCC, Chakravarty, Statement, 
pp.151-2). This is a claim which will be tested.
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to extend its union base - among Calcutta's municipal workers,
and at the railway workshops at Kharagpur and Lillooah.
Goswami began working with the non-party trade
unionist Prabhati Das Gupta to organise the 14,500 disaffected
170scavengers of the Calcutta Municipality. In January they
managed to form a union, and on March 4, after several months
171agitation, Calcutta's second scavengers' strike began. The
demands were for a wage increase and improved living and working
conditions. The strike, which brought the union leaders into
sharp conflict with the Swarajist Calcutta Corporation, lasted 
172for a week. In a compromise settlement the Mayor, J.M. Sen
Gupta, undertook to extract from the Corporation a Rs.2 wage
increase and consideration of the other demands - a compromise
which enhanced the popularity of the leaders among the scavengers.
The strike also brought the existence of the WPP into public
173awareness in the most prominent way yet. The publicity, and
the limited extension of the party's footing among the working 
class was a useful start to 1928.
170. Goswami, interview; MCCC, P.52 op.cit.; RCLI, Vol.V(2), 
pp.136-7. Das Gupta, one of India's first trade unionist 
women, became involved in labour work from 1927 after 
returning from post-graduate study in the U.S.A.
171. MCCC, P.52: op.cit.; MCCC, P.1348: Goswami to Ghate,
8/3/28; Statesman, 1/7/28, p.16. Das Gupta became 
President and Goswami, General Secretary. The first 
strike was in May 1924, lasting for three days.
172. MCCC, P.52 op.cit.; MCCC, P.28: report of a Scavengers'
Union mass meeting, 5/3/28; MCCC, P.2505: speeches by
Goswami and R.R. Mitra; MCCC, P.546(10): Spratt to F.
Malonie, 26/8/28.
173. Statesman, 1/7/28, p.16; Goswami, interview.
A lock-out strike at the Kharagpur workshops of the
Bengal—Nagpur Railway (BNR) in the latter half of 1927 provided
the BJWA with its first opportunity to 'descend' on a railway 
174conflict. Chakravarty, Bhattacharya and Bannerji from the
175BJWA group 'soon arrived on the scene', to join both militant
•J T / -and moderate trade unionists from Bengal and elsewhere. The
lock-out was the railway administration's response to a 
'determined' stand by the workshop men against the former's
177decision to retrench 1,600 of the approximately 11,000 employees.
174. The strike/lock-out followed a month long BNR strike by 
21,000 workers, including half of the Kharagpur employees, 
in Feb.-Mar. 1927. The issues had been low wages, racial 
discrimination in employment practices, victimisation of 
union activists, and corruption among supervisory staff.
The strike failed, the men returning unconditionally. See 
RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), pp.171-3, and ps. 257, 534 and 545, and 
Vol.VIII(2), pp.436-9, 473-4; IB, Communism, (1927), pp. 275-7: Karnik, op.cit., pp.154-63, provides a narrative
account of this strike and the later lock-out.
175. Chakravarty, Interview, p.136.
176. Trade unionists from several provinces involved themselves 
at Kharagpur because of its inter-provincial implications. 
Among the militants were Singaravelu Chettiar, Mukundalal 
Sirkar, Dange and Mirajkar, as well as Chakravarty and 
Bhattacharya from the Bengal WPP. The moderates were led 
by V.V. Giri and C.F. Andrews. Chakravarty, Interview, 
pp.136-7; Mirajkar, interview; K. Murugesan and C.S. 
Subramanyan, Singaravelu - First Communist in South India 
(New Delhi, 1975), p.118. 'The Bengal-Nagpur Railway 
Lock-Out', in LM, Vol.9(12), Dec. 1927, pp.765-6.
177. The retrenchment was in line with the recommendations of 
the State Workshop Enquiry Committee (1926). During the 
War railway workshops had been used for the manufacture of 
munitions in addition to their normal functions. By the 
mid-1920's the re-adjustment to peace time operations was 
complete and the Enquiry Committee established the guide­
lines for the resulting rationalisation and retrenchments. 
The Kharagpur block-retrenchment was one of the first and 
was a particularly heavy and sudden cut-back. The Kharagpur 
conflict which resulted led the central government to 
recommend to the Railway Board that future retrenchments be 
staggered. RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), pp.171-2.
281
The strikers were militant, rejecting the calls of the moderate
178trade union leaders for an early return to work. Nevertheless,
the WPP's annual report concluded, the party activists, 'in the
absence of close contact with the men and with inadequate
179resources, were unable to take any useful action'. The strike
eventually collapsed, and the men returned unconditionally on 
180December 8. Union organisation as a whole declined subsequent­
ly, despite continued retrenchment, after the strain of two 
unsuccessful strikes in a year and a resurgence of communalism 
in 1928.181
Nevertheless the Kharagpur strike provided the WPP 
with its first experience in a major industrial struggle. It 
demonstrated the weakness of a railway strike which remained
178. The moderates had a difficult time at Kharagpur. Andrews
commented that the men were much more determined and bitter 
than during any previous strike in which he had been 
involved, and 'at one time it was as much as I could do to 
get a hearing'. (IOL, Halifax Papers, Vol.21: Andrews to
Irwin, 29/10/27). The advantages for the militants were 
partly vitiated, however, by Mukundalal Sirkar's factional 
ambitions: MCCC, P.526(29): op.cit.
179. MCCC, P.52: op.cit.
180. The Agent's compromise, otherwise nominal,included the 
unusual concession of payment of full lock-out wages to 
the men.
181. Kharagpur had previously been sufficiently prone to 
communalism for the Administration to find this an effect­
ive means of social control, and it remained a continuing 
problem after the strikes of 1927. Two serious communal 
riots between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs broke out in Kharagpur in 1928, and in 1929 H.S. Suhrawardy was able to 
capitalise on these tensions by establishing a rival 
communal union among the minority (approx. 11%) Muslim 
community. The BNR union subsequently charged the adminis­
tration with favouring the communal union. RCLI, Vol.
VIII(1), pp.546-8, and Vol.VIII(2), p.470; MCCC, P.544(2): 
minutes of BTUF meeting, 2/9/28; Statesman, 1/7/28, p.9.
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confined to the workshops, the difficulty of influencing 
events in the absence of previous party activity among the 
workers, and the potential for eliciting a more enthusiastic 
response from workers under attack than the moderates could 
attract. It also brought them into contact with the Secretary 
of the Khagaul (Patna) branch of the East-Indian Railway Union 
(EIRU), K.C. Mitra.
BJWA activists, and particularly Chakravarty, began
working with Mitra from October 1927 to establish a union among
the 14,000 employees of the EIR's workshop at Lillooah, near
Howrah. The response was 'one of enthusiasm' from almost all 
183communities. They were able very quickly to form the nucleus
of a union organisation and draw up a list of grievances. The 
grievances centred on the issue of corruption among and exploit­
ation by the supervisory staff and included demands for wage 
increases to the level of those paid at the EIR workshops at 
Lucknow and Lahore and for improved housing facilities. Soon 
the charge of victimisation of union activists by foremen was 
added to the list. However the substantive demands were rejected 
by the Agent. In response, on March 7, 700 of the Lillooah 
workers repeated the Kharagpur tactic of'industrial satyagraha'- 
entering the workshops but refusing to work. The EIR Agent
182
182. Allison had earlier emphasised to Bengali trade unionists
the importance of this point, in relation to a proposed 
strike at Kharagpur: IB, Communism, (1927), p.276.
183. RCLI, Vol. VIII(1), ps. 162 and 165; Chakravarty, 
Interview, p.137. Chakravarty says that the Bengali 
workers were least active (this may have been because 
Bengalis were mostly in skilled jobs) and that UP Muslims 
were the most active in the union, followed by 'up-country' 
Hindus. At least one Bengali worker - K.D. Chatterjee,
an electrical fitter - became a union activist: RCLI,Vol.VIII(2), p.425.
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responded immediately and intransigontly, declaring a lock-out
throughout the workshops, thus involving all workers. This
action began the most bitter conflict in Bengal's preceding
184industrial history. Occurring in early 1923, and situated
near the major industrial centres of the Calcutta region, the 
timing and location as well as the scale of the Lillooah strike 
ensured that its outcome would be crucial for the subsequent 
fortunes of the WPP's working class program in the late 1920's.
The Lillooah Railway-Workshop Strike
The WPP's prospects at Lillooah were more favourable 
than at Kharagpur. Having been involved in the initial stages 
of the union organisation leading to the lock-out, its 'descent' 
on the troubled workshop had not been so 'sudden'. The pre­
dominant up-country sector of the workforce was actively involved 
in the union and in the subsequent struggle and Chakravarty's 
knowledge of Hindi provided the party with an independent point 
of contact with the migrants. The workers were militant, 
assertive,,demonstrated a high level of unity in their opposition
to the authorities, and were determined to defend their fledgling 
185union; and, importantly, the jobbers (or their equivalents)
184. RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), PS. 172 & 481. Karnik provides a 
narrative of the Lillooah strike in op.cit., pp.205-11.
For a communist perspective see 'The Lillooah Railway 
Strike' (probably by Spratt) in LM, Vol.l0(9), Sept. 1928, 
pp.572-4.
185. This is apparent from the nature of the men's grievances 
and actions - e.g. their attack on supervisor corruption 
and their resistance to victimisation of union activists.
A large proportion of the men attended the union's mass 
meetings, e.g. 12,000 on March 1: RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), 
p.482.
were in an ambiguous position in the conflict - some siding with
the workers and others with the administration - thus providing
186room for more initiative from among the ordinary men. The
union had 'substantial' funds at the outset of the strike, and
187received quite generous public contributions during its course. 
Finally, it was during the early stages of the lock-out that the 
WPP adopted its more definitive trade union policy. This guide­
line, together with the Kharagpur experience, made it more 
possible than previously to develop and implement a clear party 
strategy.
But there were also a number of negative features.
Comprehensive railway unions and successful railway strikes were
188inherently difficult to organise, and in this case the Railway
Board and the government were determined from the outset that the
workers should not win any concessions for fear that this 'may
189be interpreted as a victory' and encourage further strikes.
186. Many foremen, the key personnel involved in recruitment,
and mistris (skilled artisans, with dominant roles within 
the work force structure) came under attack. This indicat­
ed the labourers' preparedness to attack abuses within the 
existing system, if not the system itself. However mistris 
such as Atul Behary Santra, Ram Autar and Shara Gurdit 
Singh, were also among the leading union activists, and 
were a crucial bridging group between the union leadership 
and the ordinary workers: RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), pp.478-8,
481-2 & P.489 and Vol.VIII(2), p.425; Chakravarty, 
Interview, p.141.
187. MCCC, P.415(15): 'EIR Dispute', a pamphlet written by
Spratt; Chakravarty (Interview, p.140) says that Rs.
50,000 was raised in Bengal for the strike fund. The fact 
that the strike was directed against a government agency 
was undoubtedly an important factor contributing to the 
level of public support, which was in sharp contrast to 
that received by the Bombay mill strikers.
The main problems were: the strength of the employer -
the government - and its determination to defeat strikes
188 .
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This intransigence,- emphasised at an early stage by violent
police and railway auxiliary force repression at the Lillooah
190suburb of Bamangachi, made it imperative that the workshop
stoppage be rapidly extended along the line in order to bring
traffic to a halt. Without this sanction a workshop strike was
in a very weak position for, as the Railway Board later noted,
its immediate effect was simply 'a considerable saving to the
191administration in wages and materials'. But the extension of
the strike would require clear thinking and a concerted effort
on the part of the leadership, for the organisational work at
Lillooah preceding the lock-out had been limited and there was
192no organisation along the line. Finally, the alliance with
Mitra was a somewhat hazardous one for a Marxist trade union 
leadership. Despite his 'militance' Mitra was far from being 
a champion of class-based organisation and worker leadership 
of the union, and he was a wily and charismatic fellow, capable
188 (Cont'd)
on the strategically sensitive railways; the organisation­
al difficulties of co-ordinating the widely separated 
departments; and the difficulty of neutralising the loyal, 
strategically placed European and Anglo-Indian traffic staff.
189. IOL, Halifax Papers, Vol.22: Jackson to Irwin, 29/3/28;
RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), pp.482-5, which includes the G of I 
communique (3/6/28) giving full support to the Railway 
Board's stand.
190. On March 23 strikers returning from a mass meeting were 
fired upon by a contingent of police and railway auxiliar­
ies, backed by Gurkha soldiers. Four were killed and over 
30 wounded.
191. ibid., p.171. (And Cf. D. Arnold , op.cit., on the reasons 
for the failure of the SIR strike).
192. Cf. the GIPRU leadership's concern to delay strike action 
until strong organisation, covering both the traffic and 
workshop departments, had been established.
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of keeping the initiative in his own hands. Mitra, a former
station master in Bihar and an 'eloquent' Hindi speaker, was
able to establish a strong personal following among the men. It
is significant that he cultivated this following through a
populist religious appeal. Known to the workers as 'Jatadhari
Baba', he affected the style of a sadhu. While Sir Stanley
Jackson found him 'decidedly capable ... with a decided personal- 
194ity, a frustrated Spratt later spoke of his use of 'his
religious reputation, intrigue and a rather low type of demagogy'
to effect the main goal of his policy - 'keeping the men under
195his own personal control'. The communists' alliance with
'Jatadhari Baba' brought the party into closer contact with the
workers. But if they were to use the alliance to develop a
Marxist influence and a party base among the Lillooah workers
they would need to attain a similar independence to that
exercised by the Bombay communists in their united front with
reformist unionists. This was, however, inherently more
difficult, for the Bengali communists at Lillooah did not have
an equivalent to the Maratha workers to be mobilised as readily
196as an independent base. This situation gave added emphasis
to the need for a clear party policy and for skill and deter­
mination in its execution.
193. Chakravarty, Interview, p.137
194. IOL, Halifax Papers, Vol.22, p.158: Jackson to Irwin, 
20/5/28.
195. MCCC, P.2419(P): Spratt to R. Page Arnot, 23/10/28. He
regarded the EIRU leadership as a whole as 'Congress 
reformist': MCCC, P.527(8) op.cit.
195. Bengali workers averaged less than a quarter of the work­
force in Bengal's railway workshops: RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.14.
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The communists' policy in the Lillooah struggle
passed through two stages, separated from each other by Spratt1s
arrival in Bengal in early April. In the first stage the BJWA
group working with K.C. Mitra - Chakravarty, Goswami and S.N.
Banerji - appears not to have made any attempt to initiate an
independent party policy, nor even to have recognised the
197necessity of doing so. In the second stage this situation
198was slowly rectified, under Spratt1s constant pressure.
In the first stage Mitra appears to have been able 
to retain unchallenged control of the overall strategic and 
tactical direction of the strike. The BJWA group simply adopted 
the subsidiary role of 'agit-prop' shock troops in the mobilis­
ation of the workers at Lillooah and elsewhere. There is no 
evidence of the Bombay communists' clear overall strategic 
perspective, the careful assessment of their strengths and 
weaknesses to determine the extent and forms of their dependence 
upon the reformists, or the equally careful tactical deliberat­
ions within the party, the GKU and the JMSC daring the general 
strike. Not only was there no significant policy discussion
within the Bengal party, Mitra, even after Spratt's arrival,
197. The BJWA group was later criticised for its 'mere sub­
servience' to the Mitra leadership (MCCC, P.527(8): 
op.cit.) and it is perhaps significant that Chakravarty, 
in his recent extended memoir of the strike, makes no 
retrospective critique of either the Mitra leadership or 
the BJWA group's political relationship with it.
198. Eg., it was not until June 21 that Ganavani published a 
party critique of the Mitra leadership's policy in, and 
conduct of the strike.
The MCCC records do not include any EIRU or WPP
evidence of formal meetings by the strike leadership to 
decide strike strategy and tactics. Given the compre­
hensive nature of the collection of evidence for the
199.
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'delayed by all possible means’ the formation of a strike
committee. He kept personal control over strike tactics and
the expenditure of funds, and when a committee was finally
200formed, mainly of outsiders, he 'prevented its working'.
Mitra's strategy was to use a limited strike in an
attempt to bring about negotiations with the railway adminis-
201tration or the intervention of the government - his 'milit- 
ance' was very limited. After the union's initial attempt to 
force a compromise had foundered on the obduracy of the author­
ities, underlined by the Bamangachi police action, the Mitra 
leadership decided on a limited extension of the strike in the
Calcutta-Howrah area to place greater pressure on the railway
202administration. Chakravarty was put in charge of the
203volunteers and S.N. Banerji became the 'mass spokesman'.
After leading marches of the Lillooah men through the adjacent 
areas, and after the Bamangachi fatalities, they managed to 
catalyse sympathetic strikes in several of the already turbulent 
EIR installations and in the private engineering works in Howrah. 
These,however, were not sufficient to halt traffic on the line
199. (Cont'd.)
Meerut Case this lacuna, which contrasts strongly with 
Bombay, is not just a problem of source materials - it 
also provides strong circumstantial evidence that, in 
marked contrast to Bombay, such meetings did not occur.
200. MCCC, P.2419(P): op.cit. It is probable that Mitra's
informal style of leadership depended significantly on 
the meditation of the influential mistris who joined the 
union.
201. RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), pp.482-4; IOL, Halifax Papers, Vol.22
p.518: Jackson to Irwin, 6/6/28.
202. MCCC, P.415(15): op.cit.
203. Chakravarty, Interview, p.138.
289
and force the administration to the negotiating table. Accord­
ingly, Chakravarty recounts, the strike leadership 'realised
that our struggle must be extended or we shall lose in
204.isolation1. * But the direction in which they chose to ex-
20 Stend it was not along the EIR line, but through the jute area.
The leadership organised a series of 'long marches by workers'
jathas' along the Hooghly, with two aims in mind: 'the first
was to rally the support of the entire working class of Bengal
behind this struggle and secondly to rouse and organise the jute 
206workers'. This tactic consumed a great deal of the time and
energy of the strike leadership and the Lillooah strikers during 
this period.
These were grand objectives. And it is very poss­
ible that, as Chakravarty claims, 'the whole Hooghly working
207class belt was electrified' by the marches. They also help­
ed to sustain the morale of the Lillooah strikers. And, 
although there is no evidence of the marches' having catalysed
204. loc. cit.
205. This tactical choice was consistent with the motivation 
behind the BJWA group's initial attempts to organise the 
Lillooah workers - they had sought to create a strike 
there in sympathy with the Kharagpur strike, (ibid.,p.137), 
even though this would not have contributed in any tang­
ible way to the latter's success.
206. ibid., p.138.
207. ibid., p.139. Chakravarty (PP* 138-141) provides an ex­
tended account of these marches. See also MCCC, P.2173 
and 2174, and PWs 47, 83 & 94 - police reports of the 
marches and communist speeches (with Chakravarty frequent­
ly translating into Hindi).
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208further unionisation of jute workers, some jute mill strikes 
209did occur and the party managed to establish a few unions in
210other industries. But these limited advances contributed
little towards the immediate prospects of the situation at
Lillooah. They brought no additional pressure on the railway
authorities - traffic continued to run as normal - and, despite
the temporary effect of the marches on the spirits of the
211strikers, morale began to sag from mid-April. By May there
were also signs that significant numbers of strikers had begun 
to resent the additional burden on their dwindling funds imposed 
by the small number of 'sympathetic strikes' that did occur in
208. Chakravarty (p.141) says that jute strikes occurred both 
during the marches, and after the Lillooah strike when 
dismissed Lillooah activists got jobs in the mills.
209. IOL, Halifax Papers, Vol.22, p.449: Jackson to Irwin, 
20/5/28. There ware a large number of limited jute 
strikes during the year, many of them associated with the 
conversion from a multiple shift to a single shift system 
(see the figures provided in RCLI, Vol.V(l) p.126). These 
may well have been influenced, if not caused by the 
Lillooah conflict.
210. Unions were begun among the 4,500 workers at the Kesoram 
Cotton Mills in the Calcutta suburb of Matiaburz, the 
2,000 employees of the Angus Engineering works at Shamna- 
gore, up-river from Howrah, the ordnance factories at 
nearby Ichapore, and among the carters of Burrabazar 
(Chakravarty, Interview, pp.140-141; MCCC, Judgement,
p.499 ). The Kesoram Textile union was formed during an 
11 day strike, involving all sections of the millhands 
(75% migrant) against the reduction of the weavers' rates. 
The new union was not able to influence the strike, which ended with the restoration of the old rates, but it became 
the nucleus for later expansion. (RCLI, Vol.V(l), pp. 
412-13, & 422-23; MCCC, P.2256: Ahmad to Tagore, 19/7/28). 
It is perhaps significant that both the Angus works and 
one of the ordnance factories employed a majoritity of 
Bengali labour (RCLI, Vol.V(l), ps. 395, 203 & 208).
This may have contributed to the BJWA group's 'unionisa­
tion' of these factories. Nevertheless neither of these 
unions achieved significance. In contrast, the contact 
with the carters was to become politically significant
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21 2in other industries.
It was in this 'very serious' situation, that Spratt
sought to convince the strike leaders, whom he found 'difficult
people to deal with', that a quite different strategy was 
213required. Spratt took the view that their tactical errors
flowed from theoretical misconceptions: 'the syndicalist
notions in regard to the "active minority"' - the belief that the 
Lillooah workers, the most active and militant group on the rail­
way, could alone 'secure gains for the whole line'; and 'the 
very similar theory of the "spontaneous" reaction of the masses 
to a proper stimulus' - the belief that unorganised workers else­
where would respond spontaneously to and in sympathy with the 
'example' set by the Lillooah workshop. '.... both theories',
Spratt added, were 'merely excuses to escape from the hard
214drudgery of organisation'. Although there is no available
evidence to show that the BJWA group totally abandoned these 
views, they did accept Spratt's tactical alternatives. He 
persuaded them to discontinue their latest 'stupid' tactic-
210 Contd.
in 1930.
211. IOL,Halifax Papers, Vol.22 p.375: Jackson to Irwin,
18/4/23.
212. ibid., p.449: Jackson to Irwin, 20/5/28. Spratt thought 
that the strike funds were spent 'rather recklessly':
MCCC, P.415(15): op.cit.
213. MCCC, P.1322: Spratt to Ghate, 12/5/28.
MCCC, P.415(15): op.cit. (There are clear continuities
between these theories and bhadralok terrorist ideology).214.
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performing mass 'satyagraha' outside the Howrah Magistrate's
Court to protest the dismissal of charges against those respon-
215sible for the Bamangachi shootings. He convinced them that
they should concentrate instead on forming a strike committee,
including ordinary workers, extending the strike along the line,
and mobilising further funds.
Despite Mitra's resistance - to the first two goals
at least - these tactics were adopted as EIRU policy. An appeal
for financial assistance was sent to the Profintern and Rs.
10,000 was received in mid-May although, in line with the
216request, this was sent to Mitra. At the same time Spratt,
Goswami and Radha Raman Mitra, another of the BJWA group's non- 
WPP associates, were delegated to agitate for strike action at 
the previously unorganised EIR workshops at Ondal and Asanol, 
near the Bihar border. By the end of the month they had manag­
ed to bring out Ondal and to initiate a more limited stoppage 
at Asanol, and had begun attempts to form party branches among
215. MCCC, P.1322: op.cit. He argued that the satyagraha,
'the tactics of middle class impotence, ... coloured by all kinds of false religious and moral ideas', simply 
provided the police with 'the chance they were waiting 
for' - to 'bludgeon them mercilessly' and 'strike a little 
terror into the workers' hearts'. It also burdened funds 
with bail and defence costs. Forty were injured, some 
seriously, and 20, including Chakravarty and S.N. Banerji, 
were arrested: ibid., MCCC, P.415(15): op.cit.
216. NAI, H .Poll, 18/IV/1928? G of Ben. to HD, G of I, 1/5/28; 
NAI, H .Poll, 10/XXII/1929. Approximately Rs. 5,000 more 
was sent by communist organisations in Britain, though 
there is no record of its receipt.
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217the workers there. But not only did these strikes meet with
military-backed 'police-terror ... probably worse than any-
218thing ... seen in industrial disputes for some time', they
coincided with the beginning of the slow collapse of the
Lillooah strikers. When, on June 2, the Government of India
issued a communique giving full support to the EIR administrat-
219ion's refusal to make any concessions, K.C. Mitra finally
issued an official union call for a general strike along the
line. He then left the Lillooah area, for the first time, to
assist in the attempt to extend the strike.
It was, however, far too late. The first cracks
appeared when the Howrah engineering workers, whom the EIRU
leaders had failed to organise or represent during their strike,
220began to return from early June. By this time the Lillooah
workers, too, were exhausted, along with the Profintern's con­
tribution to the strike fund. They began to return in the 
second half of June, leaving the Asanol and Ondal strikers 
increasingly isolated. All that could be hoped for was 'an
917 MCCC. P.501: Spratt & Goswami (Ondal) to Ahmad, 25/5/28
Goswarai reported optimistically that their party-building 
efforts were receiving a 'nice response from the young 
men' in the workshops, but the response proved to be temporary: MCCC, P.526(12): Ahmad to Spratt & Goswami, 
26/5/28; MCCC, PW.68: police report on activities at
Asanol.
218. MCCC, P.415(15): op.cit. See also LM,_ Vol. 10 (9) , op.c^t., 
for an account of police violence at Asanol, Ondal an 
elsewhere during the EIR strike.
219. The communique is reproduced in RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), p.172.
220. RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.390.
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honourable settlement' rather than an outright defeat.221 But 
even this hope faded rapidly. On July 10, Mitra advised a 
public meeting of strikers that they should call off the strike, 
and from the next day the men began an unconditional return to 
work. Many were subsequently victimised by the administration.
A final flare-up, in response to the Agent's final terms, quickly 
subsided without any further gain.
222Nothing had been won by the strikers. The strike,
221a WPP post-mortem acknowledged, had finished 'tragically'.
The results ... seem for the moment to be 
terrible. Many hundreds of men^250 at Ondal and 
Asanol and 54 at Lillooahy7 are victimised, thous­ands have been for months without proper food; 
heads and bones have been broken by the dozen.
Adding to the sense of defeat, the Government of India announced
on August 17 that 2,600 of the Lillooah employees would be re-
224trenched during the following 20 months. The retrenchments
were effected without any further strike attempts.
Nor had the party gained significantly from the event. 
'We rather made fools of ourselves over the Lillooah strike', 
Spratt reflected in October;
221. MCCC, P.1118: Spratt to Joglekar, 23/6/28.
222. The only concessions were a marginal pay increase for some 
categories of the lowest paid workers and a promise to 
investigate housing conditions.
223. MCCC, P.415(15): op.cit.
224. Reproduced in RCLI, Vol.VIII(l), pp.483-84. The EIR admin­
istration, in addition, withdrew their recognition of the 
union: RCLI, Vol.VIII(2), p.397.
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We merely gave some assistance in agitation etc.,; but 
without making any serious difference to the ill- 
judged and very reactionary policy of Mitra ... When 
eventually he consented to let us try spreading the 
strike, it was too late, and the effort failed ...
He made clever use of the situation, and succeeded in 
fooling us pretty completely, while we have little i-n225 
the way of propaganda achieved to compensate for it.
Mitra delivered a final coup de grace by making the communists,
because of their advocacy of the extension of the strike, appear
responsible for the victimisation of the Asanol and Ondal 
226workers. Mitra was able to retain control of the EIRU, to
attract what remained of the strike leadership's waning in-
227fluence over the defeated Lillooah men, and, gradually and
228partially, to rebuild the union. The BJWA group's subseq­
uent access to the Lillooah workers remained indirect, med­
iated by the EIRU leadership, despite their close contact with
225. MCCC, P .2419(P): op.cit. Mitra's differences with comm­
unist policy were further revealed at the Nagpur session 
of the AITUC in December 1929. When the moderates 
seceded from the militants Mitra joined the former:
(RCLI, Vol.VIII(2), p.425).
226. ibid. Isemonger (DIB) commented that the outcome of the
Lillooah shrike had 'lowered the influence of Spratt and 
his Communist associates' in Bengal: NAI, H.Poll,
18/XVI/1928: note by Isemonger, 29/8/28.
227. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928, KW XI: op.cit. The Railway
Board reported that after the collapse of the strike the 
Lillooah workers, in contrast to their initial enthusiasm 
for the union, had adopted an attitude of 'indifference', 
viewing it as 'a well intentioned body which however, 
cannot achieve anything of benefit to them': RCLI,
Vol.VIII (1) , ps. 165 & 162.
228. Eg., on October 13, K.C. Mitra led a rally of 3,000 
workers, carrying red flags and chanting slogans such as 
'Lai Paltan ki Jai' (Victory to the Red Army) and 
'Mazdur Bhaion ki Jai' (Victory“'.to the Labourers) ; in 
December the EIRU was able to organise a mass meeting of 
6,000 workers at the workshops to be addressed by a
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the strikers for several months. For the WPP little more than
'lessons for the labour movement' could be salvaged from the
Lillooah experience; the only consolation that could be offered
was a repetition, though with little apparent conviction, of
Lenin's dictum that the revolution necessarily passed through
229successive defeats before winning final victory.
Nevertheless Spratt's comment on the communists' 
failure as propagandists requires further investigation, for it 
was not a failure to project and make popular a militant anti­
capitalist ideology. In fact the K.C. Mitra leadership sub­
sequently adopted this as the EIRU's official ideology. In 
October, three months after the collapse of the strike, the 
union began a Hindi weekly called Lai Paltan (Red Army). It 
featured on its front page the hammer and sickle and a cartoon
depicting a worker firing a capitalist from a cannon, and
230argued for the abolition of capitalism. The ideological
choice suggests that these themes were not unpopular with the 
workers. During the strike the marchers' slogans had included
228. Contd.
visiting international communist, J.W. Johnstone (NAI, 
H.Poll, 18/VII/1928, KW XI: op.cit.); and in March,
Mitra organised a rally of 1,000 workshop labourers (NAI, 
H.Poll, 17/1929: Bengal FR2 Mar.) And,as will be seen 
below, Mitra also played an important role in a worker 
demonstration at the Calcutta Session of the INC. In 1929 
the EIRU collected some Rs.12,000 from members, and in 
Feb. 1930, had a balance of RS.2,500. Most of its office­
bearers were mistris. RCLI, Vol.VIII(2), p.430.
229. MCCC, P.415(15). This document is a WPP post-mortem of 
the strike and the communists' role within it.
230. NAI, H.Poll, 1/1928: Bengal FR2 Oct. 1928: NAI, H.Poll
18/VII/1928, KW XI: op.cit.
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'Lai Jhanda ki Jai' (Victory to the Red Flag) and 'Mazdur-Kisan
Hukumat Zindabad' (Long Live the Worker-Peasant State), and
similar slogans were chanted at mass rallies organised by the
232union after the strike. To this extent the communists had
succeeded.
But the change in consciousness was, compared to 
that which occurred among the Bombay mill workforce, rather 
superficial- Nor was it accompanied by a transformation of the 
existing modes of social and political organisation. The 
evidence provided by the Bombay situation would suggest that 
these two features mutually limited each other. We have seen 
that K.C. Mitra successfully resisted the communists' belated 
attempt to establish worker leadership and class organisation 
during the strike. For evidence of the limits of the ideolog­
ical shift we have Chakravarty's account of the strike. Despite 
his direct experience of the life of migrant labour in the mills 
and bustee-s of Bhatpara,he was perplexed by 'the peculiar stage
of consciousness' of the strikers during the marches along the
233Hooghly - at the point when morale was highest. In addition
to the slogans for workers' power and the worker-peasant state 
the marchers had also, and 'finally', chanted 'Ganga Mai ki Jai'. 
The BJWA group also 'received a shock' when the strikers, 'who 
had remained firm in class battle and had not flinched in the 
face of bullets, would not dine together - so deep was their
231. Chakravarty, Interview, pp.138-39; see also the police 
reports cited in fn.207.
232. See fn.228.
233. Chakravarty, Interview, p.139.
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prejudice of caste and religion'. The men explained to the be­
mused communists: 'We can give up our lives but not our
religious beliefs'.
The failure to induce a profound change in the work­
ing class's consciousness and organisation at Lillooah arose to 
a large degree from the objective realities of the situation - 
community consciousness appears to have been more deeply rooted
among the north Indian workers of Lillooah than among the
235Maratha mill-hands, and the Lillooah strike was in an inher­
ently much more difficult position than the Bombay textile 
strike. Nor were the migrant majority of the Lillooah workers 
as accessible to Bengal's communists as were the Marathas to 
the communists of Bombay. The bhadralok Marxists' 'shock' on 
discovering the reality of the strikers' consciousness demon­
strates their distance from the cultural world of industrial 
labour, and the romanticisation of the working class made 
possible by that distance. The previous 'proletarianisation'
234. ibid., cf. Rowe, op.cit., p.p231-2, on the particularly 
important role of religion for insecure up-country mig­
rants to Bombay. Religion was one way of 'dealing with 
the dangerous pardesh' (lit.foreign country). In both 
village and city, 'deities control space and their worship 
provides an integrating mechanism for the diverse groups 
making up the population*.
235. Eg., Rowe found that in Bombay in the 1950s his sample
group of UP migrants were far less inclined than Marathas 
to participate in voluntary associations such as trade 
unions, remaining instead within their primary, village- 
oriented community forms of organisation: North Indian
workers, 'seem to be at the far end of the continuum of involvement in city life, since nearly all of them areso strongly identified with the village'. (ibid., p.232).Rowe's observations of differential community conscious­ness in the 1950s suggest probable, if not direct parallels with the 1920s. Similarly, up-country migrants in Bombay presumably shared this characteristic with those in Calcutta.
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of Bengal's industrial labour/ even of its 'active minorities', 
had not been nearly as complete, nor its acceleration during a 
major strike as rapid, as the WPP activists had anticipated.
The Bombay communists began their venture with similar pre­
conceptions, but after making direct contact with labour these 
were soon modified. However, the former station-master 
'Jatadhari Baba', in contrast to his communist colleagues, 
clearly understood the realities and implications of the work­
ers' community-religious world view and the organisational forms 
associated with this consciousness. Mitra was able quite com­
fortably to reconcile the limited change in consciousness which 
did occur, even though it included an explicit demand for work­
ing class power, with his traditional, 'reactionary' conceptions 
of organisation and leadership. He did not have to contend with 
an equivalent of 'the union of the militant workers' which 
developed from the Bombay strike.
Nor, however, did he have to contend with a deter­
mined alternative communist leadership, posing a systematic 
challenge to his conceptions and practices. This absence marked 
the basic political failure of the communists in the Lillooah 
strike. The difference between the Calcutta and Bombay leader­
ships in this regard is striking. It can be seen in the
236. Cf. Spratt's comment, on another occasion, on the Bengal 
working class's'apparently complete subservience ... even 
to the worst leadership', a feature which he found more 
pronounced in that province than in Bombay; MCCC,
P.2419(P): op.cit. Nevertheless Mitra's position was not 
permanent - he was removed from the union in late-1929 
'because he did not like to work'. He was replaced by 
another ex-station master, Santi Mondal: RCLI, Vol.VIII
(1), p.425.
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different kinds of approaches which the two groups took towards, 
respectively, K.C. Mitra and Jhabvala. These two trade union­
ists had much in common: both combined ideological militance 
with policies aimed at maintaining a personal following among 
the .workers; both were influential within the existing trade 
union structure; and each provided the local party with a 
valuable access to trade unionism and the workers, and a conven­
ient alliance against the conventional reformists. But the 
Bombay communists approached their alliance with Jhabvala from 
a much more independent position. In so doing they were able, 
through an energetic and systematic program of organisation and 
propaganda based on a clearly formulated Marxist strategy, to 
mobilise an independent base among the Marathas and thus make 
him increasingly dispensable. The activity of the Calcutta 
communists in the EIR strike shows that this was not the case 
for the Bengal party. The detailed trade union policy adopted 
by the party in March does not appear to have benefitted the 
BJWA group's strike activity appreciably, except possibly 
towards the end, when it was too late. In their propaganda
they failed to project the party as a distinct entity and the
237most legitimate working class leadership: as Muzzafar Ahmad
recognised, the communists were 'not .... able to lay before 
the strikers our main points correctly'. That the Mitra 
leadership should produce a Hindi 'communist' newspaper for a 
working class readership while the WPP's intended Hindi organ,
237. MCCC, P.2099(C): Ahmad to 'J' (M.N. Roy), 10/5/28.
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238Lai Nishan (Red Flag), failed to materialise/ was both a cause 
and a symptom of the communists' failure as independent pro­
pagandists to the working class.
The Bauria-Chenqail Jute Mill Strikes
The WPP's participation in the Lillooah struggle 
had foundered principally on its failure to establish a suff­
icient level of independence in its relationship with the K.C.
Mitra leadership. The underlying shortcomings in party policy
239had been 'difficult to realise ... at the time'. But an 
opportunity to apply the 'lessons for the labour movement1 
arising from the Lillooah experience was presented in the second 
half of 1928 - this time in the strategically crucial jute 
industry.
In mid-July, soon after the collapse of the
Lillooah struggle, the workers of the Fort Gloster jute mills at
Bauria, downsteam from Howrah, began what was to become the
'most protracted' strike in the previous history of the jute 
240mills. The issue which triggered the strike was management
238. The party resolved on August 26 to begin Lai Nishan (MCCC,P.416(14): minutes of WPP meeting, 26/8/28), and Muzaffarsubsequently devoted considerable attention to overcoming the obstacles blocking its publication. He failed because 
of the party's chronic financial problems. (MCCC, P.525 (39): op.cit., MCCC, P .1865(1)(T): Ahmad to S.N. Tagore,8/9/287 NAI, H .Poll, 18/XVI/1928: G of Ben. to G of I, 19/l2/28). It should be noted that the decision to con­tinue to accord priority to the Bengali weekly meant in effect that 'petty-bourgeois' propaganda was regarded
as more important than working class propaganda.
239. MCCC, P .2419(P): op.cit.
240. RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.126.
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victimisation of workers participating in attempts to unionise
the Bauria millhands. But the underlying grievance was the
decision of the managing agency, Kettlewell Bullen and Co., to
convert the mills from a double to a single-shift system - a
change which would result in the retrenchment of 2,000 of
241Bauria's 15,000 millhands. But the conversion to a single­
shift system had previously been introduced at a large number of
mills in the past few years and, though usually accompanied by
242strikes, these had been short-lived. There was another issue
contributing to the intensity of the Bauria conflict, and thus
to the opportunities it provided.
As we saw in Chapter 2, the Bauria mills, in
common with many of the jute mills to the south of Calcutta,
employed a higher proportion of Bengali labour - most of it
coming from the villages of the immediate vicinity - than did
the main mill area to the north. At Bauria this local Bengali
243labour made up more than half of the total. In the inter­
ests of social control over its workforce the management 
decided to replace its local labour progressively with more man­
ageable up-country migrants. This decision, the immediate 
effect of which was the intensification of the strike, was a
241. RCLI, Vol.V (2), p.153. The Bauria mills were all under 
the same managing agency.
242. See fn.209.
NAI, H .Poll, 18/XVI/1928: G. Rainy (Sec., Commerce Dept., 
G of I) to Haig, 8/1/29, (a report based on a meeting 
with the managing agents).
243.
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direct consequence of the enthusiastic response of the Bengali
workers at Bauria to the recently begun efforts of the
244bhadralok trade unionists at the centre. The Bauria situat­
ion thus indicates the greater potential for trade union org-
245anising among Bengali labour there, and it provides strong 
supporting evidence for the thesis that the overall predominance 
of migrant labour in Bengal was a major obstacle to the form­
ation of Bengali-led working class organisation in that 
246province.
244. ibid.
245. Cf. Indrajit Gupta's finding that the Bengali communists 
subsequently attained a long-term base in the jute industry 
only among Bengali workers. (I am indebted to Dipesh 
Chakrabarty for this point. I was unable to obtain a copy 
of Gupta's book, Capital and Labour in the Jute Industry). 
At Bauria another factor may have facilitated the trade 
unionists' penetration - because the Bengali labour was 
recruited from the neighbouring districts it may not have 
been as subject to the power of the jobber as was up- 
country labour. Its ready access to additional, agri­
cultural income probably added to its comparative indep­
endence .
246. At Bauria, and presumably elsewhere, the relative diff­
iculties of mobilising migrant labour were not simply 
socio-cultural. Many of the migrant local workers were 
housed in 'coolie lines' inside the mill compounds, where­
as the local workers commuted daily from their villages. Those living within the compounds were subject to the con­
trol of the company's Gurkha guards as well as being iso­
lated from outsider union activists during their off-work hours. One of Kettlewell Bullen's reasons for replacing 
their local Bengali labour was, indeed, to ensure that a 
large proportion of its labour would be housed inside the 
compounds to secure these results: NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVl/ 
1928: Rainy to Haig, 8/1/29. (Rainy also commented on
the higher level of social control exercised in this way 
by the jute mills, compared to the Bombay mills). How­
ever, although it was more difficult to mobilise the 
migrants in the Bauria strike, there is evidence that the 
non-Bengali communities also gave strong support to it: 
see fn.314 below.
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Trade union work at Bauria-Chengail was begun by
Kishorilal Ghosh's BTUF, which had earlier decided to establish
a comprehensive jute workers' union. Because of the troubled
conditions in the Bauria-Chengail area it resolved to begin 
247there. The BTUF delegated R.R. Mitra and Bankim Mukherji to
Chengail in March during a strike at its Fort Gloster mill.
They were unable to achieve significant results during the
strike, but immediately began a union compaign at the neighbour-
248ing Ludlow mill. When the management victimised those workers
who became involved in this effort a strike resulted. Mitra, 
Mukherji and,after he had been asked by Ghosh to assist the 
other two, Spratt, helped the Ludlow strikers to formulate their 
demands - for the reinstatement of victimised workers, the 
dismissal of two foreman and recognition of the union - and to
lead the strike. It ended after two weeks, with most of the
249demands conceded - the first jute strike, Spratt claimed,
250which had achieved significant success.
Mitra and Mukherji, occasionally assisted by Spratt, 
then began a unionisation compaign at the troubled Bauria mills. 
In early July, after several weeks effort, a union was formed
247. K.L. Ghosh, cited in MCCC, Judgement, p.545.
248. MCCC, D.84(10 & 11), D.87, cited in Judgement, p.254;
R.R. Mitra, Interview, pp.144-45.
249. Statesman, 27/6/28, p.6.
250. MCCC, P.1322: Spratt to Ghate, 12/5/28; MCCC, PW.s 27 &
93. Spratt worked full-time for 2 weeks at Chengail.
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251with Ghosh as President and Mitra as Secretary. The manage­
ment of the Bauria mills was not, however, as amenable to deal­
ing with unions as was that of the Ludlow mills at Chengail.
It responded first by preventing union meetings on company pro-
252perty, then by dismissing six union activists, and finally by
calling in police to quell agitated crowds of workers. After a
violent confrontation on July 16 between 4,000 protesting workers
and the mill authorities and police, Kettlewell Bullen declared
253a lock-out, which was then extended to the other Bauria mills.
The workers' struggle against the management's attempts to im­
plement its new policies continued until early January, keeping
the mills closed for most of that time. Nevertheless, in the
254face of Kettlewell Bullen's determination, the strike finally 
ended in unconditional defeat for the workers. It was a
251. MCCC, P.118: R.R. Mitra's note-book; MCCC, P.2221: policereport of one of Spratt's speeches.
252. The six activists were dismissed for 'creating trouble by fomenting insurbordination among the other employees': Statesman, 18/9/28, p.5.
253. Statesman, 17/7/28, p.9; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 17/7/28, 
cited in Karnik, op.cit., pp.235-6; IQR, 1928, Vol.2, p.l. 
In the clash 23 workers, 13 police and 4 mill guards were injured. Many of the injured workers were shot. Karnik, pp.235-39, provides an account of this strike.
254. The IJMA's annual report for 1928 indicates the extent of
the management's determination that the strike should not 
succeed, and also the way in which it was seen as a test- 
case for the industry as a whole; 'It was thought that if the mill authorities recognised as intermediaries the 
'officials' of the 'Union' formed in the Fort Gloster area, 
work would be resumed at the cost of certain concessions: 
this, however, the Managing Agents refused to do as it was 
evident that any success the agitators might achieve in 
this direction would have far-reaching effects on all 
mills on the river': quoted in Karnik, op.cit., p.239.
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remarkable, if ultimately unsuccessful five to six months-long
255resistance, costing 1,129,358 man-days.
But the heroic dimensions of the workers' stand at 
Bauria stood in sharp contrast to the quality of the leadership 
supplied by the communist trade unionists who involved them­
selves in the struggle. The leadership became engulfed in an 
intense factional struggle, initiated by the BJWA group, which 
almost totally vitiated its contribution to the strike.
The Bauria factionalism developed from a long­
standing conflict between Kalidas Bhattacharya and Kishorilal 
256Ghosh. When the BTUF decided to begin a jute workers' union
the BJWA1s hostility increased, on the grounds that, given the
BJWA1s prior existence as a jute union, the BTUF was breaching
257the principle of industrial unionism. After the Bauria
255. RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.126. These figures provided by the
G of Ben. appear however to be questionable, for they mean 
an average of only 7,500 of Bauria's 15,000 workers' having 
stopped work for the entire 5 month period. We do not 
know if the reason for the mills' having remained closed 
for most of this time was full support for the strike 
from all sections of the millhands. It is perhaps more 
probable that some non-striking departments were closed 
by the effect on mill production of sectional strikes in 
other departments. Nor do we know how the strikers sur­
vived for so long, apparently without significant relief funds; but for the Bengalis their alternative - if meagre — 
agricultural income must have been important, and the 
up-country workers probably received assistance from their 
home village if they did not actually return home; see 
fn.306.
256. In his late 1927 survey of Bengali trade unionism Spratt 
referred to a 'perpetual difference' between the two: 
MCCC, P.526(29): op.cit.
. MCCC, P.2419(P): op.cit.; Ganavani, 26/7/28, in MCCC,
P.593-T.
257
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strike had begun the party group in the BJWA initially resisted 
Spratt's efforts to bring them into the strike leadership, des­
pite his involvement in it from the beginning, stating that they
258were not prepared to work with 'reformists'. Eventually, in
October, Chakravarty and a few others went to Bauria and became
259actively involved. However, a later party document argued,
they replaced their original abstentionist mistake with an
260'opposite error': 'Instead of co-operating with the strike
leadership and criticising its lapses or mistakes, they launched
a campaign of ... recrimination and abuse' against it in order
to undermine the BTUF's attempt to build a separate jute union.
The 'feud', Spratt wrote to London, had, 'as usual, assumed an
intensely personal form', and he had been quite unable to counter
261it and initiate a useful party discussion on strike policy.
The BTUF was consequently able to 'make much capital' out of the 
behaviour of the party activists.
An indication of the level of the hositility against 
the party arising from the Bauria experience, and an image of
258. MCCC, P.527(8): op.cit.; this document also reported
that the BJWA group consistently refused to attend meet­
ings of the BTUF, though entitled to do so, on similar 
'ultra-leftist' grounds.
259. MCCC, P.526(9): K.L. Ghosh to Spratt, 29/11/28; NAI,
H .Poll, 18/VII/1928, KWXI: op.cit.; MCCC, PW.s 37 & 98, 
& P.2224: Police reports on activity at Bauria and
Chengail.
260. MCCC, P.527(8): op.cit.
MCCC, P.2419: op.cit. Spratt attempted to raise the
same issues that he had stressed during the Lillooah 
strike.
261.
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Bengali trade unionism as a whole, is provided in a letter
2g2written by Ghosh during the strike:
I have now begun to realise why there is such a strong 
feeling of hostility created against the so-called 
Communists everywhere. From a study of their literature 
as also from association with Saklatwala and Campbell 
(Allison) as also with Spratt I had altogether different 
ideas about the so-called Communists from what I actually 
found the members of the Bengal Workers' and Peasants' 
Party (si.c.) . They have hardly any initiative and dash. 
They are incapable of sustained work. They always de­
light in hampering other people in the task of organis­
ation. They appear to have a sort of clique of adven­
turers who because they are pledged to support one 
another, right or wrong, try to dictate their own terms 
to other trade unionists who in most cases have to yield 
to them because they have no solidarity but are rent 
asunder by petty personal jealousies and intrigues.
The picture painted by Ghosh tends to be confirmed by Spratt -
there was 'no doubt' in his mind that 'the demoralisation thus
produced' by the BJWA group's factional campaign 'contributed
263towards the collapse of the strike'. The group did subseq­
uently realise its goal of undermining the BTUF1s venture into 
mill unionism - both R.R. Mitra and B. Mukherji were persuaded 
to join the BJWAZ - but at the cost of a potential base at 
Bauria.' In contrast to Lillooah, no continuing union organ-
262. MCCC, P.24: op.cit. Ghosh was also attacking Muzaffar
for his refusal to release the money sent by the CKU for 
the Bauria strike. Ahmad was unhappy about Ghosh's account­
ing procedures. This fight, also, became acrimonious.
263. MCCC, P.527(8): op.cit.
264. MCCC, P.34: Minutes of the BJWA's AGM, 3/1/29. Mitra was
elected general secretary and Mukherji became the Bauria 
centre secretary. Ghosh claimed that the BJWA had bought 
Mitra's loyalty. (MCCC, P.24: K.L. Ghosh to N.M. Joshi,
7/12/28) and, in February, was complaining that both 
Mitra and Mukherji were 'acting under ... instructions' 
from the WPP: MCCC, P.2154: Ghosh to Ahmad, 16/2/29.
309
isation was sustained at Bauria subsequently and the mills were
able to proceed unhampered with their program of replacing
265Bengalis with up-country labour.
Thus the WPP at Bauria revealed shortcomings which, 
though taking a different form, and despite the relative advan­
tages provided by the much larger Bengali component of the 
workforce, were essentially very similar to its Lillooah mis­
takes. In neither was the WPP involved as a disciplined, in­
tegrated party, and in neither did the actual policy pursued 
bear any direct relationship to official party policy. In both 
strikes the contentious issue was the policy to be adopted 
towards 'reformist' trade unionism, and in both the party
activists' policy was based, essentially, on factional consider-
266ations, not on political analysis.
In the Lillooah conflict the BJWA group had part­
icipated uncritically with a reformist union, without identif­
iable gain for the WPP or, in the final analysis, the strike; 
at Bauria they adopted an attitude of unmitigated hostility to­
wards another reformist leadership - with similar though more
265. By early January the Bengalis in one mill had been entire­
ly replaced, and in the other two had been partly replaced. 
'In the end1, Rainy reported, 'very little local labour 
will be employed': G. Rainy, 8/1/29, op.cit.
266. Ghosh, for instance, described the WPP's trade union policy
as one of 'interference alternated with aloofness'. 'When 
there is actual need for your assistance', he wrote to 
Ahmad, 'your party does not seem to be unanimous for help, 
while certain men are allowed to speak big in your party's 
name and with its apparent approval ... really it is time 
that your party came out with a definite policy': MCCC, 
P.2154(P): op.cit.
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negative results. The continuities between 'revolutionary' and 
'reformist' trade unionism in Bengal remained, at the end of 
1928, much more pronounced than the disjunctions: both forms
continued to be driven primarily by the dynamics of daladali 
politics rather than being guided by formulated policy; and 
both remained, essentially, divorced from the working class 
masses.
The Bengal WPP Splits
The conflicts which broke out during the Bauria
strike contributed to the collapse of,not only the strike and
the BTUF's jute industry union plans, but also the WPP itself.
During 1928 the tension between the Chakravarty-Goswami group
and the party secretary, Muzaffar Ahmad, had increased.
Frustrated by the latter's autocratic methods and his continued
success in excluding their associates from the party, the BJWA
group began, from October, a concerted, though initially covert
267campaign to remove him from office. This hostility was also
directed against Spratt because of his closer relationship with
the 'party centre' group and, probably, his co-operation with
268Ghosh and his criticisms of their trade union activity.
257. An analysis of the background to, and the events surround­
ing the party split are provided in MCCC, P.527(8): op.cit. The split, its significance and its implications will be examined more closely in Chapter 4.
268. One of the reasons for Spratt's move to Bengal was to work with Ghosh, following an AITUC decision, on a survey of Bengali trade unionism, particularly in the jute industry (MCCC, P.479: Spratt to Ahmad, 6/3/28). Spratt and Ghoshsubsequently formed quite a close working and personal relationship, despite ideological differences. The BJWA 
group propaganda against Spratt also emphasised the fact that he was British: MCCC, P.527(8): op.cit.
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Accordingly, Spratt claimed, the Chakravarty faction took the
opportunity of the Bauria strike to launch an attempt to 'fight
269us out by propaganda among the workers'.
The intra-party hostility survived the collapse of 
the Bauria strike. In February, after failing to remove 
Muzaffar from power, the BJWA faction resigned en bloc from the 
WPP to form an oppositional 'Peoples' Party' with their non-WPP 
associates. The BJWA, whose name was changed to the Bengal Jute 
Workers' Union (BJWU), became the new party's organisational 
centre. The union's office was also moved from Bhatpara to 
Calcutta, and nominal union branches were established for each 
of the major jute mill centres, in order to reinforce its claim 
to being the industrial union of all jute workers in the pro­
vince and not simply an informal organisation based on one
i n * 1 270locality.
The effect of the split upon the WPP was, in
271Spratt's view, 'nothing short of a tragedy':
I write in a mood of despondency ... the work of a year 
has practically been destroyed. The bulk of the party 
members remain, but of the active men half have gone ... 
and what is worse, the other half all seem to be para­
lysed - through sickness, other occupations, or mere 
slackness. ... And of course, this affair has resulted 
in a general withdrawal of support, so that we are 
absolutely crippled.
The bitterness of the conflict between the two groups continued 
to escalate until the Meerut Case arrests imposed a forced 
resolution within the confines of the Meerut jail.
269. MCCC, P.527(1): op.cit.
270. MCCC, P.34: op.cit.
271. MCCC, P.527(1): op.cit.
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Against this background an event which has been
taken as a sign of the rapidly developing influence of the WPP
272over the labour of Bengal - the working class demonstration 
on December 30 at'the Calcutta Session of the INC - adopts a some­
what different significance.
An earlier demonstration had been organised by the
273WPP, during the AIWPP conference, on December 23. On that day
the delegates to the conference marched with a demonstration of
workers from Shradhananda Park to the site of the forthcoming
National Congress session. A brief meeting at the site was
addressed by Sohan Singh Josh, the WPP leader from the Punjab,
and R.R. Mitra. This demonstration, unlike the December 30
march, does not appear to have made a significant political
impact. In the second demonstration between 20,000 and 30,000
workers, carrying red flags and chanting slogans ranging between
'Mazdur Hukumat ki Jai' and 'Raja Jawaharlal Nehru ki Jai',
274marched to the Congress pandal. There they were met and
resisted by Subhas Bose's volunteers. After a scuffle the 
volunteers were overpowered and large numbers of the demonstrat­
ors entered and demanded that they be allowed to address the
272. Eg. G. Chattopadhyaya, Communism, p.116; Sukhbir
Choudhary, Peasants'_and Workers' Movement in India
1905-1929, (New Delhi, 1971), p.247.
273. Report of the First AIWPP Conference, in MCCC, P.334; Ahmad, Myself, p.433; NAI, H.Poll, lO/lV/1929, KW: DIB 
Weekly Report, 17/1/29.
274. MCCC, PW.49; NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928, KW XI: op.cit;
IQR, Vol.2, 1928, p.355; Statesman, 1/1/29, p.19; 
Mirajkar, interview.
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session. They remained for an hour and a half/ meeting with 
Congress leaders, including Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, and 
passing a resolution calling on the Congress to recognise and 
cater for their interests and to adopt as its goal Complete 
Independence and the abolition of all imperialist and capital­
ist forms of exploitation.
The demonstration indicated a certain level of 
politicisation of the local working class - and, presumably, the 
workers' community leaders - in the turbulent industrial con­
ditions of 1928. It was also significant as an event which 
firmly registered within the National Congress the existence of
industrial labour, its condition, and its potential political
275weight, in the most direct and forceful manner yet. But
from our perspective there are a number of features which are 
more significant.
The first is that the demonstration was not organ­
ised by the WPP. The organisers appear to have been K.C. Mitra
of the EIRU, Shibnath Banerji, and Bankim Mukherji and R.R.
2 V 6Mitra, the strike leaders at Bauria. The workers who marched
275. Eg. P. Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian NationalCongress, Vol.l, (Bombay, 1946), p.332! [Sitaramayya claims that 50,000 workers were involved). The government, also saw it as 'an indication of the enormous increase in the powers of organisation of the workers' - NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII /1928: Survey of communist activites, Sept. 1928-Jan. 1929.
276. Abdur Rezzak Khan, one of those involved in the march, stated categorically to the author that the WPP did not organise the march. He credits Sibnath Banerji, Bankim Mukherji and others in the 1Santosh Mitra Group' with being the main organisers. (A.R. Khan, interview).K.C. Mitra figures prominently as one of the organisers and marchers in the reports by MCCC, PW.49 and m  the Statesman, 1/1/29, p.19.
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came mainly from the closed Bauria mills (on the eve of the
277collapse of the strike) and from the Lillooah workshops.
The BJWA party group, who had worked closely with both the 
Lillooah and Bauria leaders, were also involved in the organis­
ation of the demonstration. But as they had not become the 
dominant leaderships in either of these two strikes their role 
in the mobilisation for the INC demonstration could only be 
subsidiary - once again they were involved as auxiliaries in an 
event organised by men criticised by the WPP, if not by the 
BJWA group within the party, as being non-Marxists and 'Congress 
reformists'. The second feature of significance - the obscurity 
of the political motives of the organisers - is related to this 
last point. Although the evidence is not clear, there are 
suggestions that the motivations of the demonstration organisers
may have owed at least as much to the demands of factional
278politics in Calcutta as to working class 1vanguardism'.
Finally, the demonstration was little more than an ephemeral
event - it was not part of a definite political trend, despite
M.N. Roy's optimistic claim from Europe that 'The Calcutta
Demonstration may be compared with the Insurrection of the
279Parisian proletariat in ... June, 1793- Some 10,000 workers,
277. Most of the Bauria marchers were now probably permanently unemployed, and thus no longer strictly working class.
278. This issue will be developed in Chapter 4.
279. M.N. Roy, 'The Role of the Proletariat in the National 
Revolution' (Ca. Feb. 1929), in MCCC, P.1676. This event was subsequently to be used repeatedly by the Comintern to support its current thesis that the working class had 
become the leading class in the nationalist movement.
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organised in a similar manner, participated in the demonstration
280against the Simon Commission on January 19. But this form of
political mobilisation proved to be even more temporary than the 
industrial mobilisation with which it was associated. It can­
not be taken as evidence of rising class political consciousness 
among Bengal's industrial labour.
The WPP was now a working class party with almost
281no semblance of meaningful contact with the working class.
Was the new 'Peoples' Party' capable of inheriting the WPP's 
mission of taking Marxism to industrial labour? Had the seceders, 
the core of the WPP's former 'Labour Group', finally integrated 
the 'lessons' of their trade union experience in 1928? And was
280. MCCC, PW.36? Statesman, 20/1/29, p.12? Goswami, inter­
view. The demonstration took place in the Congress's name 
but most of the marchers were workers? K.C. Mitra and the 
BJWU leaders marched with Congress figures such as
J.M. Sen Gupta and Subhas Bose.
281. This was demonstrated very clearly at the time of the Meerut 
arrests. In Bombay the arrests provoked considerable work­
ing class unrest, and 14 mills struck spontaneously in 
protest, returning to work only under the restraining in­
fluence of the new GKU leaders? (NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: 
Bombay FR2 Mr.? Newman, op.cit. p.329). In contrast, 
Calcutta's labour 'showed little interest' in the arrests. 
(NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929, Bengal FR2 Mar.). By late-1928,
the G of Ben. reported, the WPP had influence in 28 unions 
- 24 in Calcutta, 2 in Dacca and 2 in Mymensingh (NAI, 
H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: G of Ben. to G of I, 19/12/28). But
the Dacca and Mymensingh unions were only nominal (NAI, 
H.Poll, 1/1928: Bengal, FR2, Aug.? MCCC, P.2018-T & P. 
2002-T: Gopal Basak (WPP member, Dacca) to Ahmad, 24/7/28
and 23/8/28) and in Calcutta only 2 of the unions (the 
BJWA and the textile workers' union) had memberships of 
more than 1,000 (MCCC, P.544(3): op.cit.). Even the 
Scavengers' Union, which earlier appeared to be facing a 
promising future, later received a serious set-back: in
June the Calcutta Corporation rescinded its March promises, 
but the union, too weak to mount a serious challenge,
'simply had to acquiesce in being swindled': MCCC,
P.2419(P): Spratt to R. Page Arnot, 23/10/28.
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the BJWU able to create a relationship with the workers qualit­
atively different to that exercised by the mainstream of Bengali 
trade unionism? These questions are of some significance, for 
within less than four months the BJWU was to become the leading 
union within an industrial event unprecedented in Bengal, and
which has been seen by some as having been conducted under
282communist leadership - a general strike in the jute industry.
In answering these questions we will look first at the nature 
of the BJWU in early 1929 and then at its participation in this 
strike.
The populist title chosen for the new party in­
dicated its approach to political activity. As we have seen, 
even by the end of 1928 the dissidents had not managed to base 
their political practice on the Marxist theory introduced to 
Bengal by Spratt. Those of the group's non-WPP associates, such 
as Bankim Mukherji, R.R. Mitra, and S.N. Banerji, who had worked
closely with them, were further removed from Marxist trade union
28 8theory and practice. Finally, the WPP charged, the BJWU, as
an organisation, was becoming 'notoriously and increasingly 
284-reformist'. Its leaders failed to draw up a constitution,
282. Eg. Punekar, op.cit., p.94.
283. Mitra, e.g., has recalled that 'I had then only a very
nebulous idea of communism': Interview, p.145.
284. MCCC, P.527(8): op.cit.; see also MCCC, P.34: minutes of 
the BJWA's AGM. The WPP critique cited, as an example of 
the BJWU's increasing reformism, the union's AGM on 
January 3, when 'three Congressmen were quite unecessarily 
placed in prominent offical positions' at the instance
of the dissidents, in order to increase the strength of 
their faction within the WPP.
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had no membership list, and did not attempt to ‘recruit paying 
285members. It was in fact a very fluid organisation.
The state of flux became even more pronounced after
the Meerut arrests. Goswami, Chakravarty, R.R. Mitra and
S.N. Danerji were included in the Meerut Case, and Kalidas
Bhattacharya retired from the union soon after. Kali Sen and
Bankim Mukherji, non-WPP associal.cs of Chakravarty and Goswami
but later to join the CPI, succeeded to the positions of
secretary and organising secretary. In addition Prabhati Das
Gupta, who had begun working with the Chakravarty group at the
time of the Scavengers' strike in March 1928, was brought in as
president. This was a sudden and rather curious rise to
prominence for at the time of the Meerut arrests she had been
organising a rival jute workers' union at Champdany and as a
consequence, had come into conflict with the union. At the
end of March she agreed to merge her organisation with the
BJWU, and was co-opted to its executive. Even more curious
was the manner in which she and the other two leading officials
were elected to office - at an informal, unpublicised meeting
attended only by these three individuals- This appears not to
have been challenged by the remainder of the BJWU executive.
And, it was later claimed, there were only two formal
286executive meetings in the following five months. Further, 
and in contrast to its 'continuous' existence when based at
285. RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.s 145 & 149.
286. P. Das Gupta in ibid., pp.148-49; and Kali Sen in ibid., 
pp.146-48.
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Bhatpara, the activities of the Calcutta-based BJWU were 
287'sporadic'. This was the organisation which was to prove it­
self capable of forcing the powerful millowners to engage in the 
previously unthinkable activity of negotiating a strike settle­
ment with an unregistered union.
A study of the BJWU's role in the jute mill general 
strike provides final proof of how little Bengali trade unionism 
had been changed by the communists during the upheavals of the 
previous two years. Conversely, it emphasises, once again, the 
refractory quality of the traditional forms of social organisat­
ion among industrial labour in the Calcutta region. Both 
features are highlighted when compared with the 1928 textile 
mill general strike in Bombay.
The 1929 Jute Mill General Strike
Superficially at least, the two general strikes 
288shared several features: both were catalysed by management
responses to increased competition; both strikes spread out 
from relatively more unionised 'epicentres', found their most 
active bases among the weavers, and depended upon the active 
support of the jobbers; both set previously unapproached 
records in the industrial histories of the respective provinces;
287. ibid*/ p.145.
288. The following broad features of the jute mill strike are
taken from the G of Ben.'s lengthy submission in ibid., 
pp. 126-61; See also: Buchanan, op.cit., pp.253-4;
WBA, Commerce 2-R-14, Progs A37-40, Dec. 1930; and LM, 
Vol.11(10), Oct. 1929, pp.634-5.
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both forced the millowners' associations to deal for the first 
time with 'political' trade unions/ which won significant con­
cessions for the workers at the expense of the less popular 
'legitimate' unions; both confronted the managements and the 
provincial governments, as never before, with the unpredictable 
and potentially unmanageable consequences of the inchoate 
structures of wages, working conditions and labour organisation 
which prevailed in the two industries, and thus raised the 
issues of standardisation and stable unionism in a much more 
forceful way than hitherto; and both, while remaining remark­
ably orderly and free from significant communal tension, 
caused the provincial administrations unprecedented anxiety and 
prompted them to initiate (informal) conciliation proceedings 
for the first time.
Beneath the surface, however, these similarities 
fade in significance, outweighed by the more profound differ­
ences. Most importantly, the economic contexts of the two
289strikes were, as we noted earlier, quite dissimilar. The
Bombay textile industry's market problems were critical. Pro­
ducing for a restricted domestic market which was already 
intensely competitive, during the 1920's it had also to face 
the growing incursion of cheaper Japanese and up-country pro­
ducts. This situation produced an extended and intensifying 
depression of crisis proportions, the result of which was the 
spate of anarchically competitive wage-cuts, thorough-going
289. This summary of the economic context of the jute strike 
is based on Bagchi, Private Investment, pp.275-81.
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rationalisation measures, and retrenchments attempted in 1927-
28. The jute industry, in contrast, did not have to face an
equivalent crisis in this period.
About half of the jute mills had found it advisable
to meet the modest decline in their profit margins following
the post-war boom by utilising the economies of the single-shift
system. This had resulted in a large number of retrenchments
290and corresponding labour protests. In the late- 1920's the
industry also faced increasing competition from the Dundee and
continental-European mills and from several new, non-IJMA mills 
291in Bengal. But these problems were not of the same dimens­
ions as those of Bombay. Despite them the jute industry, pro­
ducing for an expanding export market, had continued to exper-
292ience IJMA-regulated stability and continued profitability. 
Although the IJMA mills faced increasing competition during the 
decade the total world demand for jute products actually con­
tinued to increase until the arrival of the world Depression 
in late 1929.
The management policy-change which led to the jute 
general strike was an offensive reaction designed to maintain 
its dominance, unlike Bombay's defensive measures to maintain
290. RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.s 15 & 127. The shift conversions 
resulted in the retrenchment of approx, a half to a third 
of the workers in the affected mills.
291. On this point see the IJMA submission in RCLI, Vol.V(l), 
p.307.
292. Cf. Buchanan, op.cit., p.253: 'It is doubtful if any
other group of factories in the world paid such handsome 
profits between 1915 and 1929'.
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its survival. During the 1920's the IJMA had used the mechanism 
of controlled under-production in order to maximise prices. In 
late 1928 the Association decided to allow its members to in­
crease production from the pre-existing 54 hours per week to 
60 hours in order to under-cut its competitors/ increase its 
share of the world jute market and maintain the solidarity of 
the IJMA. It postponed the implementation of the new agreement 
until July 1/ 1929. The grievances underlying the general 
strike arose from the rate of the wage increase - exactly pro­
portional to the increase in hours worked - which accompanied 
the new system. But labour's demand for a more-than-proportional 
wage increase was a simple one which the still prosperous in­
dustry could easily afford to accommodate within its new policy 
should it decide to do so.
Thus, in sharp contrast to the Bombay textile 
strike, the 1929 jute strike was the result of a quasi- 
monopolistic manufacturers' organisations' carefully controlled 
expansion, unaccompanied by structural changes in the social 
and technical production relationships of the mills, within a 
still prosperous industry. The industry was capable of granting 
economic concessions to its workers, and anxious to do so should 
the alternative course curtail the intended increase in product­
ion. In the contemporary economic context of the jute industry 
the issue which sparked the general strike was an anomaly, not, 
as in Bombay, the inevitable denouement of a protracted crisis. 
Its potential for producing equivalent transformations in work­
ing class organisation and consciousness was correspondingly 
less, even though it did catalyse widespread protest and provide
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labour leaderships with unprecedented opportunities for mobilis­
ing the workforce's chronic discontent and extending organisation 
throughout the industry as a whole.
There was another important feature of the jute 
mill strike not shared by its Bombay counterpart. It was 
generally accepted in Calcutta that Marwari hessian dealers 
involved in the speculative futka (futures) market, faced with 
considerable losses from a fall in hessian prices, liberally 
financed the strike leadership in order to cut their losses. 
Their intention was to use the strike to increase the price 
of hessian and, more importantly, to take advantage of a special
strike clause to cancel their existing contracts with the 
293mills. The money was distributed to jobbers and local shop­
keepers, the two groups holding the greatest sway over the 
millhands: 'for a thousand or two of rupees', the government
commented, 'it seems possible to close down any mill in Bengal
294for, at least, a short time'. Thus while it is possible, as
we speculated earlier, that the history of union organisation 
and agitation in the Bhatpara area contributed towards its
293. Eg.: ibid., pp.145-6 & p.156; NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929:
Bengal FR2 July; MCG:2? see also the references to un­
disclosed funding in the BJWU documents reproduced in 
RCLI, Vol.V(l), pp.147-49. According to the G of Ben.: 
'Wild rumours became prevalent regarding the hessian 
gambling, and many names prominent in Calcutta business 
and politics were connected with the instigation of the 
strikes ... many Marwaris, never hitherto interested in 
labour matters, but known to be interested in the hessian 
market, are known to have taken an interest in the strike' 
ibid., p.146.
294. loc. cit.
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being the epicentre of the general strike, the Government of
Bengal placed more stress on another possibility - the Begg
Dunlop group of mills at Bhatpara had the largest number of out-
295standing contracts with hessian dealers.
In the months preceding the implementation of the
new working hours the Kankinarrah Labour Union arranged two
conferences of the millhands of the Bhatpara-Jagatdal area to
ascertain the attitude of labour towards the proposed changes.
It was decided to approach the mill managements to request them
to attend a conference to discuss the new wage rates. They
refused. The moderate Kankinarrah Union then decided to wait
until the first wages were paid under the new system before
296attempting further negotiations.
However events soon overtook the union. In late 
June and early July it met with a dual challenge to its pre­
ferred course of action. The first challenge came from power­
ful liquor-smuggling, gambling and drug-selling interests in 
the Bhatpara area who, though not directly involved in indust­
rial issues, were anxious to see the demise of the Kankinarrah 
Union. The second arose when the weavers of four Jagatdal
295. ibid., p.145.
296. ibid., p.s 130 & 275. The BJWU does not appear to have 
become involved in agitation about the new scheme until 
after it was implemented - another indication of its 
'sporadic' activity after its move to Calcutta.
297. ibid., p.s 275, 130 & 144. During 1929 Maulvi Latafat 
Hossain, MLC, one of the union's leaders, had begun a 
campaign against these interests. This had resulted in 
raids by Customs officials. The Bhatpara interests - 
and, the Union claimed, the local police - immediately 
began their counter-campaign to destroy the Union.
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mills made a direct protest against the new scheme, in the first 
week of its implementation, by walking out after working 54 hours. 
The union leadership claimed that the two challenges were re­
lated - that the workers' direct action, an implicit vote of 
no-confidence in its recommended tactic, was instigated by the
antagonistic Bhatpara interests as part of their campaign to
298discredit the union. We do not have sufficient corroborating
evidence to accept the Kankinarrah Union's claim as a total
299explanation of the weavers' action. Nevertheless a number of
unusual features surrounding the weavers' walk-out do lend the 
Kankinarrah leadership's explanation considerable credence. Of 
particular interest is the sudden emergence as a labour leader 
of a figure previously unknown in the area.
The mysterious rise to prominence of the Barrack- 
pore pleader Narendra Chatterji was described by the government 
of Bengal thus:~^°
He had no knowledge of the jute industry and had never 
previously been known to have any business connections 
in Bhatpara, yet suddenly for no reason which could be 
ascertained by the employers and without any official 
position in any union, ... he seemed to get control of 
a considerable body of men.
298. ibid., pp.275-6.
299. It almost certainly underrates , e.g., the autonomous,
protest-motivated element of their decision to take 
direct action. Given the past history of management - 
labour relations the weavers may well have doubted the 
effectiveness of negotiations on this occasion.
300. ibid., p.144 & pp.275-76.
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It was on Chatterji's advice that the weavers of the affected 
mills refused to work more than 54 hours. He offered to take 
their case against the managements to Court, arguing that this 
would be more effective than the Kankinarrah Union's negotiat­
ions. The extent of Chatterji's hold over the four mills was 
later revealed when the Kankinarrah Union did manage, in the 
context of the weavers' direct action, to negotiate an agree­
ment to pay the rates demanded by them. The weavers replied, 
however, that they would accept the agreement only 'if the
employers would simply write a letter to Naren Babu and get his
301permission for them to return to work. The employers
'flatly refused'-to do this because of the risk of legitimising
Chatterji. They closed the mills instead.
The Kankinarrah Union claimed that Chatterji was
hired by the liquor, drug and gambling interests of Bhatpara
through the agency of a shopkeeper with influence over the
302weavers of the affected mills. The weavers were persuaded
by the shopkeeper that the Kankinarrah Union was collaborating 
with the management and that only a law suit would satisfy their 
demands. They were advised against strike action. That the
301. ibid., p.144.
302. As noted in Chapter 2, shopkeepers, as traditional supp­
liers of credit to the workers, had a great deal of power 
over them. Further, as the shopkeepers and the jobbers 
were usually in a close alliance - often, in fact, the 
jobber being a shopkeeper - the latter's power was increa­
sed. And as the Kankinarrah Union had already alienated 
the jobbers with its campaign against corruption, both 
the jobbers and the shopkeepers were probably very will­
ing to participate in this particular campaign against it.
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weavers of another mill under the same management, but among 
whom the Kankinarrah Union had a stronger influence, resisted 
taking direct action, gives further support to this theory. In 
any case it is clear that Chatterji's sudden ascendancy, given 
his previous lack of influence, rested upon the foundations of 
the existing pattern of community leadership among the workers. 
Without this he could hardly have gained such legitimacy in the 
eyes of the workers in such a brief period, despite their very 
real grievances and fears.
It was not until this stage of the dispute, in the
third week of July, that the BJWU became involved and the issue
of a strike was raised for the first time. The rapidity with
which the BJWU - or rather, its president - gained influence in
the area, is also remarkable. On a visit to Bhatpara-Jagatdal
at this point Prabhati Das Gupta acquainted herself with
Chatterji, persuaded him to abandon his policy of avoiding strike
action, recruited him to her own cause and, soon afterwards,
without reference to the BJWU executive, appointed him vice-
303president of the union. Das Gupta, like Chatterji, had no
more than a superficial knowledge of the jute industry and was 
previously unknown in the area* But she, too, was able surpris­
ingly quickly to gain the allegiance of the Bhatpara-Jagatdal
304workers and 'thenceforth took command of the situation'. The
protesting millhands continued to resist the increasingly 
liberal concessions of the mill managements and the efforts of
303. RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.s 130 & 149.
304. ibid., p.130; NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bengal FR1 Aug.
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the Kankinarrah Union/ replying that 'they would not resume
305work without the order of their union', the BJWU. With
Chatterji now subordinate to her, and with the aid of substantial 
funds, Das Gupta was able to mobilise the aggrieved weavers of 
Bhatpara-Jagatdal as pickets in the neighbouring areas and to 
spread the strike very rapidly. In the following weeks, and 
under Das Gupta's personal leadership, the strike spread progress­
ively to almost all mills along the left-bank of the Hooghly to 
the north of Calcutta,and to several mills in other centres. By 
mid-August 192,000 workers had struck, 60 percent of the 
industry's looms had been stopped, and large numbers of workers 
had left for their villages.
Das Gupta's entrance thus transformed the character 
of the existing dispute. That she was able to gain such influ­
ence so rapidly suggests, as with Chatterji, that her ascendancy 
depended upon the co-operation of the workers' traditional 
leaders. And the most plausible explanation for this co-operation
305. loc.cit.
306. ibid., p.131. It can be seen from this sequence that the 
extension of the jute strike followed a roughly equival­
ent pattern to that of the Bombay general strike. However, 
despite the significant funding available for the 
Calcutta strike, no formal relief organisation appears to 
have been established. Consequently the strikers, as in 
the first phase of the Bombay strike, had essentially to 
provide for themselves. The IJMA produced statistics 
which suggest that the strikers received substantial 
assistance from their villages for this period. During 
the strike the Titagarh Post Office received five times 
the normal remittances sent from up-country villages and 
there was a corresponding three-fold decrease in the normal 
remittances sent from Titagarh to up-country centres.
(ibid., p.303). These statistics also indicate the close 
link which labour maintained with the village.
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is that offered by the government - that it was bought, with 
funds provided by the hessian dealers. That Chatterji's original 
policy had been not to strike, and that the managements were, by 
late July, anxious to accede to the original demands, thus 
obviating the necessity of strike action, gives added plausibil­
ity to this explanation. With Das Gupta's entrance in late
307July the Bhatpara-Jagatdal conflict's patronage changed hands.
To accept the terms of this explanation is not to 
deny the importance of the role of worker protest in the strike. 
The millowners' traditional arrogance and distance in their 
attitudes towards and dealings with labour, their refusal to 
enter negotiations over this issue until direct sanctions had 
been applied, and the millhands' corresponding suspicion, anxiety 
and confusion about the new scheme, all undoubtedly contributed
308very considerably towards the ease with which the strike began. 
Further, the scale of the strike which followed, and the rapid­
ity with which it developed, could hardly be explained without 
including the role of widespread and deeply felt protest. But 
outside funding provided the initial and crucial catalyst; and 
the continued importance of both outside funding by elements not 
interested in trade unionism as such, and the mediating role of 
the jobbers, is suggested by the patterns which emerged during
307. The change in patronage appears to have taken place with­
out any significant conflict of interest between the two 
groups. While the original patrons may not have preferred 
a strike, the new policy and leadership nevertheless 
continued to serve their main policy of discrediting and 
undermining the Kankinarrah Union, which became increas­
ingly irrelevant to the situation.
308. It is also probable that the industrial unrest of the 
previous 18 months contributed.
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the development and withdrawal of the ensuing general stfcike,
and by the operational modes and the subsequent fate of the BJWU.
The rapidity of the BJWTJ's rise and the degree of
control which it came to exercise in the area north of Calcutta
were remarkable. But just as striking was its failure, despite
'intense efforts', to gain significant influence in the other
309major centres, including Bauria. Doth sides of this contrast
were clearly demonstrated in the second half of August. On
August 16, Das Gupta put her signature to a strike settlement
which won significant concessions for all mills belonging to 
310the IJMA, and agreed to recommend a return to work. All of
the striking mills on the left bank were working within 24
311hours. But at this point large numbers of the mills which
309. ibid., p.132. The failure at Bauria is significant. That 
this centre did strike subsequently (see below) is proof 
that the workers had not been completely exhausted by the 
1928 strike. The refusal to strike thus indicates the 
extent of the earlier failure to establish a union there - 
a failure exacerbated by the subsequent retrenchment of 
the Bengali workers.
310. Details of the negotiations and settlement are provided in
ibid., pp.133-39. It was an unprecedented event on several 
grounds: it was initiated by a government officer, and
despite the resistance of the IJMA; it was the first 
significant negotiation between mill owners and labour; 
and the settlement granted very real concessions, going 
beyond the mill owners' original offer, as a consequence
of the strike sanction. (The IJMA was unhappy about the 
settlement's having given the workers 'something for which 
they never asked' - RCLI, Vol.V(2), p.170) . Nevertheless 
the settlement did not have the sanction of either a strike 
enquiry committee (which was opposed by both the IJMA and 
Das Gupta) as in Bombay, or a board of enquiry to investi­
gate grievances subsequent to the strike settlement (the 
IJMA 1 absolutely and finally refused to have anything to 
do' with this idea - RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.136). The only 
guarantee was the IJMA's recommendation to its members that 
they accept the terms of the settlement.
ibid., p .145; NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929; Bengal FR2 Aug.311.
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had previously continued working now struck, 'against every
argument that the ...(BJWU) leaders could use to induce them to
312remain at work'. This second-stage strike spread through
the previously resistant mills like a 'contagious disease',
apparently in the belief that if they did not do so they would
not share in the concessions granted in the settlement. In the
Shamnagore area, for example, which neighboured Champdany where
Das Gupta had been working prior to her joining the BvTWU, the
workers rejected her strike settlement because they did not
recognise her authority. When she went to the area to persuade
313the strikers to return to work she was 'abused and insulted'.
She was also rejected in the Budge Budge area, while at Bauria 
the workers now struck for the demands they had formulated in
the 1928 strike, in spite of the BJWU's arguments against
. .. . 314striking.
Another notable feature of the strike was the 
extent to which the functioning of the BJWU was dependent on the 
personal role of its newcomer president. The union did operate
312. RCLI, Vol.V(l), p.132. Some 80,000 workers stopped work 
and a further 25% of the industry's looms were closed, 
in the post-settlement strikes. Altogether, the two 
strikes resulted in 272,000 workers losing 2,896,000 man- 
days, and closed 42,700 of the industries 51,000 looms: 
ibid., p.126.
313. ibid., p.132.
314. That the Bauria mills struck again for the demands of the 
1928 strike, despite the intervening retrenchment of the 
Bengali workers, is evidence that all communities support­
ed the original strike. All of the post-settlement strikes 
eventually collapsed unconditionally, independently of the 
BJWU's efforts, and by mid-September had returned to normal 
operations under the terms of the August 16 settlement.
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315fairly effectively as an organisation. But the effectiveness
of the BJWU was dependent on Prabhati Das Gupta. Her organisa­
tional contact with the millhands remained dependent on the 
pre-existing working class political structures. But she gained 
an impressive level of genuine popularity, resting in part on a 
cult of the 1 Mataji1 (Respected Mother) propagated on her
b e h a l f . S h e  'had only to lift her little finger and the
317workers would obey'. This personal influence over the workers,
combined with her apparently monopolised access to the large 
sums of money which financed the organisation of the strike, 
assured her autocratic control within the union: she 'ultimately
gained complete control of the organisation of the strike,
315. The BJWU produced a constant steam of carefully prepared 
handbills in several vernaculars and distributed them in 
the different mill centres through a comprehensive network 
of Hindi-speaking agents - a process requiring the spend­
ing of 'a great deal' of money. (ibid., p.144). The 
government commented that the leaflets were 'couched in 
language which might have been used in an orderly strike 
under the leadership of a well-organised trade union in a 
more highly organised country'. (Three of the BJWU leaf­
lets are reproduced in ibid., pp.159-61. These confirm 
the government's approving judgement on their reformist 
ideological content, and thus present one more contrast 
with the GKU - little attempt was made during the jute 
strike to effect an ideological transformation among the 
workers). The BJWU effectively exercised a controlling 
influence over those, both Hindu and Muslim, who struck
in the pre-settlement phase. The government commented 
that the strikers remained 'remarkable peaceful' and 
'very orderly', 'in spite of the inherent dangers of the 
position'. (ibid., p.133). Given the history of violent 
communalism among jute labour, this was an achievement of 
some significance.
316. See, e.g. the BJWU leaflet reproduced in ibid., p.411.,
which declared: 'Looking at your unity and the wonderful
enterprise of Mother Provabatai Das Gupta, the eyes of 
the capitalists and mill owners have been opened'; and 
described her as both 'the father and mother of the poor'.
317. ibid., p .149.
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irrespective of any of the other officials or agents of the 
318union'. It also assured the dominance of her union over
others in the crucial north left-bank area. The WPP, for
instance, formed the Beliaghata Jute Workers' Union in the
Sealdah area, under the leadership of Abdul Halim and Abdur 
319Rezzak Khan. From this base it then attempted to develop an
independent influence in the strike. The Beliaghata union,
however, without resources, was unable to produce a significant
320impact on events outside the few mills in Sealdah.
But despite its real achievements the BJWU's power
did not long survive the settlement of the strike. Having
served its delegated function the union disintegrated, leaving
the traditional structures intact. In August, factional strife
developed between Das Gupta and the majority of the union's
executive, the latter rebelling against her autocractic style,
321her control of funds and her decision to call off the strike.
It may also be significant that Das Gupta's source of funds had
318. ibid., p.145.
319. Ranen Sen, 'Communist Movement in Bengal in the Early 
Thirties', in Marxist Miscellany (New Delhi), No.6, 1975, 
p.2 -(Sen joined the party after the Meerut arrests and 
soon became one of the communist leaders); RCLI, Vol.V(l), 
p.131.
320. MCG:2. This report says that the WPP group, in contrast 
to the 'pseudo-communists' in the BJWU, refused money 
offered by the hessian dealers, and that this was a major 
reason for their lack of influence.
321. NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bengal FR2 Aug. See the accusations
published in the press by both sides, in RCLI, Vol.V(l), 
pp.146-49. Das Gupta signed the agreement despite 'all 
advice to the contrary' from the BJWU executive, the 
majority of whom attempted to continue the strike after 
the settlement: ibid., p.137.
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322begun to dwindle following the settlement. Bankim Mukherji
led a campaign against the president which led to her expulsion
on August 24. Das Gupta responded by declaring the expulsion
void, electing a new set of office-bearers, and claiming that
this was the legitimate BJWU - a sequence made possible by the
fluid, unstructured nature of the union. But the subsequent
propaganda war which the two factions conducted against each
other in the Calcutta press soon proved to be irrelevant to
jute mill unionism. Although Das Gupta remained for some time
'mistress of the situation ... in the area where she had power 
323originally' neither faction (nor the WPP group) conducted
systematic organisational work to consolidate and extend the
324limited advance made during the strike. The considerable
degree of recognition which the union had won among the millhands 
was dissipated by the end of the year, and Das Gupta later left 
the field altogether. With this failure, and the failure to 
involve the workers meaningfully during the strike, no effective 
working class organisation survived the upheaval. Traditional 
community organisation and consciousness had not been displaced.
322. Das Gupta commented after the settlement that 'I lack the
resources' to finance further strike action: ibid.,
p.149.
323. ibid., p.150.
324. MCG:2; the Bengal FRs for late 1929/early 1930 report 
only weak union activity. However the BJWU's decline was, 
no doubt, as with the collapse of unions after the other 
strikes covered in this chapter, more than a failure of 
leadership. It also reflected the inherent difficulties 
of finding a secure trade union base in Bengal.
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When the Depression struke the jute industry soon afterwards,
comparatively little effort was made to resist the wage cuts and
the retrenchment of more than a third of the workforce which
32 5then took place. This was a marked contrast with the
Bombay millhands' response to the millowners' efforts in 1928 
and 1929. There were to be no further general strikes in the 
jute industry until 1937, after the popular government had 
come to power.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied two contrasting 
stories: the building of a communist mass base in Bombay and the 
failure to do so in Calcutta. The outcome of the Bombay 
communists* working class activities demonstrated the soundness
325. The Depression began to effect the industry seriously in 
1929-30. Its effect during the next few years can be 
seen from the following statistics, showing the value of 
exports of total manufactured jute products and the total 
numbers employed, from the record figures of 1928-29 to the 
lowest point in 1933-34.
Year Exports ('000 Rs .) Total Emp
1928-29 569,049 331,899
1929-30 519,268 339,665
1930-31 318,945 328,177
1931-32 219,243 268,289
1932-33 217,118 254,314
1933-34 213,749 246,717
Sources: Exports - Bagchi, Private Investment, p.280;
Employment - Gupta, 'Factory Labour', Appendix A.
But, despite the retrenchment of 30 percent of the workforce, 
the only jute industry strikes between 1930 and 1934 that the 
Government of India found worth reporting in its annual 
survey of India were the following: 548,185 man-days lost in 
two separate strikes in 1930 (G of I, India in 1930-31, 
p.244); a two month strike by 5,000 workers at one mill in
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of the policy they had formulated early in 1929, its relevance
to the Bombay situation in the late 1920s, and their ability
to base their activity closely on this model. No such
affirmations emerged from their Bengali comrades' attempts.
The outcome of the jute industry general strike was a particularly
clear demonstration of how little had been changed in Bengal's
working class politics by two years of 'taking Marxism to its
class'. The Bengal WPP had not even completed the first phase
of gaining substantial control over labour through the existing
organisational modes. The structural transformation that was
achieved in Bombay was not even begun in Bengal.
The Meerut Case prisoners, reflecting on their
involvement in the Bengal strikes of the period, provided the
3 2 6following candid evaluation of the results:
... the Left Wing had strong ideological influence 
... but failed to entrench itself organisationally, 
with the result that the petty bourgeois politicians 
and intellectuals are [still] in control of the 
organisations.
Unlike in Bombay, the Meerut arrests left virtually no communist
working class organisation behind; and even the WPP's ideological
327influence proved to be very temporary. The trade unions had
325. Cont'd
1931 (G of I, India in 1931-32, p.115); a simultaneous 
strike in four mills, involving 19,000 workers and costing 
331,000 man-days, in 1932 ( G of I, India in 1932-33, p.96).
The 1931 strike was the biggest in India, and the 1932 strike 
the second biggest, in the respective years. But they did 
not compare with the Bombay millhands' 1928 and 1929 protests 
against the effects of the textile industry's earlier 
economic crisis.
326. ACH, 1929/46: 'The Tasks of the Left Wing Trade Unions of
India', November 1929. This pamphlet was produced by the 
Meerut group (MCG:1) for the Nagpur AITUC and published 
under Abdul Halim's name.
327. See, eg., the Home Department's contrast between the two 
provinces in NAI, H.Poll, 179/1929: G of I to all LGs, 
24/6/29.
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not become 'schools of communism' in Bengal. Moreover, the 
aftermath of the jute strike showed that even the 'petty 
bourgeois' organisations had established only a very tenuous 
connection with the working class; the BJWU had not become an 
equivalent of the old GKM, nor the Kankinarrah Union of the BTLU.
We have seen in this chapter that a number of factors
contributed to this failure. Firstly, the contingencies that
facilitated the Bombay communists' industrial advance were
absent in Calcutta. For example, Spratt's Marxist theory and
organisational principles arrived in Bengal a year later than
in Bombay. Nor did the Bengal party have the benefit of
3 2 8Bradley's considerable organisational experience. The
greater geographical dispersion of Calcutta's industry was 
another comparative disadvantage, especially for a small 
leadership with negligible resources.
But that Spratt's theoretical expertise did not make 
a substantial difference even when it was introduced indicates 
that the causes of the contrasting results in the two cities 
went much deeper.
The greater difficulties for the Bengali communists 
than for up-country organisers in mobilising an independent 
base among Bengal's predominating migrant labour were illustrated 
by the Lillooah situation. The Bauria Bengali workers' more 
enthusiastic response to the bhadralok unionists' efforts 
emphasised the same problem from a different angle. Bauria 
also illustrated the problems posed by the jute mills' powers 
for social control, their access to the state repressive 
apparatus, and the solidarity of the IJMA. But Bauria high­
lighted a further problem - the apparent inability of most of
328. Eg., Spratt believed that Bradley's 'firmness (not to saybrutality)' would have made a substantial contribution towards 
resolving the WPP's discipline problems: MCCC,p.527(1): op.cit.
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the middle class trade unionists to become real representatives 
of even the Bengali workers. Rather, the WPP activists' 
mode of operating remained closer to that of the 'petty 
bourgeois politicians and intellectuals'. The differences 
between the two groups were restricted to the ideological 
level; they did not encompass a basically different political 
relationship to the working class. In Bengali trade unionism 
in the 1920s, the distinction between 'revolutionaries' and 
'reformists' did not become a very meaningful one.
The general strike in the jute industry, too,
demonstrated the problem of the gulf separating the bhadralok
trade unionists from the working class. Yet, paradoxically,
the 1929 strike also indicated that this social and cultural
barrier was not an absolute one. It showed that, in exceptional
circumstances (and, in this case, with the assistance of Hindu-
329speaking intermediaries ) effective, large-scale bhadralok- 
millhand (or at least, bhadralok-jobber) contact was possible.
The conditions under which the contact was forged in the 1929 
strike were hardly conducive to the development of sound trade 
unionism. Nevertheless, the wider point remains valid. Thus 
it was at least conceivable that, under a different set of 
exceptional circumstances - such as those that developed in the 
Bombay textile industry - an objective basis for a sounder and 
more lasting intelligentsia-proletarian relationship could emerge.
But, because of the much stronger economic situation 
and organisation of the jute industry, the possibility of such
329. See fn.315 above.
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a situation arising in the forseeable future was a remote one.
The industry was able to pass through even the Depression without
anything like the profound economic crisis - nor, therefore,
the necessity to institute the structural changes - that had
330arisen in the Bombay textile industry. And, in the absence
of structural changes of this dimension, the problems posed 
by working class heterogeneity and community organisation and 
consciousness, and by the distance between the working class 
and the Bengali communists, would probably prove to be 
insurmountable.
330. See Bagchi, Private Investment, pp.280-90; Buchanan, 
op. cit., pp.251-2.
339
CHAPTER 4
FROM LEFT NATIONALIST FACTION TOWARDS AN 
'INDEPENDENT' PARTY: 1927-EARLY 1929
The appropriate expression of the [WPP's] old 
relations ... was that ... [it] constituted itself 
as a Left Wing of the Nationalist Movement, and 
worked as a section of the Congress.- This can no 
longer be the situation. The ... [WPP] is the 
representative of the advancing mass movement. The 
dominating leadership of the Congress associates 
itself with the retreating bourgeois bloc ... The 
two movements separate, and their leading organisations 
must do so also. The Workers' and Peasants' Party 
must henceforth play a definitely independent part.
(From MCCC, p.56: Political thesis adopted by the 
First All-India Workers' and Peasants' Party 
Conference, Calcutta, December 1928.)
We have argued that the political momentum which could 
only be provided by a mass base was a necessary pre-condition for 
the development of an autonomous, non-bolshevised communist party. 
From this perspective we will now study the trend in Bombay 
towards autonomous communist leadership which followed the WPP's 
success in establishing a dynamic mass base, and the contrasting 
stagnation of the Bengal leadership associated with its working 
class failure. In the preceding chapter we examined the Bombay 
communists' contribution to working class organisation and 
consciousness. Here we are interested largely in examining what 
Bombay's working class did for the communists: to what extent
did the mass base advance the communists' position in the wider 
political arena, and what were the effects of both the mass base
340
and the political advance on their Marxist theory and practice, 
their organisational development and their perceived relationship 
to the 'World Party'? Were these changes sufficient to justify 
- in both the Indian and the Comintern contexts - the December 
1928 claim to independence quoted above? We will look first at 
the fate of the Bengal party. We will then trace the changes in 
the political position of the Bombay party which followed its 
working class successes. Then we analyse the effects of both the 
mass base and the advancing political position upon the Bombay 
communist leadership. Finally we examine the character of the 
'All-India' WPP and communist party organisations which began 
to be constructed from the end of 1928.
1. THE BENGAL WPP
We observed in Chapter 3 that communist trade unionism 
in the Calcutta region remained essentially undifferentiated 
from non-communist trade unionism: the communists, despite
their theoretical-ideological differences with the 'petty- 
bourgeois' unionists, were unable either to implement a 
qualitatively different working class strategy or to distinguish 
themselves from their rivals by building a strong working class 
base. We also observed that the internal tensions within the 
WPP - present since its birth - eventually split the party, 
thus further vitiating its political effectiveness. The lack 
of differentiation in the trade union arena also applied in 
the wider political context, and the nature of the party split 
was clear evidence of this fact.
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The WPP split arose from a long standing combination
of ideological and personal conflicts between the ex-terrorists
and most of those who were from non-terrorist backgrounds.^
Goswami and Chakravarty were convinced that the communist
movement would not be able to advance without large numbers
of those currently involved in the terrorist organisations
being won over to the party as cadres. Muzaffar Ahmad
took the lead in opposing this position. Initially hostile
to the revolutionary organisations because of their bhadralok
bases and anti-Muslim tendencies, he was also able to justify
his resistance to direct recruitment from the revolutionary
organisations by using the Bolshevik critique of the terrorists
2and the anarchists. In fact the party secretary is reported to
have been so intransigent that he would not allow non-party
3bhadraloks into the party office. From the time of his arrival 
in early 1928 Spratt supported Muzaffar's Bolshevik critique of 
ex-terrorist recruitment. The ex-Anushilanites, however, 
supported by Rezzak Khan who shared with them a militant 
nationalist background, believed Muzaffar's non-political 
background to be a serious liability to the party's effectiveness. 
But what Muzaffar lacked in wider Bengali political contacts he 
made up for in the contact he maintained, as a prolific correspond­
ent and diligent party secretary, with international and extra­
provincial communist groups.^
1. For sources for this paragraph see Chapter 3, fn.156.
2. See, eg., Ahmad, Myself, pp.433-4, and Chapter XXIX, titled 
'Revolution and Revolutionaries'.
3. Interviews with D. Goswami and A. Rezzak Khan.
4. This is revealed by’ the MCCC evidence. Many of the letters 
are requests for funds for the impoverished Bengal party's 
coffers.
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The conflict was first manifested openly in April 1927,
in an election for a new secretary to replace Saumyendranath
Tagore after he left for Europe. Both Ahmad and Rezzak Khan
stood, and the former was defeated because he 'was considered 
5unsuitable'. By late 1927, however, Ahmad was able to find
enough support on the executive committee to block an attempt
by the Goswami-Chakravarty faction to have a number of their
former colleagues admitted to the party. The grounds of the
rejection were that those who sought to join the party
... were not genuine supporters of the Party policy 
of mass action, but were still in their outlook and 
sentiment terrorists; (and further, that they were 
persons of almost universal ill-repute, who could  ^
only do the party harm in the eyes of the public).
Moreover, Chakravarty - even though he had been trained in the
Soviet Union - and Goswami and Rezzak Khan, were refused CPI
membership.
Soon after the failure of their attempts to bring in 
their comrades the Goswami-Chakravarty faction established an 
independent organisation, with its own office and journal, which,
7'could only ... have been intended as a rival to the Party'. 
However this exercise was soon abandoned. Instead they renewed 
their attempts to neutralise Muzaffar's 'anti-nationalist' policy 
at the party's annual meeting in March 1928, which was held at 
the ex-Anushilan group's 'stronghold' of Bhatpara. In the 
election of office-bearers the Goswami-Chakravarty group won a 
majority of the seats on the executive committee and its sub-
5. IB, Communism (1927), p.132; Ahmad, Myself, pp.428-9; 
Chakravarty, Interview, pp.135-6.
6. MCCC, p.527(8): op. cit.
7. ibid.; also Ahmad, Myself, pp.429-30.
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committees, but were unable to prevent Ahmad from winning thegsecretaryship. The political resolutions passed by the meeting
reflected the tension between the opposing viewpoints on the
political value of retaining connections with 'bourgeois'
nationalist organisations. For example it was resolved that:
Our policy and tactics in connection with the 
national movement and the Congress require careful 
determination. On the one hand we have not been 
sufficiently aggressive. ... the public ... has 
been allowed to suppose that on such important 
questions as the Boycott of the Simon Commission ... 
we had no policies at all, or none different from 
those of the Swaraj Party. On the other’ hand we 
must be careful not to oppose the National Congress 
without sufficient definition of our opinions, or 
we shall enable our opponents to claim that we are anti- 
Congress, or even anti-national ... We must maintain 
our alliance with as large a stratum as possible of 
the middle class, and can ally with any section, what- g 
ever its social basis, which fights against imperialism.
The resolution concluded that 'The basis of our opposition to the
Swaraj Party is not that it is bourgeois, but that it is not
wholeheartedly for national independence'. It was decided
that party members should become actively involved in the
Congress and attempt to swing it to the left by allying with
its radical .rank-and-file. But Muzaffar resolutely opposed these
decisions. Writing in May to the CPGB he commented:
... many of our comrades have still got much charm 
(sic.) for the Congress. I scarcely get any support 
when I fight for not accepting any office in the 
Congress which means a waste of energy. On our 
accepting office we are to commit so many things 
which we must not do on principle. 10
Nor, he continued, should the party attempt to influence the
Congress rank-and-file radicals - 'This sort of tactics (sic.)
8. MCCC, P.514: Constitution of the WPP of Bengal, 1928.
9. MCCC, P.52: 'The Peasants' and Workers' Party of Bengal -
Report of the Executive Committee, 1927-28'.
10. MCCC, p.2099(c): Ahmad to 'J' (either C.P. Dutt or M.N. Roy),
10/5/28.
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will not be any use in the future'.
Muzaffar's strength was that he had orthodoxy on
his side, if not a clear majority within the Bengal party.
His position was firmly within the CPGB's 'new Imperialist
policy' theoretical framework, and for this reason he received
support from both the British Party and from Spratt. For
example C.P. Dutt chastised as 'terrible' the Bhatpara
conference's statement that the WPP's opposition to the Swaraj
Party was not because it was 'bourgeois', and he criticised
the tactic of attempting to 'capture' the Congress. The reason
for the Swaraj Party's not being 'genuinely' anti-imperialist,
Dutt responded, was precisely because it was 'bourgeois', and to
spend time attempting to influence it was to waste time.^ At
a meeting held in Bombay in September to prepare for the
December AIWPP conference, Spratt and Muzaffar took the lead
12in championing this position as WPP policy. The ex-Anushilan
13faction continued to resist it.
The Goswami-Chakravarty group sought during 1928 to 
change the situation by other means. They devoted an increasing 
amount of time to youth organisations, and in August formed a 
party youth section called the 'Young Comrades' League', which 
recruited from among students and ex-students. Most of these 
recruits were associated"^ with the revolutionary organisations. 
Within a month the Young Comrades' League was attracting attend-
11. MCCC, p.526 (43): C.P. Dutt to Spratt, 14/6/28.
12. MCCC, P.526 (39) and p.670: Spratt's and Bradley's notes 
of the meeting.
13. Eg. a circular issued by Goswami towards the end of the 
year to publicise the AIWPP conference argued that the 
revolutionary mass movement 'must cooperate, but on an 
Independent basis, with the general political movement': 
MCCC, P.1797(P).
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ances of about 20 to Marxist study circles run by Goswami and 
15Spratt. Significantly, it became the most successful area
16of party activity. A number of those who were to join the
CPI in the 1930s made their debut through the Young Comrades'
17League. The ex-Anushilan faction also continued to work
closely with their leftist-inclined contacts outside the party.
Then, when Goswami was elected in September as the chairman of
the reception committee for the AIWPP conference, his faction
began to plan another attempt to bring their non-party
colleagues into the WPP and to end Muzaffar's dominance. Goswami
managed to 'stack' the Bengal delegation to the conference
with a large contingent of supporters of his faction - including,
18it was charged by their opponents, a number of non-party men.
As the conference was in Calcutta the great majority of the 300
delegates and visitors who attended were Bengali, and the
19majority belonged to the ex-terrorist faction. But this 
faction's efforts to capture the general secretaryship of the 
AIWPP and all of the Bengali seats on the national executive 
council - and to oust Ahmad and his associates in the process - 
were defeated by constitutional rulings by the conference president, 
Sohan Singh Josh from the Punjab WPP. The president was supported
14. MCCC , P. 5 4 6 (10) : Spratt to F.C. Mellonie, 26/8/28; MCCC ,
P.527(8): op. cit; IB, Communism (1935), p.240.
15. As in fn.14; MCCC, P.563-65: Minutes of YCL meetings during
August-October 1928.
16. Eg., at the September meeting which prepared for the AIWPP
conference the only area of Bengal WPP work to receive 
favourable mention was the youth program (MCCC: P.526(39):
op. cit; and P. 670: op. cit) .
17. See, eg., Pakrasi, Interview, p.147.
18. MCCC, P.527(8): op. cit.; also Ahmad, Myself, pp.430-33.
19. MCCC, p. 467 (l), p. 468 (2), p. 467 (4): lists of provincial 
delegates; NAI, H.Poll, 10/V/1929: Intelligence report 
of the conference; MCCC, P.334: official report of the 
conference.
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by the other provincial delegations.
Thwarted by the other provinces' support for their 
opponent - or, at least, by the opposition to themselves - 
the Goswami-Chakravarty faction walked out of the conference 
in 'indignation at the arbitrary conduct of the President and 
[because of] their objection on principle to the presence in
21the National E.C. of the individual against whom they had voted'.
22Attacks on the party leadership followed in the press.
Muzaffar responded by cancelling Chakravarty's membership on
23the grounds of his not having paid his membership fee.
Goswami and the rest of the faction then resigned from the
WPP and, with their non-party colleagues congregated in the
24BJWU and formed the People's Party.
Apart from the debilitating effect on party activity 
of the extended factional preoccupation and the eventual 
disintegration, there are three features of particular interest 
about the intra-party conflict and the split. First, Muzaffar's 
success in keeping the bhadralok ex-terrorists out of the party - 
which depended very largely on the external support he received 
because of his orthodoxy - merely delayed the inevitable. As 
is well known, large-scale conversions to communism - to a 
significant degree a direct consequence of the Goswami-Chakravarty
20. MCCC, P. 334 : op. cit.
21. MCCC , P. 5 2 7 ( 8) : op. cit.
22.
23.
ibid..
MCCC, P.1767: Sec., WPP of Bengal to Gen. Sec., AIWPP,
24.
18/2/29. 
MCCC, p.423 : letter of resignation from 12 Bengal WPP
members to Sec. WPP of Bengal, 8/3/29; MCCC, P. 527 (8) : 
op. cit..
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faction's efforts during the 1920s - took place in the jails 
and detention centres during the first half of the 1930s. These 
ex-terrorists were to form the bulk of the Party's cadres after 
their release.
Secondly, the intra-party conflict was directly
related to the wider factionalism of Calcutta's politics. This
wider factionalism was particularly intense in the late 1920s.
In a reply to a query from New Delhi about the current state
of communism in Bengal, the Bengal government wrote (using a
generous definition of 'Communism') as follows:
The present position is confused by the rivalry 
between the Nationalist and Communist Revolutionists. 
Although this rivalry to some extent is due to a 
difference in principle and reflects a dislike of 
the social and economic dogmas of Communism, it 
is at present chiefly due to the secret opposition 
of Subhas Chandra Bose and his ex-detenu supporters 
of the Anushilan, Jugantar and Madaripur groups to 
Jawaharlal and his adherents, representing the 
Independence League. ... The two movements are 
at present by no means distinct; on the contrary 
many of their objects and activities and much of 
their propaganda are common, and each movement 
reinforces the other. But the jealousies that already 
exist and the difference in outlook and ultimate aims 
indicate the possibility of a growing cleavage.25
The struggle between Bose's and Nehru's followers, the government
continued, was primarily for control of the Bengal Provincial
Congress Committee Executive Committee; 'Closely involved in this
struggle are the efforts to secure the control of the youth
movement and the adherence of the ex-detenus', and to use these
elements as cadres to mobilise "the power dormant in the illiterate
25. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928 : G of Ben to G of I, 19/12/28.
Spratt provides a very similar analysis of the causes and 
patterns of the conflict between the Nehru and Bose factions, 
in MCCC, P.2419(P): Spratt to R. Page Arnott, 23/10/28. For
BPCC factionalism in the late 1920s see also Gallagher, 
'Congress in Decline', pp.595-98. The factionalism was also 
associated with the Bose-Sen Gupta competition for the 
BPCC presidency.
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2 6masses". Finally, the government added, the Bose campaign
had become more intense following Nehru's recent personal
success as president of the All-Bengal Students' Conference.
The WPP had, by early 1928, already incurred the
2 7wrath of the BPCC leaders. But by entering the competition
for the loyalties of the students and ex-detenus the party -
and particularly the Goswami-Chakravarty faction - entered
directly into the battle described by the government. In fact
this arena appears to have absorbed more of the ex-Anushilan
faction's energies during the second half of the year than did
official party work, and their extra-party loyalties seem to
have been stronger than their party commitments. In particular,
Goswami and Chakravarty worked closely with Santosh Mitra,
another former Dacca Anushilan member who, influenced by
Roy's early emissaries to Bengal, had eventually broken with
2 8the dadas over the issue of mass organisation. Mitra was a
leading organiser in what the Bengal government described as
29the Nehru faction. He worked closely with Bhupendranath Dutt 
and with trade unionists such as Bankim Mukherji (who had become
26. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: G of Ben to G of I, 19/12/28.
27. In fact the BPCC's opposition (and particularly that of the
Bose faction) was expressed in a form and with a vehemence 
sufficient for the communists to describe it as 'fascist'. 
See, eg., MCCC, P.2419(P) op. cit.. Following the conflict 
in early 1928 between the WPP and the BPCC-controlled 
Municipal Corporation during the Scavengers Strike (during 
which the Corporation used the police and Congress Youth 
blacklegs) the WPP believed that: 'Recent developments in
the policy of the [Bengal] Congress leaders, their action
in connection with the Scavengers' Strike... etc., show that 
there is a tendency to mobilise nationalist sentiment against 
us in a Fascist manner. ... this development may become an 
extremely dangerous one for us and for the movement': MCCC,
P.52: op. cit.; see also MCCC, P.546(10) op. cit.
28. Laushey, op. cit., p.95; interview with A. Rezzak Khan.
Mitra was to be shot dead by the authorities in the Hijli 
detention camp in 1931.
2 9. IB, Communism (1935), p.240 .
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involved in the Bauria-Chengail strikes) and Shibnath Banerji.
In 1928 Mitra founded the 'Socialist Youth League', which
became the group's organisational base. From it he led his
opposition to Bose and the Jugantar and Anushilan leaders -
including Mitra's old Dacca leader Pratul Ganguly - with whom
Bose formed a close working alliance during the year. Bose's
efforts centred around mobilising from revolutionary ranks a
volunteer corps which was intended initially for the Calcutta
session of the National Congress, but which was subsequently
to be maintained, in the service of his faction, as a permanent 
30organisation. The workers' demonstration at the Congress 
pandal during the Calcutta session appears to have been 
organised by Santosh Mitra's group through its trade unionist
3members and contacts. One of its targets was Bose's volunteers.
During 1929 the 'People's Party', formed by the Goswami-
Chakravarty faction in conjunction with the Mitra group,
continued its struggle against the Bose faction. Both factions
engaged in rival attempts during the year to mobilise labour
for their respective causes. This was in part the context of
the People's Party's involvement, through the BJWA, in the 1929
jute general strike, of Subhas Bose's involvement in strikes
at Jamshedpur, at the Golmuri tin-plate works and at the
Burmah oil installations at Budge Budge, and of the increasing
emphasis given by the BPCC during the year to the question of
32organising labour. However, of the two factions the People's
30. It came to be known as the 'Bengal Volunteers': Laushey,
op. cit., pp.58-61.
31. See Chapter 3, fn.276.
32. NAI, H.Poll, 257/1/1930: Notes on the People's Party and
on Subhas Bose's activities, in the DIB's abstract on 
Congress and Labour from Jan. - Sept. 1929; RCLI, Vol. V(l), 
pp.150-52.
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Party group, as we shall see in Chapter 7, was to retain a more
long-lasting interest in the labour question.
It appears that the Mitra group was interested in
joining the WPP and, with the Goswami and Chakravarty group,
in dominating the party. The AIWPP conference officially
recorded its opinion that this group was 'jealous of the growth
of the Party' and, therefore, 'made an organised attempt to
3 3wreck it' at the conference." It seems more likely, however,
that it was not so much an attempt to wreck it as to capture it
and displace the existing Ahmad-Spratt leadership. This
factional situation was further complicated and embittered by
its becoming enmeshed in a campaign by one of the expatriate
revolutionary groups in Berlin to discredit the existing
communist leadership in India. This particular factional
campaign was transmitted to Bengal via Bhupendranath Dutt,
34Jawaharlal Nehru and others who had returned from Berlin.
Following the failure of the attempt to 'capture'
the WPP, and the subsequent formation of the People's Party
35with 'men of whom the Party could not approve', the warfare 
between the two parties became open. The third feature of 
interest about the WPP split is the way in which the People's 
Party group conducted its campaign. Though there were definite 
ideological differences between the Goswami-Chakravarty and 
Ahmad factions, the terms of the People's Party attack on the 
WPP leadership were personal rather than ideological. A frustrated
33. MCCC, p.465: official report on the AIWPP conference; see
also Ahmad, Myself, pp.430-33.
34. See Chapter 7, fn.31.
35. MCCC, P. 527 (8) : op. cit..
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and bewildered Spratt was struck by 'the curious absence of 
any political element from the disputes':
Personal motives are throughout of the greatest 
importance. (Ambition, to become secretary or what 
not; blind friendship and devotion to individuals 
or subordinate groups rather than to the Party as 
a whole; spite, or envy, on the part of certain 
non-members, who, as is well known, took a prominent 
hand.) Personal issues were chosen to fight on, with 
hardly any colouring of principle to disguise their 
nakedness. ... Personal attacks were employed to 
conduct the fight. The whole affair depended on a wide­
spread campaign both within the Party and without of 
slander against individuals. (So-and-so is not a 
revolutionary; is pro-British; shows favour to 
such-and-such, and neglects somebody else; 
misappropriates the Party funds; even - "is a spy".
...) ... Closely related psychologically ... is
the conspiratorial method of organisation and attack.
Spratt linked these features to 'the apparently unusual 
predominance of personalities in Bengal politics', and 
characterised the political mode of the seceding faction as being 
'petty-bourgeois' and neo-anarchist rather than communist. In 
support of this characterisation he cited:the People's Party's 
divorce from, and alleged lack of faith in the working class; 
its greater faith in the revolutionary potential of the 
educated and unemployed youth; its continued sympathy for, and 
contact with terrorists; and its 'vacillations' between 'ultra­
left' abstention from certain 'reformist' organisations and 
groups and its 'right-reformist' capitulation to others. He 
drew on the history of the BJWA group's involvement in the 
trade union movement and in the strikes of the year to illustrate 
his argument.
Spratt's attack was not completely non-partisan - 
partly, no doubt, because he himself had been attacked for being
36. MCCC, p.527(8): op. cit.. (Emphasis in original.)
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an 'English' communist, and his associates for being 'pro-
37British' because of their association with him. He did
recognise that the characteristics he condemned were not
confined to the ex-terrorist faction within the party. But
he did not recognise the importance of the policy differences
which divided Muzaffar and himself from the other faction, nor
the extent to which the personal, non-ideological terms of the
People's Party's attack arose from what the Meerut Sessions
Court judge described as 'dissatisfaction with Muzaffar Ahmad's
3 8autocratic methods'.
* * *
Thus, from late 1928 we see a party permeated by 
mutual hostilities arising from an entanglement of ideological, 
policy and personality differences, coming apart at the seams 
and dissolving into the political surroundings. The Bengal WPP 
could muster up little of substance with which either to hold 
itself together or to distinguish itself clearly from the 
wider patterns of Bengali politics. The WPP had originally come 
together, as a coalition of several groups emerging uncertainly 
from the surface turbulence of urban elite politics in the 
aftermath of Non-Cooperation. Neither the coalition as a 
collective unit, nor any of its component parts, proved able
37. ibid..
38. MCCC, Judgement, P.242. If Muzaffar's Myself and the 
Communist Party of India, 1920-1929 can be taken as a guide 
to his approach to politics in our period, then we can see 
that much of Spratt's critique of the Goswami-Chakravarty group would have applied to Muzaffar as well. His book is 
a curiously titled one for a Marxist history, and it
consists primarily of a vitriolic attack, in highly personal 
terms, on his 1920s opponents.
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to bridge the elite-masses gulf which characterised political 
Bengal. Without a mass base the party was unable to develop 
its own centre of gravity and had only ideological means to 
hold itself together and to differentiate 'communist' politics 
from the 'bourgeois' form. But because the ideological 
discourse remained within the confines of the intelligentsia 
and was not, as in Bombay, shaped by contact with the working 
class, ideology, too, was only weakly developed. It was, thus, 
particularly inadequate for the tasks of party-bonding and 
political differentiation.
In this situation Muzaffar Ahmad, without significant 
affiliations with Bengali politics, relied greatly on his 
communist contacts outside Bengal to maintain his position. This 
was continuous with the way in which he had become 'Bengal's 
first communist' - essentially through M.N. Roy's having chosen 
him as his main contact in the province, rather than through a 
process of 'natural selection'. Conversely, the extreme weakness 
of communist politics in Bengal, and Muzaffar's vulnerability 
to an ex-terrorist influx into the party, may partly explain 
his pronounced extra-Bengali preoccupations. In contrast, the 
Goswami-Chakravarty group's close contacts with political 
organisations beyond the WPP, and its preoccupation with 
converting its non-party colleagues and with bringing them 
into the party, may partly explain its heterodoxy in relation 
to the WPP's CPGB-provided theoretical and policy guidelines. 
Whatever were this faction's political shortcomings, it was at 
least in close touch with a significant element in Bengali 
politics and, moreover, it was to prove to be the wave of the 
communist future in Bengal.
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But, in the late 1920s, Calcutta's bhadralok politics
reclaimed its own; the WPP all but disappeared - caught in the
same undertows from which it had initially partly emerged.
Marxist politics, too, was prey to the daladali politics of
'fortuitous rivalry', despite the new ideological component.
By March 1929 all that remained of the WPP was the small
group who stood around Muzaffar - the advocate of CPGB
orthodoxy in Bengal. For the Bengal WPP the AIWPP's December
1928 declaration of independence was, therefore, no more than
a forlorn hope. Rather, as Spratt commented in March, on the
eve of the Meerut Case arrests, the party remained in a state of
39'almost pitiful unpreparedness' for the coming upheavals.
2. THE BOMBAY COMMUNISTS' POLITICAL ADVANCE
After the 1928 general strike in the cotton mills 
one of its communist leaders was to comment that 'The strike
40was not our creation, but we were the creation of the strike'. 
This statement is true at two levels. First, the success of 
the strike 'created' the communists, not only as local trade 
union leaders, but also as a force in the politics of their 
city and in national trade unionism. Secondly, the educators 
were educated: the strike experience began to create a
'proletarianised', 'Indianised' and more disciplined communist 
leadership from a loose combination of Congress radicals inspired
39. MCCC, P. 527 (8) : 0£. cit. .
40. Dange, quoted in Newman, op. cit., p.238.
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by international communism. There were, however, definite 
limits to the changes in both political influence and modes 
of leadership. In this section we will chart the different 
processes and note their limits.
The Communists' Position in Bombay Politics
The communist-led, primarily Maharashtrian leftist
faction which transformed itself into the Congress Labour Party
in late 1926 was, with about a quarter of the BPCC's membership,
a significant force within that organisation. The influence
of the communist minority within the left faction was seen in
the facts that Nimbkar was the BPCC secretary and that he and
41Joglekar were among the seven BPCC delegates on the AICC.
But the CLP and its successor, the WPP, were hardly parties
in any strict sense of the term: the concept of party
membership was 'absolutely not understood' among most of the
42non-communists, Spratt wrote in September 1927. Only the 
communists were actively engaged in full-time work on behalf 
of the party. The rest of its members were little more than 
sympathisers.
Out-numbered by the primarily Gujarati 'business' faction 
and even more disadvantaged in terms of resources, the party could 
initially do little more than cautiously present its program in 
the BPCC and the AICC - not in the hope of getting it accepted, 
but 'to find out where the supporters are for the purpose
41. MCCC, P.826: Secretary's Report to the Annual Conference 
of the Bombay WPP (March 1928).
MCCC, p.1009: Spratt to C.P. Dutt, 4/9/27.42.
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of getting some real labour work done on the largest possible 
43scale'. The AICC program was kept moderate so as not to
44'drive away what little support there is for us'. The
party's long-term goal was to convert the Congress into a
WPP-type party. But the initial program called for little
more than constitutional changes in the Congress, so that it
could better represent the interests of the workers and peasants,
4 5and for a policy of militant action against the Raj. By 
May 1927, following the formation of the WPP from the Congress 
Labour Party, the communists felt sufficiently confident to 
begin criticising the existing Congress leadership. In that 
month Joglekar presented a program to the AICC which attacked the 
leadership for representing only 'an insignificant section of 
the people, the big capitalists and their allies the intellectual 
and professional upper classes' and for thus being incapable of 
leading a mass anti-imperialist movement.^ The Congress 
leadership was also condemned for tolerating 'and even encouraging' 
communal conflict. Nevertheless the program remained a mild 
version of that recommended by R.P. Dutt. The tactic was still 
the limited one of attempting to 'discredit' the leadership by 
allowing it to reject the WPP's program, while testing for
4- 4 7supporters.
43. MCCC, P.1144: Allison to Joglekar, 26/11/26.
44. ibid..
45. The program is reproduced in ibid..
46. MCCC, P.843: Program to be presented to the AICC; NAI,
H.Poll, 32/1927: Bombay FRl May.
47. After Vallabhbhai Patel had disallowed extended discussion
on the program Kranti took the opportunity to condemn the 
Congress leadership [MCCC, P.1375(T): Kranti, 21/5/27).
The party was reasonably happy with the response of some 
AICC radicals to the program and discussion: MCCC, P.1009:
Spratt to C.P. Dutt, 4/9/27.
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By late 1927 - coinciding with the party's first
significant contact with the working class of the city -
the communists were prepared to initiate a more active policy
within the Congress. At the Madras session of the National
Congress in December 1927 the Bombay group, supported by a
smaller Bengali WPP contingent, vigorously took up the issue
of the impending Simon Commission on future constitutional
reforms. At Madras they called for a nationalist united front
around a program of mass boycott of the Commission, complemented
by a demand for a National Constituent Assembly to decide India's 
4 8future. Again, the tactic was designed partly to try to force
the Congress conservatives' hand and to attract radical support,
and the communists were satisfied that they had 'created an
4 9impression' at the Madras session.
But they were primarily interested in organising an
effective boycott in Bombay when the Simon Commission arrived
there in February. The communists' plan was to generate
sufficient momentum among the Congress radicals to neutralise the
Congress leaders' 'shuffling and hypocrisy' on the issue and, as
we saw in Chapter 3, to mobilise an impressive working class
50hartal around radical mass demands. They dominated the BPCC 
hartal committee and, from January, launched an intensive 
organisational and propaganda campaign in the press and at 
public meetings. This was sufficient to neutralise the BPCC
CD MCCC, 
1927 .
P.23: Manifesto of the WPP to the INC, Madras, Dec
49. MCCC, P. 526 (39) and P.670: op. cit.. The WPP was able to
get a few of its minor resolutions passed - perhaps because 
of the radicalising presence of Jawaharlal, recently returned 
from his European communist contacts.
50. MCCC, P.1372(2): Minutes of a communist meeting at Madras,
28/12/27. MCCC, P.441: Manifesto of the WPP (early 1928)
is a result of this meeting.
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conservatives' opposition to a militant hartal involving the 
51working class. The success of the hartal, the Commissioner of
Police reported, was due almost entirely to the communists'
preparations and their ability to bring out large numbers of 
52workers. However the communists were later to criticise
their own tactics, for they had acted publicly as Congressmen,
not as members of the WPP, and so the latter gained very little
5 3in terms of publicity.
If the communists' still-limited working class influence
in February had placed them unmistakeably on the .Bombay political
map at that point, the outcome of the general strike, and of
the building of the GKU, made them an increasingly formidable
force. The old Bombay conflict between the 'shetias' and the
'intelligentsia' was now taking on a very different form.
Throughout the year there was a progressive polarisation within
the BPCC. By April, Ghate reported, the conservatives had
firmly 'set themselves against everything labour'. In June
a BPCC meeting which was scheduled to discuss the question of
granting Rs.4,000 to the strikers fell through when only the
WPP members and their sympathisers arrived, and there were not
enough to form a quorum. 'It is believed', the Intelligence
Branch noted, 'that members of the other groups in the BPCC, who are
jealous of the growing prestige of the Communist Party, purposely
55absented themselves'. Kranti took the opportunity to launch
51. MCCC, P.1344: Bombay WPP, EC meeting, 23/1/28; MCCC, P.
1348(49): WPP Manifesto on the Statutory Commission; see 
also fns.38-40, Chapter 3.
52. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: Commissioner of Police, Bombay, 
to G of Bom, 7/8/28.
53. MCCC, P.526(32) and p.670: o£. cit..
54. MCCC, P.821: Ghate to Thengdi, 4/4/28.
55. NAI, H.Poll, 190/1928: DIB report, ca. mid-Jun.
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a scathing attack upon the dominance of the capitalists in 
56the BPCC. Relations with the Congress leadership were 
also strained in May when Gandhi and Motilal Nehru, in Bombay 
for the All-Parties Conference, declined an invitation by the 
WPP to address a mass meeting of the strikers. They gave as 
their reasons the fact that ’they had no sympathy for the 
strikers who by their actions were upsetting the plans for 
the boycott of foreign cloth'. As a result they were condemned 
by the communists at public meetings for 'being in league with
57the millowners ... and as caring nothing for the working class'.
The conflict with the national leaders was resumed at
the annual session of the National Congress at Calcutta at the
end of the year. The Bombay and Bengal parties had prepared four 
5 8resolutions which were presented to the Congress Subjects
59Committee by Nimbkar. The first resolution called on the 
Congress to declare its goal to be Complete Independence; the 
second, reflecting growing Soviet fears of British armed 
intervention, called for preparations for complete non-cooperation 
with the government in the event of the British beginning another 
war; the third called for a Congress declaration on 'the need 
for the organisation, on the basis of class struggle, of the 
masses of industrial workers and peasants, as an indispensable 
preliminary for the attainment of independence and as a means 
for the advancement of the economic and cultural status of the 
masses'; and the final resolution, repeating a constant Bengal
56. MCCC, P.1375(T): Kranti, 29/7/28.
57. NAI, H.Poll, 1/1928: Bombay FR2 May.
58. In MCCC, P. 1373 (8A).
59. MCCC, P.1311: INC, 43rd Session, Subjects Committee - list 
of resolutions received.
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WPP theme, condemned the Bengal Swarajists for opposing the
Tenancy Amendment Act and for consistently supporting zamindar
interests against those of the cultivators. Again, the
resolutions were intended merely to pressure the conservatives
6 0and to promote radicalisation through debate on the proposals.
Even so the communists were unhappy with the results. None of
the resolutions survived the Subjects Committee and so could
not be used in the open session to promote debate. Moreover,
discussion on Nimbkar's amendment to Gandhi's resolution on the
Nehru Report and the future program of the Congress was avoided
by Motilal Nehru's 'stage-managing' in the Subjects Committee
and the application of the gag in the open session of the
Congress. Bradley was moved to comment that 'I have never
61seen so much opportunism shown amongst leaders before'. The
outcome of the Calcutta session confirmed the communists' growing
belief in the 'reactionary' character of the Congress leadership.
The increasingly bitter fight with the BPCC leadership
during 1928 - a development which inevitably followed from the
communists' progression from leftist gadflies to successful
militant labour organisers - was matched by a growing
rapprochement .with the more radically inclined Bombay nationalists.
For example, although the communists, despite some effort, were
unable to establish a significant footing among the Bombay student 
6 2community, they were able to begin to establish a working
60. MCCC, P. 5 26 (32) and p.670: 0£. cit. .
61. MCCC, P.2415(P): Bradley to Potter-Wilson, 19/1/29.
62. MCCC, P.1979 and p.1941: Spratt's notes for a speech to the 
Bombay Students' Brotherhood, 24/4/27,and a file of press 
clippings reporting it; MCCC, P.546(10): op. cit.; MCCC, 
P.546 (11): Manifesto of the WPP to the Bombay Youth 
Conference; MCCC, P.420: Report of Bombay WPP to the AIWPP 
Conference.
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alliance with K.F. Nariman's and Yusuf Meher Ali's Youth League.
Both sides cultivated the alliance. The communists were
seeking a wider nationalist support for the strike, and toned down
their public critique of 'petty bourgeois' nationalism
accordingly. Nariman also saw potential benefits in an alliance
6 3with the emerging mass leadership. The communists became
increasingly galled by the fact that their rising influence among
Bombay's radical intelligentsia was not matched by their numerical
strength in the BPCC. Consequently the WPP decided in July to
make a concerted attempt to increase their strength at the
October BPCC elections, and in August a sub-committee was
formed to organise an enrolment drive and electioneering 
64campaign. In the elections they managed to secure 30 
seats for 'members or associates of the Party' - an increase of 
about 10 - out of the total of 75 seats,^ though it was still 
not enough to over-rule the dominant business faction. Another 
communist (Dange) joined Joglekar and Nimbkar on the BPCC's 
AICC delegation.^
Similar considerations led the party to decide to
contest the February 1929 Municipal Corporation elections. The
proposal was first put forward by Dange and J.B. Patel at the
6 VWPP's annual conference in March 1928 and received considerable 
attention during the following year. The party saw participation 
in these elections primarily as a useful propaganda exercise.
63. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: Bombay Commissioner of Police to
G of Bom, 7/8/28. See Kumar, 'From Swaraj to Purna Swaraj', 
p.94, on Nariman's Youth League and his political 
activities in this period.
64. MCCC, P.1344: WPP meetings, 19/8/28 and 2, 9 & 23/9/28.
65. ibid.: WPP meeting 14/10/28.
66. AICC Papers, 1929 (this source was kindly provided by 
Sandy Gordon).
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With only about 10 percent of the population enfranchised
6 8under the Rs.10 monthly-rental qualification, the communists
did not anticipate winning any seats - though that eventuality,
it was argued, would provide a useful 'loudspeaker' for the
party in the Corporation to force discussion of the labour
issues 'which have always been disregarded in the Corporation 
6 9till now'. However there was considerable disagreement within
the party about both the benefit of the exercise and the
tactics that should be pursued. The changing consensus on
tactics indicates the party's changing conception of its
position in Bombay politics. It was decided in October that,
in order to have any chance of success, the party candidates
70should stand on a Congress ticket. In January, against
some opposition, it was decided that they should stand as WPP
members - a decision which immediately brought the party into
71conflict with the Congress.
The party directed its campaign towards 'the 98 
percent', consisting of the 'workers, peasants, as also men of 
the clerical profession belonging to the higher castes', who
72were exploited by 'the imperialists, capitalists and landlords'.
67. MCCC, P. 1344 : WPP meeting, 18/3/28; MCCC, P. 1348 (16): a
copy of the resolution.
68. This percentage is calculated from figures quoted in a Bombay 
Legislative Council Debate on democratisation of the 
Municipal franchise (BLC, Debates, Vol.27, 1929, p.401) and 
from a report on the voting in the Times of India, 30/1/29, 
p.13. (Both sources provided by Sandy Gordon).
69. MCCC, P.1348(7): Report of the WPP sub-committee on the 
feasibility of contesting the elections, 8/4/28.
70. MCCC, P.1344: WPP meeting, 21/10/28.
71. ibid.: 13/1/29; MCCC, P.1373(1): notes of the same meeting;
Times of India, 28/1/29, p.5. None of the nationalist news­
papers would publicise the WPP's election program: interviews
with S.S. Mirajkar and M.G. Desai.
72. MCCC, P.791(T): Marathi electioneering pamphlet issued by
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The WPP put forward a program, set explicitly within an
ideology of class and anti-imperialist struggle, which called
for greatly increased Corporation expenditure on public
amenities and social services and welfare, a democratisation
of the franchise, a more progressive taxation scale, and complete
Corporation autonomy from the government. In presenting
the program the WPP condemned the Congress leaders for their
’treachery' in having 'always sacrificed the interests of
the exploited masses by compromising with the capitalists and
imperialists'. However, the party hastened to assure its
audience, its own candidates were also 'staunch Congressmen':
'the mandates of the Congress are obeyed by us'; 'Do not,
therefore, be frightened because we do not go under the Congress 
74ticket'. That the communists felt this assurance to be
necessary indicated the increasingly ambiguous nature of their
relationship with the Congress. The educated clerical audience
was urged to recognise the essential identity of its interests
with those of the exploited masses, to overcome its elitist
prejudices, and to act responsibly by voting on behalf of the
75disenfranchised masses.
None of the four WPP candidates won a seat. But, as
72. (Cont'd)
Joglekar, the WPP candidate for F. Ward. (This exhibit 
includes a number of WPP electioneering leaflets.)
73. ibid.; MCCC, p.577(1): The Spark (Bombay) Vol. 1(1),
27/1/29, p.l. (The Spark was M.G. Desai's creation and he 
published the party*s election program in the first issue.)
74. MCCC, P.79KT): op.cit. . See also MCCC, p. 792 (T) and p.931(T) 
leaflets issued by the GKU urging workers to vote for the 
WPP candidates.
MCCC, P.791(T): op. cit.; see also MCCC, P.577(1): op. cit..75.
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the government observed, the campaign had proved 'remarkably
7 6successful' for the party. Although Pendse, the candidate
for the middle class ward of Girgaum came last, Joglekar and
Nimbkar were both at the top of the list of failed candidates
77in mill area wards. Given the franchise qualifications, these
results must have depended primarily on non-working class
votes; and that the voting for the WPP candidates did not
7 8fall within the generally communal pattern of voting shows
that it was primarily their ideology which was found attractive.
The communists were greatly encouraged by the effectiveness of
the campaign as a propaganda medium and by the index of their
7 9growing 'petty bourgeois' support provided by the results.
The Bombay Communists in the AITUC
Though the WPP's increasing weight in Bombay did 
not significantly increase the party's strength within the 
Congress at the national level, it did do so within the national 
trade union organisation. The difference was that while Congress 
voting was on an individual basis, within the AITUC the communists' 
voting strength increased in proportion to the membership of their 
unions.
76. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928: Report on communist activities,
Sept. 1928-Jan.1929.
77. NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FR2 Jan.; Times of India, 
30/1/29, p.13. It is interesting that the WPP did worst in 
Girgaum, which was their main power base in the BPCC.
78. NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FR2 Jan.. However there may 
have been a convert and unsolicited element of community 
appeal, since Bombay's clerical population, like the 
communists, was predominantly Maharashtrian Brahman in 
composition.
79. MCCC, P.2417(P): Bradley to J.Potter-Wilson, 2/2/29.
Mirajkar, one of the candidates, stressed this point to 
the author: interview with S.S. Mirajkar.
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The communists actually managed to establish their
first foothold in the AITUC before they had established a trade
union base. The Seventh AITUC session in Delhi in March 1927
was called at short notice to enable the visiting communist
and British MP Shapurji Saklatvala to attend before leaving
India. Saklatvala, Britain's only Indian MP, had received
considerable publicity throughout his whirlwind tour of India
8 0in early 1927, despite the fact that he was a communist.
The Indian communists had been able to gain some publicity
81for themselves in the process. With Jhabvala's assistance
and AITUC president N.M. Joshi's compliance, the communists
8 2were able to participate in the session. Because the session
was called at short notice many of the AITUC's officials and
delegates did not attend. Accordingly, although they were
8 3'timid early in the proceedings', the WPP delegations from
Bombay and Calcutta were able to muster sufficient support to
get through several of their political resolutions and a
resolution recommending 'one union for one industry', and to win
8 4election to several of the AITUC's minor positions. This was
8 5seen as a 'quite important' start for the party.
80. NAI, H.Poll, 32/1927: Bombay, Bengal, Madras, Delhi and 
CP and B FRs 1 & 2 Feb.
81. MCCC, P.855: Mirajkar to Thengdi, 26/1/27.
82. Spratt, Blowing up India, pp.36-7.
83. MCCC, P.1828: Mirajkar to Thengdi, 16/2/27: MCCC, P.849: 
a copy of the resolutions, with a note by Thengdi.
84. MCCC, P.1955: Spratt to R. Page Arnott, 10/3/27; MCCC, 
p.1828: Spratt's report of the AITUC proceedings; MCCC, 
p.859: official report of the AITUC (7th Session); LM,
Vol. 9, 1927, pp.443-44. Thengdi was elected as admTnistrative 
secretary, Ghate as assistant secretary and Thengdi and 
Joglekar were elected to the Negotiations Committee.
85. MCCC, p.1828: 0£. cit.. However it hardly warrants Punekar's 
comment that with this AITUC session the organisation 
progressed ideologically 'from rose pink to Vermillion red': 
op. cit., p.92.
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At the Eighth AITUC session in Kanpur, in November of
the same year, the Bombay communists concentrated on forming, with
their Bengali comrades and radicals from other provinces, a more
coherent leftist challenge to the moderate AITUC leaders. They
were able to form a pressure group, numbering 14, which also
8 6attracted wider support. Once again they managed to have
some of their resolutions passed - including one backing the
boycott of the Simon Commission - and to influence others.
Members of the Bombay group were again elected to several
executive positions and to its Constitutional Committee and
Council of Action - the latter, the result of a WPP initiative,
having as its purpose the organisation of 'a mass movement of
8 7the workers and peasants'. But without a significant union
base the WPP group was unable to effect any really substantive
changes in AITUC policy and was powerless to ensure the
implementation of those resolutions which it did get passed.
The Council of Action, for example, was unable to function
8 8because the Executive Committee simply refused it funds.
86. MCCC, P. 1871 (1)C: report on the work of the 'T.C. Left Group' 
by Dange, early Dec. 1927.
87. MCCC, P.1381: official Report of the Eighth Session of the 
AITUC. Thengdi was elected as one of the three vice- 
presidents, Dange as one of the two assistant secretaries 
and Jhabvala as the organising secretary. Spratt became 
the convenor of the Constitutional Committee and Jhabvala 
was elected as the organising secretary of the Council of 
Action.
88. MCCC, P.826: Annual Report of the WPP, Mar. 1928; MCCC, R. 
420: Report of the Bombay WPP to the AIWPP Conference;
MCCC, P.479: Spratt to Ahmad, 6/3/28. However the left group 
in the AITUC was able to block the moderates' attempts to 
affiliate the AITUC with the social democratic International 
Federation of Trade Unions.
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Following their spectacular successes in Bombay during
the year the communists arrived at the Ninth AITUC session,
held at the Bihar coal mining centre of Jharia in December
1928, in a much more confident and aggressive mood than before.
With the unprecedented strike activity of 1928, and the
increased nationalist activity during the year, the Jharia
session was much more politicised and heated than the previous 
89sessions. The WPP group 'worked well', Bradley later wrote,
90'but it did not have an easy passage'. The AITUC constitution 
ruled that a union delegation's voting strength was determined 
on the basis of the union's membership at the preceding AITUC 
annual session. Therefore the Bombay communists could not yet 
draw upon the GKU's current strength to consolidate their 
position within the national federation. Even so, as the leaders 
of India's largest union they were in a position of moral 
strength and could now, in addition, use their position within 
the large GIPRU to attain a much greater degree of influence than 
previously. Consequently they succeeded in getting the AITUC 
affiliated to the communist dominated international organisation,
89. MCCC, P.1206(1): 'Disruptionists in the Trade Union Congress'
- an article by Bradley attacking the anti-communist faction; 
MCCC, P.527(1): Spratt to C.P. Dutt, 14/3/29 - Spratt 
reported that the atmosphere was so heated that he could
not even take notes; J. Nehru, Toward Freedom: An
Autobiography, (N.Y., 1942), pp.186-7. Nehru, who attended
the session, described the situation at Jharia in the 
following way: 'More important than these questions [of
international affiliation] was the vast difference in 
outlook between the two sections of the Congress. ...
The radical group, though more powerful in the rank and 
file, had little opportunity of influencing policy at the 
top. This was an unsatisfactory position and it did not 
reflect the true state of affairs. There was dissatisfaction 
and friction and a desire on the part of the radical elements 
to seize power ... At the same time there was a 
disinclination to carry matters too far, for a split was 
feared'.
90. MCCC, P. 2416 (P) : Bradley to Potter-Wilson, 18/1/29.
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the League Against Imperialism, despite the determined
91opposition of the moderates. But, more importantly, their
candidate for the presidency - the GIPRU official and WPP
member D.B. Kulkarni - was only narrowly defeated (29:36) by
9 2the moderates' distinguished nominee, Jawaharlal Nehru.
They were also able to have more of their political resolutions
passed than at the previous sessions, and increased their
9 3representation on the Executive Committee.
Moreover, the communists improved their position
within the Railwaymen's Federation at its annual general meeting,
which was held at Jharia concurrently with the AITUC. The
moderates on the AIRF had been preparing their opposition to
9 4the militants since August. But even so the moderates only
narrowly defeated the WPP group's resolution that the AIRF
prepare for a general strike on the GIP Railway should the
Agent refuse, or not respond to, the GIPRU's demands. In
addition, Bradley was elected as a vice-president and
9 5Jhabvala as the organising secretary.
On the basis of their increased strength at Jharia 
the communists could confidently anticipate dominating the
91. NAI, II.Poll, 18/VII/1928: note on the Jharia AITUC. Part 
of the reason for the passage of the affiliation resolution 
was the strong reaction of most delegates against the arrest 
of the visiting LAT representative (Johnstone) at the Jharia session.
92. Nehru was nominated at the last minute by the moderate 
D. Chamanlal when it became apparent that Kulkarni might 
win. Nehru, who was not present at this point, says that 
he was embarrassed at having defeated an actual worker and 
would not have stood had he been aware of the situation:Toward Freedom, p.187.
93 Joglekar was elected as an assistant secretary, Kulkarni,
Ahmad and Abdul Majid (of the Punjab WPP) became vice- 
presidents, and Bradley, Spratt and Ruikar (a non-party 
radical ally in the GIPRU) were elected as EC members.
94. MCCC, P.2416(P): 0£. cit..
95. MCCC, P.2416(P)(4): report of the AIRF Conference 17-19/12/1928.
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AITUC at the next annual session, when they would be able to 
use their recent union gains to great advantage. Control of 
the AITUC would provide them with greatly increased prestige 
and with very valuable new material and propaganda resources.
It would also enable them to move beyond Bombay, into their 
first significant national political base.
3. TOWARDS THE FORMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
IN BOMBAY
S.A . Dange has recalled that during the 1920s the
communists 'got moored (sic.) into [Royist] sectarian dogmatism
from the very beginning', but that eventually 'sheer pragmatism
and the mood of the masses' enabled them to find a way out of 
. . . . 97this initial trap. Dange's statement indicates much about 
the changes which began to take place within the Bombay 
communist leadership from early 1928. It indicates the fact 
of an important transition, the crucial role of their interaction 
with a mass base and nationalist politics in bringing it about, 
and the 'pragmatic' limits of the changes which did occur. From 
1928 the Bombay communists, under the pressure of events in 
which they were now directly involved and no longer merely 
observing and analysing, were forced for the first time to 
engage in 'praxis'. The radically new Marxist analysis of Indian 
society which they had earlier discovered, via M.N. Roy and 
R.P. Dutt, and whose synthesis of political radicalism and logical
97. Dange, When Communist (sic.) Differ, p.39.
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coherence they had appreciated so much, had now to be applied. 
The Bombay communists would now have constantly to evaluate 
against their immediate experience the theoretical perspectives, 
conceptual categories, policy guidelines and organisational 
recommendations provided them from abroad. Under novel 
pressures to work as a disciplined and cohesive leadership, 
and now operating within a new context within which to 
develop these qualities, they would begin to appreciate more 
fully the importance of the Roy-Dutt emphasis on the necessity 
of effective organisation. But in other areas the fit between 
received doctrine and Indian realities would be perceived - if 
'pragmatically* - to be less than perfect. In what way$,then, 
and to what extent, did the acquisition of a mass base and 
the consequent advance in the nationalist arena change the 
modes of communist leadership in Bombay? Was the December 
1928 claim to political independence a justifiable one - and 
was it justifiable in both the Indian and the Comintern 
contexts? To what extent, that is, had the Bombay communists 
created a disciplined and 'proletarianised' Indian leadership, 
clearly differentiated from the prevailing 'bourgeois' mode 
of nationalist politics; and to what extent an 'Indianised' 
communist leadership, capable of an autonomous relationship to 
the Comintern?
For the first year of its existence the Bombay WPP 
remained a small - if hardworking - coalition of activists 
rather than a disciplined party: 'Party consolidation is a
great necessity of today', Mirajkar wrote in September,
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9 81927. However Spratt saw little chance of this situation
changing until a more marked political differentiation had occurred
within the Bombay Congress, with more of its rank-and-file being
99radicalised and attracted to the party. Under present conditions,
he added, it would be premature, and essentially meaningless,
seriously to consider developing - or even maintaining - the
CPI. Until early 1929, in fact the CPI was to continue to
exist 'but in name only', as its Delhi members complained in
early 1928.^^ The WPP's problems were increased by the
tendency of its new full-time active members - only about five
during 1927 - to act as individuals, often disregarding party
directives, rather than as disciplined members of a Marxist
party. For example the executive met only very irregularly
during the year,^^ and the problem of discipline was
sufficiently pronounced for the March 1928 annual conference
to acknowledge it in the following way:
... other parties ... have attributed the misdeeds of 
individuals to our Party as a whole. There might be 
many who may go and do something individually, without 
a mandate from the Party, there may be many who may not 
be our Party men, yet declaring themselves to be ours. 
How can we or our principles and theories be held liable 
for personal deviations and lapses? A principle cannot 
be vilified because its exponents turned sometimes a 
wrong way.102
98. MCCC, P.1010: Mirajkar to Spratt, 21/8/28. In the following
month, Intelligence noted of the WPP that 'there is no regular 
membership, and there is only a clique ... who number not 
more than fifteen': BSB, 1036/B/IV/1935: Report, 17/10/27.
99. MCCC, P.1009: op. cit..
100. MCCC, P.1891(C): circular from M. Shafique, H.A. Nasim and 
P. Mansur, to 'the Members and Sympathisers of the Communist 
Party of India', 19/2/28. The Bombay Special Branch had 
observed in December 1926 that the CLP (the forerunner of the 
WPP) was much more active than the Communist Party, 'which 
does little but bemoan its collective and individual poverty' 
(BSB, 1036/B/IV/1935 : Note, 20/12/26). This description 
applies to the whole of this period until the end of 1928.
101. The EC met formally only eight times during the year:
MCCC, P.1344: op. cit..
102. MCCC, P.1209: From a resolution on the WPP's attitude
towards the Congress and existing TU leaderships.
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During 1927 the party also uncritically accepted the 'new 
Imperialist policy' analysis as its theoretical framework,
10 3seeking simply to apply the theory to the Indian situation.
When the party held its March 1928 annual conference
it was on the verge of its transformation from a group of
ideologues isolated from the masses into the cohesive
leadership of a mass movement. It had recently made a
major contribution to the Bombay anti-Simon Commission hartal,
it had established a much stronger relationship with the GKM
worker militants and had been involved in its first strikes, and
there were clear signs that a major strike could break soon.
In this situation the problem of organisation became a more
pressing one, and was accorded a high priority at the annual
meeting. Part of the resolution on organisation read:
... the success of any group of individuals lay (sic.) 
in their state of organisation. Scientifically 
organised, ... the Party can become a power to be 
considered in the Industrial and Political world.
It must also be on such a basis that decisions can 
be easily transmitted, correctly understood and 
carried out. ... look to it as being the very first 
task to set about.104
That the party's executive met regularly - on a weekly basis -
during 1928, showed that the concept of organisation was being
taken more seriously than in 1927. The annual conference
also recognised the 'urgent need' of propagandising 'the
admittedly unfamiliar but profoundly important idea of the
function of a Party' among trade union and Congress radicals
] 05in order to expand the party's membership. The WPP now took
103. MCCC, P.1372(2): Notes of a communist policy discussion 
at the Madras INC session, 28/12/27.
104. MCCC, P.832: Resolution on Organisation.
105. ibid..
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seriously - in a way it had not during the first year of
its existence - the task of removing the misunderstandings
of ' sympathisers'admirers and neutral elements', though 'without
essentially compromising our principles or outlook'. In
February it began a more concerted recruitment drive, particularly
among trade unionists, which resulted in nine new members in
106the first month. Membership, however, was to remain
] 07'strictly limited ... idle membership is not canvassed for'.
Part of the concern to expand the membership arose from a
growing realisation of the need for a Marxist leadership to
include the 'leading elements' of the working class. During
1927 Spratt had found the WPP members' outlook 'very petty
10 8bourgeois', and was constantly 'gibing at them for it'.
By the beginning of 1928, however, 'their psychology was 
undoubtedly changing'. A few of the new recruits - most notably 
Alve - were workers. The conference documents also indicate a 
new sensitivity to the changing political situation. The Roy- 
Dutt theoretical framework was retained. But the argument 
that the British had drawn the Indian bourgeoisie into a 
partnership which would lead to the voluntary granting of 
Dominion Status did not explain why the Simon Commission had 
excluded Indians from its personnel, nor the growing antagonism 
of Indian capital, the Moderates, and the Congress conservatives, 
towards the Raj. Thus the following 'pragmatic' qualification
106. MCCC, P.1344: EC meetings, 8/2/28, 15/3/28 and 25/3/28.
107. MCCC, P.826: op. cit..
108. MCCC, P.546(10): op. cit..
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was added to the WPP's policy declaration: 'when the Indian
oppressors of the Indian Masses oppose Imperialism when their
interests are threatened, we unhesitatingly lend our support
to the anti-imperialist section and strengthen their hands' -
10 9but from an independent revolutionary working class basis.
It was an essentially Leninist formulation. The annual 
conference resolved that party 'fraction' work in the BPCC 
and AICC were 'very i m p o r t a n t T h e  party was also anxious 
to establish that its opposition to the reformist trade 
unionists was not a factionalism based on personalities: 'we
do not look to their personal motives. We only look to the 
ideology with which they enter [the] Labour field'.^^
Thus we see an apparent correlation in early 1928 
between, on the one hand, the WPP's increased concern to become 
a disciplined, independent minded, politically differentiated 
and larger party and, on the other, its concurrent transition 
from being an isolated and uninfluential group towards a 
leadership linked to a mass base and wielding influence in the 
city's nationalist politics. That the former process was 
related to the latter is further suggested by the subsequent 
development of these trends in the modes of communist leadership 
during 1928.
The party's changing context also changed the character 
of its internal tensions. Formerly, factional differences within 
the WPP were simply 'paper differences'; because there was no
109. MCCC, P.1209: op. cit..
110. ibid..
Ill. ibid,.
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context within which to work them out, such disagreements
remained only hypothetical and were easily entangled with
personality differences. With first the prospect, and then
the reality of a mass base, the same differences could be
'externalised' by being translated into practical terms.
We can demonstrate this point by comparing the character of
factional differences within the party in 1927 and 1928.
We noted in Chapter 3 that during the Sassoon mill
strike in August 1927 differences arose between Joglekar and
the rest of the membership over the issue of whether or not to
merge the GKM with the BTLU. At that point Joglekar, working
closely with Mayekar, the GKM's leader, was virtually the
party's sole point of contact with textile unionism. The party
had decided that, in accordance with its policy of industrial
unionism, it should take the opportunity provided by the strike
to attempt to merge the GKM with the BTLU to form 'one
112formidable union'. Mayekar, jealous of his union's separate
identity, firmly resisted this proposal. The party, exasperated
by earlier manifestations of Joglekar's individualistic 
113'rascality'. was convinced that he was supporting Mayekar's 
stand, and 'for the same old reason - E g o i s m ' . C o n s e q u e n t l y  
Joglekar was 'practically dropped' from the party, and its 
involvement in an important strike was seriously undermined.
The problem did not arise, however, in the second
112. MCCC, P .1011: Ghate to Spratt, 22/8/27.
113. MCCC, P.2328(P): op. cit.. Joglekar had also 'jealously 
guarded' Dange since his release from his Cawnpore 
Case imprisonment.
MCCC, P.1010: op. cit..114.
376
Sassoon mills strike in January 1928. The strike itself
was more extensive - providing greater opportunities for
115the WPP's involvement as a party. Further, the developing
split between Mayekar and the working class militants in the
GKM provided greater WPP access to the union. This
correspondingly reduced the party's dependence on Joglekar's
personal relationship with Mayekar. Because of these factors
and the party's increased stress on party discipline, the
WPP was able to participate more collectively.
The 1928 general strike deeply affected the ways in
which inner-party tensions were manifested and dealt with.
The working class unrest rapidly developed momentum in the
mill area throughout April. But the WPP, divided between
'moderates', such as Dange and Bradley, and 'militants', like
Mirajkar, Nimbkar and Joglekar, were unable until late April
to reach a firm decision on the strike policy to be adopted
116towards the reformist BTLU. Bradley, with his considerable
strike experience in England, calculated that the strike would
be seriously weakened without the BTLU's support. The 'militants',
however, impressed by the millhands' radicalism and enraged by
the BTLU's efforts to defuse the situation, now believed that
the strike would be weakened by the constraints of an alliance
117with the conciliatory BTLU. The issue was resolved by the
millhands. At the mass meeting on April 18 which formed the 
Joint Mill Strike Committee both Bradley and Nimbkar put forward
115. See Newman, op. clt., pp.228-35.
116. MCCC, P.1344: EC Meeting, 25/3/28.
117. They condemned Joshi and the BTLU as 'enemies of labour
and the friends of the capitalists': NAI, H.Poll,
1/1928: Bombay FR2 Apr.
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118their differing views. The strikers supported Bradley.
The party consequently formally adopted a 'united-front'
119policy on April 29.
The choice having been made, the relative merits of
the two approaches could then be continuously evaluated at
the practical as well as the ideological levels. The party
'militants' were involved primarily in the mass committees
and were thus in close touch with the militance of the workers,
which they also helped sustain. They therefore tended to
oppose on ideological grounds the concessions necessary to
12 0maintain the BTLU alliance. Bradley and Dange, however,
engaged in the equally necessary administrative functions in 
the upper levels of the strike organisation, were in a position 
to see clearly the strike's limitations and its continuing 
dependence upon the BTLU's resources and contacts. In the 
context of the general strike, therefore, ideological differences 
led to (and were sustained by) functional specialisation rather 
than to the acrimonious and destructive factional disputations 
which fractured the isolated Bengal WPP. Moreover, the 
functional differentiation within the Bombay party, and the 
ideological differences associated with it, strengthened both 
the strike and the party. The same strike context also welded 
together the primarily Brahman communists and the Maratha worker 
activists - and brought some of the latter into the party - in a
118. Newman, op. cit., pp.249-50.
119. MCCC, P.1344: EC meeting, 29/4/28
120. Newman, op. cit., pp.251-2.
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way that otherwise would probably have been impossible.
However the strike did not bring about a complete
transformation in the modes of intra-party relations. A
conflict between Dange and the rest of the party during the
course of the general strike demonstrated the continuing
difficulties in overcoming individualistic indiscipline and,
in addition, the potential problems arising from functional
specialisation. In July the party appointed a sub-committee,
consisting of Dange, Joglekar and Pendse to prepare its counter-
121standardisation scheme. Dange's views on the terms of the
scheme brought him into conflict with the rest of the executive.
Then, on August 26, Dange, the party's specialist on technical
issues following his private study of the structure of the
industry, was charged with deliberately withholding information
from the party so that 'the resultant ignorance of the Party-
members may facilitate the continuation of ... [his] "high post
122in the public eye"1. He also met 'severe criticism' for
allegedly having disregarded party policy during his informal
123
negotiations, in association with N.M. Joshi, with the millowners. 
Finally, he was accused of having made a statement contrary to 
party policy at a mass meeting of strikers.^ ^  He was formally 
censured on each of these grounds. Dange, however, was 
unrepentant. He had not withheld information, he retorted; 
it was simply that the other members of the party did not have 
the intellectual rigour and initiative necessary to understand
121. MCCC, P.1344:: EC meeting, 1/7/28.
122. Quoted in P.1373(13): Dange to the EC, WPP, 27/8/28.
123. MCCC, P.1344: EC meeting, 26/8/28.
124. ibid.: 2/8/28.
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12 5the intricacies of the textile industry. Party decisions
were 'not preceded by any scientific study .. based ... on 
pure Marxism' and 'verified by the working class instinct', 
he continued, but merely upon 'impressions, whims'. In these 
circumstances, Dange concluded, party discipline 'does in no 
sense carry that same iron meaning that a "Leninist" would 
apply to it'. He tendered his resignation from the party in 
protest.
Dange was in a strong position, for the other members
of the party were, indeed, 'Reds' rather than 'Experts'. They
did not have his grasp of technical detail nor, apparently,
his interest in mastering it. He was therefore indispensable,
particularly at that point in the strike negotiations, and so
the party executive resolved that they could not accept his 
12 6resignation. Dange agreed to return. The executive then
accepted Dange's original proposals for the strike negotiation
12 7terms which had been the original cause of the conflict.
The Dange controversy had both similarities and 
differences with Joglekar's earlier conflict with the party.
In each case a party member who had the power arising from 
contacts necessary to the party and, in Dange's case, 
irreplaceable knowledge and skills, had used that power to defy 
party authority. But in Dange's case the issue was a more 
substantive policy disagreement and it was discussed and resolved 
within a party which, largely as a result of its 1928 experience,
125. MCCC, P.1373(13): op. cit.. (Dange's resignation letter).
126. MCCC, P.1344: EC meeting, 26/8/28.
127. ibid., 27/8/28.
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was more structured than before. Moreover, the Dange 
experience contributed to a party decision to reduce its 
dependence on particular leaders by training replacements in 
the necessary skills.
The issue, and particularly the nature of Dange1s
defence, raised in a concrete way a fundamental problem for
the party: was the WPP a Marxist party if its strategy and
tactics were based essentially on broad ideological perspectives
alone, without these perspectives being grounded in the concrete
realities of its immediate situation? At the time of the
founding of the WPP in early 1927 Spratt had stressed the
absolute necessity of intensive and constant Marxist
theoretical study, complemented by a program of detailed
research work into the specifics of the Indian situation
129with which the communists were dealing. The study circle
which he instituted at that time had produced a broad trade
union strategy which later stood the Bombay communists in
good stead. Moreover, although he took R.P. Dutt1s analysis
as his starting point in explaining Indian politics, Spratt
also displayed a sophisticated grasp of basic Marxist
categories which was far removed from the 'vulgar Marxism' of
12 9the Stalinist era. ' But the study circle survived for only 
a few months and was not revived in 1928 (perhaps partly because 
of the demands of the general strike) and, apart from Dange's
128. ibid., 13/1/29.
129. MCCC, P.1976: 'Party Training'; P.1013: 'Suggested
Syllabus'. The bibliography for the course was: The
Communist Manifesto; Lenin's State and Revolution, Left 
Wing Communism, Imperialism, and The Proletarian 
Revolution; Stalin's Leninism; and R.P. Dutt's Modern 
India and Communism. Spratt's conceptual framework was Leninist rather than Stalinist. Nevertheless the course is a study in applied Leninism. There is no evidence of a critical evaluation of Leninist conceptual categories in
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individual initiative, no research program was initiated. 
Without both theoretical sophistication and concrete studies 
of Indian realities, the Indian communists' response to 
received doctrine from international sources would necessarily 
be either uncritical or based only on 'impressions', 'whims' - 
on 'sheer pragmatism and the mood of the masses'. That the 
latter was the case for the Bombay WPP can be seen in the
way it contributed towards the drawing up of the political 
thesis adopted by the AIWPP conference in December 1928.
R.P. Dutt's 'new Imperialist policy' theory provided 
the starting point for the formulation of the December thesis. 
As we have observed, Dutt's analysis had difficulty in 
accommodating some new features of the 1927-28 situation: the
British government's hardening attitude towards even moderate 
Indian political opinion and towards the economic demands of 
Indian capital; and the increasingly bitter opposition to the 
Raj of the moderates and the industrialists as well as of the 
Congress leadership. After a period of uncertainty both Dutt 
and Spratt reasserted, with some makeshift adjustments, the 
CPGB analysis. They now argued that these new economic and
129. Cont'd
the light of Indian realities. The analysis of agrarian 
relations is particularly inadequate.
130. MCCC, P.2419(P): op. cit.; Dange later wrote from the 
Meerut Jail that Tn Bombay 'The theoretical calibre was 
never attended to. Even the trade union organisation 
[and] the simple workers' grievances and problems were 
not studied by the most leading men': MCCC, P.2512:
'The Situation in India'.
131. R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', in LM, Vol.l0(6), June 
1928, pp.323-41; MCCC, P.526(41): pamphlet titled 'The 
Role of the WPP', written by Spratt and published in early 
July. Spratt wrote to London in late October of the
'apparent increase in the acuteness of the conflict between 
the British and Indian bourgeoisie' (my emphasis), and 
informed them that he had been 'rather puzzled throughout 
to account for the behaviour of the government in connection
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political developments arose from temporary readjustments 
within British capitalism during a period of difficulties.
The overall British strategy of industrialising India and 
incorporating its bourgeoisie through progress towards 
eventual dominion status, however, remained. The Indian 
bourgeoisie's current protests, the revamped analysis argued, 
were no more than attempts to win a few immediate concessions.
The significance of these protests would vanish in the longer 
term when British imperialism resumed its fundamental strategy.
The crucial feature of the Indian situation as far as the mass 
movement was concerned was that, despite the bourgeoisie's 
protest against current British policy, it was continuing its 
retreat because of its fear of the rising mass movement.
Further, the National Congress, as an organisation, and not 
merely its leadership, was now declared to be firmly under 
the control of the retreating bourgeoise. This was evidenced 
by the resurrection of the old guard leadership which had 
betrayed the Non-Cooperation movement, its disregard of the 
resolution for Complete Independence passed at the Madras 
session of the Congress in December 1927, and the subsequent 
decision to adopt the Nehru Report strategy. Further, because 
the Congress no longer possessed any significant anti-imperialist 
potential, neither did its radical wing - Jawaharlal's Independence
131. Cont'd
with the [Statutory] Commission. It seems unnecessarily 
provocative; and I have been driven to various more or 
less improbable explanations on grounds of tactics. ... I 
don't think, on the other hand, that there has been any 
very important change in the attitude of either side, to 
judge e.g., from the Anglo-Indian press, and the Nehru 
Committee's Report. I mean that there is no fundamental 
change in the situation from our point of view' (MCCC, 
P.2419(P): 0£. cit.). Spratt and Dutt made their 
theoretical adjustments independently of each other.
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for India League (IIL). Rather, the IIL, too, was firmly 
linked to the bourgeoisie. Its political function was to 
disorganise the revolutionary mass movement by attempting to 
win its leadership through radical phrases and then leading 
it astray. Therefore the communists should not participate 
in the Congress organisation, except for the temporary and 
purely tactical purpose of winning over the remaining Congress 
radicals to the genuine revolutionary movement led by the 
WPP. Nor should WPP members join the IIL, nor enter into any 
permanent alliances with it. It was now time for the WPP finally 
to take the initiative in establishing an independent revolutionary 
mass anti-imperialist movement outside the framework of the 
Congress.
This analysis was discussed at the September meeting
of a provisional AIWPP committee at which both Bombay and Bengal
132members were present. While Spratt and Muzaffar Ahmad
advocated this 'ultra-proletarian' and anti-Congress strategy, 
the Bombay communists' response was ambiguous. The ambiguity 
arose from their experiences during the year. The Dutt analysis 
appeared to be partly congruent with that experience, but in 
other respects practice appeared to call both the analysis and 
its conceptual categories into question.
The partial congruence arose from the communists' 
proletarian perspective. In Bombay there was a substantial, 
militant proletariat, large sections of which had begun to 
progress from purely community modes of organisation and 
consciousness towards class modes. The Bombay proletariat did
132. MCCC, P.526(39) and P.670: respectively, Spratt's and
Bradley's notes of the meeting.
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appear during 1928 to be playing a 'vanguard' role in Indian 
politics. The BPCC leadership was largely representative of 
Bombay's Indian capital and, as such, had adopted 'reactionary' 
or 'vacillating' policies towards the working class radicalism 
and the major anti-imperialist event of the year - the anti- 
Simon boycott. The communists, basing themselves on the 
workers, had played the leading role. This had also brought 
them up against the Congress's national leadership, who did 
appear, too, to be closely allied with Indian capital against 
the working class. Gandhi's 'feudal' ideology was used in 
practice to justify his policy of maintaining the Bombay 
workers in a state of political passivity.
There were, nevertheless, some apparent discrepancies 
between theory and reality. Bombay's industry and proletariat, 
though substantial, were hardly increasing - on the contrary 
they were suffering the effects of a protracted
crisis. Though the example of the textile workers, or at least
the Maratha section, was encouraging, the communists had
eventually discovered the deeply entrenched character of
'feudal' community consciousness within the working class.
This realisation contrasted with their earlier optimism about
the consciousness of industrial labour being incipiently 
133'proletarian'. ‘ Community consciousness was not - as Roy 
and Dutt had argued - essentially an artificial, residual 
'false consciousness' bearing little relationship to contemporary 
socio-economic realities. It could not, therefore, be 'thrown 
off in an instant' in a period of crisis. Finally, the Bombay
133. See, eg., Dange's observations in MCCC, P.2512: op. cit. .
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communists were not convinced of the wisdom of a total break
with the Congress. They had found membership of the
organisation useful for their purposes, despite the dominance
of the business faction. The support provided by radicals
such as Nariman was also regarded as valuable. The September
AIWPP meeting agreed that attempting to 'capture' the Congress
134was now 'hopeless'. But after the meeting Spratt wrote to
London:
... in Bombay [and UP and the Punjab] ... a great 
difficulty will arise about the relations of the 
Party to the Congress. There may be trouble about 
it in the forthcoming ... [December AIWPP] 
conference, and it is certain to arise sooner or 
later. The Congress in these places is not at all 
acutely class conscious [as in Bengal], and all the 
leading ... [WPP] members are also staunch 
Congressmen, and find little inconsistency in it.
I believe that a sharp break with the Congress is 
inevitable, but we cannot bring it about yet.135
Consequently, largely as a result of Bombay's pressure, the
policy conclusions following from the current CPGB-Spratt
analysis were modified at the December AIWPP conference. The
political thesis adopted there was based on the premise that
'It is British imperialist policy to industrialise India, in
partnership with Indian capital, though in such a way that
136British predominance is maintained'. But the Congress was
not yet completely controlled by the bourgeoisie:
For some time ... the Congress will maintain its 
composite character, as a loose organisation, with 
indefinite creed, under bourgeois leadership, but 
with a petty-bourgeois following including different 
social strata and different political tendencies, some 
of a potentially revolutionary nature.
134. MCCC, P . 526 ( 39) : op. cit.
135. MCCC, P . 2419 (8) : op. cit..
136. MCCC, P.56: op. cit..
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Therefore, during a transitional stage while the Congress 
retained this character and the WPP remained relatively weak, 
it would
... be necessary to follow the traditional policy 
of forming fractions within Congress organisations 
for the purpose of agitation, of exposing its 
reactionary leadership and of drawing the revolutionary 
sections towards the ... Party. This policy, however, 
is only temporary. The ... Party can have no intention 
of dominating or capturing the Congress: the function
of its members within the Congress is a purely 
critical one. Party members cannot, therefore, be 
allowed to take office in Congress organisations 
(except with the special permission of the N[ational] 
E[xecutive] C[ommittee]). The object of the ... Party 
can only be to build up its own independent 
organisation so that it can as soon as possible 
dispense with the necessity of agitation within the 
Congress.137
This compromise, allowing continued work within the Congress
for the time being, was largely a consequence of the Bombay
viewpoint. It was not until February that the Bombay WPP
decided to implement the December decision to withdraw from
13 8the Bombay branch of the IIL, and there was no further 
discussion within the party restricting the work of communist 
Congress office-bearers.
The Bombay communists intuitively recognised the lack 
of political wisdom in isolating themselves by breaking with the 
Congress, particularly when the WPP was such a small and weak
137. ibid..
138. MCCC, P.1344: EC meeting, 3/2/29.
387
13 9party. However they were not able to establish in
theoretical terms their disagreement with the Roy-Dutt 
analysis. They did not recognise the 'Janus-like' quality 
of the bourgeoisie and the Congress leaderships which they 
opposed; the communists did not see that both the class and 
the political leadership were simultaneously 'genuinely' anti­
imperialist and anti-revolutionary.^^ Consequently, although 
they pursued a 'united-front' policy, their theoretical 
legacy to the next period remained 'left-sectarian'. This 
absence of a sound communist 'united-front' position in the 
1920s would contribute to the problems of Indian communism 
in the early 1930s. This was the price of 'pragmatism'.
A Problem Area - the Peasant Question
The inadequacy of the received 'new Imperialist policy' 
theory also contributed to the urban 'petty bourgeois' communists' 
failure to come to terms with the peasant question. The 
Roy-Dutt theory's formal emphasis on the importance of agrarian 
politics in India was offset by the argument that the political 
future lay with the proletariat. Thus, even in early 1929,
Spratt could still assert (and in a public manifesto) that
139. Guillermaz (op. cit., pp.140-2) has stressed the equivalent 
dependence of the Chinese Party upon the KMT during the 
former's early years. As the KMT had been established 25 
years before the CCP and had an established organisation and 
a great deal of prestige in the eyes of China's nationalist 
intellectuals, the CCP began its career at a considerable 
relative disadvantage. Its only means for fairly rapidly 
expanding its influence in both town and country was by 
working within the KMT, despite the attendant risks. The 
Indian National Congress had been functioning for 50 years 
when the Indian communists began their career. Their 
initial dependence would, for this reason alone, be 
considerably greater than was the CCP's on the KMT.
We will explore this theme in Chapter 5.140.
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'The peasants will be but passive followers of the working 
141class' ; and, elsewhere, that the peasantry was 'naturally 
very reactionary and backward1 .  ^ In Bombay this particular
consequence of the theory was magnified by the fact that 
proletarian political practice in the late 1920s tended to 
'confirm' the 'ultra-proletarian' doctrine.
In theory, the WPP was to be based on both the working 
class and the peasantry. When the party was founded in early 
1927 it decided to concentrate initially on the proletariat, 
but to take up the peasant question 'as soon as possible'.^ ^
144Throughout 1927-28 the WPP had a formal peasant Sub-committee.
In practice, however, the peasant committee remained inactive.
Even in 1928, when the massive exodus of the mill strikers to
their villages provided an unusually favourable opportunity to
establish rural contacts, the communists went no further than
urging the returning strikers to 'raise the Red Flag' in their
14 5villages by agitating for the non-payment of rents and taxes. 
During both the 1928 and 1929 strikes the Bombay government 
worried about this possibility - but,significantly, its 
particular concern was not that the communists, but, rather, 
the Congress, would capitalise on the rural radicalisation.^ ^
141. MCCC, P. 527(8): 'Manifesto of the CPI to all Workers'.
142. MCCC, P. 527(4): 'Elementary Course' (for cadres), early 
1929 .
143. MCCC, P. 1335(7)D: Spratt's Notes for a WPP Meeting,
26/1/27
144. In 1927 J.3. Patel was the secretary of the peasant 
committee,and in 1928 it was Parvate: MCCC, P. 851: article 
in BC 24/2/27 ; MCCC, P. 826: Bombay Annual Report, Mar. 1928
145. NAI, H. Poll, 18/XVI/1928: G of Bombay to G of I, 10/9/28.
146. loc. cit.; NAI, K. Poll, 303/1929: record of conversation 
between Haig and Kelly (Bombay Commissioner of Police)
4/6/29.
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In late 1928 the Bombay party had to report to the Calcutta
AIWPP conference that its 'main work has been essentially
confined to the industrial workers in the City, and owing to
certain insurmountable difficulties the work of organising the
147Peasants has been left in the background'. This situation
had still not changed significantly by the time of the Meerut 
Case arrests.
But the problem went deeper than the inadequacies of
received doctrine. Nor can the great demands on very limited
manpower resources of the general strike and the building of
the GKU completely explain the failure. At least one member
could have been spared for full-time work on this important
question - both in research and in making rural contacts.
In Dange's view this was certainly possible after the ending
148of the 1928 strike. But these urban intellectuals were
extremely reluctant to leave the cities for the alien world
of the villages, and were not even enthusiastic about research
work on agrarian relations and conditions. In April 1928 the
comrade in charge of the peasant committee reported to the
party that so far no members had responded to his calls for
recruits for peasant work and, consequently, nothing had been 
149done. He appears to have been reluctant to work on the
question alone. The communists' displayed this reluctance right
147. MCCC , P. 420.
148 . MCCC , 
1929
P. 2512: 'The Present Situation
or early 1930.
in India', late
149 . MCCC, P. 1344: minutes of EC meeting, 1/4 /2 8
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up until the Meerut arrests. 'There is a psychological reason 
for it', Dange wrote after the arrests:
It is the remnant of petty bourgeois 
psychology. The T.U. movement in the 
cities gives a tremendous all-India 
publicity [to] the leadership, which the 
leader does not like to leave and (sic) 
sink himself in the tedious peasant work„,_Q 
which for a long time gives you no fame.-1"
Thus, although the Bombay communists' working class success 
provided new opportunities and resources for bridging the 
gulf between themselves and the peasantry, the- success 
actually reduced their motivation to make the step. This 
'psychological reason' was probably connected to the 1920s 
1bohemianism' of the early recruits to communist politics.
For them a powerful element of Marxism's appeal had been 
its rationale for their revolt against the irrational and 
restrictive 'feudal' orthodoxy of their backgrounds. Urban 
Bombay was unattractive to them for the same reason. At this 
stage of their personal development at least, to have returned 
to the much more 'feudal' world of the mufussil would have 
entailed sacrificing this uncompleted project of personal 
liberation from the shackles of the past.
Moreover, on the few occasions when members of the party
150. MCCC, P. 2512: op. cit.
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did visit peasant agitations they were not encouraged by
what they found. In 1927 the WPP deputed a representative
to assess a Kolaba district agitation against increased tax
assessments. He 'returned disappointed' after discovering
that the agitation was firmly in the control of rich peasants
151and that it was directed exclusively against the government.
An assessment of the 1928 Bardoli satyagraha led to a similar
conclusion. Because it was controlled by the rich peasants,
and because their political needs were satisfied by the
'bourgeois' Congress, there was no room at Bardoli, either,
152for communist intervention.
However in this period one significant peasant agitation
developed which had more radical possibilities, namely a protest
movement in Satara district, from mid-1927 to mid-1928, against
15 3the government's Small Holdings Bill. This legislation would
have forced the sale and consolidation of fragmented, 'uneconomic' 
land-holdings, thus 'proletarianising' the lower strata of the 
peasantry and benefitting the rich peasantry. The poor 
peasantry thus provided the main force of the agitation. It 
was led by the radical section of the non-Brahman movement.
This was the first time that non-Brahman activists had been 
engaged in an anti-government movement, and so the Satara 
situation contained potential for an alliance between radical 
non-Brahmans and radical nationalists. Finally, Satara was the
151. MCCC, P. 2408 (P): Ghate to C.P. Dutt, 20/7/28 (replying 
to Dutt to Ghate, 28/6/28, which requested the Bombay 
WPP to adopt a more positive policy towards the Bardoli 
satyagraha.
152. MCCC, P. 2408 (P) : op. cit.
153. For this agitation see Omvedt, 'The Satyashodak Samaj and 
Peasant Agitation', pp. 1979-80.
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second biggest labour-supplying district for the Bombay mills,
and the repatriation of the mill strikers did overlap with
at least the final phase of the Satara agitation. But despite
all of these features the communists did not interest themselves
1^4in the agitation.
In part this failure probably occurred because the party,
in attempting to establish itself as Bombay's working class
leadership, was in competition with the city's non-Brahman 
155movement. By the beginning of 1929 this competition had
developed into open conflict. Moreover the non-Brahman radicals 
who had led the Satara agitation joined with the conservatives 
in this anti-communist attack. Thus, as late as 1929, the 
strength of the community bonds within the non-Brahman movement 
more than counterbalanced the ideological differences and at 
that stage the difficulties standing in the way of a communist 
non-Brahman alliance were probably insurmountable.
No doubt residual 'neo-Brahmanical' elitism in the 
communists' attitudes contributed to the b a r r i e r . T h a t  such 
a tendency continued to exist is suggested both by the limited 
response which the non-Brahman campaign did elicit from the 
Marathas on the managing committee and by the nature of the 
communists' reaction to this development. Non-Brahman approaches 
to the working class managing committee members resulted in 
Kasle's defection and the temporary vacillation of several of
154. The WPP minute book shows that the Satara agitation 
was not even officially discussed by the communists.
155. We noted this in Chapter 3. The nature of the conflict 
is examined in Chapter 5 (3).
156. Omvedt, who, rightly, attaches considerable importance to 
the fact that this alliance did not materialise, considers 
that communist elitism was the most important factor 
contributing to the failure (see her 'Non-Brahmans and 
Communists', pp. 755-756 and pp. 804-805).
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157the others. The managing committee survived essentially
intact - thereby demonstrating the strength of the alliance
between the communists and the working class militants; but
Kasle's defection and the temporising of the others suggests
that the worker militants resented some aspects of the
15 8communists' mode of leadership. The communists' response
to the managing committee factionalism is more revealing.
Despite the potential seriousness of the discontent the
communists did not consider the question of whether or not
they were in any way guilty of the charge of elitism: they
simply and complacently resolved that 'members should not
159fight over this communal question'.
Thus Brahman communist elitism may have been an important 
factor standing in the way of an alliance with the non-Brahman
157. NAI H. Poll, 10/14/1929: B.V. Jadhav (the non-Brahman 
Party leader) to Hotson, 26-4-29; NAI, H. Poll, 17/1929 
Bombay FR1 Jan.; Newman, op.cit., p. 322; Omvedt, 
'Non-Brahmans and Communists', p. 755.
158. There had been earlier conflicts between the communists 
and Alve and Kasle over the running of the GKU (MCCC,
P. 1344: WPP EC meetings 23/9/28 and 13/1/29). At the 
latter meeting Kasle 'objected to Dange's attitude on 
the settlement made by Kasle and Alve with the Bradbury 
mills', and also to his unilateral hiring of non-working 
class clerks - presumably for the union. During the 
Meerut Case both Alve and Kasle retrospectively criticised 
the communists for having elitist attitudes towards the 
workers (MCCC, Kasle's Defence Statement, p. 1014, and 
Alve's Defence Statement, p. 984; NAI, H. Poll, 61/1930: 
Alve's petition for release from the case, 1/2/30). At 
the time of the non-Brahman troubles there were also 
rumours that the communists were restricting the workers 
militants' control over GKU funds: NAI, H. Poll,
17/1929: Bombay FR1 Jan.
159. MCCC, P. 1344: WPP EC meeting, 13/1/29.
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radicals.^0 But that this was not serious enough to split 
the managing committee shows that it was not of fundamental 
importance. The weakness of the basis for revolutionary 
tendencies within the non-Brahman movement was probably more
1 r Tdecisive. This weakness was clearly revealed in the
early 1930s when the non-Brahman movement merged with the
Congress, thus redirecting non-Brahman radicalism and
providing the hitherto urban capitalist-based Bombay
16 2Congress with its first solid rural base. Thus the
structural feature underlying the weakness of revolutionary 
tendencies within non-Brahmanism was probably the same as 
that which made communist intervention at Bardoli an 
unpromising venture - the strong basis for an alliance, via 
the Congress, between the rich peasantry (who constituted 
the non-Brahman mainstream's main rural base) and urban 
capital. The existence of this structural basis for such
160. That Javalkar, the most militant non-Brahman radical, 
maintained relations with Mirajkar, the one non-Brahman 
communist, reinforces this hypothesis: see Omvedt, 
'Non-Brahmans and Communists', p. 801.
161. I thus differ with Omvedt (who argues that Javalkar was 
an emerging revolutionary) in my analysis of this issue.
If one does not accept that the weakness of such non- 
Brahman revolutionism was decisive then it is difficult
to explain how Javalkar was co-opted into playing a leading 
role in the conservatives' attack on the communists, 
despite the latters' obvious popularity with the vast 
majority of the Maratha working class.
162. Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and Nationalists', pp. 211-14. 
Significantly, the leading figures in the Satyashodak- 
Congress alliance were a leading non-Brahman radical,
K. Jedhe, and a radical Congress Brahman, N.V. Gadgil.
The Congress left's form of radicalism appears to have 
been sufficient for Jedhe, and the fact that Gadgil was a 
Brahman was not a barrier to the merger. Marathas 
subsequently came to dominate the Congress organisation
in Maharashtra. Javalkar moved towards Marxism from 1930 - 
a trend which was terminated by his early death in 1932 - 
but he did so in virtual isolation from the other non- 
Brahman radicals and with a limited mass base: see 
Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and Communists', pp. 800-05.
an alliance would also help explain why only one intellectual 
from a peasant background - Mirajkar - joined the Bombay 
communist movement during the Party's formative period.
Thus the communists' neglect of the peasant question 
arose not only from the shortcomings of their theoretical 
inheritance, their lack of resources and their 'petty 
bourgeois psychology', but also from the forbidding structural 
barriers working against communist penetration of the country­
side. The communists - and the government - recognised the
barrier posed by the dominant peasantry and its natural
163tendency to ally with the 'bourgeois' Congress. The
communists' awareness of the problem contributed to their
lack of enthusiasm for rural work. But as Dange later wrote,
it was 'suicidation' for the Party to concentrate only on the 
164working class and from early 1929 the communists began to 
devote more attention to the issue. In January a new party 
member from Bassein, in Thana district, submitted a report 
on a peasant agitation in that area. His report stimulated 
the first extended party discussion of the agrarian question"*-^  
and the executive resolved that it 'was desirable that we should 
establish our influence amongst the Peasantry'. But the 
discussion centred on the limited point of 'whether the Party 
was in a position to take up the lead of such movements. There
163. For the government's awareness, see Chapter 5, fn.103.
For a detailed study of the several dimensions of the 
problems for revolutionary agitation arising from the 
dominance of the substantial peasantry, see S.C. Henningham, 
'Protest and Control in North Bihar, India, 1917-42. A 
Study of Conflict and Continuity in a Colonial Agrarian 
Society', (PhD Thesis, Australian National University,
1978), passim. As Dr Henningham points out, a significant 
aspect of the problem for 'outsider' revolutionaries was 
self-protection from physical attacks by the locally 
dominant.
MCCC, P. 2512: op.cit.164.
165. MCCC/ P. 1344: WPP EC meeting, 30-1-29.
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166was no use of (sic) assisting sporadically'. The executive
decided to contact a leader of the Bassein agitation and then 
to reconsider the issue. But the Meerut arrests precluded 
any further investigation of the question and the January 
discussion was as close as the WPP came to attempting to 
build a peasant base.
A Leadership in Transition: on the Eve of the Meerut Case
Phillip Spratt described the communists' life in the
pre-Meerut Case period as having been 'a whirl of activity'
16 7involving 'unaccustomed responsibilities'. They 'had
been engaged, in some cases to the exclusion of other
occupations, in an attempt to realise a political ideal,
and to some extent to shape their lives in a way appropriate 
16 8to it'. This activity was most frenetic in Bombay and it
climaxed in the few months before the Meerut arrests. It 
was a confusing period of rapid transition in both the 
party's environment and its internal life. During these 
few months the commumists attempted to take stock of what 
had been accomplished and to identify and rectify their 
increasingly apparent weaknesses as a communist leadership 
so that they could better cope with the emerging challenges 
of the new phase.
166. loc. cit.
167. P. Spratt, 'Some Notes on Jail Psychology', Modern Review, 
Vol. LXI(6), 1937, p. 653.
168. ibid., p. 652
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The examination of the Bombay leadership in this 
period of high tension reveals both its continuing 
weaknesses and its emerging strengths. The communist 
leadership began coming to terms with its 'unaccustomed 
responsibilities' as the revolutionary leadership of a 
dynamic mass base by taking its first serious steps 
towards recreating itself as a communist party based on 
the Leninist model. The nature of its response to the major 
change in Comintern policy initiated by the 1928 Sixth 
Comintern Congress was a measure of the level of independence 
attained, as a consequence of its mass base, by the recon­
structed leadership. The communists, caught up as they 
were in the momentum of their new situation, were impelled 
to judge critically the new instructions of their international 
guides. At the same time they had, in the GKU, a new 
material basis for this relative autonomy: for the first 
time they had an indigenous source of funding with which to 
finance major political activity.
The challenge of the Pathan-millhand clashes in February 
revealed both the WPP's inadequacies as a communist political 
leadership and the communists' self-critical reorientation.
The riots developed from a conflict which arc&se during a
strike in December-January at the Shell and Burmah Oil
169installations at Sewri.
169. The following account of the development of the riots 
is based on:
Bombay Riots Enquiry Committee, Report of the Bombay 
Riots Enquiry Committee, (Bombay, 1929), (hereafter 
BREC, Report), pp. 1-7;
Bombay Commissioner of Police, The Police Report on 
the Bombay Riots of February 1929, (Bombay, 1929) 
(hereafter BCP, Report).
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The companies recruited Pathan blacklegs - a common practice
among employers - and this led to violent conflict between
the blacklegs and the strikers. Then, from January, numbers
of millhands began to join the oil installation workers in
their attacks on the Pathans. Widespread hostility towards
the Pathans already existed among the millhands - Muslim as
well as Hindu - because of the Pathans' traditional roles as
blacklegs, mill watchmen and notoriously rapacious money- 
170lenders. The Pathans had been active in each of these roles 
during the 1928 general strike and anti-Pathan feeling reached 
a high level during its course. Consequently the millhands' 
solidarity with the oil workers was natural. But in early 
February the millhands' participation in the Sewri situation 
brought the conflict into the mill area itself. At the 
beginning of February it suddenly escalated with frightening 
speed when a rumour that the Pathans were kidnapping the 
millhands' children gained wide currency. The rumour was 
founded on a long-standing popular anti-Pathan prejudice 
and was fanned by the mounting hostility against them for 
their several roles in the industrial area. The resulting 
panic closed several mills and, on February 4 and 5, violent 
and sometimes fatal, clashes erupted between Pathans and 
millhands. Although the initial attacks on the Pathans were
170. The BREC noted (Report, p. 31) commented that the Pathan
moneylender was 'particularly usurious', demanding interest 
of 150 percent and more and relying on 'a big stick' rather 
than the courts to recover his dues.
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directed specifically against those who were moneylenders,
strike-breakers and watchmen , the clashes threatened to
escalate, in the growing panic and excitement, into
indiscriminate communal rioting. This was a very serious
threat to the class basis of the GKU.
These developments shook the communists deeply.
Following closely after the non-Brahman challenge, these
two challenges registered firmly in the communists' minds
that the period of the relatively easy successes of 1928
had passed and that the challenges of the future required
a fundamental re-thinking and re-organisation. The tentative
reconsideration of the peasant question was just one
outcome of this undermining of the old complacency.
The communists were disturbed by their failure to
understand the consciousness of the millhands and, therefore,
to anticipate the escalation of the potentially destructive
events of early February. In retrospect they could see
that, since early January, there had been clear warning signs
171of the eventual turn of events. However the millhands'
acceptance of the kidnapping rumour, and the vehemence of
their 'feudal reaction' to it, took the communists completely 
172by surprise. They had seriously underestimated the extent
to which such irrational 'false consciousness' continued to
171. This paragraph is based on: MCCC, P. 1344: WPP EC 
meeting, 17/2/29 (an intensive post-mortem of the 
riots and the WPP's response to it); MCCC, P. 1170: 
notes of the same meeting.
172. The term is used in ibid.
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hold sway, and had overestimated the millhands' transition
to 'proletarian consciousness'. Thus the communists'
failure to understand this dimension of the millhands'
mental world was a measure of the incompleteness of their
own 'proletarianisation'. The communists were also
unhappy with the indecisiveness of their initial response
to the crisis and the weaknesses which the crisis had
revealed in their political organisation. Initially
party members shared in the general panic and the leadership
was unable to act decisively. Even when, on the third day,
it decided on a definite policy, the WPP did not operate
as a disciplined communist organisation. Rather, the
communists later reflected self-critically, it functioned
merely as a group of individuals acting like 'feudal 
1 173chieftains'. Even after a plan of action was decided uponK
individual party members 'were hesitating to carry out the
Policy'. Moreover, 'throughout the riot [some had] deliberately
failed to carry out the decisions' and others had acted
174contrary to the decided policy. Finally, the crisis showed
that the organisational links between the party and the mill 
committees were inadequate.
The WPP and the GKU managed to survive this crisis 
relatively unscathed. The party did manage, finally, to 
formulate a policy. Though the policy was imperfectly executed, 
'the response of the workers to the Party's call to keep
173. ibid.
174. MCCC, P. 1344: WPP EC meeting, 17/2/29
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175peace', Ghate commented was 'very commendable'.
But the communists took to heart the lessons of the incident:
it was urgent that they eradicate 'feudal' modes of
consciousness and organisation from their leadership and
that they come to terms with the revealed 'feudalism' among
the workers. The February riots prompted not only the self-
critical post-mortem after the crisis had passed, but also
a series of discussions to plan a permanent solution to the
problems that had been revealed. In particular they decided
that, having 'created the preconditions' for a Leninist
176communist party the urgent task of the moment must be 
to transform themselves from a left-wing trade union and 
nationalist leadership into a functioning Communist Party 
of India.
The sense of urgency did not arise from the Bombay
situation alone. At the end of December 1928 the communists
gained a new comrade, Dr. G.A. Adhikari, who returned to
India after several years membership of the world's second
17 7biggest communist party - the German Party. Adhikari soon
became a crucial figure in the CPI. He had been a 
contemporary of Dange's at Wilson College. Like the others 
he had been deeply affected by the ideological impact of the 
First World War and the ensuing turmoil, but his heightened
175. MCCC, P. 480: Ghate to Ahmad, 17/2/29. For an account 
of how the WPP/GKU leadership managed to pacify the 
situation, see Newman, op. cit., pp. 323-27.
176. MCG:2.
This paragraph is based on: 'Biographical Sketch', in
Rao and Sen, Our Doc, pp. 1-6; interview with G.A. Adhikari 
7/6/74.
177.
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patriotic feelings led him to devote himself to science rather
than politics. He made this choice not only because of his
love of science and his conviction that India needed its
own scientists if it was to advance, but also because he
found the existing political choices unattractive. Like
several of the other communists he rejected the extremists
for their reliance on irrational religious ideologies and
the moderates because of their moderation. He won a
Doctoral scholarship to Berlin University in the early
1920s and worked in the field of physical chemistry.
During his stay in Berlin his work attracted the attention
of Albert Einstein. But while in Berlin he also discovered
Marxism, which satisfied his former objections to political
involvement, and the Communist Party, which embodied his
17 8new philosophy. He also began working closely with
Virendranath Chattopadhyaya's Berlin group of revolutionary 
expatriates and with M.N. Roy in addition to joining the 
German Party. By 1928 he had decided to make politics 
rather than science his profession, and he arrived in Bombay 
with this intention.
One back in India Adhikari judged the Indian communists' 
achievements harshly against the German model. Writing to 
M.N. Roy in March Adhikari commented that:
178. Dutt's Modern India made a particularly big impression 
on him.
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Conditions in the ... [Party] are anarchic.
It is at present nothing more than left-wing 
Trade Unionism. ... the objective situation 
is rapidly developing. But the vanguard is a 
rearguard. Party discipline! — ? But where 
is the Party?
In addition to his German experience Adhikari also brought with
him excerpts from the decisions on India taken by the Sixth
180Comintern Congress several months earlier. Shaukat Usmani,
who had left India to attend the Sixth Congress and who had
participated in its debate on the colonial question, also
181returned to India in late December. This was the first time
that the Sixth Congress's decisions had reached the Indian 
182communists. As we will see in Chapter 6, this Congress
instituted a basic reorientation in theory and policy for India. 
It also gave some specific directives. One of these was that 
the Indian communists must give much more attention to organ­
isation and, specifically, to the formation of a strong 
Communist Party of India.
The Communist Party members of the WPPs of Bombay,
Bengal and the Punjab, convened a series of Party meetings in 
Calcutta in late December — at the time of the AIWPP conference
179. MCCC,P.1174 : Adhikari to M.N. Roy, 15/3/29.
180. Many copies of this abridged version were found during the 
Meerut Case arrests. Several of these were produced as 
exhibits in the Case. It gives only a truncated picture 
of the overall theoretical framework of the Sixth Congress 
thesis. But it was sufficient to show that the thesis 
was based on very different assumptions to those of the 
'new Imperialist policy', and it contained all of the 
policy directions pertaining to India.
181. NAI, H . Poll, 10/V/192 9 : DIB Weekly Report, 17/1/29.
182. MCCC, Judgement, p. 444.
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X 8 3and soon after the arrivals of Adhikari and Usmani. The
Bombay delegation constituted half of those present. The
Calcutta meetings focussed on 'the question of making the Party
184active, [and of] doing propaganda in the name of the C.P.I.'
The communists decided to resurrect and reorganise the moribund
CPI and to expand its membership. Several members were expelled
for inactivity or questionable conduct and others, including
Adhikari, were admitted as members. A new Central Executive
Committee was elected, with Ghate as the general secretary. The
executive consisted of five Bombay members, three from Bengal
185and two from the Punjab. Bombay was selected as the Party
headquarters and Calcutta was to take charge of the Party's new 
central organ. The five Bombay executive members would act as 
the Central Executive Committee between meetings of the full 
national body. The Calcutta meetings thus formally recognised 
Bombay's predominance.
This was the last meeting of the full Central Executive 
Committee before the Meerut Case arrests. The Calcutta meeting 
meeting had asserted the importance of a national Party and had 
created the formal apparatus for it, and during early 1929
183. IB, Communism, (1935) pp. 133-34; MCCC, Ps. 1300, 1303, 
1309 & 1295 : minutes of CPI meetings, 27, 28 & 29/12/28.
184. MCCC, P. 1295: op. cit.
185. The CEC was as follows: Bombay - Ghate, Nimbkar, Joglekar,
Mirajkar & Dange; Bengal -Ahmad, Halim & Huda; Punjab- 
Abdul Majid & Sohan Singh Josh. It is significant that 
all three of the Bengali members were Muslims, reflecting 
the break with the ex-Anushilan group.
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Muzaffar Ahmad attempted to maintain the momentum. But the 
Bombay group displayed little interest in the national organ­
isation, possibly because, as Spratt wrote, the communists'
first attempt at a full scale inter-provincial conference — the
186AIWPP conference — had been 'a farce1. The Bengal WPP's
factional struggle during the conference could hardly have in­
spired Bombay's confidence in the immediate prospects of the
187national organisation. Instead — and to Ahmad's annoyance —
18 8Bombay concentrated 'for the present' on the development of
its own WPP and CP organisations. It resolved to overcome its
189former 'indifference' to the question of recruitment by bring­
ing the most class conscious workers and more intellectuals into
19 0both the WPP and the Party. Partly to help counter the dis­
ruptive effects of repression, Adhikari was detailed to lead a
191program of ideological and technical training of members.
Finally, during several meetings in mid-March, the Bombay group
192returned to the question of establishing a Party organisation.
186. MCCC, P.5271(1): op.cit.
187. E.g. MCCC,P.1302: Ahmad to Ghate, 8/3/29, complaining of 
Bombay's 'dead-like silence' in the face of his frequent 
requests for action at the national level. This letter is 
one of several written by Ahmad in early 1929 in a similar 
vein.
188. MCCC, P.1172 : minutes of a CP meeting, Bombay, 19/3/29.
189. MCCC, P.670 : minutes of a provisional AIWPP executive 
meeting, Bombay, September 1928. This comment was made 
during a general asessment of the state of the different 
provincial branches. The Bombay communists later admitted, 
from the Meerut Jail, that they had restricted membership 
to 'a small clique' : MCG:2.
190. MCCC, P.1344 : WPP EC meeting, 30/1/29. It was probably 
not coincidental that the decision to bring more working 
class members into the Party was taken after the mill 
committee system had begun to demonstrate the workers' 
capacity for organisation and leadership.
191. MCCC,P.1344 : WPP EC meetings, 13 & 30/1/29.
192. MCCC,Ps.1171, 1172, 1173, 1296 & 1297 : minutes of CPI 
meetings, Bombay, 17 & 19/3/28.
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Those present at the meetings 'agreed on the intensive organ-
193isation of the CP' which was henceforth to be 'the basis of
19 4all Communist Work'. They resolved to organise the Party
into five departments —  trade unions, peasant organisation,
'agit-prop', political work and Party organisation.
A meeting on March 19 appointed a sub-committee of four —
Ghate, Adhikari, Usmani and a recent arrival from a Soviet
19 5training school, Amir Haider Khan —  to draw up a detailed
196program for the creation of this structure. Significantly,
however, neither the December nor the March Party meetings gave 
any attention to the specific question of underground organisa­
tion. The Calcutta meetings, in fact, ha.d continued to float 
the idea of the feasibility of a legal communist party. Haider 
Khan was subsequently to prove himself capable of effective 
underground work, but he was not able to demonstrate his talents 
until after the Meerut Case arrests, which took place on the day 
after the March 19 meeting. Because of this particular lacuna, 
and because the decisions on recruiting a wider membership and
training alternative leaders were taken too late, the arrests
19 7 eleft little of the original leadership behind. Consequently 
the communists paid a high price for their failures in these 
necessary dimensions of a 'definitely independent' revolutionary 
leadership.
193. MCCC, P. 1296 : op.cit.
194. MCCC, P.1171 : op.cit.
195. IB, Communism, (1935), pp.177-78.
196. MCCC, P.1171 : op.cit.
197. See Chapter 7, below.
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Nevertheless the significance of the transition should
not be underestimated. Its significance can be seen by comparing
the communists' respective responses to the Roy-Dutt schema in
early 1927 and to the Sixth Congress line in late 1928 and early
1929. They accepted the former almost without questioning.
Their initial reaction to the latter, however, was conditional—
that it 'should be taken up as a basis ... to be changed accord-
198ing to the conditions in India'.
Against the background of the Bombay events of 1928 the
communists deemed that the Sixth Congress line was not wholly
appropriate to 'the conditions in India'. The Bombay communists
did gradually come to regard the Sixth Congress's theoretical
framework and the general thrust of its policy formulations to
be more adequate than those of the 'new Imperialist policy'
thesis. However most of them disagreed strongly with one par-
199ticular policy directive — that they should abolish the WPP. 
They maintained both elements of this response after they were 
removed to the Meerut jail: they developed a creative and quite 
perceptive theory of Indian politics from their reading of the 
Sixth Congress document;and despite the ECCI's constant 
assertions to the contrary, they continued to maintain that it 
was politically unwise to abolish the WPP.^^ Thus when the 
communists finally decided in December 1928 to seek affiliation 
with the Comintern and to improve their direct communications
198. MCCC, P.1303 : op.cit.
199. MCCC, P.1296 : op.cit.
200. MCG;2. The Meerut group's theoretical and political 
development is studied in Chapter 8.
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with it, they also decided that policy would be formed 'by the
201Party with the agreement of the Comintern', not the other way 
around.
It was the CPI's great misfortune that these leadership 
developments arising from its 1928 achievements began so late, 
and that the political conditions within which they occurred 
were atypical. When the Raj finally clamped down the recent 
transitions had not been consolidated. Although the early 1929 
tendencies developed further inside the Meerut jail, the 
March 20 arrests broke the continuity of the CPI's evolution 
almost completely. This occurred partly because the communists 
neglected the lesson of the Cawnpore Case —  they continued to 
entertain the illusion that, because of the legalism of the 
Raj's general approach to repression, an essentially open Party 
was feasible in the current conditions. That the communist 
leadership continued to entertain this illusion demonstrated not 
only the extent to which it misunderstood the logic of the Raj's 
response to political opposition, but also the extent to which it 
remained, in its thinking, a left Congress faction.
2 0 1 . MCCC, P.416(7) : CPI Constitution, 1929. (Drawn up after
the Calcutta CPI Meetings in December).
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CHAPTER 5
ENVIRONMENTAL SHIFTS, I;
THE CONTRACTION OF URBAN »REVOLUTIONARY SPACE*, MARCH 1929-1933.
’Come along warriors, come to the battle, 
a bloody struggle is taking place.
Look, look how the enemies have led a counter-attack 
and are assailing us on all sides I •
- from the 'Girni Workers' Poem', Bombay, 
February, 1929.
By early 1929 the Bombay communists, in contrast 
to their comrades in Bengal, had built a mass base and, as a 
result, had reinforced their position within the BPCC and the 
AITUC and their footing in nationalist politics at the all- 
India level. They could have made a fair claim to being, at 
that point, the leaders of a mass movement - if not of a Party - 
stronger than that of any other communist leadership in Asia;^ 
and they seemed well placed to consolidate and further expand 
their influence within the city of Bombay and beyond. But 
these positions within Indian politics and Asian communism proved
1. Professor D.A. Low made this point during his paper on 'The
Asian Background to Decolonisation in Africa', in the Research 
School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 
on Nov. 9, 1977. The CPI occupied this position because the 
Vietnamese Party was still only embryonic and the Chinese and 
Indonesian Parties had not recovered from the repressions they 
and their movement had suffered in 1927. The Indonesian Party 
was, in fact, essentially eliminated. For the state of the 
Chinese Party at this point see: Guillermaz, op. cit., pp.
165-73, ps. 201 & 225; and S. Schram, Mao Tse-Tung^ (London, 
1967), pp.138-43.
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to be very temporary. During the following 18 months their 
advances were to be almost completely crushed or undermined 
by quite radical transformations - particularly rapid 
during 1929 - in each of the contexts within which the Indian 
communist movement functioned. Some of these changes were 
reactions against the successes of the previous year and had a 
direct impact upon the nascent CPI's continuity and fortunes.
Others were broader socio-economic, political and ideological 
shifts which, though unrelated to the communists' activity 
and without an immediate impact upon it, were to provide a set 
of objective limits to revolutionary politics in India very 
different to that of the preceding phase. The most significant 
feature of these changes was a marked contraction in the 
'revolutionary space' available to the communists in Bombay 
city. Following this contraction, Indian communism then 
began seriously to feel the impact of the major changes that 
took place in the Comintern during 1928-29.
In this chapter and the next we examine these environ­
mental shifts. This chapter will look first at the transformation 
of the Bombay situation and its immediate impact upon the 
communists' mass base and position within nationalist politics.
It will then delineate the main features of the new conjuncture 
the communists faced in the 1930-33 period. In the following 
chapter we study the changes within the Comintern.
The reaction against the rise of the WPP and the GKU 
in Bombay was multi-deminsional. For example, open attacks were 
launched by the state and Bombay's industrial and merchant 
capitalists and communal organisations, while more subtle opposit­
ions were mounted by the reformist trade unionists and the Congress
41 1
mainstream. The most crucial of these reactions was the state's 
repression, which began in March 1929. This had the most 
immediate and effective impact and, by leaving the communists' 
political apparatus and mass organisations much more vulnerable 
to the eroding effects of the other dimensions of the reaction, 
contributed decisively towards the resolution of these struggles, 
too. The Raj, in turn, in planning its offensive, also took into 
account the communists' and the GKU's indigenous oppositions. 
Almost all elements of the opposition were articulated at the 
national as well as the local level, but in significantly 
different forms at each level. These differences, also, were 
to contribute to both the modes and the timing of the reaction.
In studying these transformations we are also able to 
identify more clearly the deeper indigenous and colonial 
structures shaping the Indian communist movement throughout the 
period of the Party's formation and, ultimately, determining the 
outcome for the CPI of the bolshevisation of the Communist 
International. In the crises of this period these structures 
and their inter-relationships, formerly largely concealed, now 
stood much more fully revealed. The revelation provides an 
opportunity to explore these deeper features more fully and to 
determine their wider implications for Indian communism.
1. THE LOGIC OF THE RAJ'S ANTI-COMMUNIST STRATEGY
In March 1929, more than four years after its last 
serious attempt to crush Indian 'Communism', the Government of 
India finally and dramatically ended its apparent moratorium on
4 1 2
the repression of the movement. In the early hours of the 
morning of March 20, in an impressively coordinated secret 
operation including the stationing of two companies and three 
platoons of troops in Bombay city, 31 men were arrested in four 
provinces to be tried in the Meerut Communist Conspiracy Case.2 34
They were charged with having conspired with each other and with 
the Communist International and its subsidiary organisations, 
between 1925 and 1929, to 1 deprive the King-Emperor of his
3sovereignty of British India'. The method was-not new - it was
intended as 'a continuation of the successful Cawnpore Conspiracy 
4Case'. But it was by far the most ambitious of the Raj's 
sequence of conspiracy cases, eclipsing its predecessors with
2. The arrests, along with extensive searches and confiscations 
of literature and correspondence, took place at 10 centres 
in Bombay, Bengal, UP and the Punjab. The Bombay government 
stationed the troops to meet the possibility of ' serious 
trouble' from the millhands when they heard of the arrests 
of their leaders. (NAI, H.Poll, lO/lV/1929: G of Bom. to
G of I, 20/3/29.) The act was clear evidence of the govern­
ment's awareness of the popularity of the WPP/GKU leaders.
The secrecy of the operation testified convincingly to the 
internal security of the Raj's apparatus - on questions of 
communist repression at least. As the DIB later commented, 
despite the IB's having prepared the case for five months, 
despite the involvement of provincial officers in the dis­
tribution of the 200 arrest and search warrants, and despite 
the participation of significant numbers of Indians at all 
stages, 'the secret of the prosecution was kept': 'Nothing
got out. No one absconded, books and papers were found on 
every office table and correspondence was passing freely in 
the post. In these days,when so little is secret, this was 
something of a feat'. (NAI, H.Poll, 109/1934: Petrie to
Hallett, 7/10/33). Only one communist (Lalji Pendse) received 
sufficient warning - through a Congressman friend (N.V.
Gadgil) with a relation in the Bombay CID - to destroy 
incriminating evidence: from Lalji Pendse's unpublished
memoirs, translated for the author by his son. Dr S.Pendse.
3. MCCC: Committal Order.
4. NAI, H.Poll, lO/lV/1929: V to S of S, 19/1/29.
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its 'gigantic' scale and 'unprecedented' duration:5 6 it drew 
upon 2,500 prosecution exhibits and 320 prosecution witnesses, 
including several from Britain, cost the Government of India alone 
more than Rs. 18, 00,000, and took nearly four years to prove an 
apparently simple charge. The Meerut Conspiracy Case was, 
despite its precedents, unique in the legal and political history 
of colonial India.
The Meerut Case immediately raises four questions: why
did the Raj take the communist movement so seriously as to launch 
such a major act of repression?; why, given its earlier readiness 
to move quickly against much less serious manifestations of 
'Communism', did it wait until March 1929 to repress the activit­
ies of the preceding years?; what logic led it to choose this 
ponderous mode of repression?; and what were the immediate 
consequences and longer-term implications of both the mode and 
the logic for an urban, working class-based communist movement in 
colonial India? In answering them we also learn something about 
both the Raj's wider political strategy and the structure of 
opposition within Indian society faced by a communist movement.
The modalities of repression chosen by the government to meet the 
communist challenge were very carefully deliberated and inte­
grated with its discriminating, overall strategy for maintaining 
its political dominance; and both strategic levels were deeply 
influenced by the powerful socio-economic groups and political
5. The (pejorative) epithets are the Allahabad High Court's:
MCCC: Appeals Judgement, p.803.
6. 10, Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and 
Condition of India, 1932-33, No.67, (London, 1933), p.48. 
This assessment does not include the cost of the Appeals.
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movements that were, immediately or indirectly, opposed to 
communist politics and class-based working class radicalism.
The Background of the Meerut Case
As we saw earlier, the first phase of repression, end­
ing in the Cawnpore Case in 1924, was determined, essentially, by 
wider political factors than specific 'Communist' activities in 
India. London's exaggerated anxieties in the wake of the Russian 
Revolution and in the context of the post-War agitations in India, 
and its 'Imperial' interest in creating a 'Communist threat' in 
India, had been the most important factors. The Raj's political 
strategy of using the same 'threat' to impress upon 'moderate 
opinion' the dangers of mass-based political action, and to warn 
the nationalist movement of the political costs of 'Communistic' 
deviations, had also contributed significantly to the (uncharacter­
istically) heavy repression of M.N. Roy's first correspondents 
in India. In the political quiescence of the mid-1920s these 
metropolitan and domestic considerations lost their urgency. No 
further public demonstrations of official anti-communism were 
believed to be necessary, despite the continuation of the 
'international Bolshevik conspiracy' in India and the inaugurat­
ion of the Communist Party of India at the 1925 Kanpur conference.
By mid-1927, however, the vigilant DIB, David Petrie, 
could see future hazards presaged in the slight political shifts 
of that year. He set himself to convincing sc-eptical colleagues 
of the dangers posed by the communist presence, no matter how 
apparently insignificant. 'It would be folly to despise the day 
of small things', Petrie,in the Biblical tones favoured by 
New Delhi's Directors of Intelligence in their pronouncements on 
communism, warned the Raj. For, he continued in the pathological
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imagery found equally appropriate to the subject, 'the germ is
bound to multiply, even as that of an infectious disease, and to
'7taint the entire body politic'. The Home Department's publicat­
ion in September 1927 of a second edition of Communism in India, 
under Petrie's direction, heralded a second phase of repression. 
This time the Indian administrations rather than the India Office 
set the pace.
Again, this concern in 1927 was prompted more by 
general changes in nationalist politics than by.specific 
communist activities. In particular* Petrie was worried by what 
he saw as the growing nationalist recognition of 'the immense 
power of mass action as a political weapon' - by the increasingly 
effective percolation into the National Congress* mainly from 
communist sources, of the idea of 'the need of organising the 
labouring masses in order to associate them with the general 
movement'. The continued propagation of 'the idea that by their 
own action the masses themselves' could effect their own liberat­
ion was particularly dangerous, and it was 'indisputable' that
9'the mass action idea has come to stay' in nationalist politics. 
But Petrie was also worried by the particular threat posed by the 
communists themselves, despite'Roy's singularly barren record' of 
attempts to establish an autonomous movement in India. In 
particular, he foresaw with alarm the possibility of increasing 
communist success in the organisation of industrial labour. This
7. IB, Communism, (1927), p.292.
8. ibid., p.287.
9. ibid., p.290* (my empha sis) .
10. ibid., p.287.
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potential, combined with the possibility of another mass movement 
equivalent to NCO, was ominous: 'it needs few words to point
out the mischief that Communism might do were it to obtain a 
proper grip over ... Labour', particularly during a national 
crisis when 'the calling of a general or sectional strike among 
railway-workers, dockers, etc., might completely paralyse 
Government's ability to procure supplies and to keep open its 
lines of communication'Thus was resuscitated what had been 
the government's 'greatest fear' during 1920-22;
For all of these reasons, the DIB concluded, any 
manifestation of communist politics should be immediately and 
ruthlessly repressed:
It wjuld be as little justifiable for the Govern­
ment to relax its vigilance in time of peace as 
it would be for our health authorities to discard 
precautions when the public health is at its best. 
Wherever Communism manifests itself it should be 
met and stamped out like the plague ... it must 
be looked straight in the face,and it must be fought 
with the most unrelenting opposition. 12
13In 1927 Petrie was frustrated by 'open scoffers', 
but during the following 18 months the Government of India was 
increasingly to heed his warnings and to accept the main thrust 
of his frankly stated diagnosis and extremist recommendations. 
Its immediate concern was to deport the British communists, a 
measure regarded as absolutely essential by Petrie, and then to 
follow his advice to close 'any loophole whatsoever by which
11. ibid., p.291.
12. ibid., p.292 (my emphasis)
13. ibid., p.283.
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the agents and doctrines of Communism might find admission to 
14this country'. It was believed that these measures to isolate 
the Indian movement would be sufficient to render it impotent.
But in seeking to deport Spratt and Bradley the 
government faced a fundamental problem which had first been 
raised in the pre-1924 phase and which was to occupy it increas­
ingly during the following years - the problem, for a government 
which attached great political value to observing due legal 
process and minimising arbitrary executive action, of obtaining 
a constitutional basis for summary action against communist 
activity per se. As trade union activity had already been 
legalised the question was how to 'connect up activities which
in themselves might be capable of innocent interpretation with
15the ultimate objects of Communism'. In this case Allison, 
having committed a passport offence, could be dealt with simply. 
But Spratt and Bradley, being British citizens who had entered 
India legally, could only be deported if they breached the law. 
The sedition case against Spratt in Bombay was the first attempt 
to secure a conviction. Spratt's acquittal embarrassed the 
government and demonstrated the unlikelihood of securing a 
conviction on a political charge through the jury trials required 
at Bombay and Calcutta. Intelligence 'very carefully watched' 
Spratt and Bradley after the sedition case, but it soon became 
apparent that both men were continuing to take care not to
14. ibid., p.292.
15. NAI, H .Poll, 18/XVI/1928: G of I to all LGs, 18/8/28. The
G of Bombay (ihid.: G of Bom. to G of I, 10/9/28) noted 
the same problem: 'the ordinary law does not contemplate
interference with the ostensibly innocent and 'legal' activ­
ities of Communism, which form an integral part of Communist 
activities'.
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1 Atransgress the criminal code in their political activity.
New Delhi then began to consider new methods. It was no longer
prepared either to wait for the communists to commit an offence
or to risk another jury trial.
In May 1928, soon after the beginning of the Bombay
general strike, New Delhi and London decided simultaneously that
the problem should be overcome by obtaining through the Legislat-
17ive Assembly Executive power to deport British communists.
This additional power, it was still believed at' the time, would
be sufficient to undermine the Indian movement, 'by itself very
weak', and thus to avert 'the great potentialities of danger' in 
1 Rthe future. Accordingly the 'Public Safety (Removal from 
India) Bill', based on a draft supplied by the India Office, 
was prepared in the following months. It also incorporated the 
power to confiscate foreign remittances from communist sources.
In addition, the Home Department reviewed its procedures for 
detecting incoming communist literature, and the imperial intell­
igence system its surveillance for the departure of communist 
agents for India.
The decision to seek to gain the desired deportation 
powers through the Assembly is revealing. In 1928 the govern­
ment faced a rather delicate balance in the Assembly. This was 
because the Swarajists, the moderate, Bombay industrialist-backed 
Nationalist Party, and some Independents, had earlier formed an
16. IOL, L/PO/255: V to S of S, 9/5/28.
17. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928: V to S of S, 24/5/28, replying to
S of S to V, 3/5/28.
18. loc. cit.
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informal alliance in opposition to the government. The 
opposition was further reinforced, by other moderates, after the 
announcement that the Statutory Commission on future constit­
utional reforms would not include any Indians. This opposition 
meant that the passage of the Public Safety Bill was not comp­
letely assured. Nevertheless the government decided not to use 
the simpler and safer method of Executive Ordinance because of
the attendant dangers of'giving the Communists a martyr's halo'
20and of provoking wider moderate opposition to the government.
So, in consonance with what had become, since 1921, a basic
tenet of the Raj's political strategy, New Delhi was, as Irwin
wrote to London in May, 'careful to carry public opinion with
21us' while securing its new powers:
Moderate opinion has been alarmed by recent mani­festations of Communism. If we do anything we 
want to have that opinion with us, and we might 
possibly get support for carefully drafted 
legislation.
A great deal of attention was subsequently devoted to maximising
19
19. The Nationalist Party was founded in 1926 by a coalition of 
Liberals and other responsive co-operators, and it included 
several prominent industrialists and their representatives. 
After the 1926 Assembly elections the Nationalists, Swara­
jists and several Independents formed a loose opposition.
In 1927, at the highpoint of the alliance, it commanded 69 
of the 144 votes in the Assembly. (A.D. Gordon, op. cit., 
pp. 268-70). The reasons for the Swarajist-Nationalist 
oppositional alliance will be studied below.
20. IOL, L/PO/255: V to S of S, 9/5/28. For Irwin's view of 
the importance in 1928 of detaching the moderates from the 
Congress opposition to government, see D.A. Low, 'Sir Tej 
Bahadur Sapru and the First Round-Table Conference', in 
Low (Ed.), Soundings, p.302.
21. IOL, L/PO/255: V to S of S, 9/5/28.
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the moderates' support. New Delhi was anxious to use the 
Assembly debate to emphasise 'the distinction between political
p por subversive purposes and legitimate industrial disputes'.
Between May and August the draft bill went through successive 
23alterations to make it quite clear to the Assembly that it was
intended only for 'the people we wish to strike ...the
Communists'/ and not 'those who merely hold extreme political 
24opinions'. The bill was to be projected not as 'a measure for
the protection of Government/ but ... for public security and to
25stamp out Communism and Revolutionary teaching in this country'.
The Government also supplemented its careful redraft­
ing with an intensive anti-communist propaganda campaign, both 
before and after the bill had been introduced into the Assembly. 
As in the first phase of its anti-communist repression, the 
government continued to attach a great deal of importance to 
propaganda. Indeed, an important dimension of its anti-communist 
strategy throughout was to use its repressive actions as 
occasions for concerted propaganda exercises demonstrating the 
grave social, political and moral dangers of 'Communism' - a 
term which had earlier been used more as a synonym for organised, 
militant mass action than as a referent for specific,inter­
nationally-affiliated communist activity. Such a demonstration, 
it had been hoped since the days of Non-Cooperation, would serve
22. loc. cit.
23. The correspondence relating to the Public Safety Bill is 
contained in NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928.
24. ibid., note by Haig, 12/6/28.
25. ibid., note by Isemonger (Acting DIB), 2/7/28.
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to warn the 'property-owning classes' of the. hazards of mass 
nationalist activity, rally the moderates, and isolate the mili­
tant nationalists. To this extent the existence of Comintern- 
connected Indian communist groups was, in fact, politically useful 
to the Raj.
The government's views of the great importance of propa­
ganda in 1928, when the need to discredit both communist and 
'Communistic' activities was more pressing than in the pre-1924 
phase, is revealed in the 'Assembly Letter' incident. The 
incident was reminiscent of the government's earlier 'leaking' to
the press of M.N. Roy's program to the Gaya National Congress
2 6session and the more recent 'Zinoviev Letter' in Britain. It 
also provides an informative case study in the government's use of 
the press.
To' help to prepare the way for ... [the] anti-communist 
27legislation', the India Office and New Delhi's Home Department
decided simultaneously to have the press publish a Comintern
document which would compromise the Indian communists and convince
Indian politicians and the public of the reality and immediacy of
2 8the 'Communist threat'. A long letter of 'instructions' from
26. The 'Zinoviev Letter' - a similar letter of instructions, the 
authenticity of which has been hotly contested, from the 
Comintern to the CPGB - was published by conservative interests 
in Britain to discredit the CPGB and the Labour Party before 
the 1924 national election. See = L. Chester et al_. , The 
Zinoviev Letter, (London, 1967); S. Crewe, ^ h e  Zinoviev 
Letter: a Reappraisal', in Journal of Contemporary History,
Vol. 10(3), Jul. 1975, pp.407-432.
27. IOL, L/PO/255: S of S to V, 9/8/28.
loc. cit.; ibid.: V to S of S, 11/8/28. It was decided that 
'the advantages of publication seem [to] outweigh [the] risk 
of exposing our knowledge': ibid.: S of S to V, 14/8/28.
2 8 .
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M.N. Roy to the CPI in December 1927, markedly 'conspiratorial'
in style and including many passages hostile to 'bourgeois' nat-
29ionalism, was chosen. The operation was carefully prepared and 
30synchronised. It was decided that the Home Department should
unofficially hand a slightly edited version of the letter to
Associated Press in India, 'as I should have given it to the
"Times" here', the Secretary of State suggested, then 'instruct'
Reuter's to telegraph the same extracts for publication in 
31Britain. To ensure maximum publicity the publication of Roy's
letter was delayed until August 17, one week before the gazetting
of the deportation bill, because of the Indian press's preoccupat-
3 2ion with the All-Parties Report before that date.
29. NAI, H .Poll, 18/VII/1928: 'J' (M.N. Roy) to the CCs of the
CPI & WPP, 30/12/27. There is a certain irony in the fact 
that the HD should select a letter from a man whose effect­
iveness as a 'conspirator' it had derided,and whose influence 
in the Cl and upon the CPI was on the decline, to 'prove'
the existence of an internationally organised threat to India. 
Once again the Raj had found Roy's rather amateurish efforts 
very useful to its purposes. The publication of the letter 
aroused some controversy - particularly Roy's (correct) 
description of J. Nehru as the LAI's main contact in India. 
Both Roy and the Indian communists publicly denied the 
letter's authenticity (MCCC, P.s 549(19) & (20), 1887 & 1888). 
However the IB already had a copy of the letter, and was 
convinced of its authenticity, by early-June (in NAI, H.Poll, 
190/1928), well before it was decided to use it. In any case 
the most significant point in this context is not the question 
of the letter's authenticity, but the 'conspiratorial' use 
that was made of it - transforming a letter from Roy into the 
'Assembly Letter'.
30. In particular, Irwin was concerned that the method and timing
of the publication should not arouse in India the suspicion 
that it was London's initiative and the consequent inference 
that the bill was 'being pressed upon us from home': IOL,
L/PO/255: V to S of S, 11/8/28.
31. ibid.: S of S to V, 14/8/28, & V to S of S, 11/8/28. A copy 
of the edited version is in ibid.
32. ibid.; V to S of S, 16/8/28.
423
But the publication of the Roy letter, and the liberal
use made of it as part of the government's propaganda campaign in 
33the Assembly, did not secure the intended result. Despite the 
34propaganda, careful preparations and cautious optimism, the bill 
met with an unexpectedly vigorous opposition from the loose 
Swarajist-Nationalist coalition the government had hoped to 
divide. Eventually, on September 24, the vote was taken. The 
result was a fitting climax to the affair. Several government 
members happened to be away from New Delhi at the time and the 
Assembly President, Vitalbhai Pate]., ruled that an official member 
who arrived late for the division could not participate. When the 
resulting vote produced a tie of 61 votes to each side Patel gave 
his casting vote to the opposition. The Public Safety Bill had 
been defeated. The British communists, by the most fortuitous of 
circumstances - a contingency arising from the Raj's pronounced 
political concern to secure 'popular' legitimisation of its rule - 
had been granted an apparent reprieve.
33. It was this that gave rise to the popular term the 'Assembly 
Letter'. A copy of the complete Assembly debate on the bill 
is filed in NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928.
34. Quoting extensively from Comintern documents Crerar, the 
Home Member, sought to convince the Members that the 
communists were anti-nationalist and were working for the 
total destruction of Indian society and the negation of its 
traditional culture. He stressed their atheism. He cast the 
government in the role of the protector of the interests of 
the constituencies represented in the Assembly against a 
threat which he claimed was imminent. But, unable to reveal 
Intelligence documents, he urged the Assembly to accept his 
claims on trust.
35. The terms of the opposition mounted by the Swarajist-Nation­
alist coalition and some Independents fe.g. N.M. Joshi) were, 
essentially, anti-government, not pro-communist. The main 
arguments against the bill were that the 'Communist threat' 
was neither substantiated nor serious, that the bill would 
give (and was intended to give) the government wide
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But even before the bill had finally reached the Assembly 
the government had begun considering an alternative, more compre­
hensive move against Indian communism. In May, when the idea of 
the deportation bill was first conceived, the authorities had 
believed not only that the Indian movement could not sustain it­
self without foreign assistance, but also that the Bombay and 
Calcutta strikes then in progress did not pose a serious threat. 
These, Irwin predicted, would soon collapse and the militants
would consequently lose ground to the moderates, having been
3 6'discredited by an expensive failure'. In late July this view
3 7was still held within the Home Department. But by mid-August its
complacency had been seriously eroded. 'Until recently', the
Viceroy informed his provincial governments on August 18,
... the Government of India were disposed to 
think that, if the Indian movement could be ... 
isolated, it would not be likely to make much 
progress. But the experience of the last few 
months has suggested that the movement has 
obtained in India a stronger hold than seemed 
likely ... 38
This reassessment raised, for the first time, the question of a 
more comprehensive action directed against the Indian movement as 
a whole, not just its foreign assistants.
* * *
(35. cont'd...)
discretionary powers, which could be used against non-communists 
as well as communists, and that it could be used to discrimin­
ate between Indian and British communists. Of the National­
ists only one (F.I. Rahimtullahl supported the bill. Both 
Birla and Thakurdas (the latter being the Indian Merchants' 
Chambers representative), were prominent in the debate 
against the bill.
36. IOL, L/PO/255 : V to S of S, 9/5/28.
37. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: HM (Crerar) to V, 29/7/28.
38. ibid.: G of I to all LGs, 18/8/28.
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The Bombay government was the agency primarily respons­
ible for New Delhi's reconsiderations. The exchange which took 
place between the two governments in the second half of 1928 was 
to raise most of the issues behind, and to establish the essential 
guidelines for, the Raj's repression of communism in the following 
decade.
Between late July and mid-August Bombay sent a sequence 
of alarmist telegrams and letters to New Delhi warning of an 
impending provincial emergency, of the gravest dimensions and with 
all-India implications, if the communist leaders were not immedi­
ately arrested. The emergency arose, Bombay argued, from a con­
junction of the Bardoli satyagraha and the communists' growing
influence in the railway unions subsequent to their successes in
39the textile strike. It argued that there was a strong possibil­
ity of a railway strike which could paralyse the government's 
capacity to move troops, police and supplies to Bardoli. Bombay
was also worried about the communists' growing tendency to 'ally
40themselves with political attacks on Government', and later
expressed'its concern about their developing a rural base through
41repatriated strikers in the villages. It was unable to move
against the communists under the ordinary law as they took 'good
42care to keep within the law as it stands'; it was reluctant to 
use the emergency powers available under Bombay Regulation XXV of 
1827 because of the risk that emergency action 'against railway
39. ibid.: G of Bom. to G of I, 27/7/28, 29/7/28 & 5/8/28
40. ibid.: G of Bom. to V, 9/8/28.
41. ibid.: G of Bom. to G of I, 10/9/28.
42. ibid.: G of Bom. to G of I, 27/7/28.
426
communists who are [also] mill strike leaders will appear and be
represented as interference by Government in [a] legitimate
trades ... dispute induced by capitalist mill owners'; and
Bombay argued that Government of India action was preferable in
any case because the railways, and the implications of the wider
44communist threat, were inter-provincial. Bombay's recommendat-
4 5ions were extreme; the Government of India should immediately 
proscribe under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 'any association 
to further communistic principles' and arrest all members of such 
organisations; and the Bombay government should be allowed to 
take extensive powers to deport communists from the cities and 
intern them in rural areas, and to prevent picketing in industrial 
disputes.
But surprisingly, given its original stress on the role of 
the communists in the railways, Bombay continued to insist that 
the crisis remained just as extreme after New Delhi had establish­
ed that the WPP had neither the capacity nor the inclination to
call a railway strike to coincide with Bardoli,^ and even after
4 7the Bardoli dispute had been settled. The real problems, it 
began to appear, were the consolidation of the textile strike
4 8during July and the growing distress of the millowners.
43. ibid.: 5/8/28.
44. loc. cit.
45. ibid.: 27/7/28.
46. ibid.: Agent, GIPR to Sec., Railway Board, 1/8/28, & minutes 
of a meeting between Isemonger and members of HD, G of Bom. 
18/8/28 (.hereafter cited as; Meeting in HD, G of Bom., 18/8/28).
47. ibid.; G of Bom. to G of I, 8/8/28.
It was probably not coincidental that Bombay's first calls 
for help came soon after the strike had been greatly strength­
ened by the jobbers' decision to participate in it fully.
48 .
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The Bombay government's extreme anxiety had a context.
The organisation developed during the general strike had confirm­
ed the worst of the fears it had long entertained, since Tilak's 
efforts, of the mill workers finding an' effective political 
leadership. But of equal importance was the fact that the 
problem of the relationship between Bombay's industrial capital 
and the British colonial state had, by 1928, become acute. As 
we saw in Chapter 2, the co-existence since 1923 of the textile 
industry's economic decline, which had been aggravated by New 
Delhi's London-imposed economic policy, and the nationalist 
retreat into constitutional politics, had respectively motivated 
the Bombay industrialists towards and allowed them to adopt an 
increasingly oppositional stance towards the Government of India. 
The extent of its disenchantment was demonstrated by the Nation­
alist Party's stand against the Public Safety Bill in the Assembly, 
which had become an important national forum for industrialist 
propaganda against the government. The Nationalists maintained 
their alliance with the Swarajists on this issue despite the fact 
that the bill was directed against two of the industrialists' key 
antagonists at a time of industrial crisis. As a joint deputat­
ion of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and the Indian Merchants' 
Chamber later made 'quite clear' to the Bombay government - while 
they would welcome and publicly support government initiatives 
against the communists qua trade unionists, they 'would not be
prepared to countenance any effective action against the politic-
49al side of Communist agitation'. The Nationalist Party s vote
49. NAI, H .Poll, 1/1928: Bom. FR2 Dec.. The Public Safety Bill
came under the second category, despite its potential
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against the government on the Public Safety Bill was this part of
Bombay capital's wider, rather ambiguous tactics of limited
opposition to the Government of India because of Its current
50economic policy towards the domestic textile industry.
In their conflict with New Delhi the millowners had 
found a firm ally in the Bombay government. The government had 
a direct stake, in terms of revenue, in the health of the industry, 
and it was politically dependent on the collaboration of the 
industrialists. Bombay was therefore particularly concerned to 
promote the industry's profitability, to reduce the millowners' 
growing alienation from government, and to counter its rapproche­
ment with the National Congress. This anxiety had been evidenced
(49. cont'd..)
contribution to the first. The millowners were also 
reluctant to initiate a counter-propaganda campaign against 
the communists, despite the government's encouragement.
(NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/19 2 8: Com. of Pol., Bom. to G of Bom. 
7/8/28.) However they were not as reticent about identify­
ing themselves with government industrial initiatives that 
did not impinge directly upon issues of nationalist 
politics. When, as a response to the Bombay mill situation, 
the G of I introduced the Trades Disputes Bill - designed 
to counter 'political' trade unionism - most millowners 
supported it, some even forming a special pressure group 
(appropriately titled the 'Bombay Capitalists' Associat­
ion') for the purpose. Thakurdas, still seeking to main­
tain the Nationalist-Swarajist alliance, was one of the few 
industrialist opponents of the bill: Gordon, op.cit., p.295.
50. This, statement is not meant to deny the contribution of 
nationalist ideology to the Nationalists' stand on the 
bill, particularly in the year of the arrival of the Simon 
Commission. (For the ideological impact on the lending 
moderate, Sapru, of the exclusion of Indians from the 
personnel of the Commission, see Low, 'Sir Tej Bahadur 
Sapru', p .300.) The Nationalist Party was not simply the 
IMC in another guise. Nevertheless the Nationalists' 
nationalism could not range too far beyond the orbit 
determined by the immediate political-economic interests of 
Indian industrial capital.
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over the issue of economic policy from the mid-1920s. In A.D. 
Gordon's words:
... in all the campaigns fought by the industrial­
ists [with New Delhi) over the economic questions, 
help was forthcoming from the Bombay Government - 
even to the point of by-passing normal methods of 
procedure ... the ... Government was concerned 
both to maintain its political allies - thet-1 
industrialists - and to ensure prosperity.
This support was sufficiently vociferous to make the Bombay
5 2Government 'something of a bete noire' to the centre. At the 
level of provincial politics at least, the WPP's accusation that 
Indian industrial capital and foreign government were 'allies' 
was correct.
A similar triangular pattern of support and conflict 
developed in 1928-29 over the issue of industrial politics. 
Although the Bombay industrialists opposed the Public Safety Bill 
at the national level they applied strong pressure at the pro­
vincial level for state intervention against the strike. The 
Bombay government/because of its dependence on the millowners, 
was very responsive to this pressure. As the Department of 
Industries and Labour commented, it was 'not surprising that 
[Bombay) ... should be anxious to see a victory for the mill-
owners', despite the genuine grievances of the millhands and the
53popularity of the strike leadership. Bombay officially adopted 
the millowners' position that the strike was due primarily to 
communist agitation, not to genuine grievances, that the workers
51. ibid., pp.283-4.
52. ibid., p.284.
53. NAI, H. Poll, 18/XVI/1928: note by Clow, 4/9/28.
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had more natural leaders in the BTLU, and that the government had
a responsibility immediately to repress the communists - and to
repress them as trade union leaders rather than as opponents of
54the government. Its partisan support for the millowners 
became most explicit in August and September as it faced the grim 
prospect of the collapse of the BMOA's solidarity, the capitulat­
ion of the millowners, and a decisive victory for, and subsequent
55strengthening of, the millhands. Sir Leslie Wilson, the 
Governor of Bombay, saw all of the millowners personally at that 
point to warn them of the grave political implications of grant­
ing the strikers' demands.^ Bombay cautioned the central govern­
ment that 'Any conclusion of the mill strike on terms which 
could be represented as a victory for the millhands would be a
most signal victory for the Communists and place them in the
57position of Labour's leaders throughout India'. To avoid the 
imminent possibility of this dual victory, and the consequent 
eclipse of the moderate trade unionists, Bombay once again urged
the immediate arrest of the communists by the Government of
58 59India. It maintained this pressure into 1929.
* * *
54. ibid.: G of Bom. to G of I, 5/8/28 & 17/9/28.
55. ibid.: Meeting in HD, G of Bom., 18/8/28.
56. ibid.: Note by Haig, 24/9/28.
57. ibid.: G of Bom. to G of I, 24/8/28.
58. loc. cit.; ibid.: Meeting in HD, G of Bom., 18/8/28.
59. See the correspondence in ibid.
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The Bombay Government's succession of alarms did much
to change the Government of India's assessment of the seriousness
of the threat posed by the communists: by mid-August, following
the Bardoli settlement, New Delhi was convinced that the communists
60led 'the most important revolutionary movement in sight'. 
Nevertheless, despite this re-evaluation, it was at that point 
disinclined to make any special concessions to the millowners 
and took a rather different view of the wider significance of the 
situation to that of the Bombay administration. • In fact Bombay's 
exaggeration of the immediate threat, its partisan adoption of 
the millowners' viewpoint, and its repeated requests for New Delhi 
to initiate actions that the latter believed to be Bombay's
61responsibility, provoked considerable concern and irritation.
'Bombay official and commercial opinion', wrote Haig, the
Secretary of the Home Department, 'pays too little attention to
6 2the question [of] whether the workers really have grievances'. 
Commenting on the request for the central government to intervene 
to avoid the danger of the Bombay government's appearing partisan, 
he noted caustically that Bombay was 'alive to this as far as 
they themselves are concerned, but seem to be oblivious of it if
60. ibid.: joint HD memo by Haig & Crerar for the Sub-Ctee. of 
the Exec. Council, G of I, 4/1/29 (hereafter cited as: Haig/ 
Crerar, 4/1/29) .
61. Cf. also D.A. Low, 'The First Non-Co-operation Movement', on 
the patterns of conflict over political tactics between 
Bombay (and other provincial governments) and New Delhi 
during that movement. On this issue,too, New Delhi had 
resisted calls for immediate repressive action.
62. ibid.: note by Haig, 23/8/28. This was also the view of
the Industries and Labour Dept : ibid.: note by Clow,
4/9/28.
The(Z Othe action is to be taken by the Government of India'.
differences between Bombay and New Delhi became sufficiently
sharp for New Delhi to issue a formal rebuke: 'the position of
Government would be very unsound', the Home Department wrote in
September, 'if the desire to suppress the Communists should develop
64into a desire to defeat the present mill strike'. The Bombay
Government should use its influence 'rather in the direction of
securing some reasonable accommodation of the dispute than of
defeating the strikers with the object of discrediting their
Communist leaders'. 'The traditional role of Government in an
industrial dispute1, Bombay was reminded, 'is that of an impartial 
65arbiter'. New Delhi stressed the necessity of this role on 
two grounds: it was of great value to both groups of disputants;
and it was very important for the government's own position - 
for if government could credibly be represented as hostile to 
labour 'the path of the Communists in combining the exploitation 
of labour grievances with attacks on Government is made smooth'•
In the Government of India's careful deliberations 
over the most prudent mode of repression of communism and milit­
ant trade unionism the second consideration subsequently proved 
to be of much more significance than concern for the rights of 
labour vis a vis capital. As with the Public Safety Bill,
New Delhi very carefully weighed against the immediate gains
63. ibid.: note by Haig, 11/8/28.
64. ibid.: G of I to G of Bom., 5/9/28.
65. loc.cit., (my emphasis).
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the wider political costs of the sort of precipitate action pro­
posed by Bombay. This assessment depended upon its evaluation 
of the significance of the Bombay situation in the context of the 
overall political situation in India - an evaluation which was to 
change significantly in the following months.
In mid-August the Government of India was about to 
introduce its deportation bill into the Assembly, and was plann­
ing the introduction of trade union legislation (the Trade 
Disputes Bill) providing greater powers to control labour 
militance and 'political' trade unionism. Apart from its general 
concern not to alienate the moderates, provoke the Congress, or 
counter the hopefully salutary effect on political opinion of 
its anti-communist propaganda, the government was particularly
concerned at that point not to prejudice the passage of these
6 6two pieces of legislation. By taking emergency action or en­
acting new legislation by ordinance all of these political costs 
would be incurred. In any case, in August-September New Delhi 
did not share Bombay's anxieties about the communists' becoming 
permanently entrenched following a successful general strike. 
Immediate emergency action was not required, for the communists' 
consolidation of their position could 1 subsequently be reversed
by a successful prosecution ...the triumph of the communists
6 7would be brief'. The government could afford to allow them 
more rope while deciding on the method of repression least likely 
to increase its difficulties in other directions. These were the 
considerations underlying the Government of India's 'impartiality',
66. ibid.: V to Gov. of Bom., 13/8/28.
67. ibid.: G of I to G of Bom., 5/9/28.
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and the 1928 general strike's freedom from repression. New Delhi
was more concerned with Bombay's failure to 'take a very compre-
6 8hensive view of the situation' than with its hostility towards 
labour. The differences between the two levels of the adminis­
tration were much less substantive than those behind the conflict 
over the textile industry's economic demands. The millowners' 
interests in industrial politics - and therefore the question of 
defeating effective trade unionism - did not loom nearly as large 
in New Delhi in August-September 1928 as they did in Bombay. But 
the Government of India was just as determined to crush the 
communist labour leaders, despite its tactical differences with 
Bombay, and it would subsequently prove to be more amenable on 
the wider trade union question as well.
This was the carefully considered background to 
New Delhi's decision that a case based on a charge of conspiracy 
against the state was the optimum tactic in the existing situation. 
It made this decision despite the fact that the communists' 
activity so far had been markedly open and un-conspiratorial and 
had not been primarily directed against the state, and despite 
the fact that the necessarily lengthy preparations for the case 
would considerably delay its anti-communist repression. The 
perceived advantages of this mode of repression, relative to
those proposed from Bombay and other provincial governments, were
69spelt out subsequently: it was the sole means available under
68. ibid.: note by Haig, 22/3/29
69. ibid.: Haig/Crerar, 4/1/29. (This memo was an extended 
consideration of all possible courses of action available 
to the central and provincial governments, and its 
recommendations were adopted as G of I policy.) See also 
NAI, H.Poll, 10/IV/1928: V to S of S, 19/1/29.
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the existing law for moving against the communists and their 
associates; it would immediately 'break up the existing organis­
ations and remove the more dangerous leaders'; the subsequent 
convictions would 'expose by means of a judicial pronouncement/ 
which could not be questioned/ the real aims and methods of the 
Communists'; this legal finding could subsequently be used to 
justify the proscription of communist organisations in a way that 
minimised the political risks of direct proscription; for all 
of these reasons it would serve in any case to 'deal the whole 
Communist movement a much more serious blow', more permanent in 
its effects, than would any alternative emergency measures or 
special additions to the law; 'and at the same time the Govern­
ment would avoid the odium and the political danger of adopting 
these special expedients'.
The idea of another conspiracy case under Section 121-A
of the Indian Penal Code had been championed for some time by the
70Acting DIB, Isemonger. The Bombay situation provided him with 
the opportunity to gain wider acceptance for the idea. It was 
first mooted very tentatively with Bombay on August 2, and again, 
along with other alternatives, with all provincial governments 
on August 18. Bombay, still smarting from the experience of 
the Spratt sedition case and apprehensive of the results of
72another jury trial for a political offence, reacted negatively.
73It escaped the consideration of the other governments. But
70. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: note by Haig, 23/8/28. For Ise­
monger ' s arguments see NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928: Isemonger 
to Haig, 20/9/28.
71. In NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928.
72. ibid.: G of Bom. to G of I, 5/8/28.
73. Their replies, written between Sept. & Dec., are in ibid.
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New Delhi, despite Bombay's reaction, began to explore the option
in greater detail. Isemonger was sent to Bombay and Calcutta in
mid-August to assess the situations there and to confer with the
respective governments. In Bombay he was only able to secure
the administration's support for a conspiracy case that was held
promptly, to break the current strike, and outside that province
74so as to avoid a i jury trial in Bombay. In Calcutta he gained
the Government of Bengal's acquiescence, but not its enthusiastic 
75support. But by the time Isemonger had returned to New Delhi
the Home Department had already decided, on the basis of his
interim report from Bombay, that 'Nothing would suit us better
7 6than a successful conspiracy case'. By September 8, during
the course of the Public Safety Bill debate in the Assembly, the
Government of India was sufficiently confident of this course to
notify the India Office that its possibilities were being serious-
77ly investigated. A team of legal specialists was appointed to 
assess the likelihood of its success.
(73. cont'd)
Though most of the other govts'. did not regard action 
against communists as being urgently required, all recommend­
ed repressive action against them via additional powers.
74. ibid.: meeting in HD, G of Bom., 18/8/28; G of Bom. to G of 
I, 24/8/28; Isemonger to Haig, 20/8/28.
75. ibid.: note by Isemonger, 29/8/28. In fact at no point dur­
ing the deliberations leading up to the Meerut Case did 
Bengal appear anxiouä for drastic action against the commun­
ists: e.g. it did not reply until Dec. 19 to the G of I's 
Aug.18 letter canvassing the provincial governments' views 
on methods of repression, and in its reply argued that there 
was no serious communist problem.
76. ibid.: note by Haig, 23/8/28.
77. ibid.: G of I to S of S, 8/9/28.
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Thus the Government of India had already decided that
it would prefer a conspiracy case, provided that it could be
absolutely assured of success, before the bill had been defeated.
This decision conditioned its response to the defeat. It briefly
78considered enacting the legislation by ordinance but then decided
to wait to reintroduce the bill in early 1929. There were two
79reasons for this decision. The first was the political cost of 
executive action, particularly when 'it would be difficult to make 
out that a real emergency existed, ...[justifying] legislation at 
all costs'. Secondly, and more importantly, because Spratt and 
Bradley were central figures in the 'conspiracy' they were now 
needed to strengthen the proposed conspiracy case. For this reason 
they would not be deported even if the necessary powers were 
passed and, Irwin wrote to his provincial governors,
I attach such importance to the maintenance in 
some form of reserve powers, even after the 
next revision of the Constitution, that I am 
very loath to bring them into discredit by 
employing them without being certain that the 
legislation ... is goin§ to be immediately 
required. 80
It was for these reasons that the defeat of the bill allowed 
Spratt and Bradley a temporary reprieve. The defeat was, in fact, 
despite the immediate political embarrassment, convenient to 
New Delhi's new plans for crushing the Indian movement as a whole.
* * *
78. NAI, H .Poll, 18/VII/1928: V to S of S, 25/9/28.
79. ibid.: V to all Provincial Govs., 25/9/28.
80. loc. cit.
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The India Office, however, did not share New Delhi's
enthusiasm for the conspiracy case tactic. It was worried by the
possibility of legal and political difficulties in India. Sir
Malcolm Seton (prophetically) warned his Minister:
It looks as if His Excellency has come to think of 
an elaborate conspiracy trial as an alternative to 
legislation. ... experience has shown that such 
trials for conspiracy (except ...[on a charge of 
having committed] a particular outrage ...) 
present many difficulties. 81
But of more immediate concern to the India Office was the proba­
bility of politically embarrassing repercussions in Britain, on 
the eve of a sensitive national election. It was worried in 
particular about the trade union and civil liberties agitation 
and the difficult questions in Parliament which would be prompted
by the trial of Indian trade unionists and, especially, British
8 2citizens, on a charge of conspiracy against the state.
However this difference of opinion was, as was that 
between New Delhi and Bombay, tactical rather than strategic.
Even if Spratt was deported, the Secretary of State wrote to 
Irwin,
81. IOL, L/PO/255: Seton to S of S, 17/9/28; see also NAI,
H.Poll, 18/VI1/1928: S of S to V, 18/9/28; Sc IOL, L/PJ/6/1967
File 3788/1928: 10 notes on V to S of S, 13/11/28.
82. NAI, H.Poll, lO/lV/1929: S of S to V, 21/2/29 Sc 7/3/29, Sc 
note by Petrie (DIB), 1/4/29. For background on the relat­
ionships between the Conservative Government, the trade 
unions and the Labour Party at this time see P.Renshaw, 
'Anti-Labour Politics in Britain, 1918-27' in Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol.l2(4), Oct. 1977, pp.693-705.
With the British trade unions in general, and the militants 
in particular, having been defeated in the 1926 General 
Strike and its aftermath, the conciliatory Baldwin preferred 
to avoid further clashes with the unions - partly, perhaps, 
to minimise opportunities for communists and other militants 
to gain ground at the expense of the now-entrenched union 
moderates.
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... we should not be content with that achievement, 
but should proceed to smash the organisations which 
he has established and which would continue his 
work after his departure, and further ... we should 
render it impossible to build up such organisation 
in the future. ... Government ... [must be]armed 
with much wider and more drastic powers than it has 
now or will obtain from the Public Safety Bill.83
For the India Office the least politically damaging path to this
goal was the immediate deportation of the British communists
followed by the proscription of communist organisations and the
8 4prosecution of their members. Its tactical difference with 
the Government of India was, as was that between the latter and 
Bombay, a reflection of the different political contexts of the 
different levels of the colonial administration.
By December 1928, then, both London and New Delhi were 
agreed that Indian communism posed a serious and immediate 
threat and that it was necessary to use whatever methods were 
necessary to 'smash' the movement and 'render impossible' its 
further development. For both, this required the removal, 
through the proscription of communist organisations, of the 
existing .legal constraints on action against communists. The 
India Office's concurrence with New Delhi's strategy, if not its 
tactics, formalised the initiation of a sequence leading to the 
eventual banning of the CPI and its associated organisations.
* * *
The tactical debate between London and New Delhi con­
tinued through the early months of 1929, the Secretary of State
83. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928: S of S to V, 19/12/28.
84. loc. cit.
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maintaining his initial objections to a conspiracy case.^ But 
for New Delhi this pressure was more than counter-balanced by 
recent political developments in India: the apparent radical-
isation of the Indian National Congress and its threat of another 
mass agitation? the consolidation of the communists' working 
class movement; and mounting pressure from industrial and 
commercial capital and other interests for action against the 
communists and militant trade unionism. For New Delhi these 
developments made the course of action suggested by the India 
Office even more unacceptable.
Ideological developments within nationalist politics 
during 1928 appeared to the Government of India to be fulfilling 
Petrie's predictions. New Delhi was particularly concerned 
about the formation within Congress of a youthful, radical 
nucleus - reinforced by the communists in the AICC - interested 
in the organisation of labour and youth in preparation for 
another mass movement for 'Complete Independence'. Jawaharlal 
Nehru's activity became the main object of this general anxiety.
The government had been worried about Nehru from the
time of his return to India at the end of 1927, 'fresh from his
8 6internationalist and communist connections' in Europe. His
85. The correspondence is in NAI, H.Poll, lO/lV/1929.
86. IOL, L/PJ/6/1955 File 365/1928: Haig to Hirtzel, (Under S
of S), 19/1/28. In Haig's view there was 'no doubt that--
Nehru is anxious to link up the Congress with the avowed 
enemies of the British Empire abroad'. For a more extended 
account of Nehru's activities in this period, and of the 
Raj's resulting concern, see S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru,
A Biography, Vol.l (London, 1975), pp.100-26, & espec. 
pp.122-26. Gopal, however, over-emphasises the possibility 
that the government considered including Nehru in the con­
spiracy case. His name was not suggested in either the 
original lists drawn up before the arrests, or at the HD
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activities during 1928 fuelled these anxieties - his championing
of the cause of the Comintern-affiliated League Against Imperial- 
87ism, his 'Complete Independence' resolution at the 1927 Madras 
session of the INC, his role in the formation of the Independence 
for India League, and his encouragement of radical youth 
associations. New Delhi's anxieties were confirmed by the pro­
ceedings of the Calcutta session of the INC, Nehru's election as
president of the AITUC at the end of 1928,®^and Subhas Bose's
89first experiments with trade union politics. The Home Depart­
ment observed 'the very marked movement among the extremist
nationalists', most notably Nehru and Bose, 'to try and make
90use of the masses' in a renewed challenge to the Raj. Further,
(86. cont'd)
meeting on 6/6/29 which considered the inclusion of a fur­
ther six men in the case (NAI, H.Poll, lO/lV/1929). In­
deed, to have included Nehru would have defeated/as we 
shall see, one of the primary purposes of the case.
87. For HD concern about Nehru's connection with the LAI see:the 
intercepted correspondence between the LAI (particularly
V. Chattopadhyaya) and Nehru in NAI, H.Poll, 120/1928 (and 
the accompanying HD notes dated 23 Sc 24/7/28) and in NAI, 
H.Pöll, 18/VII/1928, KWXi; and the IB memo (28/11/28) in 
NAI, H.Poll, 10/XI/1929.
88. The HD was particularly worred about Nehru's election as 
AITUC president because this brought him into closer con­
tact with the communists, who had made a strong showing at 
Jharia. (NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928, KWXI: report on the 
Jharia AITUC session). See also Nehru's account in his 
Autobiography, pp.186-7.
89. Bose became involved, in Sept. 1928, in the closing stages of a protracted strike at the Jamshedpur iron and steel works, 
and subsequently became president of one of the two unions 
there. His policy at Jamshedpur was, Spratt found, 'peace 
with the Company and support the Congress'. (MCCC, P.2419P: 
Spratt to R. Page Arnot, 23/10/28). See also Karnik, op. 
cit., pp.230-31.
90. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928: note by Haig, 4/1/29.
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it mistakenly believed that the Calcutta session showed that
these younger radicals now held the initiative within the 
91Congress. By January 1929, under the threat of another mass
agitation against the government,this trend was regarded as 'a
92greater danger than Communism'. The government's alarm was
further magnified by what it saw as 'a tendency for the political
and Communist revolutionaries to join hands', combining their
respective attempts to mobilise the working class,with Nehru
93standing 'about at the meeting point'.
These worrying developments, and particularly the 
prospect of a radical-led civil disobedience movement, placed 
the communists' working class movement in a new and more danger­
ous context. The Home Department doubted that the number of
'convinced theoretical Communists' was 'likely to increase 
94largely', but the government had to act soon to remove the 
possibility of working class agitation being coordinated with 
a general movement against the Raj. The breaking of the radical
91. NAi; H.Poll, 179/1929: Gof I to all LGs, 21/2/29. Cf.
S. Gopal (op. cit., pp.127-8) on Jawaharlal's subsequent 
election as Congress president: 'From the viewpoint of the
older leaders, there was a great advantage in having in 
the chair the malleable founder of the independence move­
ment; his opinions underwrote the genuineness of their 
intention to start civil disobedience, even while they 
could be confident that he would be amenable, if need be, 
to Gandhi's persuasion'; and (ibid., p.137) on Gandhi's 
realisation that Jawaharlal was 'the best shield of the 
Congress against left-wing groups and organisations'.
92. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928: minutes of meeting of Sub-Ctee
of Exec. Council, G of I, 8/1/29. (hereafter cited as SCEC, 
8/1/29).
93. NAI, H.Poll, 179/1929: G of I to all LGs, 21/2/29.
94. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVT/1928: Haig/Crerar, 4/1/29.
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9 5working class movement was even more imperative than before.
But the recent shifts within nationalist politics also 
imposed upon the government a particularly cautious and dis­
criminating anti-communist policy. It was 'important to recognise 
the similarities and the differences' between the 'Communist' 
and 'extreme nationalist' movements. The Government of India, 
the Executive Council decided, should
... do nothing which will produce an artificial 
union between the two movements, which, if left 
to themselves, may tend to diverge. .... we 
should be very cautious in taking action against 
Communism which may rouse for the Communists any 
general sympathy among the nationalists or pro­
vide the nationalists with what they are search­
ing for at the moment, namely a good rallying 
cry for an intensive anti-Government agitation.
The new currents within nationalist politics thus accentuated
the political risks accompanying the method of repression
recommended by the India Office; for this required action by
Executive Ordinance or emergency legislation and discriminated
between Indian and English communists. New Delhi believed that,
as the objections to the Public Safety Bill had indicated, any
of these'measures would exacerbate nationalist agitation against
government- thus strengthening the position of the Congress
radicals - place the moderates in a more difficult position, and
95. loc. cit. Irwin was later, during Civil Disobedience, to
reflect with relief on 'having these Communist patriots 
out of the way at a difficult time' : IOL, Halifax Papers,
Vol.6: Irwin to Benn (S of S), 19/12/30.
96. NA.I, H .Poll, 18/XVI/1923: Haig/Crerar, 4/1/29. Chapter 5,
and a following section in this chapter, show that the 
tendency, in late-1928 and during 1929, for the communists 
and the non-communist radicals to 'diverge', was stronger 
than the Home Department believed.
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encourage a dangerous common front between the non-communists
97and the communists. These possibilities were to be avoided at 
all costs, and particularly while there was still a chance of 
heading off the threatened 'Congress mass campaign; and, if it 
proved necessary, the Congress radicals could be dealt with sub­
sequently, and separately, as a sequel to the proposed conspiracy 
98case.
As well as the political sentiments of the Congress
activists, the Home Department tacticians also took into account
the nature of the movement's social support. The essential
difference between the communist and non-communist Independence
movements, they observed, lay in the very different class
characters of their social bases and their programs: communism
contained 'grave dangers' for, among others, 'the very classes
99who support the extreme nationalist movement'. The government
should therefore 'do nothing which is likely to weaken the 
natural alarm that the property owning classes must feel at the 
development of Communism'; and nothing was 'so likely to 
obscure '. . . Qtheir] ordinary judgement ... as arbitrary action
97. ibid.: G of I to G of Bom., 8/2/29.
98. ibid.: Haig/Crerar, 4/1/29. The HD, in arguing against in­
troducing additional powers against the communists at that 
stage, stated that 'if it is necessary to strengthen our 
powers ... we may have to consider strengthening them as 
much against the political as against the Communist revol­
utionaries'. As an immediate measure against the Congress 
radicals the Executive Council decided to examine recent 
speeches by Nehru and Bose with a view to possible pro­
secutions : ibid.: SCEC, 8/1/29, & EC, H/l/29. For sub­
sequent G of I statements on the relationship between its 
repression of communists and non-communist radicals, see
G of I to all LGs, 21/2/29 & 24/6/29, (in NAI, H.Poll, 
179/1929) and 30/1/30, (in NAI, H.Poll, 98/1930).
99. ibid.: Haig/Crerar, 4/1/29.
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against the Communists'.^0 Further, New Delhi decided, it 
should complement its tactics of caution by positively accentuat­
ing the class differences between the two movements. This had 
become particularly necessary because the Congress and moderate 
opposition to the Public Safety Bill had created 'an artificial
and false atmosphere' that had to be 'set ... right as soon as 
101possible'. It was therefore important to intensify its 'steady
campaign of propaganda against the ideas and programme of the 
102Communists'. This campaign was intended, in .particular, for
the non-communist nationalist activists and for those sectors of
103the 'property owning classes', both urban and rural, who might
100. loc. cit. For evidence of this alarm in the city of Bombay 
see fns. 122, 128 & 132 below. The Bombay government became 
increasingly sure that its anti-communist initiatives would 
receive middle class support.
101. NAI, H .Poll, lO/lV/1929: Haig to J. Langford James (MCCC 
Prosecutor), 29/4/29.
102. NAI, H .Poll, 18/XVI/1928: Haig/Crerar, 4/1/29.
103. The Bombay government, in particular, stressed the need for 
rural propaganda. This was because of its fears about the 
possible destabilising effects of large numbers of politic­
ised Maratha mill workers returning to their poor-peasant/ 
agricultural labourer backgrounds in the already unstable 
Maharashtrian countryside. Rural anti-communist propaganda 
was to be directed, above all, at the 'substantial peasant 
proprietor' class, to convince it in advance that 'Communist 
success means their expropriation' (ibid.: G of Bom. to
G of I, 10/9/28). This concern had had an earlier parallel, 
in 1927-28, in Bombay's attempts to pass a 'Small Holdings 
Bill' designed to promote the development of the 'kulak' 
class (Omvedt, 'Revolution and the Rural Proletariat', 
p.264.) The Punjab government, also, lay great stress on 
tthe prophylactic value of propaganda. And, as with Bombay, 
the Punjab administration regarded the growing, 'politically 
powerful' class of 'yeoman farmers', intermediate between 
the few large landlords and the 'multitude of small peasant 
owners', as the province's main bulwark against possible 
communist inroads into the countryside. This class, 
in particular, was capable of containing communist attempts 
to gain a footing among the small peasants and to 
'seduce' agricultural labour (ibid.: G of Punjab
to G of I, 25/10/28; Imran Ali's current work
find the communists' immediate program attractive or their 
presence unexceptionable.
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A conspiracy case was the tactic most appropriate to
these requirements too. Not only was it the method least likely
to counter the 'natural' alarm of the conservative classes or the
government's campaign to exaggerate that alarm; it would also
provide. New Delhi came to believe, an ideal additional platform,
much more effective than the Public Safety Bill debate, for its
propaganda. The very act of launching a large case, and the
prosecution's evidence-supported arguments during its course,
would lend credence to the government's contention that the
'international conspiracy' posed a serious and immediate threat
104to the established indigenous social order. The case could
(103. cont'd)
on the Punjab canal colonies investigates the political 
relationship between government and the 'yeoman farmer' in 
that context). Bengal felt complacent: 'The Permanent
Settlement provides a buffer between the cultivator and the 
Government, and this may account for the weakness of the 
attempts to stir up agrarian discontent' (ibid.: G of Ben.
to G.of I, 19/12/28.) The Bombay and Punjab analyses and 
prognoses are particularly interesting in the light of 
Professor D.A. Low's emphasis on the pivotal role of the 
'dominant peasants', in Indian politics from the 1920s. (See, 
particularly, his 'Introduction: the Climactic Years'.) The 
Raj's predominant anxiety arose from its connections with 
the dominant peasants, and 'at the core of the conflict 
between the ([Congress and the Raj] ... in the 1920s and 1930s, 
there raged a battle for their political allegiance' (ibid.,
p.2.) The Bombay and Punjab responses (and see also the 
section below on the prosecution's propaganda in the Meerut 
Case) show that the dominant peasants were also seen as the 
primary buffer in the countryside against communist success 
there, if not (NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVT/1928: Haig/Crerar,
4/1/29) against the Congress.
104. The necessity of a large and 'serious' case for propaganda
purposes is a constant theme in the government deliberations 
on the Meerut Case, both before and after it had been insti­
tuted. This function contributed very significantly to both 
the structure and the conduct of the case.
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also be used to show in more detail why communism was 'not the
kind of movement that should receive the sympathy of the National- 
105ists'. A conspiracy case was seen as an ideal method for
creating a 'Communist threat' in order to crush/at least political 
cost, the threat that did exist.
The wisdom of taking this approach was further confirmed, 
and the urgency attached to the need to move against the communists 
increased, by the profound change in the class and communal polit­
ical balance in Bombay at the end of 1928. In December, following 
the formation of the mill committees, the longstanding alarm felt 
by Bombay's 'official and commercial opinion' escalated and this 
time the central government was more responsive to its pressure.
New Delhi was also worried by events in Bengal suggesting that
the Bengal communists, too, were rapidly gaining mass working
106class influence, and it was receptive to representations from
107capital in that province.
105. NAI, H.Poll, lO/lV/1929: Haig to Langford James, 29/4/29.
106. In particular, New Delhi regarded the working class demon­
stration at the INC pandal as 'a striking demonstration of 
the degree to which the Communists were succeeding in gett­
ing hold of industrial labour': NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928:
SCEC, 8/1/29; see also Chap. 4, fn. 275.
107. From Calcutta, Anglo business organisations such as the
European Association brought increasing pressure to bear on 
the state apparatus to take effective action against the 
communists and labour militancy (e.g. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/28 
Rainy to Haig, 12/1/29; NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1928: note by 
Haig, 24/12/28.) Interestingly, these groups were unhappy 
with the Bengal government's response to their pressure, and 
tended either to deal (with effective results) with the 
local district authorities or to approach New Delhi (Rainy 
to Haig, 12/1/29, as above.) They were also able to bring 
effective pressure to bear on the Indian administrations 
through the India Office - an avenue not as accessible to 
Indian capital : IOL, L/PO/43: S of S to Irwin (18/12/28)
and Jackson (19/12/28).
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After the settlement of the Bombay strike the millowners, 
compelled by their precarious economic condition to maximise short 
term production and constrained in their dealings with labour by 
the existence of the Strike Enquiry Committee, had followed a
108policy of appeasement of the GKU - at the expense of the BTLU.
But this tactical compromise did not signify an acceptance of the
new situation. It was matched by increasing pressure upon the
Bombay Government to take the action which, in the immediate
future at least, was not open to the millowners - to crush the
GKU. In their approaches to the government the millowners had
the increasing support of Bombay's wider industrial and merchant
business interests. In late-August these groups were privately
'questioning why Government is taking no action against the
1 0 9English Communists'; by December the Indian Merchants' Chamber
and the Bombay Chamber of Commerce were officially and directly
pressing upontthe Government of Bombay the urgent need for
„ 110'drastic' action against all of the GKU leaders. The govern­
ment, in turn, took up their case with New Delhi with increasing 
vigour. •
The Government of India demonstrated its increasing 
responsiveness by deputing Sir George Rainy, the Secretary of the
108. See Chapt. 4, section 2.
109. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: Isemonger to Haig, 20/8/28 (after 
visiting Bombay) ; ibid. : Agent, GIPR to Sec.yi Railway 
Board, 1/3/28 - a report of a private meeting with the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Indian Merchants' Chamber.
110. NAI, H .Poll, 1/1928: Bombay FR2 Dec; see also NAI, H.Poll,
18/XVI/1928: Irwin to Sykes, 18/1/28.
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Department of Commerce, to visit Bombay and Calcutta at the 
beginning of January 1929. Rainy spent two days in Bombay inter­
viewing many of 'those who were likely to give useful informat- 
111ion'. This category included prominent government, police,
industrial and commercial figures, but not, significantly, labour
representatives, either militant or moderate. The millowners gave
Rainy an alarming account of the current situation in the mills:
'The men were thoroughly out of hand and ready to do whatever
their leaders told them. Respect for the employer and for the
112constituted^authority had entirely disappeared'. He heard
elsewhere that the communists planned another general strike in
the textile mills, to be extended to a general strike in all
industries and on the railways, when the Strike Enquiry Committee
113handed down its report. Bombay capital was unambiguous in its
stated expectations of the state:
... the business community, whether European or 
Indian, is united in the demand that Government 
should now take steps to bring about a better 
state of affairs, to maintain law and order and 
to restore confidence. It is ... strongly felt 
that the Bombay Government has not been firm 
enough.
111. ibid.: Rainy to Haig, 12/1/29. The following quotations 
are taken from this report.
112. loc. cit. For the BMOA's view of the mill committees 
see also RCLI, Vol. 1(2), p.307.
113. While the communists did intend a second textile strike
if the Enquiry Committee's report was unfavourable - which, 
in the event, it was not - they were not planning to co­
ordinate a(premature) railway strike with it.
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Rainy's response, and his advice to the Executive 
Council of the Government of India - advice subsequently accepted 
by that body^^- indicates a very significant change in the per­
spective adopted by New Delhi towards the Bombay situation.
♦
Rainy accepted that the new mode of labour organisation institut­
ionalised in the communist-led, mill committee-based GKU, had
115indeed become a serious threat to 'law-and-order' in the city.
Nevertheless he thought that 'the business world puts forward an
116exaggerated view of the seriousness of the situation'. But
however exaggerated, he continued,
... the fact of its unanimity, about which there 
can be no doubt, is in itself an important factor 
which Government has to take into account.
It is easy enough to show that the Millowners are 
illogical and the merchants unreasonable. That 
does not solve the problem.
Therefore, while the Government of India 'ought not to be 
rushed by the Millowners, or by anyone else',
114. ibid.: SCEC, 8/1/29, and EC, 11/1/29. Rainy's memo was 
originally written for the SCEC meeting on 8/1/29.
115. Rainy emphasised the 'seriousness of the situation', for 
labour was 'better organised and in a stronger position
to assert its claims than it has ever been' (my emphasis). 
The strike leaders were 'thoroughly unscrupulous men 
aiming at an ulterior object and not at the welfare of 
labour'. The dichotomisation between political 'ulterior 
objects' and labour's 'welfare' was a familiar ideological 
technique for justifying a partisan role for the govern­
ment. It avoided the question of the impotence of the 
'legitimate' trade unionists vis-a-vis the millowners, 
and the consequent 'necessity' of 'political' trade 
unionism. (See Chapter 4(2)).
116. Cf. Irwin's comments, following these discussions, that
the Bombay business interests 'tend to take an exaggerated 
view of the situation, when their own pockets are threat­
ened, and to form unreasonable expectations and make 
unreasonable demands from Government'.: NAI. H.Poll,
18/XVI/1928: Irwin to Sykes, 18/1/29.
My emphasis.117.
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... we cannot afford to take any line of action which 
would give the impression that we were weak in our 
attitude or that we were uncertain in our own minds.
The effect of any failure of this sort would be 
immediate, for it would at once encourage the 
labour agitators and would confuse and infuriate 
the business and other communities on whom Government 
must always rely for the maintenance of law and 
order in question.118
It was now time for the state to intervene to break popular, 
militant unionism as a whole, as well as the communist influence.
With its acceptance of Rainy's advice New Delhi, while 
still not prepared to be 'rushed into hasty action', had deferred 
very substantially - at least for the duration of the crisis - to 
Bombay's 'official and commerd^gal opinion'. This was in marked 
contrast to its earlier disparagement of the same opinion; it was 
now much less concerned to maintain the appearance of an 'impart­
ial arbiter'. It made this shift partly because it now took more 
seriously the immediate and longer-term threats posed by the 
communist-GKU movement. But of more importance was the fact that, 
facing the prospect of an imminent political crisis, the govern­
ment could ill afford to alienate the classes and communities on 
whose collaboration it depended in this politically important city 
when the Raj was under challenge. Consequently, from January 
1929 the Government of India's strategy towards industrial politics
118. My emphasis. For Bombay's subsequent emphasis, during 
Civil Disobedience, on the importance of securing non- 
Brahman, Muslim and Untouchable community support for 
government, see NAI, H.Poll, 269/1930: Sykes to Irwin, 
21/5/30. This report underlines Bombay's difficulties 
in maintaining Muslim collaboration. For the difficulties 
of the loyalists within the flux of non-Brahman politics 
at this time see,Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and Nationalists', 
pp.209-13.
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coincided very closely with the interests of Bombay capital - 
and thus with those of the Bombay government. Further, it was 
now concerned actively to foster the support of the 'other 
communities'. On the issue of industrial relations at least, 
the colonial state had gone far towards incorporating - and thus 
strengthening - the communists' class and communal enemies. For 
similar political reasons, in the context of the Civil Disobedience 
movement, New Delhi was soon to complement this concession by
119vigorously taking up the industry's economic demands with London.
However New Delhi's decision to revise its relationship
with the Bombay interests did not lead it to question its
immediate tactics for repressing the communists. Rather, it
reinforced the choice of a conspiracy case despite the fact
that this fell within the category - which the Indian business
organisations had warned in December that they could not publicly
120support - of attacks upon the 'political side' of communism.
This was because, as we have seen, New Delhi believed that this
tactic would prove to be the most effective form of repression
in both the immediate and long terms; it would therefore soon
maximise the currently drifting support of Bombay's powerful
121vested interests. But the scale of the case was increased,
119. Gordon, op. cit. , pp. 341-42 & 345-46. Because of the 
moderates' strategic importance to the government during 
Civil Disobedience (see, eg., Low, 'Sir Tej Bahudur Sapru', 
pp.308-10) New Delhi became very worried about the possibil­
ity of the industrialists' breaking, over the issue of 
government economic policy, with the moderates' 
conciliatory position.
120. The Nationalist Party's continued opposition to the re­
introduced Public Safety Bill in Feb.-Apr. 1929 underlined 
this point.
121. Between January and March the number to be included in the 
case was increased from 20 to 31.
and the Executive Council also gave its attention to the
question of future, supplementary action against communist-led
122strikes occurring after the Meerut arrests. When the 1929
textile general strike began in April the question of securing 
the support of the business interests again became an immediate 
one.
When Bombay requested additional powers to deal with 
12 3the strike New Delhi's initial response was very similar to
its reaction to Bombay's requests in August-September 1928. The
Home Department was sceptical of Bombay's claims and sent Haig
to investigate. He found that the situation was 'most complicated'
He reported that the continued organisational and ideological
strength of the strike was politically destabilising and that
the government's difficulty in placating 'public*opinion, and the
deteriorating morale of the police - many of whom were
124sympathetic with the strikers - were disturbing. Nevertheless,
he decided that the millowners had acted arbitrarily and 
provocatively, that the millhands had genuine grievances, that 
the strike and its leadership were genuinely popular and that 
the millowners were simply looking to the government to re­
establish the control they had lost. The powers requested by 
Bombay would have only symbolic value or would mean going 'too far 
in the direction of taking sides with capital against
122. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/192 8: SCEC, 8/1/29.
123. ibid.: G of Bom. to G of I, 30/4/29.
124. NAI, H.Poll, 303/1929: notes by Haig of conversations with
Bombay government and police officials on 4, 6 & 7/6/29, 
and summary note, 11/6/29. The question of police morale 
was a particularly sensitive one for the Raj during Civil 
Disobedience - much more so than during the Non-Cooperation 
movement: see Low, 'Introduction', p.9.
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125labour'. But when, a fortnight later, 'the millowners and
middle class public' brought pressure to bear on the Bombay
T 2 6government in 'a more direct fashion' than previously,"
the Home Department very quickly relented and, in allowing the
passage of legislation against 'criminal intimidation', granted
127Bombay much of what it had requested. It did so - even
though it doubted that the strike situation had changed
125. Notes by Haig cited in fn.124; NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: 
note by Haig, 7/6/29. Haig commented that serious trouble 
would continue in the industry until there was 'a radical 
change of relations between capital and labour'.
126. NAI, H.Poll, 303/1929: G of I to V, 27/6/29. On July 21,
17 of the province's industrial, commerical, financial and 
utility organisations had met with the Governor and pressed 
unanimously for additional legislation against the strikers. 
The Servants of India Society, in which the BTLU leaders 
played a leading role, was also invited and gave its 
support to the resolution. Bombay's small shareholders 
were also 'making their influence felt'. The 17 
organisations present at the meeting were: the Bombay
Chamber of Commerce, the Indian Merchants' Chamber, the 
Bombay Corporation, the BB & CIR Board, the GIPR Board,
the East Indian Cotton Association, the Native Piecegoods 
Merchants' Association, the Imperial Bank of India, the 
Native Share and Stockbrokers' Association, the Bombay 
Shareholders' Association, the Associated Joint Stock Banks, 
the Provincial Cooperative Institute, the European 
Association, the Bombay Port Trust, the Marwari Chamber of 
Commerce, the Indian Industries Association and the Bombay 
Presidency Trades Association.
127. The legislation would make 'criminal intimidation' a 
cognisable offence. It would thus provide the police with 
greatly increased powers of discretion against the strikers. 
However New Delhi again resisted Bombay's request for it
to intervene, and to do so through Executive action, 
because it thought Bombay's case 'singularly weak'.
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significantly^^^ - because it recognised the increased gravity
of Bombay's political problems with the city's capital and
its middle class: 'it would have a very unfortunate effect
on the Bombay Government' if it was refused permission to
'introduce legislation in accordance with what a large body
129of public opinion considers to be necessary'. Thus the
Government of India, following its reevaluation in January 
of the significance of the Bombay situation, was prepared to 
respond to pressure from that province much more readily in
1929 than it had in 1928.
* * *
Once the essential decisions had been taken in early
January the planning of the conspiracy case gathered momentum
between then and March. At the same time New Delhi continued
130its attempts to erode London's resistance to the idea:
'The trial would take many months and be costly', Irwin
admitted to London: 'but', he added, emphasising the particular
virtues of a conspiracy case, 'in comparison with the advantages
131of success the time and money would be of little account'.
It was anticipated that the trial would be completed within a 
132year.
With the flimsy justification that a WPP meeting had 
been held there, the obscure town of Meerut was chosen as the
128. NAI, H.Poll, 303/1929: HD, G of I to V, 27/6/29.
129. ibid.: V to S of S, 11/7/29.
130. See the telegrams between the 
State from 19/1/29 to 10/3/29
Viceroy and the 
in NAI, H.Poll,
Secretary of 
10/IV/1929.
131. ibid.: V to S of S, 19/1/29.
132. ibid.: notes by Haig, 20 and 23/2/29.
456
site in order to avoid the hazards of a jury trial, and the
serious industrial and political trouble that would have attended
13 3it, in Bombay or Calcutta. Sanction for the arrests was
granted on March 14 - two days after London had finally 
acquiesced. Of the 31 men finally selected only 17 could 
conceivably have been considered to be conscious, active 
communists. The remaining 14 were chosen - on the grounds that 
they had been in association with the communists - either to 
crush militant trade unionism completely or to add to the 
credence of the government’s claim that a serious inter­
provincial conspiracy had existed.
Following the arrests, searches and confiscations on 
March 20,the 31 'conspirators', suitably handcuffed, were taken 
by train to the Meerut jail. There they waited, first in 
solitary confinement and then in a communal barrack, for the 
three months that it took for the prosecution to sift through 
the vast quantity of captured material and begin what was to 
become one of the most extended trials in world legal history.
It eventually began on June 13, in the specially converted 
bungalow of the former commander of the allied intervention at
Archangel against the Russian Revolution, General Ironside -
135an irony not lost on these Indian 'Bolsheviks'.
133. ibid.: note by Haig, 20/2/29, & V to S of S, 27/2/29.
134. There were later to be regrets about this lack of
discrimination. Not only did it add greatly to the trial's 
problems, but, in the DIB's words, 'in regard to a number 
of the minor accused it was always easy to consider that 
the solemnity and, as it were, dignity of this charge were 
bordering on the grotesque': NAI, H.Poll, 7/11/1934: note
by Williamson, 28/10/33.
135. Interviews with M.G. Desai, Bombay, 6/8/74, & D. Goswami, 
Calcutta, 18/8/74.
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The terms of the charge made it a very simple one to
prove - against the communists at least. It was not necessary
to prove the committal of overt illegal acts - 'the mere
agreement to put in practice the creed of the Communist
International and to carry out its programme, ipso facto
constitutes an offence ... whether ... the programme has
136actually been carried out or not'. Accordingly the Meerut
Case might possibly have been completed within the anticipated
time if it had been brought against only the communists and if
it had been devoted only to the securing of convictions. But
the case's propagandist function, which had largely determined
its scale, also compounded the complexities inherent in such
a big trial. Moreover, the prosecutor, J. Langford James,
carried out the propagandist function with excessive enthusiasm,
leading the government into deeper water. Langford James, a
'constellation of the first magnitude in the Calcutta legal
firmament', was chosen as 'absolutely the best procurable'
137lawyer for the job. One of his qualifications - to which even
the accused were to testify - was his zeal and wit as an anti-
138communist propagandist. Determined to create as ideologically
136. Labour Monthly, Vol.l2(l), Jan. 1930, p.27. (The prosecut­
or's speech is reproduced in Vol.l2(l-4) of this journal.)
137. NAI, H.Poll, 109/1934: Petrie to Hallett, 7/10/33; NAI,
H.Poll, 18/VII/1928 : note by Haig, 24/12/28.
138. Eg. Hutchinson, ojo. cit. , pp. 87-90 ; Spratt, Blowing Up
India, pp.51-2. Hutchinson described Langford James in the 
following manner: 'Clever, quick-witted, an able lawyer, he
possessed a sardonic humour, a generous disposition and an 
inexhaustible fund of invective. ... He ... thoroughly 
enjoyed attacking the monster of communism, revelling in 
the chance to introduce political oratory into a legal 
case. ... he was in turn amusing, indignant, sarcastic, 
facetious and malicious'.
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effective an event as possible, he did his 'best, when occasion
offers, to inform the public that this is a Moscow case and
nothing to do with Nationalism % and selected a far larger
number of exhibits than were needed for a legally watertight 
139case. Most of his four-day opening speech was devoted to
a blatantly propagandists attack on the politics of the 'anti- 
nationalist', 'anti-God', violent 'doctrinaire desperados' in
140the dock rather than to the question of their guilt or innocence.
139. NAI, H.Poll, 10/IV/1929: Langford James to Haig, 2/5/29.
Haig had already become very worried about the prosecution's 
tendency to 'paint the lily': ibid.: Haig to Langford
James, 29/4/29.
140. See fn.136. The following selection provides an example 
of the content and style of his speech:
... to be a Bolshevik of unimpeachable character you 
require certain definite qualifications to which the 
ordinary man does not aspire. You do not love your 
country, you are anti-country, you are anti-God, and 
you are anti-family ... anti-everything which the 
ordinary man considers decent. You have ruthlessly 
to hate those who differ from your views, and when 
the proper time comes you have as ruthlessly to kill 
them. And last, but by no means least, ... it is 
quite essential that you should have no sense of 
humour .
Langford James, with his eye to his Indian audience, 
also stressed the Bolsheviks' hostility to the kulaks and 
Russia's indigenous bourgeoisie, and several times claimed 
that there was a very close parallel to be drawn between 
India and pre-Revolutionary Russia. (See, eg., ibid., 
Vol.l2(2), pp.l03-5s.) Nor was the prospective audience 
restricted to Indian nationalists. The propaganda was 
later considered to have had a beneficial effect on the 
provincial governments which, apart from Bombay, had 
previously taken a 'somewhat casual view' towards the 
communist threat. This was especially the case for Bengal 
(NAI, H.Poll, 7/II/1934: note by Williamson, 28/10/33).
To ensure the maximum effect, the Department of Public 
Information published the speech and supervised and 
subsidised its distribution to the press agencies: IOL,
L/PJ/1978, file 1201/1929: Manchester Guardian article,
9/12/29, & J. Nehru to W. Citrine, 23/6/29.
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Langford James' address was a tour de force; and he 
maintained the performance during the case that, with the 
aid of his thousands of exhibits, he then proceeded to bring 
against his 'doctrinaire desperados'. But it opened a Pandora's 
box for the government. Propaganda invited and legitimised 
counter-propaganda; and the constant references to Marxist 
literature led to a demand for unlimited access to the same 
literature to prepare an adequate defence against the charge 
as defined and the prosecution's approach to it. The government 
felt constrained to accede to these tactics and demands, and to 
the demand for free access to communist defence committees/in 
order to minimise the force of the charge that the trial was 
a mockery of justice. The considerable agitation in Britain
141against the Meerut Case ensured the granting of these concessions.
141. See the large quantity of protest correspondence, and the
correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Vice­
roy, in ibid.. The pressure on New Delhi was increased when 
the Labour government came to power - the Meerut Case was 
'not popular with supporters of Government here', Benn 
telegraphed to Irwin in August, 'and the longer it lasts 
the harder will my position become' (ibid.: Benn to Irwin, 
13/8/29). However the Labour government, already in a shaky 
position, could not afford the political controversy of a 
show-down with New Delhi. Once it realised that New Delhi 
was committed to the case it soon acquiesced and, as with 
the Conservative government, the Government of India 
continued to set the terms. Secretary of State Benn was, 
by the end of 1929, working with Walter Citrine, the 
powerful, anti-communist general secretary of the TUC, to 
neutralise the grass-roots trade union campaign against the 
Labour government's involvement in the Meerut Case (ibid.:
10 memo, 2/2/30, & Citrine to Benn, 17/2/30). In fact 
Irwin had 'nothing but thanks to the Labour Party for the 
way in which they have supported us' during the case and 
Civil Disobedience. 'They really have played up very well, 
and have been ready to support us in whatever we thought 
necessary' (IOL, Halifax Papers, Vol.27: Irwin to his
father, 11/8/30). (For an interpretation of Labour policy 
somewhat contrary to mine, see P.S. Gupta, Imperialism 
and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964, (London, 1975), 
pp.203-8.)
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Thus the propagandist nature of the case allowed the
communists important opportunities to conduct a widely
publicised propaganda campaign from the dock, to develop their
theoretical skills and organisational plans, and to retain
142national and international political contracts. It also
established a dynamic which drove the trial relentlessly onwards,
far beyond the political situation it had been carefully tailored
to meet and almost out of the government's control. This greatly
compounded its embarrassment.
The trial became a deadening 'trial of endurance ...
143while the whole of outside India was in a blaze'. Even the
initially aggressive Sessions Court judge, R.L. Yorke, after
'months of tapping the evidence down on his portable typewriter,
... lost his aggressive manner and seemed resigned to spend the
144 ‘rest of his life presiding over this interminable trial'.
The proceedings, Spratt recalls, 'became such a bore that not one
of the accused ... tried to follow them. We read, talked or
145slept in the dock'. Thus, when their lively prosecutor died
142. The launching of the case, and the long Public Safety Bill 
debate which preceded and followed the arrests, ensured a 
great deal of reasonably sympathetic press coverage for 
Indian communism. The defence statements were, in the words 
of the IB, 'little more than communist theses supplemented by 
political harangues' (IB, Communism, (1933), p.179). They 
allowed the nationalist press, for the first time, to report 
Marxist doctrine without the risk of prosecution. Abridged 
versions of the statements were published in booklet form in 
both Britain and India. Inside the jail the communists had, 
for the first time, the extensive literature and the leisure 
to develop their Marxist theory. They came to regard the 
jail as the 'Meerut Communist University' (interviews with 
several of the ex-prisoners). Moreover they were able to 
conduct, under the cover of their defence committee, 'what 
amounted to a party office' in conjunction with their outside 
comrades: Spratt, Blowing up India, p.53.
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in 1930 and was replaced by a dull lawyer called Kemp, even
the victims of Langford James’ invective felt a genuine sense 
146of loss. The trial was to claim two more lives before its
completion - K.L. Ghosh, the Bengali moderate trade unionist, 
and D.R. Thengdi, the ageing one-time Bombay WPP president.
The proceedings finally came to an end in August 1932, three 
and a half years after the arrests. The court was adjourned 
while Yorke prepared his judgement. This took another five 
months and was finally presented as a massive, 700 foolscap 
page document}^
The sentences were passed in January 1933. All but 
four of the accused were convicted. The sentences were, as 
the Government of India later acknowledged, 'exceptionally 
d r a s t i c ' T h e y  ranged from transportation for life to three
143. Hutchinson, op. cit., p.117.
144. ibid., p.116. That there was no professional stenographer 
added greatly to the length of the trial.
145. Spratt, Blowing Up India, p.52; see also H.N. Brailsford, 
Subject India, (London, 1943), pp.211-13, for a critical, 
eye-witness account of the conduct of the trial.
146. Eg. loc. cit. ; Hutchinson, op. cit.., p.116, who commented 
that 'His death was regretted on both sides. ... the trial 
would have been a much brighter affair had Mr. James lived. 
... We had lost a great entertainer and had gained nothing 
in return'.
147. Its excessive length also meant that it was useless as a
propaganda document. The DIB commented: 'I wish ... [he]
had devoted two more weeks ... in preparing a summary of 
his judgement' to make it accessible to the public: NAI,
H.Poll, 7/11/1934: note by Williamson, 28/10/33.
148. NAI, H.Poll, 17/19/1933: G of I to S of S, 2/10/33. London 
was alarmed. Hoare, the third Secretary of State to oversee 
the Meerut Case, informed its second Viceroy that tho 
British agitation against the sentences was 'by no means 
confined to the Daily Herald and the labour press'; there 
was 'a general feeling, even among Conservatives, that the 
sentences are too heavy': IOL, Templewood Papers, Vol. 3: 
Hoare to Willingdon, 28/4/33.
462
149years rigorous imprisonment. It was a last-ditch attempt
to inflate the seriousness of the 'conspiracy'.
But the intense public agitation against the sentences
'somewhat influenced' the Allahabad High Court which heard the 
150appeals. Chief Justice Sulaiman's judgement, while confirming
the existence of the original 'conspiracy', sharply criticised
the conduct and outcome of the trial, acquitted nine, immediately
released five and also granted spectacular reductions in the
sentences of all the remaining 13. With this final outcome
152New Delhi's embarrassment seemed complete. The price of the
conspiracy case alternative now seemed to have been almost 
unacceptably high.
* * *
Yet, even so, Haig's decision to opt for a conspiracy 
case appears, in retrospect, as an astute one. In the 
politically charged atmosphere of late 1928 and early 1929 
the choice of an appropriate mode of repression was a very 
difficult one, and the political costs of miscalculation were 
potentially high. Despite the advantages that New Delhi's
149. MCCC, Judgement.
150. NAI, H.Poll, 17/19/1933: note by Hallett, 20/9/33.
151. MCCC, Appeals Judgement. The heaviest sentence, Ahmad's 
transportation for life, was reduced to three years 
Rigorous Imprisonment and most of the communists were 
released within the next year.
152. See the correspondence and HD notes in NAI, H.Poll, 
17/19/1933. London informed New Delhi that, in its opinion, 
while the original decision may have been sound, and even 
though the detention of the communists during CD had been 
very advantageous, 'the length of the trial and its 
ultimate result have aroused so much resentment against
the Government and the Law as to obscure the major issues 
which the prosecution was intended to make plain': ibid.:
10 to G of I, 17/8/1933.
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approach allowed the communists, Haig's rejection of the Bombay 
and India Office alternatives was essentially vindicated.
As we will see in the following section, the arrests did 
strike a very serious blow to the Bombay communists' trade union 
and political organisations at a critical juncture. The mill- 
owners could feel satisfied with the outcome of the state's 
intervention, if not with the time it had taken. And the back 
of the radical working class movement was broken before the 
onset of Civil Disobedience, and the core of the communist 
leadership detained for its duration.
While securing these results the Meerut Case did not - 
as the alternatives urged by both Bombay and London may well 
have done - force a common-front between the communists and 
Congress radicals, or a Congress reaction equivalent to the
153Rowlatt satyagraha against the repressive enactments of 1919.
The Congress protest against the Meerut arrests was fairly 
vociferous, and several prominent Congressmen interested 
themselves in the case during 1929. This caused New Delhi 
some concern. Nevertheless, the nationalist reaction did 
not go far beyond an ambiguous, and essentially ritualistic,
153. D.A . Low stresses this point in his 'Civil Martial Law', 
in Low (Ed.), Congress and the Raj, p.166. The Bombay 
government noted with some satisfaction that the 
immediate effect of the arrests on the provincial 
Congress organisation was to dampen the activity of the 
radicals: NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: G of Bom. to
G of I, 30/4/29.
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154verbal attack on the Raj's repressiveness; and, although
the British agitation against the trial and the sentences had 
a definite impact, New Delhi could draw some comfort from
155the fact that the protest in India was only half-hearted.
In fact the Gandhian leadership could hardly have been dismayed 
by the removal of the militant labour leaders and the collapse 
of the organised working class prior to the launching of its 
mass agitation;nor by the selectiveness of the method chosen 
by the Raj - the Congress radicals were not given 'a good 
rallying-cry' for an early start to the movement.
Finally, although the Allahabad High Court's criticisms, 
and its early release of the prisoners, greatly embarrassed the 
government, its judgement did preserve the desired - if now 
tarnished and very delayed - legal finding against communist 
activity. It was on this basis that the CPI was banned in July 
1 9 3 4 . Again, there was no serious Congress protest.
154. Resolutions of protest were passed at the different levels 
of the organisation; leaders such as the two Nehrus and 
Kitchlew (and the moderate, Sapru), participated in various 
aspects of the defence; and the AICC set up a defence 
committee and fund. But apart from escalating its 
obstructionist tactics against the Public Safety Bill, the 
Congress protest was essentially restricted to the passing 
of resolutions, the contents of which were very similar to 
the earlier arguments against the P.S. Bill.
155. NAI. H.Poll, 17/19/1933: G of I to S of S, 2/10/1933.
156. Sumit Sarkar has argued recently that Gandhi may well have 
delayed Civil Disobedience until after the working class 
movement had been broken - see his 'The Logic of Gandhian 
Nationalism: Civil Disobedience and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact 
(1930-1931)', in Indian Historical Review, Vol.3(l), Jul. 
1976, p.143.
157. IOL, L/PO/43: V to S of S, 30/6/34.
158. Eg., NAI, H.Poll, 18/7/1934: Bombay FR2 Jul.. There was
even less reason to protest this time, for the anti­
communist repression coincided with the end of a Congress 
campaign rather than preceding it,as before.
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Thus the Meerut Case served all of its several
intended functions; there were more effective conspirators in
the Home Department than in the early CPI. The problems it
created in the process were sufficiently serious for the DIB,
echoing a chastened Home Department as a whole, to state
emphatically that 'No one would look at a big conspiracy case
159after the Meerut experience'. But these problems arose not
so much from the original conception as from misjudgements in 
its execution. And, in any case, no further communist
conspiracy cases would be necessary.
* * *
This study of the decision-making behind the Meerut 
Case has revealed the close and complementary character of the 
relationship, during a period of political crisis, between the 
colonial state and the Indian 'business and other communities'.
When the normally resilient mechanisms of control of 
working class politics were ruptured in Bombay city - that 
sensitive 'nodal point' of Indian politics - and the communists 
skillfully grasped the opportunity, the Raj felt compelled to 
intervene. But, compared to the other colonial powers in Asia, 
the mode of the intervention was remarkably legalistic and the 
extent limited; and, although heavy in the Indian context, 
it was substantially less than the total repression desired. As 
a result the communists and their working class movement were 
allowed very significant opportunities, both before and after 
the arrests.
159. NAI, H.Poll, 32/III/1933: note by Williamson, 20/1/33.
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Several factors contributed to the Raj's legalism 
and restraint. An important one was the ideology - deeply 
influenced by the British tradition of constitutional politics - 
of the decision-makers. Another was the controlling influence 
of parliamentary democracy and trade unionism in Britain. 
Nevertheless, given India's finely balanced role within 
Britain's global interests, the tension determining the logic 
of the Raj's repression arose primarily from the powerful and 
conflicting demands of the differentiated world of Indian 
politics. The need for India to be financially self-supporting, 
in order to fulfill its key balancing role in the British 
imperial system, impelled the Raj to attempt a discriminatingly 
cooptive, rather than an expensively coercive, policy towards 
Indian opposition. Thus the immediate imperative behind the 
Raj's approach to the question of the repression of the 
communist movement was its need to come to terms with the 
conservative, 'bourgeois' opposition to current British colonial 
policy.
The significant degree of political space allowed to 
the communists by the mode of repression which emerged from 
these conflicting forces was, therefore, a fairly direct 
reflection of the strength of the communists' and the radical 
unions' indigenous opposition. The Raj was seeking through the 
Meerut Case to do, in a politically acceptable form, no more 
than was necessary to tip the balance sufficiently in this 
opposition's favour for it to complete what had been begun. In 
studying the background of the Meerut Case we have been able to 
identify the main outlines of this indigenous structure of 
opposition as well as its relationship to the colonial state.
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Following the Meerut arrests the decapitated communist working 
class movement had then to cope with this now reinforced 
structure. We next look at this encounter.
2. IN THE WAKE OF THE MEERUT CASE ARRESTS
The new leadership of the GKU inherited an impressive 
organisation and a large reserve fund. But it also inherited 
a daunting situation and a union which remained imperfectly 
consolidated and only very incompletely extended to the non- 
Maratha sectors of the workforce. The Meerut arrests were to 
prove just how vulnerable the GKU remained and, in particular, 
how crucial was the integrative role played by its original 
leadership; the decapitation of the union proved to be, in 
the face of an intensification of the oppositions it had 
successfully met before the arrests, the prelude to its 
disintegration. The defeat of the GKU was, in turn, the prelude 
to the defeat of the GIPRU. Concurrently with these processes 
in the industrial sphere, the communists were also squeezed out 
from the position of influence the WPP had established in the 
city's nationalist politics.
The Destruction of the GKU
While the Government of India had been preparing its
conspiracy case the millowners had been replenishing their 
stocks.
160. The delineation of the BMOA-GKU relationship,and the 
changes within the GKU, in this section is based 
primarily on Newman, op. cit., Chapter IX (B & C).
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For this reason, and presumably because they were more assured
of the state's industrial policy following its initial
intervention, they were more prepared than before to begin
their challenge to the GKU. Even before the arrests one mill
group - Wadia - had begun a confrontation with the union. Wadia's
challenge continued after the arrests. Then, several weeks
after the Meerut Case arrests, the Strike Enquiry Committee
handed down its report and the remaining constraint on the
millowners was removed. Within a month of March 20 a majority
of the BMOA, preferring confrontation to continued negotiations
with the union over the Enquiry Committee's findings, was
supporting Wadia's intransigence. The millowners' goal was
161now, Haig observed, 'to break the Girni Kamgar Union'.
The union was faced with a choice between piecemeal
defeat and the risks of a general strike. Though initially 
162conciliatory, the new leadership finally chose the second
course. 'It is necessary that all must leap into the fight
at once and get it finally decided', Kranti declared on April
21, after all possible avenues of compromise with the BMOA had
163been exhausted.
The leadership passed the first test. The GKU's rank 
and file responded 'in a perfectly peaceful way and with
161. NAI, H .Poll, 303/1929: note by Haig, 7/6/29.
162. The new GKU leadership even muted the ideology of class 
struggle. Eg. Kranti declared that capital and labour 
were equal partners, 'like contractors', and were therefore 
entitled to mutual respect. The propaganda for an 
inevitable general strike was also dropped temporarily: 
Newman, 0£. cit., p.333.
163. Quoted in ibid., p.331.
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remarkable unanimity', the nonplussed Bombay authorities 
164reported. Some 80 percent of the workforce struck
immediately, on April 26. By May 1, 64 mills had closed
and 109,200 were on s t r i k e . S t r i k e  meetings regularly
166numbered between 15 and 20 thousand.
But this impressive demonstration of union solidarity 
and leadership authority masked the vulnerabilities that had 
been revealed during the conflicts of early 1929. As we noted 
in Chapter 3/ the causes of the most serious of the centrifugal 
tendencies threatening the integrity of the GKU were the 
continued existence of definite community distinctions within 
the workforce, the incomplete integration of the union's base 
with its central organisation, the weakness of the communists' 
political organisation, and the almost complete failure to 
establish a political cadre system within the workforce.
The consequences of the latter two problems were made 
immediately apparent by the leadership succession which followed 
the Meerut arrests. Because the original leadership had not 
established an underground organisation or an extensive program 
of working and middle class cadre recruitment and training, 
there were almost no leaders equivalent to their predecessors 
among the successors. Most of the working class replacements 
who moved up into the leadership had had previous experience 
in the managing committee, but very few had been given training
164. NAI, H.Poll, 303/1929: note by Haig, 7/6/29. Strikes were
traditionally spread by groups of strikers stoning the 
working mills and calling on the hands to stop work. This 
response was, therefore, a remarkable event.
165. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the GKU, 1928-33;
Newman, op. cit., p.331.
166. NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FR2 Apr.
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specifically for the positions they now held, and none were
16 7WPP or CPI members. Of the middle class replacements only
one - Lalji Pendse - had previously had significant experience 
in union work. The others were S.V. Deshpande, B.T. Ranadive 
and Dange's former 'private secretary', V.H. Joshi. Joshi, 
though marginally involved in the WPP, had not participated 
significantly in the union's affairs. The other two - who were 
to become the leading communists in Bombay - had only just 
joined the WPP before the Meerut arrests. They had come almost 
directly from middle class intelligentsia and Congress back­
grounds. Deshpande was a school teacher by profession, and 
Ranadive had recently won a Gold Medal for his MA in Economics
at the University of Bombay. Deshpande had been associated with
16 8the BPCC's loose socialist faction since 1924 but had not
involved himself in the WPP after it was formed, and Ranadive
had been an active member of the Congress Youth League well 
16 9into 1928. The Meerut communist group was later to describe
them as
167. Kandalkar, the former jobber and leader of the GKU's 
volunteer force, replaced Alve as president; Pendse and 
two weavers took over Bradley's, Nimbkar's and 
Jhabvala's positions as vice-presidents; another worker 
activist, Tavde, and Deshpande took Dange's and Joglekar's 
places as secretary and assistant secretary respectively; 
V.H. Joshi became treasurer, previously held jointly by 
Ghate and Alve; and Ranadive became a centre secretary: 
Newman, op. cit., p.328-9.
168. BSAI, 1924, Para. 454.
169. MCG: 1 & 2.
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... petty bourgeois enthusiasts, whose knowledge of 
the movement was derived mainly from acquaintance with 
the period of 1928 - a time of almost unbroken, easy 
and striking, but somewhat superficial success. ...
[they were] ill-fitted to face a situation of great 
difficulty and determined attack and repression from 
the other side. 170
In particular, both they and their working class 
colleagues had been ill-prepared by the preceding leadership 
for the tasks of overcoming the existing tensions within the 
GKU and of meeting renewed attacks by the GKU-WPP's enemies.
To better understand the terms and dimensions of their predicament 
we will first look again, in more detail than in Chapter 3, at 
the opposition to the GKU-WPP which developed from early 1929, 
and then/the associated internal problems of the union.
The non-Brahman campaign that was begun in January
1929 was organised by B.V. Jadhav, the conservative, loyalist
leader of the political wing of the Presidency's non-Brahman
movement, and his influential Maratha merchant colleague,
171G.R. Shinde. It was believed that the campaign was funded
172partly by the BMOA and the Maratha merchant community. The
young non-Brahman radical, Dinkarrao Javalkar, became the 
movement's leading publicist. The campaign aimed at the capture 
of the GKU, not at its destruction. The non-Brahmans sought 
first to discredit the communists in the eyes of the workers 
by characterising them as elitist, Brahman outsiders, interested 
only in exploiting the millhands for ulterior political purposes. 
They hoped then to displace the communists and convert the GKU
170. MCG:2.
171. Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and Communists', p.755; NAI H.Poll,
10/XIV/1929: Jadhav to Hotson, 26/4/29.
172. Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and Communists', p.755.
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into a non-Brahman organisation. The campaign was conducted
at several levels: Jadhav personally approached each of the
Maratha office-bearers; Shinde drew upon his community
linkages among the millhands, particularly in the DeLisle
Road area; and Javalkar conducted a public campaign, both
through Jadhav's weekly, Kaivari, to which he had recently been
appointed editor, and then at public meetings in the mill area.
The ideological stance adopted by Kaivari incorporated much of
the militance that had become popular among the Maratha mill-
hands during and since the general strike. The attack was
launched against the Brahman communists but not against
communism per se: 'The Red Flag Union must endure and grow',
Kaivari declared, but with non-Brahmans replacing its 'elitist',
Brahman, communist leadership; 'if anyone can be a true
17 3communist it is a non-Brahman!'.
The Muslim community leaders, likewise, felt
threatened by the development of the GKU's class organisation
and its potential appeal for their Muslim working class base -
particularly after the WPP's Shaukat Usmani began working in
Madanpura. But, unlike the non-Brahmans, the Khilafatists sought
the destruction of the union: 'I fought them tooth and nail'
174Shaukat Ali later declared. The issue was particularly
sensitive for the Khilafatists at this time, for they had to
173. Quoted in loc. cit.. As Omvedt has stressed, the non- 
Brahmans' use of a radical ideology reflected the popularity 
of the new ideology of class struggle among the Maratha 
millhands. It is possible that Jadhav chose the radical 
Javalkar as his main publicist for this reason.
174. Newman, ojd. cit. , p. 326 .
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secure their mass base not only against the communists, but
also against the possibility of a Congress mass campaign in
1930. Thus the violent clashes between the millhands and the
Pathan blacklegs and money-lenders which erupted in the mill
area in early February were - despite the fact that the Muslim
workers shared the anti-Pathan sentiment - timely for the
175Muslim communalists. The riots were not essentially communally
motivated; but they developed communal overtones and they lent
themselves to communal exploitation. They provided the
Khilafatists with an opportunity for attempting to fan the
community consciousness of the Muslim millhands by characterising
the GKU and the WPP as Hindu communalist organisations opposed
1V 6to the specific interests of the Muslim workers.
The non-Brhaman campaign did not have a noticeable 
effect on the great majority of the Maratha workers. The 
communists' accessibility to the union's rank-and-file, and 
their manifest achievements as trade union leaders, more than
175. For the background and course of the millhand-Pathan 
riots see Chapter 4. For the Khilafatists wider 
politics in Bombay city at this time see R. Kumar,
'From Swaraj to Purna Swaraj', ps. 95 & 97. (It
should be stressed again that the Muslim millhands shared 
the antagonism towards the Pathans.)
176. Newman, op. cit., ps. 324 & 326; BREC, Report, p.16;
MCCC, p.480: Ghate to Ahmad, 14/2/29. Hindu Mahasabhite
Gujarati merchants also took the opportunity to attempt 
to fan communalism, though without apparent results in 
the mill area; there appears to have been no coordination 
between the Maratha and Gujarati Hindu merchant 
communities of their common antagonism towards the 
communists.
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neutralised the possibility of a serious millhand reaction
177against their bureaucratic and residual elitist tendencies.
But the campaign did meet with two limited responses. These 
indicated the potential hazards of renewed non-Brahmanism, 
particularly if the disaffected jobbers were able to regain 
sufficient freedom of manoeuvre to coordinate their efforts 
with those of the Maratha community leaders. The first was 
the wholesale defection of the GKU's DeLisle Road centre, where 
the influence of Shinde's network was strongest. This was one 
indication that community forms of organisation and consciousness 
had by no means been completely liquidated even among the 
Maratha workers. The second was the partial response within 
the managing committee noted in Chapter 4 - the defection of 
Kasle (whose base was in DeLisle Road) and the temporising of 
Alve and others. This reflected both the friction between the 
middle and working class members of the WPP which had become 
apparent from late 1928, and the continuing - if weakening - 
hold of the old community loyalties on the working class 
militants.
The threatened rifts were successfully contained
before they became serious. But in the GKU leadership
succession after March 20, Kasle's followers were able to gain
179more influence in the managing committee. Moreover, the
177. Newman, op. cit., p.322. (The evidence does not support 
Omvedt's contention that 'an emerging split' between a 
bureaucratised communist leadership and the mill committee 
base had begun before the Meerut arrests (see her 'Non- 
Brahmans and Communists', p.755). Despite the defections, 
the most striking feature of the encounter was the 
resilience of the leadership-base bond in the face of a 
concerted attack.)
178. Another feature was the rapidity with which the superstitiou; 
'feudal' belief that the Pathans were kidnapping children 
gained wide currency among the millhands.
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middle class replacements had had virtually no experience in
working responsively with mass organisations, such as the mill
committees, and had not passed through the (incomplete)
process of 'proletarianisation' undergone by their communist
predecessors in the previous 18 months. Because of this they
were potentially much more vulnerable - at both the mass and the
leadership levels - to the non-Brahman charge of elitist
manipulation and exploitation of the workers. The danger
remained, despite the impressive start to the strike.
The results of the February anti-Pathan riots were
more serious, for they clearly revealed, and further aggravated,
the GKU's biggest problem - its community limits. Despite the
communalists' efforts to exploit the riots the GKU leaders
were able, by controlling their largely Maratha rank-and-file,
to prevent serious clashes between Muslim and Hindu workers.
180The worst of the rioting occurred outside the mill area.
But the Ali brothers' efforts to promote community consciousness
among the Muslim millhands, and to neutralise the WPP's program
181in Madanpura,were largely successful. This was clearly
179. Newman, op. cit., p.343.
180. From February 6, after the GKU leadership's successful 
pacification of its rank-and-file, the situation calmed 
down in the mill area. From that point the rioting moved 
southwards from the mill area. Most of the killings and 
injuries (totalling 149 and 739 respectively) occurred in 
Kalbadevi and Pydhonie. (BCP, Police Report on the Bombay 
Riots, p.41; BREC, Report, p.5).
181. 'I succeeded', Shaukat Ali could say of the outcome of his 
'tooth and nail' struggle against the GKU in Madanpura. 
(Newman, op. cit., p.326). After the riots experience the 
WPP leaders much more fully recognised the vulnerability of 
the party and the GKU to the charge of being 'Hindu' 
organisations. The vulnerability arose largely from the 
small (less than 10 percent) minority of Muslims on the 
GKU's managing committee and in the WPP (where there was 
only one Muslim - Usmani) and the complete absence of
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demonstrated when the 1929 general strike was called; the
majority of the Muslim workers refused to join a strike
called in defence of what remained an essentially Maratha
union - particularly when they had less access to credit and
alternative sources of income. Similar factors underlay the
182Untouchables' weak response to the strike call . Thus,
although the Maratha 'class community' entered the 1929 strike
with a far higher level of internal solidarity than it had
in the 1928 strike, the inter-communal solidarity of the
workforce as a whole was much less.
The February riots also revealed organisational weak- 
183nesses in the GKU and, thus, highlighted the more general 
problem of integrating the sometimes recalcitrant 'union of the
181. (Cont'd)
Muslims from the GKU's executive. The WPP executive was 
also critical of the conduct during the strike of several 
of the leaders and activists, and of the content of some 
of the leaflets: both the activity and the leaflets had
tended to betray a 'Hindu bias': MCCC, p.1344: WPP EC
meeting, 17/2/29; MCCC, p.1170: Adhikari's notes of the
same meeting.
182. See fn. 62, Chapter 3f for the special reasons for the 
Muslims' and Untouchables' more limited access to 
alternative incomes and credit. All communities had low 
reserves because of the financial burden of the recent 
general strike. The jobbers' opposition to this strike 
probably further restricted available credit. Moreover, 
the Marathas' continued discrimination - in an increasingly 
competitive job market - against the Untouchables, 
contributed to the weakness of the latter community's 
response to the GKU's strike. The Marathi 'Girni Workers' 
Poem' is evidence not only of ideological transition within 
that community, but also of the continuing discriminatory 
community consciousness - against which the poem was 
directed - among the Marathas.
183. During the riots the leadership-mill committee connections
'did not function properly': MCCC, p.1344: WPP EC meeting,
17/2/29.
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militant' workers' with the central leadership. This problem
fell into two categories. The first was the essentially
transitional problem of coordinating such a large and rapidly
formed mass organisation with its still small and over-taxed
central leadership. This demanded a high level of mill committee
representation on the managing committee and large-scale training
of the ordinary millhands in leadership skills. By the time of
the Meerut arrests the communists' initial 'elitist' tendencies
to under-estimate the crucial importance of this task had been
largely (though not completely) eroded by the assertive character
of the mill committees and the experience of the February riots.
The second category was the definite alienation of a small number
of the Maratha mills from the central leadership. The alienation
arose from either the leadership's inability to secure their
particular demands or its refusal to do so because of the
perceived risk of premature and damaging confrontation with the 
18 4millowners. The resulting attitude of these millhands
184. Several of the Sassoon mills, for example, demonstrated
the former problem. The Sassoon weavers had initiated the 
1928 strike with their protests against the first attempts 
to introduce rationalisation schemes. Because the strike 
settlement accepted the pre-strike Sassoon rationalisations, 
the workers in these mills refused to join the GKU. Given 
the Sassoon weavers' 'vanguard' role in the strike, this 
was a protest of some significance. The GKU leadership's 
concern about the 'undisciplined', confrontationist 
activity of some of the mill committees was vindicated 
in the case of the Wadia mills, for it was precisely this 
issue which Wadia used to begin a confrontation with the 
GKU (see Newman, ojd. cit. , pp. 333-6). This is an issue 
which Omvedt fails to recognise in her critique of the 
communists' 'bureaucratism' (see Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and 
Communists', pp.754-7). The problem, at this stage, was 
primarily situational.
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towards the leadership underlined the conditional character of 
the GKU's overall support - it was dependent, in the longer 
term at least, on the leadership's continued success as 
representatives of their immediate interests. Both levels of 
the problem reemerged in the strike's early stages: some of
the alienated mills refused from the outset to join it; and, 
during its course, the mill committees tended to take from the 
new, less experienced leadership, more authority for themselves 
than they had from the old managing committee.
In addition to the millowners' and the communalists' 
direct attacks, the GKU had also to face less overt forms of 
opposition from a number of quarters: from the jobbers, the
BTLU, Bombay's middle class, and the BPCC. The jobbers, 
increasingly neutralised by the mill committees, had begun 
to resist the GKU before the strike. They were therefore waiting 
for opportunities to subvert it and regain their traditional 
power over the workforce. By the time of the 1929 strike the 
BTLU's former preparedness to work with the militants had 
disappeared. Apart from the longstanding political differences 
between the two forms of trade unionism, the BTLU's eclipse by 
the GKU, the fact that the moderates' remaining base -
Muslim Madanpura - opposed both the GKU and the strike, ensured 
the BTLU's antagonism. The middle class's opposition, which 
was much stronger than in 1928, was largely economic in origin. 
Shareholders, large and small, had a direct stake in the defeat
18of the strike and the permanent subordination of the millhands. 
Further, the middle class's worsening unemployment situation was
185. See fn.126 above.
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linked to the textile industry's decline and was, thus,
aggravated by this second general strike. Finally, the social
disruption,and the perceived potential for large-scale violence
attendant upon the rise of the GKU/also contributed to the
18 6middle class's growing hostility to the union.
The BPCC's opposition to the 1929 strike in particular, 
and to radical industrial politics in general, was much more 
pronounced than in 1928; the limited and ambiguous defence of 
the Meerut prisoners expressed by the Congress at the national 
level camouflaged the BPCC conservatives' mounting campaign 
against the communists and the GKU at the local level. The 
terms of this campaign were stated succinctly in mid-July, during 
the general strike, by the BPCC's powerful, merchant-aligned, 
organisation man, Bhulabhai Desai. During an extended BPCC 
debate on industrial politics Desai argued forcefully that the 
Congress should
... carry on a vigorous propaganda to win the workers 
to their side and save them from the influence of the 
communists. ... they should be brought round to the 
view that the struggle between the Government and the 
people was far more important than that between labour 
and capital. 187
186. NAI, H.Poll, 18/XVI/1928: G of Bom to G of I, 6/2/29
& 14/3/29.
187. NAI, H.Poll, 257/1/1930: record of BPCC meetings on 3 &
4/7/29. Several BPCC meetings were devoted to the issue 
during May-July: BSAI, 1929, paras. 969, 1094(4) & 1126;
NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FR2, Jun. & FRl Jul. To the
ends outlined by Bhulabhai Desai, the BPCC resolved to 
launch a campaign to increase its influence over labour 
at the expense of the GKU militants: the BPCC's Labour
Sub-committee, previously the preserve of the left, was
to be resuscitated and provided with an allocation of Rsl25 
per month; attempts were to be made to establish a 'Congress 
Textile Labour Union'; and a permanent Congress office, 
and eventaully a 'Congress House' costing Rs.50,000, were 
to be set up in the mill area.
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There were a number of factors behind this challenge. It
partly reflected the increasing opposition of Bombay's middle
class and merchant and industrial capital to the existence of
a strong communist-led militant union in the city. The Calcutta
Congress session's foreshadowing of another challenge to the
Raj provided another, directly political impetus - the need to
secure the dominance of the Gandhian Congress over the politics
188of Bombay city before another mass campaign was begun. This
particular concern, which became more pronounced after the 
Lahore Congress in December 1929, required the isolation of the 
communists within the BPCC, the pacification of the working class 
and, hopefully, its controlled mobilisation in the Congress's
188. This was indirectly and in part an outcome of the
National Congress's increasing - if still essentially 
nominal - wider commitment to mobilising labour in the 
Congress cause. For example, the Nehru Report had 
included a 'Labour Charter', the Calcutta Congress 
session directed volunteers to take up the cause of 
'the city labourers', and early in 1929 the AICC 
circularised all District Committees to involve them­
selves in labour organisations. The AICC also created 
a-'Labour Research Department' under a full-time officer 
at this time. (ibid.: DIB's abstract on 'Congress and
Labour since 1929', dated Oct. 1929.) These decisions 
and activities were taken note of by the BPCC in its 
1929 campaign (loc. cit.; NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929 : Bombay
FR2, Jun.), though it was the textile strike which 
provided the immediate impetus (see, eg., the BPCC's F Ward 
District Committee's anxious report about the difficulty 
of implementing the AICC directive because of the 
increasing anti-Congress sentiment among the millhands 
of its district during the general strike: AICC Papers,
Pll-1931: Hon. Sec., F Ward DCC to Gen. Secs., AICC
and BPCC, 25/6/29 (kindly provided by Sandy Gordon)).
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189cause. Finally, the communists' increasingly self-confident
attacks on the revolutionary credentials of the 'bourgeois'
Congress leadership - most clearly expressed at the Calcutta
AIWPP conference in December 1928 and, in Bombay, during the
Municipal elections campaign - provided further motivation
for a conservative attack on the Marxists and their mass base.
The textile strike ended soon after the BPCC had drawn
up its plans to counter the communists in the trade union
sphere, and so this element of its strategy temporarily lost 
19 0its urgency. It was not to be actively implemented until
1930, in the context of the launching of Civil Disobedience. 
However the isolation of the communists within the BPCC was 
successfully completed during 1929. This process was facilitated 
by the contemporaneous erosion of the support the communists had 
developed among the BPCC's radical Maharashtrian intelligentsia 
during the 1920s. During these years this support had enabled 
the communists to mobilise a significant voting bloc against the 
conservatism of the 'industrialist' and 'merchant' factions.
This began to change from early 1929. After the Calcutta
189. That the BPCC was as interested in exercising social control 
over the millhands as in mobilising them for Civil 
Disobedience became more apparent after the movement
had begun. For example the DIB found in August 1930
that the BPCC was seeking to 'keep the workers quiet
... as they had done successfully at Ahmedabad', so
as to minimise the potential for violence. To this
extent Petrie and the Bombay authorities were happy
with the Congress's labour ambitions. (NAI, H.Poll, 504/1930
Petrie to Emerson, 20/8/30). (See also the section
below on the Congress and labour in 1930.)
190. That the BPCC's campaign was temporarily shelved after 
the collapse of the strike further suggests the 
importance of the social control motivation.
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National Congress the force of'the WPP's claim to being the
only available radical nationalist leadership was reduced
by the prospect of another Gandhian-led mass campaign; the
Congress leadership was somewhat rehabilitated in the eyes of
191the non-communist radicals. The process of isolation was
then greatly accelerated by the Meerut arrests; for the
Meerut prisoners' successors in the BPCC - Deshpande and
Ranadive - did not inherit the personal influence exercised,
19 2or the official positions held, by the old WPP faction.
Deshpande and Ranadive, who remained within the BPCC during 1929 
and sought to increase their influence there, found it impossible 
to use that organisation or the Youth League as effective plat­
forms from which to rally political and financial support for 
the strike.
Finally, the 1929 strike had also to face the active 
state intervention that had been absent during the 1928 strike.
191. See, eg., New Delhi's assessment of the overall Indian 
situation on the eve of Civil Disobedience, in NAI, H.Poll, 
98/1930: G of I to all LGs, 30/1/30; also R. Kumar,
'From Swaraj to Purna Swaraj', pp.94-5.
192. This could be seen, for example, in the fact that a number 
of the non-communist former WPP members and sympathisers, 
such as J.B. Patel and K.B. Sanzgiri, participated in the 
conservative-initiated BPCC discussions during the strike 
on the Congress labour program. The Meerut arrests did
not lead to a process of radicalisation around the remaining 
communist nucleus in the BPCC: see fn.153 above.
193. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the GKU, 1928-33;
NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FR2 Jul.; BCP, 1036/B/II/1935:
note on Bombay communist groups, 1929-33.
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The 1929 strike took place during the transitional stage in
the development of the Raj's industrial policy: from January
1929 New Delhi was prepared to allow much more open intervention;
but, during 1929, residual constraints continued to deter the
Raj from a policy of total repression. During the remainder
of that year, before Civil Disobedience had definitely been
decided upon, the government was still concerned not
unnecessarily to 'disturb the rather delicate poise of the
political situation' in its interventions against communism
19 4and militant trade unionism. For this reason, repression
in this phase was not as severe as Bombay desired or as it 
would later become. Nevertheless, the Bombay government - now 
with much stronger backing from New Delhi - was more able to 
act against strikes than before. The passage of the anti­
intimidation legislation during the 1929 strike demonstrated 
19 5this shift. The government also implemented a policy of
'judicious arrest and prosecution' of individual leaders and
the police took increasingly open action against the strike.
On May Day, for example, the police prevented a GKU 'monster
procession' on the grounds that it would be prejudicial to 
19 6public order. On July 12 a police order was passed which
194. NAI, H.Poll, 304/1929: Irwin to Benn, 13/11/29. Irwin was
referring to a decision not to re-invoke the Public Safety 
Ordinance at that time. Earlier, in June, the HD had decided, 
for similar reasons, not to add Pendse and Kulkarni to the 
Meerut Case. It was decided that because 'the delicate 
situation at Bombay made it undesirable to take action which 
might provoke trouble', these two should not be included, 
despite the adequacy of the evidence against them that had 
come to light: NAI, H.Poll, 10/IV/1929: minutes of HD
meeting, 6/6/29.
195. As it eventuated, the legislation could not be passed until 
early August, after the back of the strike had been broken.
For this reason its effect on this strike would have been 
limited to the moral support for the millowners provided by 
the government's decision to proceed with the legislation.
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prohibited the holding of any meeting in the labour area.
The order was to remain in force until the end of the year.
Deshpande and Ranadive were arrested on the same day for
defying the order and were sentenced to a month's imprisonment.
More than 60 GKU volunteers were arrested during July-August
197for this and other offences. Subsequently, in November, 1929,
Ranadive was sentenced to a year's rigorous imprisonment for a 
militant speech.
Thus the overall opposition faced by the 1929 strike
was both more extensive and more intensive than that directed
against the 1928 strike. This situation also precluded the
possibility of the political and communal common-fronts that
had sustained the preceding strike; in 1929 the GKU would need
all of its recently established internal unity and resources to
counter the effects of its isolation. Its vulnerability was
increased by the fact that not only did the many different
elements of this wide opposition coincide - to a large degree
199they were also coordinated.
196. NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FRl May.
197. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the GKU, 1928-33; NAI, 
H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FRl & 2 Jul. and Aug.
198. BCP, 1036/B/II/1935: note on Bombay communist groups, 1929-
33.
199. We have already noted a number of instances of this co­
ordination: eg., the overarching support of the state for
the business and communal interests; the merchant and mill- 
owner financing of the non-Brahman campaign; the moderates' 
participation in the July 21 meeting of business organisations 
with the Governor. There were also other instances: eg., the
committee of enquiry into the causes of the February communal 
riots was a politically motivated effort to blame the 
communists - despite all the evidence of their efforts to 
pacify the situation - while ignoring the active role of the 
communalists (Newman, op. cit., pp.324-5, incl. fn.84); 
after the strike had begun the millowners deliberately fanned 
communal tension by employing Muslim and Untouchable strike­
breakers for this purpose (ibid., p.340); and the industrial­
ists and the merchants were able to overcome their wider 
differences to coordinate effectively on this issue: see theevidence of the BMOA representative in RCLI, 1(2), p.307.
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Just as the old leadership may have overcome the 
Party and union problems it had belatedly recognised had it had 
more time, the new leadership might have begun to come to grips 
with these continuing problems had the assault come later. This 
is suggested by the fact that even in mid-June, nearly two months 
after the beginning of the strike, the union was still making a 
good showing, despite the difficulties of the situation; at that 
point the government remained worried about the GKU's 'excellent 
organisation', the leadership's 'very strong hold over the 
millhands', and the continuing popularity of the ideology of 
class struggle among the strikers.
But by this point these strengths were beginning to 
be outweighed by the union's less visible weaknesses: the
hairline fissures that had flawed the solidarity of the GKU 
by the time of the Meerut arrests were fast becoming open 
fractures, and the community breaches had become unbridgeable.
The tension between the striking majority and the non-striking 
and black-legging minority was, because it largely overlapped
with the millhands' community divisions, particularly corrosive.
201It often erupted into uncontrollable violence. This was
demoralising and it also provided the police with additional 
opportunities for action against the strike. The relative 
independence of the mill committees from the central leadership 
made it increasingly difficult for the inexperienced leadership 
to conduct a coordinated strike policy. Then, in mid-June, the
200. NAI, H.Poll, 303/1929: note by Haig, 11/6/29; also NAI,
H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FRl Jun.
201. BREC, Report, p.19. For the union this communal tension was 
more serious than during the February riots because it was 
leading to Hindu-Muslim violence within the workforce.
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communists became the object of a second non-Brahman campaign
in the managing committee, much more serious in scale than the
202pre-March dispute. Finally, when the strike funds were
exhausted in late July, having been spent too early and too
freely, the end was near. With both the relief funds and their
203credit facilities exhausted, the strikers were defeated. The
millowners' determination and capacity to endure proved to be too 
great.
The final stage in the process of defeat - the collapse 
of the GKU itself - followed immediately after. This stage, in 
contrast to the defeat of the strike, arose almost completely from 
the inadequacies of the new leadership; a leadership failure 
completed what the opposition had already achieved.
202. On June 19 the non-Brahman activists in the managing 
committee put forward a resolution declaring that the GKU 
'had nothing in common with the Communist movement of 
Russia, whose emblem is also a red flag'. It was defeated 
23-12. But eight members of the faction subsequently 
published a leaflet protesting against the wearing of 
communist badges by the union's pickets, declaring that 
this was 'a dodge of the Communists to brand the Union
as a Communist body ... and to get it destroyed at the 
hands of the Government and break the strike and stop the 
labour movement'. This effort was again opposed by the 
majority. (NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FR2 Jun.) But
the defeat of the non-Brahmans could provide little comfort 
for the communists. The attack was more explicit and 
determined, and gained wider and more open support, than the 
pre-Meerut arrests attempt. It signalled a growing ground- 
swell of opinion against communist ideological militance, 
divorced from the increasingly defensive outlook of the 
ordinary millhands.
203. The mills were able to begin building their musters during
June, but the return to work accelerated only in July. By 
mid-August 111,000 had returned and by mid-September it was 
all over: NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FR2 Jul., FRl
Aug., FR2 Sept..
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Even when the strike was plainly collapsing the
union's managing committee refused to admit defeat. Instead,
it responded with a desperate and escalating ideological
2 0 4militance initiated by the communists. This serious tactical
2 05error - which was severely criticised by the Meerut group
led to the almost complete divorce of the leadership from the
workforce and to the liquidation of the mill committee movement.
The forced return to work of the strikers, in defiance of the
leadership, was in itself a serious blow to the managing committee's
authority. But, more seriously, because the leading militants
remained on strike the jobbers were able independently to
recruit the new workforce and the managements were able more
easily to victimise the activists. Consequently the jobbers,
as unchallenged recruiting agents, were able to regain much of
their former power over the millhands, while the GKU leadership
lost almost all of its organised contact with the reconstituted
workforce: 'Between July 1928 and July 1929 the G.K.U.'s
206relations with the jobbers turned full circle'. The mill
committee system - the organisational basis of the GKU - was
destroyed. Following the strike the union had only 2,000 
207members. The demoralisation of the workforce as a whole
was also reflected in the even smaller membership of the other
204. It was at this point that the militant incitements to the
millhands, to defy their opposition and continue the strike, 
began (NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FRl Jul.; NAI, H.Poll, 
7/20/1934: note on the GKU, 1928-33). The GKU leadership did 
not officially call off the strike until September 19.
205.
206. 
207.
MCG: 1 & 2.
Newman, op. cit., p.342. 
ibid., p.343.
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2 0 8unions and in the weak and erratic participation of the
GKU1s drastically reduced membership in the union's subsequent 
209affairs. The defeat of the 1929 strike was more than a
defeat of the GKU - it was a defeat of textile industry 
unionism as such in Bombay city. It was also a retreat from 
the ordered relationships that would have been provided by 
standardisation. The industry was to remain in its traditional, 
chaotic state. The price of standardisation - a strong union - 
had proved too high for both the millowners and the government.
The Communists Position in the BPCC
The GKU's defeat also sealed the communists' fate 
within Bombay's nationalist politics. In the second half of 
1929 Deshpande and Ranadive began a campaign to improve their 
position at the November BPCC elections and to capture the AICC 
seats held by their communist predecessors. From August they 
conducted a Congress recruitment drive among the millhands to
208. Whereas the April 1929 membership of the BTLU had been 5,400, 
by the end of the year the combined membership of the non- 
GKU unions was only 400 (loc. cit.) . (As the BTLU had not 
been involved in nor, thus, defeated by the strike, the 
drastic fall in its membership suggests that the Muslim 
community's support for the union had been largely politically 
inspired; once the GKU had been defeated the BTLU was no 
longer as necessary to the Muslim leaders' purposes.)
209. Eg., only 100 members arrived for the GKU's annual general
meeting on December 15 and the meeting had to be postponed. 
Some 1,500 arrived for the postponed meeting a week later, 
but by the time a leadership conflict had been resolved only 
200 remained and the meeting had to be postponed a second 
time. The leadership conducted a vigorous recruitment 
campaign before the next meeting, on January 26. Even so, 
only 700 attended, though this provided a quorum and the 
elections could be held: NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FR2
Dec.; NAI, H.Poll, 18/11/1930: Bombay FRl & 2 Jan.
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210this end. But the workers' demoralisation and indebtedness,
and the communists' declining authority, undermined these
efforts; and, without the authority and influence provided
by a mass base, the communists' had little more than ideology
to offer the BPCC radicals. The election results were a
211decisive blow to the communists' aspirations: they failed
to increase their influence; and Jamnadas Mehta, the leader
of the BPCC's 'industrialist' faction and one of the communists'
212arch foes in both the nationalist and trade union arenas,
won the presidency. Then, after Mehta had resigned his position
in January 1930 because of his opposition to the Civil
213Disobedience program, Nariman was elected as his replacement. 
Once the radical Nariman had replaced the moderate Mehta, the 
potential for a communist-led challenge to the BPCC leadership 
had been greatly reduced. Nariman had inherited the support 
previously given to the WPP leaders.
The Defeat of the GIPRU
The GIP Railway strike in February 1930 led to the 
defeat of the communists' second trade union base. It also led 
to further confrontation with the Congress conservatives.
Efforts to organise the GIP railway workers and to
210. NAI, H.Poll, 257/1/1930: report dated 2/9/29.
211. NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FRl Nov.
212. Mehta was the moderate president of the BB & Cl railway 
union and, as such, was in fairly constant conflict with 
the communists.
213. On these changes within the BPCC see R. Kumar, 'From Swaraj 
to Purna Swaraj', pp.94-7.
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prepare for a strike continued in the workshops and along the
line after the radicals' victory at the union's general meeting
at Chalisgaon in May. By the end of the year the level of
agitation, combined with the GIP administration's refusal to
consider even moderate demands, was sufficient to force the
reformist Ginwala secessionists to come to a compromise
agreement with the GIPRU militants - a 'small triumph' for 
214the latter. A strike was generally accepted as an
inevitability.
But it was a faction around the Nagpur non-communist
militant, R.S. Ruikar, rather than the communist group/which
benefitted most from these developments. At the time of the
Meerut arrests the internal organisation of the union and
the extension of its base were still at a much lower level than
in the textile industry. Moreover, the new communist leadership,
even though represented on the GIPRU's executive, was unable to
establish for itself the authority held by its predecessors.
The demands of the textile strike, the month-long arrests of
Ranadive .and Deshpande during its course, and then Ranadive's
imprisonment in November, further disorganised the communist
faction's efforts. Finally - and this was the factor which the
Meerut group believed to be the most important - the communist
group's program of work in the union during 1929 was neither
215systematic nor energetically pursued. By the end of the year
214. NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FR2 Nov.; also: NAI, H.Poll,
257/1/1930: note by H.J. Hobbs (Staff Officer, Railway Board,
Bombay), 25/10/29; List of resolutions passed by the AIRF 
meeting, Nagpur, 29/9/29, and list of demands formulated at 
the executive meeting of the GIPRU, 14/7/29 (from the Marx 
Memorial Library, London).
215. MCG: 1 & 2.
4 9 1
the communists' influence was definitely secondary to that of 
Ruikar. This was demonstrated clearly in January 1930, when 
Ruikar began propagandising for a one-day strike on the line. 
Although the previous communist leadership had been patiently 
and carefully preparing for an eventual general strike, after 
union organisation had been sufficiently advanced, the Deshpande 
leadership supported Ruikar's tactic. The communists were only
a minority in the strike committee formed to conduct the
* , 216 struggle.
The railway strike did not face the extensive 
opposition faced by the textile strike. Because the communists 
had not managed to develop class forms of organisation and 
consciousness among the railway workers to the extent that 
they had among the millhands the GIPRU did not pose the same 
threat to the established social and political order of the city. 
Secondly, because the strike was in a state enterprise it could 
be linked more comfortably with Gandhian nationalist themes.
The differences could be seen in the different character of the 
Congress's response to the two strikes: in sharp contrast to
its policy towards the strike in the Indian-owned textile
217industry, the BPCC voted its solidarity with the railway strikers. 
But though the opposition was not as extensive, state repression 
was much more intensive. This was partly because of the same 
determination to defeat serious industrial activity on the
216. ibid.; NAI, H.Poll, 18/11/1930 : Bombay FRl Jan.; NAI,
H.Poll, 95/1930: note by Petrie on the GIP situation,
6/2/30.
217. BC, 19/2/30, p.l; see Lakshman, op. cit., pp.57-8 for 
the resolutions of sympathy passed by the AICC.
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strategically sensitive railways that had earlier been evidenced
at Lillooah and elsewhere. But, in addition, the strike was the
first to follow the Lahore National Congress decision to launch
Civil Disobedience. This was a political combination to which
the bureaucracy, in both India and London, had already given
218considerable attention during 1929. Now the Raj was much less
constrained by the need to consider nationalist sensitivities
when repressing 'communistic' activity. Accordingly, when the
railway strike began, both the GIPR administration and the
government reacted with a particularly concerted and ruthless
219array of strike-breaking measures. The breaking of the
strike was facilitated by the ready availability of replacement 
labour from the,by now,large and growing reserve of desperate 
unemployed.
The acute difficulties faced by a strike in this 
situation were further compounded by the inadequacy of its 
leadership. The organisation of the strike was a fiasco. The 
one-day stop-work was timed for February 4, but on its eve the 
union leadership decided instead to extend it into an indefinite 
strike. The last-minute change, which was inadequately 
communicated to the union's centres along the line, combined
218. NAI, H.Foil, 257/1/1930: correspondence between New Delhi,
the Bengal government, and Calcutta commercial and 
industrial organisations, in August-October 1929 ; and DIB's 
abstract on Congress and Labour in 1929; IOL, L/PO/257: 
account of conference, arranged by Benn, between Tegart 
and Home Office officials (incl. Sir John Anderson) on 
25/10/29. (The conference discussed the measures used to 
break the 1926 General Strike in Britain as a model for a 
possible general strike during Civil Disobedience.)
219. BC, 8/2/30, p.8, 10/3/30, p.12, 14/3/30, p.12; Punekar, 
op. cit., p.141. The strike-breaking measures included the 
use of convict labour.
49 3
with the absence of previous preparation for a general strike,
220resulted in confusion from the beginning. Then, in this
confusion, the Ruikar-Deshpande relationship rapidly deteriorated.
2 21Within a week they were engaged in an open conflict. This
was further exacerbated when the BPCC, now under Nariman's
leadership, began actively to involve itself in order to bring
the strikers under Congress influence and to mobilise them as
222disciplined volunteers in Civil Disobedience. The Ruikar
faction, though initially hostile to the BPCC's intentions,
began to ally itself with the Congress after the strike had
22 3begun to collapse. But the Deshpande group violently opposed
22 4the BPCC-Ruikar alliance and policy. This soon became the
220. MCG: 1 & 2; Karnik, ojd . cit. , pp.218-19.
221. BC, 8/2/30, p.10; BCP, 1036/B/II/1935: note on communist
organisations, 1929-33; BSAI, 1930, para. 389.
222. It is probably significant that the BPCC did not begin 
actively to participate in the situation until after the 
strike was in trouble. It appears not to have been 
interested in strengthening the strike or in coordinating 
it, as a strike, with Civil Disobedience.
223. BSAI, 1930, paras. 381, 675, 675(1), 675(5). From late 
March,and during the first half of April, the Ruikar 
leadership joined with prominent Congress speakers to call 
on the remaining strikers to 'help the Congress and receive 
help from it'. The railway workers were requested to 
become satyagrahis, to eschew violence, to wear khaddar, 
and to renounce their 'vices'. Small doles were offered
as an added inducement for the strikers to enrol as 
volunteers.
224. The reasons for the vehemence of Deshpande's opposition
to the Ruikar-BPCC alliance - as, later, to the Kandalkar- 
BPCC alliance - will be investigated in Chapter 7.
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dominant issue in the strike, and the preoccupation hastened
its already inevitable collapse and made more complete the
22 5disintegration of the union.
At its height some 22,000 workshop and traffic
employees were on strike, and it cost a total of 895,000 man- 
226days. But, though this was a significant number of strikers,
it was only a small percentage of the GIPR workforce in the
Presidency - it was, in fact, only half of the union's 1929
membership. After a formal settlement, negotiated by the
Ginwala moderates, took effect on March 15, the administration
could proceed unfettered to recruit workers on its own terms.
The union was powerless to prevent the large scale retrenchments
2 2 7and victimisations which then took place.
While the railway began to return to normal operations,
those who had been retrenched and victimised continued a
2 2 8desperate, but impotent, rear-guard 'strike'. The most
notable events in this phase were two confused and violently
repressed 'satyagrahas', which coincided with the launching
of Civil Disobedience in the city, at the Bombay suburban railway
229stations of Kalyan and Kurla. While Ruikar and the BPCC sought
225. MCG:1 & 2; Karnik, op. cit., pp.219-21. (Given the above 
account of the strike I cannot agree, however, with Karnik's 
assertions that the strike was 'well-organised and disciplined', 
that the communists were dominant in the union's leadership, 
and that this was the main cause of the strike's failure.)
226. G of I, India in 1930-31, p.244.
227. Eg., an initial retrenchment of 1,350 from April 1 created
'much ill-feeling among the labour population', but there 
was 'no trouble, owing to the helplessness of the various 
unions due to their internal dissensions, absence of 
combination and lack of funds': NAI, H.Poll, 18/IV/1931:
Bombay FRl Apr.
228. BSAI, 1930, paras. 381, 444(3), 675(2&3), 700; NAI, H.Poll,
18/IV/1930: Bombay FRl & 2 Mar.
229. ibid.; BC, 7/4/30, p.12; R. Kumar, 'From Swaraj to Purna 
Swaraj', pp.99-100.
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to superimpose the ideology of Congress nationalism upon these
actions, Deshpande declared that the railway workers were acting
230as the vanguard in the worker-peasant revolution. For the
strikers, however, the Kalyan and Kurla 1satyagrahas' appear to
have been intended primarily at last-ditch protests against
231the Railway Board's recently released final terms. Some of
the retrenched workers enlisted as Congress volunteers. But
most showed little interest in either the Congress or the
communist programs once it had become clear that neither could
help them to realise their main object after ten weeks without
232pay - to find work 'under any conditions'. At several centres,
the authorities reported, the retrenched workers had 'expressed
233their opinion on agitators in general in no uncertain terms'.
234The union subsequently entered a sharp and factional decline.
The GKU, Congress and the Millhands in 1930.
The next phase of industrial contention took place in
the textile industry, over which, during 1930, 'the black cloud
235of industrial depression darken[ed] the whole sky'.
At the same time that it became involved in the GIPR
230. NAI, H.Poll, 18/III/1929: Bombay FR2 Feb & FRl Mar.; BSA,
1930, paras. 389 & 572 (which contain summaries of leaflets 
issued by the Deshpande group).
231. Karnik, op. cit., pp.220-1. The strike was eventually 
called off on April 16.
232 . NAI, H.Poll, 18/IV/1930 : Bombay FR2 Apr..
233. ibid.
234. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: notes on the GIPRU; MCG: 1 & 2
235. NAI, H.Poll, 504/1930: Petrie to Emerson, 20/8/30.
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strike, the BPCC also revived its labour program in the mill 
2 3 6area. As with Ruikar, the Congress sought an alliance with
the GKU's president, Kandalkar; and, as in the GIPRU, this
attempt, by aggravating union factionalism, further diminished
the possibilities for a regroupment of the millhands under a
unified militant leadership.
Although Kandalkar, like Ruikar, was initially hostile
2 37to the BPCC's labour ambitions, he, too, found the benefits
of an alliance increasingly attractive. When the BPCC provided
financial assistance to the impoverished and shattered union it
2 38was able to reopen permanent head and branch offices. The
Congress also gave nominal support to the GKU's program of
minimum demands for the working class. By mid-1930 Kandalkar
had managed to persuade a majority of the GKU's managing
committee to support the Congress, while, contemporaneously,
the BPCC stepped up its ideological and volunteer-recruitment 
239program. Through July and August,GKU leaders joined Congress
speakers, including prominent figures such as Vallabhbhai Patel, 
at moderately large meetings in the mill area. Their audiences 
were drawn from both the working millhands and the currently 
30,000 unemployed. The speakers' themes were similar to those
236. See the accounts of the BPCC meetings in Parel, in BC, 
18/2/30, p.l, 24/2/30, p.12., 13/3/30, p.12, 21/4/30, 
p.5, 24/4/30, p.7.
237. See Chapter 7.
238. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the GKU, 1928-33.
Kaldalkar played the leading role in the union in 
cementing the new alliance.
239. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VIII/1930: Bombay FR1 & 2 Jul.
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employed during the GIPR strike, and, again, they provoked 
a bitter communist r e a c t i o n . F r e e  meals and small doles - 
financed primarily by the BPCC's merchant supporters - were, 
as before, offered as inducements to potential volunteers.
The BPCC campaign reached its climax in a 'Congress Labour 
Week' from August 17-23. A 'Congress Labour Camp' was set up 
in Parel and 'the full Congress machinery' was 'placed at the 
disposal of the camp'.2^
But, as on the GIP railway, the BPCC campaign met with
little real success. Even the 'Labour Week' did not arouse a
great deal of interest among the millhands. Nor did the alliance
242with the now drastically reduced GKU prove to be of much value
240. ibid.; NAI, H.Poll, 18/IX/1930; Bombay FRl Aug.; BSAI,
1930, paras. 1330, 1367(23), 1191, 1199 & 1398; NAI, 
H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the Young Workers' League
(YWL), 1930-34. The estimate of the number of unemployed 
is from NAI, H.Poll, 504/1930: Petrie to Emerson, 20/8/30.
The average number present at the July meetings reported 
was 5000.
241. NAI, H.Poll, 18/IX/1930 : Bombay FR2 Aug.; BSAI, 1930 ,
para. 1152(27). The program for each day included meetings 
(averaging six per day), processions, visits to the chawls, 
and the distribution of large quantities of literature.
Each day was devoted to a special theme, beginning with 
specifically labour issues and ending with Congress 
nationalist themes. Soon after the Congress week the BPCC 
also began a campaign among the dockworkers, urging them
to participate in the boycott movement: NAI, H.Poll,
18/X/1930: Bombay FRl Sept.
242. The GKU had only a 'precarious' existence during 1930.
Its membership was only 800-1000 in mid-1930: BCP, 1036/
B/II/1935: note on communist groups in Bombay, 1929-33;
NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the GKU, 1928-33.
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to the Congress. Only the unemployed responded in any 
significant numbers - and more for the doles thus earned than 
through ideological conviction.^ ^  The millhands' demoralisation 
and vulnerability ensured their resistance to any form of 
political appeal. But the Gandhians' long history of neglect 
of labour, their opposition to the 1928 and 1929 strikes, the 
millhands' longstanding association of the BPCC with the 
millowners, and the uncompensated contribution to unemployment 
made by the Congress boycott of 'non-Swadeshi' mills during 
Civil Disobedience, confirmed the opposition of those still 
employed and the unenthusiastic and non-ideological response of 
the retrenched. Having fallen away from an outsider leadership 
which based its political program on working class demands, the 
millhands were not inclined to follow one which subordinated 
their demands to those enumerated in Gandhi's 'Eleven Points'.
Even the Kandalkar faction had decided by the end of 1930 that 
the BPCC was of no value to its labour program. The disillusion 
arose partly because the BPCC had decided even earlier that 
their attempt was not worth the effort. Their working class 
program appears to have been shelved soon after the failure of 
the 'Congress Labour Week'.
243. See the sources cited in fn.241. The Bombay government
reported that the 'Labour Week' program was poorly attended 
and that 'there was little real enthusiasm and attention on 
the part of the millhands'. The audiences at the various 
meetings fluctuated between 60 and 1500. However the BPCC- 
GKU alliance was able to close down 34 mills temporarily in 
protest against the arrest of BPCC leaders in August: NAI,
H.Poll, 18/IX/1930: Bombay FR2 Aug..
244. Leaflets distributed by the GKU leadership early in 1931 were
condemning the Congress leaders for doing nothing to help 
those workers who had been retrenched as a result of the 
boycott of 'non-Swadeshi' mills, and called for major 
Congress assistance for the unemployed: NAI, H.Poll,
18/1/1931: Bombay FRl Feb.; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934:
note on the GKU, 1928-33.
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Thus the BPCC's intervention into textile and railway 
unionism in Bombay did not lead to a further politicisation of 
the working class, nor to a strengthening of their trade union 
organisation. On the contrary, its 'bourgeois' efforts to add 
a subordinate working class following to its anti-government 
forces contributed to the workers' growing scepticism towards 
outsider political leaderships of whatever political hue, while
aggravating the factional divisions within - and thus hastening
. 245the decline of - local trade unionism.
The Working Class During Civil Disobedience
The decline continued. Bombay's working class was
unable in the following three years to recover from the defeats
of 1929-30. When Lester Hutchinson was released on bail from
the Meerut jail and visited Bombay in 1931 he found it
... distressing to notice the change in ... [the 
millhands'] condition. The great days of their unity 
and strength had passed with the collapse of the 
textile strike of 1929. Since then they had become 
divided among themselves ... and were at the mercy 
of opposing factions.246
245. The Congress's labour program in Bengal also aggravated
factional hostilities in Bengal: NAI, H.Poll, 257/1/1929:
DIB's abstract on Congress and labour in 1929 .
246. Hutchinson, op. cit., p.142. The increasing communal tensior 
in Bombay's political life during Civil Disobedience also 
added to the forces of division. This tension culminated
in the terrible communal riot of mid-1932, in which 211 
were killed and 2600 injured. During its three weeks 
course the riot directly affected the mill area only 
briefly, but the escalation in communal feeling in Bombay 
must have had serious consequences for the consciousness 
of the millhands: See R. Kumar, 'From Swaraj to Purna 
Swaraj', pp.104-5; Punekar, op. cit., p.129; G of I,
India in 1931-32, pp.56-7. I have taken the figures on the 
riot from the latter source. For the localities affected 
during its different stages see IQR, 1932, Vol. 1, 
pp.23-8, and Vol. 2, p.l.
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This was a fair description of the condition of the city's working
247class as a whole during the 1930-33 period. There was little
scope for effective radical trade unionism, and even less for
2 4 8the reformists; and, already defeated industrially, the
city's proletariat was not to be a political force throughout
the Civil Disobedience period.
Though in part the consequence of inadequate trade
union leadership, the Bombay working class's inability to
recover from its earlier defeats was primarily an outcome of
the Depression. The textile industry passed into an extreme
economic crisis in these years. Some 20 of the approximately
24980 mills working in 1929 had closed by 1934, while most
250of the others continued to sustain heavy losses. The
millowners responded with large-scale retrenchments and
intensified rationalisation. Before the 1928 strike the average
daily number of hands employed in the Bombay mills was some
150,000. In 1930 this dropped to 137,000 and by 1933 it was
only 120,000. Between 1930 and 1933 the average number of
251workers per loom was reduced from 94 to 61. Between 1926
247. I have not been able to locate a set of figures on industrial 
disputation in Bombay city during this period. However the 
passivity of the city's workforce is confirmed by the Bombay 
fortnightly reports for 1930-33. No major strikes took place, 
and most were confined to only one or a few mills. The 
Government of India's annual report, India in 1930-31 etc., 
which reported the more significant strikes of the respective 
years, found nothing worth reporting in Bombay city in 1930-33.
248. Eg., in May 1931 Bombay reported that while the GKU was making 
limited progress, the BTLU 'continues practically moribund':
NAI, H.Poll, 18/V/1931: Bombay FRl May.
249. M.D. Morris, 0£. cit., pp.171-2.
250. See the figures provided in Gordon, op. cit., p.298. The 
industry as a whole continued to sustain the heavy losses of 
the second half of the 1920s, but the effects were much more 
extreme because reserves had by then been drastically reduced.
251. ibid., p.299. The average employment figures mask the great 
fluctuations which occurred. The fluctuations added to the 
insecurity of the workforce.
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and 1934, wages were reduced by approximately 17 percent - most 
of the reduction occurring from 1929, after the workforce's
252largely successful resistance until mid-1929 had collapsed.
Because of the large reserve of unemployed the rationalisation
and wage-cutting could be imposed without serious resistance.
Industrial tension remained high in Bombay throughout the 
253period, and the authorities constantly worried about the
potential for violent outbreaks by the unemployed. But, as the
Bombay government reported in June 1933, at the height of the
industry's crisis, the millowners remained 'in the ascendant'
254in capital-labour relations;
Owing to the state of unemployment ... it is easy 
for the millowners to engage new hands in the place 
of those who go on strike or who refuse to return 
to work on the terms offered, and the strikes ... 
had a short duration for this reason.
The competitiveness of the labour market was increased by the
severe effects of the contemporary agricultural depression.
This deprived the unemployed of the traditional support of an
alternative income in their villages, and so most remained in
255the city in the hope of finding work.
Bombay's Depression crisis was an extreme
252. M.D. Morris, op. cit., p.223; Punekar, op.cit., p.99.
253. M.D. Morris, op_. cit. , p.185.
254. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII /1933: Bombay, FRl Jun..
255. This was apparent as early as August 1930: NAI, H.Poll,
504/1930: Petrie to Emerson, 20/8/30. The Bombay
authorities doubted whether even five percent of the 
unemployed would return to their villages, even if their 
fares were paid for them, for they would have only famine 
relief to exist on following the conclusion of the season's 
agricultural operations.
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2 56case, but the same trend occurred in most of India's 
industries and utilities. According to figures supplied by 
the International Labour Office, the total factory employment
n r 7in India fell by approximately 12 percent between 1929 and 1933. 
Employment on the railways - the second biggest source of
employment in both Bombay and Calcutta - fell by approximately
12 percent, and wages by some 10 percent, in the same time 
25 8period. That these attacks were met by only sporadic
and limited strike activity is suggested by the following table:
TABLE No.8
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN INDIA 1928-1933
Year Number of 
Disputes
Workers
Involved
Working 
Days Lost
1928 203 506,851 31,647,404
1929 141 532,016 12,165,691
1930 148 196,301 2,261,731
1931 166 203,008 2,408,123
1932 118 128,099 1,922,437
1933 146 164,938 2,168,961
Source: G of I, Bulletin of Indian Industries and Labour,
43 & 62,in: International Labour Office, Industrial
Labour in India (Geneva, 1938) , p.138 .
256. Bombay's depression crisis was extreme within the wider 
Indian context. It was also much more severe than in the 
Ahmedabad and Sholapur textile mills (M.D. Morris, op. cit., 
p.171, fn.67). This was reflected in the wage changes in 
the three centres. Whereas Bombay's workers suffered a 17 
percent cut during 1926-34, for the Sholapur workers it was 
8 percent, and the Ahmedabad wages increased by 5^ percent: 
Punekar, op. cit., p.99.
257. International Labour Office, Industrial Labour in India, 
(Geneva, 1938), p.177.
258. ibid., p.261.
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With the exception of isolated pockets - most notably Sholapur -
proletarian radicalism was not on the agenda in India during the
2 59Civil Disobedience period.
The weakness of radical trade unionism at the outset
of the Depression was maintained during the period partly by
continuing state repression. As we have Seen, the launching of
Civil Disobedience removed the Raj's concern about possible
Congress reaction to the repression of 'Communistic' trade
unionism. It also greatly reduced the industrialists' and the
moderates' earlier limited opposition to the Raj. This was
because the political and economic hazards created by the
Congress's mass agitation and boycott movement encouraged both
260groups to move, once again, much closer to the government.
The remaining grounds for their opposition to the state were
removed after London finally gave way, in mid-1932, to a worried
New Delhi's insistent demands for an economic policy more
2 61satisfactory to Indian capital. This shift allowed the Raj
even more freedom from indigenous constraints to repress 
oppositional political activity of all kinds - communist or 
Congress. Finally, once Civil Disobedience had begun, the Indian
259. The Sholapur workers played a leading role in the remarkable 
insurrection, which took control of the city for a week, in 
protest at Gandhi's arrest in May 1930. In 1931, 15,000 of 
the city's 50,000 millhands also conducted the largest strike 
in the Presidency; this lasted for only three weeks;
India in 1931-32, p.115. The largest Indian strikes in 
the period were in the Calcutta jute industry, but even 
these were fairly limited: see Chapter 3(2), fn.325.
260. For the moderates' policy during Civil Disobedience, see 
Low, 'Sir Tej Bahudur Sapru', pp.306-20; for the 
realignment of most of the industrialists of Bombay, and 
the political-economic factors underlying it, see Gordon, 
op. cit., Chapter VI.
261. Tomlinson, 'India and the British Empire', pp.365-76;
Bagchi, Private Investment, pp.420-21 & 439-40. Between 
1930 and 1932 New Delhi had already won substantial tariff 
policy concessions from the home government.
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administration was allowed much more freedom from the home
2 62government in its day-to-day responses to the Indian situation.
The emergency powers enacted in 1932, at the outset of the
2 6 3second, 'civil martial law' phase of the period, also
provided very effective additional reserve weapons against
industrial militance; under the 'Ordinance Regime' the state
had recourse, for the first time, to almost unrestricted executive
power to repress communist activity and industrial militance.
Thus, despite the greatly decreased effectiveness of
their movement during the Civil Disobedience period, communist
and non-communist trade union militants were arrested and
imprisoned much more frequently than before. Ranadive's November
1929 imprisonment was the precursor of a large number of similar
cases in the ensuing y e a r s . B e c a u s e  of the absence of major
strike activity, government repression of radical trade unionism
during the height of Civil Disobedience did not go far beyond
these actions against leaders. But that the Raj was prepared
drastically to repress militant strikes was demonstrated in
1933-34. When, in the second half of 1933, a 'frenzy' of wage
cuts in the textile industry provoked extensive unrest in the 
265Bombay mills, the Government of Bombay readied itself to use
266its 1932 emergency powers. In April 1934, after the industry's
262. Low, 'Civil Martial Law', passim.
263. Professor Low has coined this apposite phrase to encapsulate 
the Raj's policy towards the Civil Disobedience movement in 
its second phase.
264. See IB, Communism, (1935), ps.161 & 203, & pp.287-306, for 
the more important of these. But despite the large increase 
in prosecutions and convictions, the authorities had constant 
difficulty in securing convictions in the courts for speeches 
advocating social revolutionary, as distinct from seditious, 
themes. Moreover, the communists, unlike the Gandhians, 
defended themselves in court and launched appeals - which 
were often successful. The law continued to act as a real, 
if limited protection - to the Raj's chagrin.
M.D. Morris, 0£. cit., p.172.2 6 5 .
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depression had begun to lift and after the return of the
Meerut communists, a communist-led general strike finally
eventuated. Bombay, with New Delhi's backing, promptly used
its new powers to conduct a very comprehensive, intensive and
effective repression of an order which could hardly have been
267contemplated in 1928-29. Many of the communist strike
leaders were subsequently interned for long periods.
3. THE COMMUNISTS' SITUATION ON THE EVE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
Certain continuities can be discerned between the 
1927-29 and 1930-34 phases of Indian politics. For example, 
the industrial revolt and the communists' ascendancy during 
1927-29 were the prelude to the urban middle class and agrarian 
turmoil and the resurrection of Gandhian mass politics of the 
years that followed. The onset of the industrial depression 
that had catalysed the working class militancy preceded the 
arrival in India of the Great Depression, which fed the urban 
and agrarian agitations of the Civil Disobedience period. The 
Raj's repression of the communists' movement was also a 
preparation for its subsequent repression of the Congress's. 
Moreover, the industrialists' influence on the Congress leadership 
during the breaking of the radical working class movement, and 
their simultaneous exploitation of the Bombay situation
266. NAI, H.Poll, 17/11/1934: G of Bom. to G of I, 21/6/33.
267. ibid.: G of Bom to G of I, 30/8/34; IOL, L/PO/43: 
Brabourne to Hoare, 28/6/34; IB, Communism, (1935),
pp.196-7. After the strike had taken hold the government 
declared that it constituted an 'emergency' and arrested 
28 strike leaders, banned all strike meetings and 
processions, and took vigorous police action against the 
strikers.
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to pressure the Raj for their own economic ends, were to be
repeated on a larger scale during the Civil Disobedience
movement. During Civil Disobedience the industrialists played 
2 6 8a dual role: they were able, through their influence on the
Gandhian leadership, very largely to determine the limits to 
be allowed the mass movement; at the same time they were
able to use the agitation to win further concessions from the 
British. There were, therefore, strong elements of similarity 
in the fates of, on the one hand, the communists and their 
working class movement and, on the other, of the Civil 
Disobedience radicals and their militant peasant movements.
Further, even the Gandhian leadership was in an impossible 
position once the bourgeoisie as a whole had unambiguously 
withdrawn its support from the Congress movement.
Bombay had been the communists' one hope for making 
the transition between the two phases from a position of 
reasonable strength. But by the time Civil Disobedience had 
begun the Bombay communists shared - though for very different 
reasons - the Bengal branch's situation of isolation and impotence. 
At the deepest level, Bombay's fate was due to the inherent 
vulnerability of a purely working class base. Bombay's radical 
working class had to face a powerful range of oppositional 
forces. But the only unity that the Maratha 'class-community' 
could assert against the unity of its opposition was its own.
It was unable to mobilise from within Bombay the political 
or financial support that might have enabled the strike to
268. On this see Sarkar, 'The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism', 
passim; NAI, H.Poll, 136/1931: Notes by Emerson, 7/4/31, 
on the Karachi Session of the INC, and V to S of S, 
11/4/31.
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survive long enough to defeat the millowners' seige. Nor 
was there, in weakly industrialised India, a wider trade 
union movement of substance for the GKU to fall back upon for 
support. Finally, because the working class upsurge did not 
coincide with a major peasant revolt, and because the 
communists had not established a rural base, there was no 
possibility of support from that quarter, either.
Thus during Civil Disobedience the communists' 
'proletarian option' - the Party's 'natural' basis for 
participation in nationalist politics - was effectively, 
albeit not totally, closed. What, then, were the possible ways 
forward for the communists in the Civil Disobedience period?
The choices were both few and clear. The extreme weakness of 
their position demanded the application of Lenin's sound 
'united-front' principle of maximising one's friends and 
minimising one's enemies while, at the same time, attempting 
to build an independent base. The communists needed both to 
strengthen the overall forces of the left, by forming a 
common-front with the non-Party left elements, and to participate 
in the Civil Disobedience movement as a coherent radical nucleus. 
Participation in Civil Disobedience could possibly be used to 
win over as future cadres some of those radicals who became 
disenchanted with the Gandhian leadership. The Congress could 
also act as a vehicle for establishing rural contacts, at a time 
when the villages were succeeding the factories as the main site 
of mass upheaval. This did not necessitate the communists' 
abandoning the working class. But the change in the location 
of mass radicalism did highlight the necessity of developing 
a rural perspective. Finally, one of the clearest lessons to
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be learnt from the effects of the Meerut arrests was the 
absolute necessity for a communist movement in India of a 
strong and effective underground Party organisation; the 
arrests had terminated the remarkably extended period when the 
communists could function effectively purely as an open 
organisation.
But though the choices were clear the possibilities 
were very limited. In addition to the extremely limited 
resources with which the new communist leadership entered the 
Civil Disobedience era, this was so for a number of reasons.
Though from 1930 the political space available for 
communist politics in the cities was minimal, it was substantial 
for the Gandhian mode. Moreover, this was not a propitious 
time for the already isolated Bombay communists to win over 
the non-communist radical intelligentsia. With another mass 
movement finally under way, Gandhi’s hold over the Congress 
radicals was neither mechanical nor tenuous. The communists 
were, therefore, at a great political and ideological disadvantage 
in the city. They were also at a great psychological disadvantage. 
It would be difficult indeed for them to allow that the political 
leadership,and the classes, that had so recently contributed to 
their defeat, could be 'genuinely' anti-imperialist. The Bengal 
communists did not have the problem of Gandhian hegemony to contend 
with - in Calcutta at least. But Subhas Bose's charismatic 
appeal, his organisational control and his 'socialist' camouflage, 
were considerable barriers between the communists and the 
'revolutionary petty-bourgeoisie'. So, too, was the fascination 
that terrorism continued to hold, at this stage, for many of 
the youthful activists.
5 09
Nor was the path to the villages an easy one for the
few remaining communists to find and negotiate. This was so
even in Bombay, where the communists' close contact with the
working class had provided the most promising potential access
to the peasantry and where the non-Brahman movement's antagonism
towards the Congress had seemingly offered additional opportunities.
The new leadership's divorce from the millhands, and the collapse
in working class morale, combined substantially to close the
working class door to the countryside. Moreover, from 1930 the
dominant non-Brahman leaders finally entered nationalist
269politics by allying with the Gandhian Congress. A communist-
radical non-Brahman alliance may have been very possible in the 
late 1920s but, if so, the potential was now much reduced. The 
communists' only remaining method of gaining ready access to 
the peasantry was by becoming Congress volunteers - and we 
have already noted the objective and subjective difficulties 
standing in the way of this course of action. None of these 
obstacles were impenetrable barriers. But if the new communist 
leadership did make the attempt it would be starting almost 
from the beginning, and against considerable opposition.
The building of left-wing unity, too, was inherently 
difficult. This was so even in Bombay where, unlike Bengal, 
factionalism had not been a serious problem before the Meerut 
arrests. The dislocation and bitterness of defeat, compounded 
by the Congress's entry into working class politics, fostered 
a factious atmosphere. M.N. Roy's return to India at the end 
of 1930 introduced a new source of leftist division. This was
269. Omvedt, 'Non-Brahmans and Nationalists', pp.209-13.
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because, for reasons which will be examined in the following 
chapter, Roy fell out of favour with Moscow. The ECCI 
bitterly denounced Roy and his politics throughout the 1929-33 
period and enjoined the CPI to do likewise. Roy, for his part, 
hoped to rehabilitate himself with, and be re-admitted to, the 
Comintern. His strategy was to attempt to establish, through 
his own hopefully greater political successes, the superiority
270of his leadership and policy over those of the 'official' Party. 
Thus Roy, too, had little interest in a united front between 
his group and the CPI. Instead of these two left factions 
minimising their weaknesses by pooling resources, they became 
agents of a factionalism created largely by the curious logic 
of Comintern bolshevist politics and transposed on to the 
Indian situation. As the Royist group based itself in Bombay,
2this particular problem was to be manifested most seriously there.
272The Roy group initially made a limited advance. It became
the strongest left faction in Bombay, exercised a certain 
influence on the Congress left wing, and made some contact with 
the UP peasant movement. Roy was quickly to outpace the Party
270. IB, Communism, (1935), pp.216-17; Haithcox, op. cit. pp.
139-43. Prior to the Seventh World Congress of the 
Comintern in 1935, Roy sent to the ECCI a manifesto out­
lining his group's position, and a letter dismissing the 
CPI as a political force and requesting an invitation to 
the Seventh Congress: in BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935.
271. It began with the arrival in Bombay from Europe in mid-
1930 of two of Roy's lieutenants, Sundar Kabadi and 
Tayab Shaikh. They immediately involved themselves in 
the disputes proceeding within the GKU and the GIPRU, 
encouraging the Kandalkar and Ruikar factions to break 
with the communists and ally with the BPCC: NAI, H.Poll,
7/20/1934: Note on the GKU; BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: Note on 
Bombay communist groups, 1929-33.
IB, Communism, (1935), pp.162-68 and 211-15; Haithcox, 
op. cit., pp.175-201.
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group, thus demonstrating that there was more potential for the 
Left during Civil Disobedience than the communists were able 
to realise. But his successes were, nevertheless, very 
modest. Moreover, Roy's group depended very much on his 
personal authority and vigorous leadership; after he was 
discovered and arrested by the British in July 1931 the
273Royist group soon foundered, then began to disintegrate.
Finally, the contemporary changes in the politics 
of the Comintern also complicated the task of developing a 
policy and ideology appropriate to the current Indian situation. 
The 'metaphysical materialism' which provided the philosophical 
underpinnings of the Marxism characteristic of the post-Leninist 
era was inadequate for the task of unravelling the problems 
posed by, for instance, Gandhi's unpredicted resurrection, the 
mass popularity of his 'feudal' ideology, and the relationship 
between this ideology and the politics of Indian capitalism. The 
first generation of Bombay communists had, in the context of a 
mass base, begun to come to grips with the inadequacy of the 
mechanis.tic Roy-Dutt perspectives with which they had started.
They had managed to construct an ideology of genuine mass appeal 
and had perceived some of the short-comings of the simplistic 
policy towards 'bourgeois' nationalism provided by the 'new 
Imperialist policy' thesis. These advances were to be undermined, 
along with the communists' political position, after the Meerut
273. IB, Communism, (1935), pp.168-69.
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arrests. The Comintern policy changes in the second half
274of 1928 and during 1929 were not - as has been claimed 
the cause of the communists' defeats of 1929. But they 
created a major barrier to the CPI's recovery from the 
defeats. We will therefore look now at the further 
bolshevisation of Comintern from 1928.
274. Eg. Karnik, op. cit., p . 200 .
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CHAPTER 6
ENVIRONMENTAL SHIFTS, II:
THE COMINTERN 1S ‘THIRD PERIOD*
In July-August 1928 the Sixth World Congress of the 
Comintern was held in Moscow. The Congress was primarily 
concerned with the Soviet Union and the advanced capitalist 
countries, but it also gave considerable attention to the 
colonial question. The Congress's 'Theses on the Revolutionary 
Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies', in which India 
figured prominently, were the most exhaustive treatment of 
the question the Comintern had attempted or would attempt.
The theses, which later played an important role in the 
CPI's politics, marked a definite break with the strategy of 
the past. For the CPI, whose policy had been based on the Roy- 
Dutt analysis, the Sixth Congress theses constituted a shift - 
though an ambiguous one - to a less 'left-sectarian' position. 
But despite the apparently definitive character of the Sixth 
Congress document the ECCI was soon to replace it,without a 
real attempt at justification, with a crudely 'left-sectarian' 
and 'ultra-proletarian' line employing, moreover, extremely 
mechanistic conceptual categories, which the CPI was then 
expected to follow throughout the Civil Disobedience period.
The change in policy introduced at the Sixth Congress, 
and the ECCI's subsequent abrupt and pragmatic strategic shift, 
were almost entirely the consequences of the rapid changes
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taking place in the internal politics of the Soviet Union.
The same changes led also to intensified ECCI demands upon 
the 'discipline' of the member parties. To understand the 
Sixth Congress and what followed in Comintern politics we 
need first to grasp the main features of this Soviet political 
context.
The Comintern in Transition
The fact that this was the first meeting of the 
world body for four years - despite the constitutional requirement 
that they be held at least bienially - indicated the Sixth 
Congress's close relationship to Soviet domestic politics.^ In 
particular, the years between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses had 
been dominated by Stalin's struggle against the 'Left Opposition' 
led by Trotsky. Trotsky was finally defeated towards the end 
of 1927. Stalin then began immediately to prepare his move 
against the remaining potential opposition to his faction - 
the group centred around the moderate Bukharin, who had allied 
himself with Stalin in the anti-Trotsky campaign; following 
the fight against the 'left-deviation' came the fight against 
the 'right-deviation'.
Concurrently with this transition in CPSU factionalism 
the Party had also to face a major domestic crisis. In the 
first months of 1928 hoarding by the kulaks led to a severe 
shortfall in the supply of foodstuffs. This provided a new
1. The following account of the Soviet political context to 
the Sixth Congress is based on: Deutscher, Stalin,
Chapter 8, and pp.397-400; Claudin, op. cit., pp.86-90.
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context for the continuing Party debate about the optimum 
path towards industrialisation and the socialisation of 
agriculture. The urgency of the debate was increased by 
the continuing fear of imperialist intervention against an 
extremely vulnerable Soviet Union. Following his defeat of 
Trotsky Stalin decided to combine his solution to the 
domestic crisis with his campaign against the Bukharin faction. 
Though having identified himself during the anti-Trotsky 
struggle with Bukharin's gradualist and non-coercive policy 
of 'socialism at a snail's pace', Stalin now reversed his 
stand. He began to promote an extreme version of Trotsky's 
program of radical collectivisation of agriculture and rapid 
industrialisation and to wage a determined campaign against the 
'right-deviationists' who opposed it. At the same time he 
promoted even more vigorously his heretical doctrine of the 
possibility of completely building socialise in the Soviet 
Union in the absence of successful proletarian revolution in 
the West; the slogan of 'socialism in one country' was about 
to become enshrined as official doctrine in the Soviet Union 
and to provide the rallying cry to the Russian people for the 
agonising process of rapid industrialisation.
These essentially domestic preoccupations spilled 
over into, and dominated, the Comintern. Simultaneously the 
remaining authority of that organisation was exploited, as it 
had been during the anti-Trotsky struggle, to isolate the 
Bukharin faction within the CPSU and to promote Stalin's 
program. But during this stage, because Stalin's control over 
Soviet - and thus Comintern - politics had increased, the 
relationship between CPSU and Comintern politics became more
direct.
5 1 6
To justify a radical reorientation in domestic 
politics, and to provide an external focus for the heightened 
tensions in both the Party and the wider Soviet society that 
would result, Stalin argued that a fundamental shift in the 
international economy was taking place. After the post-War 
period of capitalist crisis and then the subsequent period of 
capitalist 'stabilisation', he claimed, a 'third period' of 
world economic crisis had begun. Further, Stalin argued, 
despite his deep scepticism about the revolutionary potential 
of the West, although European working class militance had 
been almost completely defeated during the 1920s the emerging 
economic crisis was leading to a spontaneous revolutionary 
upsurge. That this 'third period' was 'objectively' revolution­
ary would be guaranteed, finally, by the presence of the Soviet 
Union, within whose boundaries socialism was rapidly being 
constructed. The current conjuncture of capitalist crisis, 
proletarian challenge and an emerging socialist nation amounted 
to the terminal, catastrophic phase of world capitalism;
'catastrophism' was reemerging as the foundation of Comintern 
ideology and policy. But precisely because the existence of 
the Soviet Union was now the primary contradiction with world 
capitalism, the world bourgeoisie, assisted by its social
democratic 'left wing' would intensify its efforts to destroy
2this 'land of the socialist dictatorship of the workers'.
2. From the "Manifesto of the VI World Congress', Inprecor, Vol. 
8 (92), 1928, p.1769. This document encapsulates, in 
polemical form, the 'third period' argument running through 
all of the official Comintern documents of this period.
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For this reason it was more imperative than ever that the
Soviet Union embark on a program of rapid industrialisation
and that the world's communist parties rally in a disciplined
manner to 'form a wall of iron' around this 'bulwark of the
3movement for freedom' in the world.
The combined 'third period' and 'socialism in one 
country' arguments led directly to an intensification of the 
'Bolshevisation' program. The sense of crisis could be used 
to justify a regime of extreme monolithicity. Because the 
world situation was 'objectively revolutionary', party 'unity' 
and 'correct' leadership were imperative. Resistance to the 
new line could therefore be categorised as dangerous 'deviationism' 
and in an 'objectively revolutionary' situation 'deviationists' 
and 'disruptionists' would have to be expeditiously purged. 
Moreover, in the same way that Stalin had argued mechanistically 
that the economic 'crisis' would spontaneously produce an 
'objectively' revolutionary mass response, the reasons for the 
failure of an actual revolution to materialise from these 
'objectively revolutionary' conditions could be reduced to 
failures in party leadership - both past and present. Secondly, 
because, in this argument, the Soviet Union was now the 'leading' 
force and final guarantor of the world revolution - contrary to 
Trotsky's argument that its continued survival was absolutely 
dependent on successful revolution in the West - it was natural 
that the Soviet (and thus Stalinist) leadership should be the 
best judge of the 'correctness' of a party's leadership. More­
over, it followed that the first duty of the world's communist 
parties should be the defence of the Soviet Union. 'Ultra­
centralism' had received a further justification.
3. loc. cit..
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This bolshevisation of theory and policy had an 
organisational counterpart.^ The specificity of each of the 
national situations continued to be acknowledged formally.
But the bureaucratic-centralist way in which the Sixth 
Congress theses were prepared,and the universal scope of the 
'third period' analysis, belied the acknowledgement. The 
Sixth Congress implicitly legitimised the bureaucratic 
centralism and reaffirmed the discretionary powers accorded 
to the ECCI by the Fifth Congress. Because the ECCI was now 
even more under the control of one faction the reaffirmation 
legitimised an even more monolithic mode of operation. The 
Sixth Congress also allowed the ECCI the authority to despatch 
'instructors' to intervene in the internal affairs of the 
national parties. These officials had even greater discretionary 
powers than those of the 'delegates' created by the Fifth 
Congress. Finally, the establishment in Moscow of a number of 
special bureaux, including one for the East, further increased 
the ECCI's bureaucratic powers.
Stalin first put forward his 'third period' argument 
at the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU in December 1927, soon 
after Trotsky's total defeat. It was opposed by Bukharin, who 
could find nothing in the evidence put forward by Stalin justify­
ing the hypothesis that capitalist 'stabilisation' had begun to 
break down; in fact, for the time being at least, the post-War 
capitalist 'stabilisation' was continuing and, moreover, social 
democracy was still expanding its mass base. The issue was then 
shifted to the Comintern, and it was raised at the Ninth Plenum
4. See Claudin, op. cit., pp.113-14, on these organisational 
changes.
51 9
of the ECCI in February 1928. The Plenum affirmed Stalin's 
hypothesis, which then became the basic premise of the
5documents prepared for the Sixth Congress of the world body 
and, indeed, the raison d'etre of that congress. The next 
stage of the move against Bukharin - and the concluding 
skirmish against the Trotsyist rump - occurred in that arena. 
Following the Sixth Congress, the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI 
in June-July 1929 completed the entrenchment of the 'third 
period' strategy as official Comintern policy and prepared the 
final moves against the Bukharin faction.
This was the political context of the 1928 world 
congress of the Communist International. The very lengthy 
theoretical treatises that were presented and produced, and 
the extended and often heated discussions around these documents, 
were more a concealed projection of the above patterns of 
Soviet domestic politics than an investigation of international 
realities. The note of hysteria that was sounded throughout 
the proceedings was a symptom of their essential artificiality. 
For example the Congress's manifesto, which expressed this 
hysteria in a concentrated form and heralded the new mode of 
Comintern polemics, declared that 'the steady and rapid 
intensification of the class struggle' against 'the imperialist 
beast with its dull eyes' could be seen 'everywhere' - and not 
least in India, where 'the growing thunder of the revolutionarygvolcano' was 'already sending up preliminary smoke signals'.
5. See: the 'Draft Programme of the Communist International' 
as adopted by Programme Commission of the ECCI on May 25, 
1928 , in Inprecor, Vol. 8 (30), 1928 , pp. 549-59; aqd (ECCI), 
The Communist International Between the Fifth and Sixth 
World Congresses, (London, CPGB, 1928).
6. The above and following quotations from the manifesto come 
from Inprecor, Vol. 8(92), pp.1769-71.
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'Under the crack of slave whips', capitalism had managed to
survive the post-War crisis.
But capitalism is beginning to suffocate under the 
weight of its own contradictions. Its historical 
fate drives it once again with tremendous 
elemental force into the vortex of tremendous 
catastrophes, the deadly breath of which will 
scorch the whole world.
But the diversionary 'Wagnerian' style, and the accompanying 
extremist and gratuitous terms of abuse which were hurled 
at the social-democratic enemy and the 'deviationist traitors', 
were not only symptomatic. As they became institutionalised in 
the following years they also became a material factor in the 
decline of the quality of Comintern politics: the Comintern
itself was beginning to suffocate, under the weight of its florid 
and incongruously combined metaphors.
India and the Sixth Congress.
The defeat of the Chinese revolution - the one arena
of substantial revolutionary activity in the world in the 1920s -
ensured that the colonial question would receive detailed
7attention at the Sixth Congress. The prominence of the issue 
was increased by the facts that the Chinese defeat was closely 
associated with Stalin's policy for the Chinese Party and that 
this policy had been opposed, and the defeat predicted, by 
Trotsky: the Chinese defeat both coincided with, and directly
impinged upon, the Stalin-Trotsky conflict. The importance of 
the Chinese question ensured, in turn, India's prominence in 
the theses on the colonies and semi-colonies. India had always
7. For the Chinese background to the treatment of the colonial 
question at the Sixth Congress, see: Boersner, op. cit., 
Chapter VII and pp.253-59; d'Encausse and Schram, op. cit., 
pp.53-56.
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been linked with China in the Comintern's deliberations on
the colonial question. Now Stalin's post-facto justifications
of his Chinese policy gave the Indian revolution the
additional function of 'carrying forward' the revolution begun
in China, and of 'learning the lessons' of the Chinese Party's
'mistakes' in its application of the ECCI's 'correct' policy;
the Chinese defeat would not have been in vain. As the ECCI
put it in the following year, 'The revival of the Indian
revolution give[s] the revolutionary movements of China,
Indonesia and Egypt a new life, will sound a rallying call
0for the whole of mankind in chains'.
But there were additional reasons for India's
prominence at the Congress. The 'third period' analysis of
world capitalism accorded India a crucial role in world political
economy: as the colonial lynch-pin of the dominant imperialist
power, India was a crucial 'link' in the 'chain' of world 
9imperialism. India would necessarily reflect the alleged deep 
crisis into which the British political economy had entered; 
and the resulting revolutionary upsurge in the colony would 
further deepen Britain's metropolitan crisis. The Indian 
revolution would also play an important role in the defence 
of the Soviet Union against the British-led imperialist intervention 
that was claimed to be imminent. The 'third period' analysis
8. 'For the Liberation of India from the Yoke of Imperialism', 
in Inprecor, Vol. 9(17), 1929, p.340. This theme runs 
through the Sixth Congress documents on the colonial 
question and the ECCI's subsequent treatment of the issue.
9. See, eg., Kuusinen's remarks in his report on 'The 
Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies', in Inprecor, Vol. 
8(68), p.1226. The same view continued to be stressed 
subsequently. See, eg., Lozovsky's report to the Tenth 
Plenum of the ECCI in mid-1929, in Inprecor, Vol. 9(55), 
1929, p.1203.
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required a deep revolutionary crisis in India.
Finally, M.N. Roy's theoretical and political 
past became a significant issue in Comintern politics at 
this time, thus contributing to the detailed consideration of 
the Indian question. Roy was already in a difficult position 
because of his direct involvement, as an ECCI representative, 
in the China debacle"^ - an event from which Stalin had to 
dissociate himself. At the Sixth Congress he came under fire 
because of the incompatibility of his 'new Imperialist policy' 
thesis with the 'third period' argument - an incompatability in 
an area that was of vital importance to Stalin's new line.
Roy's argument that British finance capital was structurally 
compelled to engage in a long term policy of large scale 
export of capital for investment in Indian industry did not 
accord with the Stalinist hypothesis that British capitalism 
had entered a deep, contractionary crisis. Hence the ECCI, 
in 1928, belatedly discovered the error of Roy's theoretical 
ways. Much of the discussion on the colonial question before 
and at the Sixth Congress centred on the Royist 'new Imperialist 
policy' thesis -or, as it was called at the Congress, the 
'decolonisation' theory.'*''*" It is also possible that the dominance 
of this rather academic issue in the colonial theses was in part 
a means of preventing the Chinese question from becoming the 
dominant issue. One further consequence of the importance of the
10. See: Haithcox, op. cit., Chapter 4; Overstreet and Windmiller,
op. cit., pp.90-4; for Roy's involvement in China in 1927.
11. The history of the Sixth Congress's 'decolonisation' controversy 
is covered in great detail in S.D. Gupta, op. cit., pp.
40-56.
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'decolonisation' question at the Congress was that the CPGB,
which had based its colonial policy on Roy's analysis, also
came under attack. This added to the controversy surrounding
12the Indian question. The attack on the Roy-Dutt thesis
was given an added, though spurious, legitimacy by the
involvement of a number of travellers from India, including
Shaukat Usmani, in the debates. None were accredited CPI
13delegates, and Moscow was warned accordingly. Yet all were 
allowed to attend the Congress, and Usmani was even elected to 
the Presidium. Usmani fulfilled his role by bitterly attacking 
both Roy and the CPGB.^
It was against this background that Manuilsky reported
to the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI in the following year that
'50 per cent of the attention of the Comintern must now be 
15paid' to India. Of the colonial and neo-colonial world 
only China warranted equivalent attention - but by that time 
the real leadership of the Chinese revolution was based in 
the remote and inaccessible Chingkangshan mountains, beyond the 
direct reach of the ECCI. The CPI was less remote: from late
1929 a succession of ECCI representatives successfully penetrated
12. Eg. Kuusinen's remarks, in Inprecor, Vol. 8(68), p.1226.
For the CPGB's stormy passage through the Sixth Congress
see L.J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Party: Its Origin
and Development Until 1929, (London, 1966), pp.204-09.
13. Three North Indian members of the CPI - Usmani, Shafique 
and Habib - had left India for Moscow in mid-1928 without 
informing the Party. In response to a request from C.P. Dutt 
in Moscow (MCCC, P.2189: telegram from 'John' to Spratt,
5/8/28) Spratt replied that the Party had 'no confidence'
in them: MCCC, P.2190: telegram from Spratt to Dutt, 10/8/28.
14. Eg. his speeches as reported in Inprecor, Vol. 8(68), 1928, pp. 
1247-48 and Vol. 8(78), pp.1472-74. Usmani has recalled
that he was 'pushed' into the Presidium, where he found him­
self seated third from Stalin (Usmani, I Met Stalin Twice, 
(Bombay, 1953), p.23). This was a curious (and brief) 
escalation to fame for an unaccredited delegate.
15. Inprecor, Vol. 9(40), 1929, p.858.
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the Raj's cordon sanitaire and involved themselves directly in
16intra-Party politics; and, as we have seen, it was in the 
'third period' that the 1920s CPI leadership gained its first 
free access to Soviet and Comintern documents. The already 
struggling CPI's greatly enhanced, Comintern-endowed, international 
responsibilities and, as we will now see, the quality of the 
attention of which it was now to receive such a large proportion, 
were heavy crosses for it to carry.
The Theses on the Colonies and Semi-Colonies
The colonial theses shared that heterogenous 
mixture of 'shadow' and 'reality', described by Deutscher, 
which pervaded all of the Sixth Congress's documents; they 
bore the marks of the tensions and ambiguities of their 
transitional political context. The CPGB delegation was (self 
defensively) to condemn the final version on the following 
grounds:
... the theses repeatedly fall into eclecticism...
The prevailing method of the thesis is: "on the one 
hand we must recognise, on the other we cannot but 
admit", without any consistent line. ... [Crucial 
sections are covered with a] cobweb of reservations 
and contradictions. ... This eclectic method deprives ^  
the theses of all semblance of a militant document....
The British delegation's Royist position had the virtue of
logical consistency (if not of a close relationship with reality)
and the criticism was apposite. The Sixth Congress theses'
logical incoherence did greatly weaken the document's force
as a guide to political action. It was also to facilitate the
ECCI's subsequent abandonment of its main strategic thrust.
Paradoxically, however, it was precisely the ambiguity arising
from this eclecticism, combined with the theses' comprehensive
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scope, which subsequently allowed a section of the CPI
leadership to develop from them a reasonably sophisticated
theory of Indian politics running counter to the prevailing
Tenth Plenum line. The Sixth Congress theses acknowledged,
both explicitly and, through their internal inconsistencies,
implicitly, the complexities of Indian politics and the
inadequacies of the earlier and subsequent simplistic theories.
The theses' inconsistencies also encouraged a selective reading
of them in the light of observed realities. And that the
relatively comprehensive Sixth Congress documents remained
the ostensible basis of Comintern policy until the Seventh
Congress in 1935 made it more possible to resist the ECCI's
inappropriate 1929 innovations. One CPI faction continued to
18draw upon the 1928 theses even after the Seventh Congress.
Because the Sixth Congress analysis was to become an important 
factor in CPI politics we need to examine their content in some 
detail.
The colonial theses were based explicitly on the 'third 
period'/'socialism in one country' dogmas. The conjunction of 
the entry of capitalism into a catastrophic crisis, and the 
building of socialism in the USSR, both guaranteed that this was 
the terminal phase of capitalism and opened 'a quite new
16. This will be covered in Chapter 7. That these agents were 
able to get past the normally very effective security 
barriers and remain in India undetected for extended 
periods may well have been due to the Raj's intelligence 
system's preoccupation with the Civil Disobedience movement.
17. Inprecor, Vol. 8(91), 1928, p.1744.
18. See Chapter 8, below.
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perspective' for the national liberation movements in the 
19colonies. But the document was centred around a direct 
attack on the Royist 'decolonisation' theory. To this 
extent the theses' main argument was essentially a restatement 
- though in considerably more detail - of the main tenets of 
Lenin's Second Congress theses from which the Sixth Congress 
theses claimed direct descent. India was taken as the main 
case study.
Imperialist political economy was directed, not 
towards the industrialisation of the colonies through the 
export of metropolitan capital, the document argued, but 
to the retardation of their industrial development. The export 
of capital, and the colonial industrialisation of the War and 
post-War period, had been only temporary, and determined 
primarily by extra-economic contingencies. The export of 
capital to India since then had been extremely limited and 
moreover, it had been invested primarily in non-industrial 
sectors. The absence of a significant engineering industry 
in India proved this point. Capital investment had led only 
indirectly, and very partially, to further industrialisation or 
to the development of a capitalist mode of agriculture. 
Imperialism had, in fact, hindered the development of the 
productive forces of the colony and had strengthened the 
parasitic, neo-feudal, pre-capitalist modes of exploitation 
(in land ownership, trade and usury) upon which it was super­
imposed. The consequent agrarian crisis imposed, in turn, very 
severe constraints on the development of an internal market for
19. From the introductory section of the theses, in Inprecor, 
Vol. 8(88), 1928, p.1661. The theses as a whole are in 
ibid., pp.1659-76.
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20industry - whether colonial or metropolitan.
From this analysis, which was essentially in accord
with Indian realities, the theses concluded, firstly, that
the colonial bourgeoisie was, apart from certain compradorist
merchant elements, 'objectively' in radical conflict with the
21interests of imperialism. The colonial and metropolitan 
bourgeoisies were not engaged in a joint strategy of industrial­
isation. There was little basis for the economic and political 
'partnership' alleged by the Roy-Dutt analysis. The colonial 
bourgeoisie, and particularly its industrialist fraction, was 
a 'national bourgeoisie'. Secondly, because of the low level 
of industrialisation, the industrial working class was 'young' 
and numerically small. Moreover, often seasonal and 'with 
one foot still in the village', it was incompletely
proletarianised and remained largely illiterate and culturally 
2 2heterogenous. Hence the task of developing class organisation
and consciousness was a difficult one. Thirdly, and also because
of the low level of industrialisation, the agrarian sector
remained crucial for a revolutionary strategy. The peasant
revolt against the 'feudal-colonial' structure of exploitation
would provide the main mass force of the national-revolutionary
movement. Thus the peasantry as a whole - though with the
possible future exception of the 'thin stratum of kulak peasants'
2 3which had arisen as a result of colonial policy - was 
objectively revolutionary. Because of these defining character-
20. ibid, pp.1662-64.
21. ibid, pp.1664-65.
22. ibid, p.1670; also p.1667.
23. ibid., p.1664.
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istics the immediate revolutionary stage was that of the
'bourgeois-democratic' revolution, and its 'axis' was the
'national-emancipatory struggle' combined with the agrarian 
2 4revolution. The preconditions for the proletarian-socialist
revolution did not yet exist.
In translating these 'objective' class categories
into concrete political behaviour the theses made some
reasonably perceptive observations. Moreover, the sociological
categories, though still crude, did mark an advance on those
previously employed in Comintern analyses of Indian society.
But the Sixth Congress analysis also drew - against its own
logic - a number of 'Royist' conclusions, without either
theoretical or empirical justification. Further, other
conclusions were qualified to the point of meaninglessness.
The theses also made some extremely mechanistic connections
between the economic and political levels.
One of the difficult problems the document grappled
with was the role of the 'national bourgeoisie' in colonial
politics. The bourgeoisie's support for the national movement
was 'vacillating' and 'compromising', reflecting its 'intermediate
position' between the revolutionary and the feudal-imperialist 
25'camps'. It could be designated as 'national reformism', to 
distinguish it from the 'national revolutionary' forces. In 
some of its formulations on the character of 'national reformism' 
the Sixth Congress document achieved a reasonable working 
definition of the political strategy of the Indian bourgeoisie.
For example:
24. ibid., p.1665.
25. ibid., pp.1665-66.
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The native bourgeoisie ... again and again capitulates 
to imperialism. Its capitulation, however, is not 
final as long as the danger of class revolution on 
the part of the masses has not become immediate... .
In order, on the one hand, to avoid this danger, 
and, on the other hand, to strengthen its position 
in relation to imperialism, bourgeois nationalism ... 
strives to obtain the support of the petty 
bourgeoisie, of the peasantry and in part also of 
the working class. Since, in relation to the working 
class it has little prospect of success ... it 
becomes the more important for it to obtain support 
from the peasantry.26
The bourgeoisie's ideological influence 'on the ranks of the
petty bourgeoisie, peasantry and even a portion of the working
27class', was also recognised. However, by over-estimating
the extent of big-landlordism and under-estimating the
strength of the 'thin stratum of kulak peasants', it seriously
under-estimated the potential for a bourgeois-peasant alliance.
Thus, the theses argued, the bourgeoisie's need to mobilise
peasant support against imperialism was its 'weakest point'.
Because of the intensity and mode of the peasants' exploitation
they could only be substantially mobilised around a program of
agrarian revolution, not mere reform. But the bourgeoisie, as
with the petty bourgeoisie, was 'by its immediate interests so
closely bound up with landlordism, with usury capital and with
the exploitation of the peasant masses in general' that it
opposed not only agrarian revolution, but also decisive agrarian 
2 8reform. Therefore as the agrarian crisis advanced the 
bourgeoisie would increasingly retreat to the tactics of using 
'empty nationalist phrases and gestures to keep the petty 
bourgeois masses under its influence and to compel imperialism
26. ibid., p.1666
27. loc. cit..
2 8. loc. cit..
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to grant certain concessions.
This shortcoming would not have been as serious
had the theses not also - and, again, against their logic
of the central argument - exaggerated the potential political
strength of the working class and the potential for a worker-
peasant alliance. 'The real threat to British domination
comes [it was asserted] not from the bourgeois camp, but
from the growing mass movement of the Indian workers'
30supported by the agrarian revolution. This was 'leading 
to a radical transformation of the whole political situation 
in India': 'the hegemony of the proletariat' in the 'bourgeois-
democratic revolution' was now possible. Despite the vehemence 
of the argument against the possibility of substantial 
industrialisation in India, it was asserted that 'the new 
capitalist forms of exploitation bring into the arena a 
genuine revolutionary force - the proletariat, around which the
3many millions of the peasant masses rally more and more strongly'.
Finally, the theses' careful attempts to categorise 
the 'ambiguous' politics of 'national-reformism', so as to avoid 
the Chinese Party's 'mistakes', became far too careful - and 
even more ambiguous than the tactics of the national bourgeoisie. 
Both the ambiguity and the under-estimation of the force of 
'bourgeois' nationalism are particularly evident in the following 
passage:
29. loc. cit..
30. loc. cit..
31. ibid., p.1664. The theses drew 
evidence for this claim: ibid.,
on the current strikes as 
ps. 1660 and 1673.
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The national bourgeoisie has not the significance of a force in the struggle against imperialism. 
Nevertheless, this bourgeois-reformist opposition 
has its real special significance for the development 
of the revolutionary movement ... in so far as it 
possesses any mass influence at all.32
In contrast to the confused tentativeness of such
formulations, the theses' conceptualisation of the relationship
between class and party was as crudely confident as that of
the school it was criticising. The National Congress, it was
33asserted, was 'the organ of the Indian bourgeoisie'. The
Congress leadership thus directly pursued the goals and
tactics attributed by the theses to Indian capitalism, despite
the 'petty bourgeois' origins of much of the leadership:
colonial movements such as 'Gandhism' were 'originally petty
bourgeois ideological movements which, however, as a result
of their service to the big bourgeoisie became converted into
34a [sic.] bourgeois nationalist-reformist movement'. However
the Congress also contained a 'petty bourgeois' 'radical wing'
which had not yet submitted to bourgeois hegemony and which
stood for 'a more or less consistent national-revolutionary
3 5point of view'. But even the members of this group were
merely acting as 'more or less revolutionary representatives
of the anti-imperialist interests of the colonial bourgeoisie',
and would renege on their radicalism when the mass revolutionary
3 6crisis deepened. Only small numbers of the intelligentsia 
would join the 'genuine' worker-peasant, anti-imperialist,
32. ibid., p.1667.
33. ibid., p.1660.
34. ibid., p.1668.
35. loc. cit..
36. loc. cit..
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bourgeois-democratic revolution; for this revolution
would also be directed against the intelligentsia’s class
position. Thus a very misleading economic reductionism
complemented the sociological shortcomings of the theses.
The failure to recognise the important mediating role of
ideology which underlay this reductionism also led to a
deterministic optimism about the likely political behaviour
of the exploited masses: having been 'betrayed' once - in
1922 - by 'bourgeois national-reformism', they would relatively
quickly liberate themselves from 'bourgeois' ideological
influence in the coming crisis. The same mode of analysis led
to the drawing of extremely mechanistic analogies with Chinese 
37politics. The inadequacy of the comparisons with'China were 
compounded by a complete failure to take into account the critical 
role of the colonial state in India.
The tactical conclusions drawn from the above arguments 
and assertions reflected the theses' inherent ambiguity. In 
consonance with the formulation on the oppositional role of 
the bourgeoisie, the CPI was warned against the sectarian 
mistake of self-isolation through failing to participate in 
the currently bourgeois-led nationalist movement. The communists 
were to exploit to the full the contradiction between imperialism 
and the national bourgeoisie. However the Party was also warned 
against the opposite mistake of failing to prepare itself and 
the masses for the bourgeoisie's fairly imminent capitulation 
in the face of a rising mass revolt: it was necessary 'mercilessly
37. Eg., the National Congress was portrayed as a direct
equivalent of the Kuomintang, and Gandhi of Sun Yat Sen.
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to expose before the toiling masses the national-reformist
character of the Swarajist ... and other nationalist parties,
and in particular of their leaders'. However the exposure was
... not to be achieved by any noisy phrases, 
however radical they may sound superficially, about 
the absence of any distinction between the 
oppositional national-reformists ... and the 
British imperialists or their feudal counter­
revolutionary allies. The national reformist 
leaders would easily be able to make use of such 
an exaggeration in order to incite the masses 
against the Communists.38
Organisationally, the Party was to 'reject the formation of any
kind of bloc' with the 'bourgeois national-reformist' parties
and to 'demarcate' itself 'in the most clear-cut fashion'
from the 'petty bourgeois national-revolutionary' parties.
However it was 'permissible' to form temporary agreements
and coordinate separate anti-imperialist activities with the
former, and to establish temporary unions with the latter,
provided that their anti-imperialism remained 'genuine' and
that they did not hinder the communists' mass work. The
communists should, through ideological struggle, win from
the petty bourgeoisie their hegemony over the peasantry,
while 'relentlessly' struggling against the 'slightest' sign
39of bourgeois influence inside the labour movement.
The Sixth Congress asserted, against the 'new 
Imperialist policy' advocates, the central importance of the 
peasantry in the colonial revolution. Accordingly the CPI 
was directed to place a great deal more emphasis on peasant 
organisation than hitherto. But the force of this directive 
was blunted by the assumptions that the proletariat was the
38. loc. cit.. 
39 . loc. cit..
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only 'genuinely' revolutionary class and that it was
4 0significant enough in India to lead a revolution, and by
the exaggerated fear of the intrusion of 'petty bourgeois'
influence, via the peasantry, into proletarian politics.
Thus the working class was to remain the sole organisational base
of the CPI. On this base the Party could become a 'powerful'
force in Indian politics. Further, the Party was urged not to
continue to organise the Workers' and Peasants' Parties, for
these 'two-class' parties could 'too easily ... be converted
into ordinary petty bourgeois parties. The Communist Party can
never build its organisation on the basis of a fusion of two
classes, and ... it cannot ... organise other parties on
this basis, which is characteristic of petty bourgeois groups'.^
Thus while the CPI was forcefully reminded of the very great
importance of developing its influence among the peasantry,
it was to do so, not through a political party which included
the peasantry, but only through peasant unions. The alliance
of the proletariat and the peasantry was to be expressed
merely in 'carefully prepared and periodically convened joint
conferences and congresses' of representatives of trade and
42peasant unions and through similar organisational forms.
All of these tasks, which presupposed a strong
Communist Party, were urged upon the CPI despite the Sixth
Congress's explicit recognition that, strictly speaking, no
4 3Communist Party of India yet existed. But instead of relating 
the Party's weakness to the objective difficulties for revolutionär
40. The proper relationship between the proletariat and the
peasantry in the revolution was encapsulated in the following 
way: 'The peasantry can only achieve its emancipation under
the leadership of the proletariat, but the proletariat can 
only lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution to victory in 
union with the peasantry': ibid., p.1666.
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politics, the theses spoke glibly of 'the excessively
marked disproportion between the objective revolutionary
44situation and the weakness of the subjective factor'.
Because the 'third period' hypothesis required an 'objectively' 
revolutionary situation, the weakness of the revolutionary 
movement was reduced to 'the subjective factor'. For the 
present, the current leadership in India was simply chastised 
and reminded of the urgency of the task of forming a united 
national Party which was capable of effectively combining 
legal and illegal work. They were not yet burdened with the 
full responsibility for the 'failure' of the Indian revolution - 
nor, therefore, with the full program of 'Bolshevisation'.
Thus the general class analysis employed in the Sixth 
Congress colonial theses was logically consistent and provided 
a much more adequate hypothesis than any previously received 
by the CPI from abroad. It was very schematic, underestimated 
the influence of both merchant and industrial capital on 
nationalist politics and the potential for a political alliance 
between.urban capitalists and the dominant peasantry, and over­
estimated the level of poor peasant revolt. Nevertheless it 
did recognise the crucial political significance of the agrarian 
sector, the inherent antagonism of interests between the 
British and Indian bourgeoisies, the tactical nature of the 
latter's compromises with imperialism, and the importance of 
the role of 'bourgeois-democratic' ideology in determining the 
existing character of nationalist politics. It also explicitly
41. ibid., p.1671; also p.1673
42. ibid., p.1671.
43. ibid., p.1673.
44. ibid., p.1670.
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recognised the incomplete proletarianisation of the 'semi­
peasant' working class and, through its argument on 
industrialisation, it implicitly recognised the strategic 
weakness of the working class in Indian politics. To this 
extent it was a reasonable basis for CPI politics in the 
coming period. But when the theses attempted a detailed 
consideration of political strategies and tactics they led 
to conclusions which either lay quite outside the preceding 
logic or which were qualified to the point of meaningless. 
Moreover, the conceptualisation of the relationship between 
class and politics became extremely mechanical. At a method­
ological level, the discrepancy between the underlying analysis 
and the policy conclusions revealed, in part, a confusion between 
two incompatible modes of analysis: while the central argument
employed a structural class analysis, many of the conclusions 
or qualifications relied on a subjectivist, psychologistic 
mode of analysis. For example, though the theses initially 
relate the bourgeoisie's 'vacillations' to its intermediate 
class position they are subsequently linked to bourgeois
states of mind - 'half-heartedness', lack of a 'genuine' 'desire'
45for independence, wavering 'moods', and so on. The latter, 
non-Marxist tendency subsequently became a much more dominant 
mode of ECCI analysis.
The Tenth Plenum and After
Although the Sixth Congress theses remained the 
official basis of CPI policy they were, in fact, soon replaced
45. eg., ibid., ps. 1668 and 1670.
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by a policy based on the 'left-sectarian1 inconsistencies in 
the 1928 document rather than on the anti-'decolonisation' 
logic. Moreover,the conceptualisation became even more 
crude, the tone more hysterical and the attacks on 'bourgeois' 
and 'petty bourgeois' nationalism more abusive. The CPI's 
respite from the 'left-sectarianism' on which it had been raised 
was brief. But this time, in the Civil Disobedience period, 
the consequences were far more serious.
The policy change was heralded in an April 1929 
Comintern manifesto to the Indian revolution,^ confirmed at 
the ECCI's Tenth Plenum, and enshrined in the 'Draft Platform
47of Action of the Communist Party of India' at the end of 1930. 
The Draft Platform became the official basis of CPI policy.
The new policy was also reproduced constantly in the pages 
of the Comintern press during the following four years.
According to this argument the Indian proletariat, 
led by the millhands of Bombay, had finally risen to its 
inherent political consciousness and power. Moreover, the 
peasants had begun to rally behind this challenge. Consequently 
the Indian bourgeoisie (and thus the National Congress) had 
finally capitulated to British imperialism - it was now 
'imperialism's b a t m a n - despite the remaining contradiction 
of interests. The capitulation was evidenced by the rescinding
46. See fn. 8.
47. The Draft Platform first appeared in Inprecor in December
1930 (Inprecor, Vol.10(58), 1930, pp.1218-22). It was 
first received in India in early 1931: MCG:2.
48. P. Schubin, 'Problems of the Revolutionary Movement in 
India', in Communist International (hereafter Cl), Vol.
6 (11-13), 1929, p.506.
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of the Complete Independence goal at the Calcutta Congress.
The workers' demonstration at that Congress was the true
indication of the future shape of Indian nationalist politics.
Even imperialism was 'scared out of its wits' by the proletarian
challenge - this was shown by the launching of the Meerut Case,
which was directed against the WPPs' 'rapidly rising influence
4 9in town and country'. The Congress's launching of the
Civil Disobedience movement was simply a preemptive attempt by
the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie to disorganise the inevitable
mass revolt by claiming its leadership. The 'petty bourgeois'
radical wing of the National Congress had, in turn, capitulated
to the bourgeoisie, while at the same time strengthening its
links with the 'treacherous' social democrats of Britain. The
Congress left was now acting as the 'left-reformist' agency
of the reactionary bourgeoisie. The revolutionary credentials
of the intelligentsia would be determined by its relationship
to the proletarian revolution: 'That section which does not
submit to the hegemony of the proletariat will be immediately
thrown by the course of events into the camp of the counter- 
50revolution'. The 'left-reformists' were particularly 
dangerous because they masked their true, bourgeois counter­
revolutionary colours with leftist 'phrases' which, though 
empty, might 'fool' the masses. In the Draft Platform of Action 
this particular danger was formulated in the following words:
49. Inprecor, Vol. 9(17), 1929, p.340. (My emphasis.)
50. Schubin, o£. cit., p.518.
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The greatest threat to the victory of the Indian 
revolution is the fact that great masses of our 
people still harbour illusions about the National 
Congress and have not realised that it represents 
a class organisation of the capitalists working 
against the fundamental interests of the toiling 
masses of our country. ... The National Congress, 
and particularly its "left" wing, have done and 
are doing all in their power to restrain the 
struggle of the masses within the framework of the^ 
British imperialist Constitution and legislation.
How a revolutionary situation could exist while this illusion
remained strong among the masses was not explained.
Instead, the CPI was tutored in the hyperbolical
art of Stalinist abuse: Jawaharlal Nehru was a 'sly son of an
even more sly father, now deceased'; the GKU's Kandalkar was
a 'counter-revolutionary centipede' who 'has in reserve
hundreds of manoevres for dissipating the force of the
proletariat'; following the Gandhi-Irwin Pact the 'Congress
and its "left" wing ... will now, more than ever, creep out
of its skin in order to screen its black treachery and help
English imperialism to avenge itself on the mass revolutionary 
52movement'. In accordance with the Tenth Plenum schema the 
CPI was.urged to break of all organisational contact with the 
Congress, to declare 'ruthless war' on the Congress as a whole, 
and to organise the proletariat as an independent political 
force and rally behind it the peasantry and the urban poor.
Concurrently with the escalation of 'left-sectarianism' 
the ECCI accelerated the program of bolshevisation. To eradicate 
'deviationism' and to 'explain' the weakness of the CPI at 
the outset of the alleged revolutionary conflagration in India,
51. Inprecor, Vol. 10(58), 1930, p.1219.
52. G. Safarov, 'The Treachery of the National Congress and
the Revolutionary Upsurge in India', in CI_, Vol. 8(9), p. 260 , 
pp.263-4 and p.265 respectively. Safarov's imagery is more 
imaginative than most, but its style is representative of the anti-Congress polemics in Cl and Inprecor throughout this period.
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it publicly scrutinised the shortcomings of the national
and international leaderships of Indian communism in the 1920s.
At the Tenth Plenum 'Comrade' Roy became a 'renegade', and
53he was subsequently expelled. The CPGB, which had had the
temerity to make a spirited attack on the Sixth Congress
colonial theses, was chastised for its 'woefully inadequate'
leadership of the CPI and received special mention as a Party
54in need of bolshevisation. Roy's role as the European-based
Indian expert and rapporteur on Indian affairs was taken over
by his longstanding rival, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya. During
his decline Roy initially maintained his 'new Imperialist policy*
55position. He than changed his policy to one which acknowledged 
the anti-imperialist role of the Indian bourgeoisie and the 
Gandhian leadership, projected a more modest revolutionary role 
for the proletariat, and accorded more political importance 
to the Congress radicals and to work within the Congress.
He returned to India with these new policy perspectives.^
The CPGB, however, had little contact with Indian politics 
during this period. It appears to have been removed by the 
ECCI from its late 1920s position of principal guide to the 
CPI, and replaced by the direct representatives of the ECCI 
mentioned earlier.
The ECCI also reprimanded the 1920s Indian communist 
leadership. They were heavily criticised for their resistance 
to the Sixth Congress's 'recommendation' that the WPPs be 
abolished and for having lagged far behind the 'revolutionary'
53. Inprecor, Vol. 9(40), 1929, p.846; Inprecor, Vol. 9(69)
1929, p.1470.
54. Inprecor, Vol.9(53), 1929, p.1148; Macfarlane, op. cit., 
pp.231-33.
55. Eg. MCCC, P.1207(6); an article by Roy titled 'On the Indian 
Question at the VI World Congress'.
See Haithcox, o£. cit.., pp. 164-74 .56.
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temper of the working class. Moreover, they were contrasted
very unfavourable with the new communist leadership: 'They
are this year not the same by far what they were last year (sic.).
What enormous vacillations and errors we witnessed last year
among Indian Communists, and how different is their attitude
now!'. The same process of leadership change was taking
place throughout the world's communist parties: 'The most
active and militant elements ... are now gaining the upper
hand. Commensurate with this the less active sections within
the Parties are relegated to a secondary position. The Party
5 8Executives are reorganised ... along the same lines'. Even
before the Tenth Plenum the old CPI leadership had received a
severe censure in an article in the Comintern's theoretical
journal. It had remained in 'almost complete mechanical
59isolation' from international communism and, largely because
of this, had continued to participate in the dangerous illusion
of a 'legal' communist party:
This "Communist Party of India", which existed 
legally on paper, and in which together with honest 
revolutionary elements were also petty bourgeois 
confusionists, and openly suspect elements, by its 
utter impotence, passivity, and complete severance 
from the mass struggle could only give the workers 
the impression that the organisation of a Communist 
Party of India is quite impossible. The fact that 
the legal Community Party neither lives nor dies 
had led to the theory that its destiny is to "occupy 
an empty place", whilst the struggle of the workers 
and peasants has to go on independently of the C.P.
... under the leadership of other party organisations. 
... Thus India also ... has already revealed the 
tendency to "re-dye the pseudo-Communist revolutionary 
emancipation movemeht in backward countries in the 
hue of Communism" .... 60
57. Inprecor, Vol. 9(40), 1929, p.847.
58. ibid., p.852. It was standard Stalinist practice to jettison 
old leaderships with old policies, as a means of justifying 
the policy change.
59. Schubin, op. cit., p.522.
60. ibid., p.524. The ECCIwas thus identifying the pre-Meerut 
Case leadership with Satyabkakta, the convenor of the 1925 
Kanpur 'communist' Conference.
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Thus the old CPI leaders were reduced to no more than 'honest 
revolutionary elements' naively participating in a 'pseudo- 
Communist' movement. The categorisation continued in 1930 
and 1931.
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CHAPTER 7
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT: THE DISINTEGRATION OF COMMUNIST
LEADERSHIP DURING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE COMINTERN'S
'THIRD PERIOD'
'The outlook is so hopeless from our point of view 
that we are almost tempted to give up the idea of 
saying anything whatsoever.'
- The Meerut group, commenting in January 1933 
on the state of the CPI (in MCG:3).
The CPI's history in this period is primarily a history
of intra-Party politics. Although its details are often byzantine,
the main features of the story are simple. In January 1933, just
before receiving their very heavy sentences in the Meerut Sessions
Court, the Meerut group wrote in despair that:
During the past four years the Communist movement in 
India has received a series of set-backs. It has been 
losing one vantage ground after another. We have lost 
our influence over the working class masses in Bombay 
and Calcutta, we have failed to make any mark in the 
political field, we are faced with confusion and 
disintegration in our own thinning ranks. ... No 
coordinated work is done. Recrimination and counter­
recrimination is the order of the day. An atmosphere  ^
of mutual distrust and suspicion reigns supreme.
If we add to this the increasingly active and direct involvement
of the ECCI in the affairs of an increasingly dependent CPI - an
involvement which was simultaneously imposed on and sought by the
latter - then the essential outlines of the picture are complete.
1. MCG:3.
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As the Raj had intended, the Meerut Case period put not
only the first leadership of the CPI on trial, but also the very
existence of the Indian communist movement. The decapitation of
a movement which was unprepared for repression, and the subsequent
elimination of the Bombay branch's mass base and position in
nationalist politics, led to a deep leadership crisis in the tenuous
'all-India' Party which remained. In the much less favourable
1930-33 conjuncture the Party was reduced to a constellation of
mutually hostile leadership factions based on regional and personal
loyalties as well as political differences - a small group of
2defensive, divided and bemused 'generals without an army'. This 
leadership failure prevented it from undertaking the inherently 
difficult task of regrouping and participating in the other battle 
which now raged around it. The Comintern became increasingly 
important as both a directive and a mediating force in intra-Party 
politics; but its contribution, far from breaking the futile 
circle of impotence and disunity into which the CPI became locked, 
completed it. Meanwhile, the great wave of Civil Disobedience 
formed, then passed it by; any potential which this upheaval 
might have possessed for communist politics was to remain almost 
totally untested. Against this background the actual survival of 
the Party was an achievement of some significance.
This, then, was the nadir of early Indian communism.
The deep crisis of leadership demonstrated the full extent of the 
vulnerability of the communists' achievements in the late 1920s and 
of the inappropriateness of the ECCI's 'third period' guidelines. 
But if the significance of the period lay only in this then not a 
great deal more would need to be added to the account provided in
2 . IB, Communism, (1935), p.165.
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Chapter 5. In fact the trauma was also of deep significance for 
the future development of the Party: from the extremes of the
CPI's humiliation some equally extreme lessons were drawn and long­
term plans laid; out of the bitter 'mutual distrust and suspicion' 
described by the Meerut group were born deep-rooted schisms and 
frustrations whose traces can be discerned into the post-colonial 
period; and those communists whose convictions survived this period 
of trial were almost all to become life-long committed members and 
to form the core of the Party's subsequent leadership. Moreover, 
at a more general level, we can also see the disintegration of the 
Party in this period, and the manner of its formation in the next, 
as a particularly informative case study of the relationship 
between the Party's modes of operation and the general problems 
for it inherent in the Indian and Comintern contexts; here we 
see particularly clearly the necessary conditions for the CPI's 
survival, as a Party, in these contexts. For these reasons it
is necessary to outline the contours and the dynamics of the intra-
3Party politics of this period as well as to register the failure.
The CPI's mode of organisation at the time of the Meerut
3. Because the character of intra-Party politics was the most
significant aspect of the Party's history in this period, and 
because its political insignificance at a time of political 
upheaval meant that its activities were barely reported in the 
press or noticed by Intelligence, we rely primarily on Party 
documents. The series of lengthy reports prepared by the Meerut 
group are the most informative sources - for Intelligence (see 
BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: undated BSB note on MCG:2) as well as the 
historian. These reports are detailed reconstructions of, and 
commentaries upon, Party affairs. Together they cover some 80 
pages of single-space typed foolscap. They are based on inter­
views with the 'outside' communists at the Meerut jail, reports 
sent to the Meerut group and observations made by the several 
Meerut prisoners who were allowed to visit their home cities 
for various reasons - from sickness, to being allowed bail 
during the case. The reports cite the evidence upon which they 
are based.
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arrests was still that of a 'family circle' of like-minded groups. 
The attempts at reorganisation begun in December 1928 had not 
successfully created a disciplined, centralised Communist Party.
The Indian communists and the ECCI were repeatedly to emphasise 
the importance of strong, centralised Party organisation during 
1929-33, and a formal 'all-India' Party apparatus was, in fact, 
set up. Nevertheless the 'family circle' metaphor remains apt as 
a description of communist organisation in this period, too, even 
if the circle was to fall prey to the hostile and brittle relation­
ships to which the family is prone in times of stress. Between 
1929 and 1933 there were three distinct member groups: Bombay,
4Bengal and the Meerut jail group. For reasons which will be 
investigated in this chapter, Bombay was to remain the dominant 
group throughout this period, even after its political influence 
had declined to something like the Bengal group's level. For 
example, the Party Secretariat and Central Committee which were 
established in 1930 remained in Bombay's hands. Most of the 
changes in the character of Party organisation and modes of 
operation were linked to Bombay initiatives and changes within the 
Bombay group; Bengal's impact was very weak. This chapter will 
therefore be concerned primarily with Bombay and its relations 
with other groups. Because the developments within the Meerut 
jail were not to have a substantial impact on the development of 
the Party until the following period, these will be investigated
4. The UP groupings were destroyed by the Meerut arrests. Two or 
three individuals were left in Lahore and Amritsar, but they 
were unable to re-form themselves into a definite group. A 
very small group was begun in Madras in 1931, but it made no 
headway (see below). The Meerut group believed that 'none of 
these is... worth taking notice of as a factor of importance 
in dealing with the immediate Party situation': MCG:2.
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in Chapter 8.
* * -k
The malaise in Party politics described above by the 
Meerut group began to appear openly in the second half of 1929, 
and was entrenched by the end of 1930. It was manifested in a 
number of ways. A central feature was the decline and ossification 
of the Bombay leadership, and the projection of the effects of this 
process onto the other groups through the formal 'all-India' 
apparatus which it came to dominate. The bureaucratic-centralist 
way in which the Bombay leadership controlled the apparatus from 
the end of 1929 was complemented by its increasingly complete 
political isolation and inactivity. However the isolation and 
inactivity rested awkwardly during 1930 with a strident propagation 
of the ECCI's 'ultra-revolutionary' sectarian policy in both 
nationalist and trade union politics, punctuated by sporadic 
sectarian 'militant' actions which hastened rather than arresting 
the Party's decline. Behind this formalistic projection of 
orthodoxy lay a developing symbiosis between the Soviet and 
(though not uniformly) the different CPI leaderships: the former
needed, for its own ideological-political purposes, 'confirmation' 
of the 'correctness' of the ECCI's Indian policy and, thus, the 
CPI's 'disciplined' adherence to it; contemporaneously, once the 
latter had lost the resources, political authority and momentum 
provided by a mass base, it chose increasingly to depend on the 
authority and the material and moral resources bestowed by the ECCI.
As we saw in Chapters 5 and 6, this situation was created 
and sustained primarily by the major structural changes which took 
place in both Indian and Comintern politics in the late 1920s.
But what was the process by which these structural changes were
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translated into the Bombay communists' near-complete failure, 
sketched above, to respond as a revolutionary leadership? What 
were the specific forms taken by this leadership failure?
The personal qualities and the political skills and 
commitments of the leaders were factors of obvious importance.
They became particularly significant in the conditions of 
extreme defensiveness, and then defeat, which the new leadership 
had immediately to face; the psychology of defensiveness and 
defeat was the second factor of importance. The third was the 
specific contribution made by the Comintern agents who arrived in 
India during this critical transitional period. We will now look 
at each of these issues before going on to chart the further 
decline of the Bombay branch from 1930.
Personal Factors Assume Political Importance.
In their carefully considered analysis of the causes 
of the decline of leadership in 1929-30, the Meerut group placed 
the greatest emphasis on the un-transformed 'petty bourgeois 
mentality' and the alleged doubtful motivations of their successors. 
For both reasons, the Meerut group argued, the new leadership chose 
to work 'not ... as a Party, but as a group on a personal basis',
5allowing 'personal factors to assume political importance'.
The Meerut analysis greatly underestimated the 
contribution of the other two factors noted above. And, although 
the Meerut group recognised the continuities of the new leadership's 
'personal group' mode of organisation with its own, it played down 
the significance of the continuity. Nevertheless, the Meerut
5. MCG:2 & MCG:1 respectively. See also IB, Communism, (1935) 
p.158.
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group did identify a crucial problem. Moreover, quite apart from 
the question of the adequacy of the analysis, once it had been 
distributed within the Party it became a factor of considerable 
importance in its internal politics - it contributed to Bombay's 
factional hostility towards Meerut and to the ascendancy ofg
personal issues within the Party.
In Chapter 5 we saw the results for the communists'
trade union bases of the failure of the original leadership
adequately to train an alternative leadership and to create a
cadre system within the workforce. Similar results arose within
7the Party, and for similar reasons. The Meerut arrests spared
few with any experience in the work of either the WPP or the CP.
Moreover, there was no established procedure of leadership
succession. Of those who had attended one or more of the Bombay
CP meetings in March, only five remained: D.B. Kulkarni, Pendse,
8Amir Haider Khan, Deshpande and Ranadive. Kulkarni, the railway
worker and GIPRU leader, had been a WPP member since March 1928
and had been admitted to the CPI at the Calcutta meeting in 
9December, With this background he was the most senior Party 
member. Pendse had been an active WPP leader - if not one of its 
most prominent - since its foundation. Haider Khan, the Moscow-
6. Bombay's reactions are summarised in MCG:2. One group, for 
instance, criticised the first Meerut group report for being 
'personal rather than political'.
7. The IB commented (IB, Communism, (1935), p.180) that 'The 
inadequacy of the supply of competent alternative leaders was 
the logical outcome of the neglect of the Party during the 
palmy days of 1928, and this deficiency became the more 
pronounced by reason of the periodical imprisonment of such 
leaders as there were and the consequent dislocation of any 
arrangements which might have been made for training new cadres'
8. MCCC, Ps.1296 & 1297: minutes of CP meetings, Bombay, 17 &
19/3/29.
9. MCCC, P.1303: CPI meetings, Calcutta, 18 & 19/12/28.
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trained Punjabi who had returned to India and begun working in 
the Party from the end of 1928, was the CPI's one proficient under­
ground organiser. Deshpande and Ranadive were the least 
experienced of the five. Deshpande had not joined the WPP until
December 1928, and Ranadive, a cousin of Adhikari's, had joined
10with him in January 1929. Ranadive's had been a very recent 
conversion to a communist approach to politics, for as late as 
December 1928 he had been a 'fervent nationalist' and antagonistic 
to the communists.^
Two more figures were to play a prominent role - the
12most prominent role according to the Meerut group - in the Bombay
branch's regroupment, even though they had not previously been
members of either the CPI or the WPP. Lester Hutchinson and
Suhasini Nambiar - who was to become the CPI's first woman leader -
had arrived in Bombay from Berlin in September 1928. Hutchinson
was an aspiring left-wing journalist in his early twenties. Though
from a communist family background in England, he was not a
communist - Spratt, for instance, described him as an ardent
'fellow traveller', and he was to become a Labour MP after his
13return to England. Nambiar, in her late twenties, was the 
youngest daughter of the remarkable family of Dr. Aghorenath 
Chattopadhyaya; among her sisters and brothers were the
10. MCCC, P.1344: WPP EC meetings, 7/12/28 & 13/1/29.
11. M.G. Desai, in M.B. Rao and Mohit Sen, op. cit., p.24. The 
Meerut group commented (MCG:1) that Ranadive had come to the 
Party almost directly from the Bombay Youth League, 'bringing 
... no doubt some of its Puritanical psychology and distrust 
of Communists as "intriguers" etc.'. See also Lalji Pendse's 
unpublished memoirs (translated for the author by
Dr. S. Pendse).
12. MCG:1. Their prominence rested partly on their prestige 
in having worked in Berlin's revolutionary circles.
13. Spratt, op. cit., pp.57-8: IB, Communism, p.115.
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distinguished poet and nationalist, Sarojini Naidu, the exiled
revolutionary and leader of the 'Berlin group' of Indian
revolutionaries, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, and the noted
playwright, Harindranath.^  Nambiar had studied at Oxford before
going to Berlin with her husband. Under her brother's influence
she was attracted towards communism. Hutchinson, during his
brief stay in Berlin, also came into close working contact with
Chattopadhyaya. While Suhasini's husband remained in Berlin with
her brother's group, she and Hutchinson, for reasons that are not
clear, departed for Bombay. In Bombay Hutchinson began a Marxist
study circle for youth, and both he and Nambiar made contact with
some WPP members. However they did not join the party themselves
15until after the Meerut Case arrests.
Immediately after the arrests Nambiar, Hutchinson,
Deshpande, Ranadive, Kulkarni, Pendse and Haider formed the nucleus
16of a new communist group. Purandare, the other WPP member in the
GIPRU, was also added, only to be dropped from the party soon after,
17along with Kulkarni, for reasons that are not apparent. After the
Home Department decided in June 1929 to include Hutchinson and Haider
18Khan in the Meerut Case, the situation was changed again. Hutchinson
14. For the Chattopadhyaya family background and environment see:
H. Chattopadhyaya, Life and Myself, Vol. 1: Dawn Approaching
Noon, (Bombay, 19487^ passim; p7 Sengupta, Sarojini Naidu,
A Biography, (Bombay, 1966) , pp.8-22. Hutchinson, op. cit., 
pp.32-3.
15. MCG:1 & 2; MCCC Judgement, pp.466-7. Hutchinson, op. cit., 
ps. 37 & 39.
16. MCG:2; BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: note in the BSB, 22/4/29;
Hutchinson, o£. cit., pp.49-54.
17. MCG:2.
18. NAI, H.Poll, 10/19/1929: HD meeting, 6/6/29.
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was arrested, while Haider Khan managed to evade arrest by
going underground, leaving India for Europe, then returning to
Madras in March 1931. He was to work there undetected until 
191932. Finally, Pendse was isolated by Deshpande and Ranadive 
for alleged strike-breaking activities during the textile 
strike.20
Thus, by July the leadership was in the hands of three
21middle class intellectuals who were newcomers to the movement. 
Until the release of the Meerut communists they were to remain 
the dominant leaders in both Bombay and the CPI as a whole.
Of the three, Deshpande and Nambiar were to make the most decisive
. 22 contribution to the character of the leadership in 1929-30.
Ranadive, who was younger than the other two and with even less
experience, played a comparatively subsidiary role during 1929,
19. IB, Communism, (1935), p.177; interview with B.T. Ranadive;
NAI, H.Poll, 44/92/1934: G of Madras to G of I, 3/9/34. In
Madras, Haider Khan was able to set up a small group as well 
as arranging communication lines to the Comintern and the 
framework of a courier service, through railwaymen, to Bombay. 
But the Madras group and the communications links were broken 
by Haider Khan's arrest. The Intelligence Branch regarded him 
as 'a most dangerous individual'. See also: TNA, GO 918-9,
Public, June 20, 1932; TNA, GO 946, Public, Sept. 10,
1934, for reports on Haider Khan's activities.
20. Lalji Pendse's unpublished memoirs; Newman, op. cit., p.342. 
Pendse says that the fact that he was not included in the 
Meerut Case was also used against him to suggest that he was 
a spy. The actual reason for his exclusion from the March
20 arrests was the lack of sufficient documentary proof 
against him, and he was not included in the June arrests 
because, despite the proof that had come to light in the 
Meerut Case evidence, New Delhi thought that it should not 
risk aggravating the GIPR situation by arresting him at that 
point: NAI, H.Poll, 10/19/1929: HD meeting, 6/6/29.
21. BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: note on Bombay communist organisations, 
1929-33. Neither Deshpande nor Ranadive had attracted the 
attention of the CID during 1928 or early 1929 (NAI, II.Poll, 
303/1929: notes of conversation between Haig & the Bombay 
Commissioner of Police, 4/6/29). The IB commented that after 
the Meerut arrests 'the vacuum in the leadership ... was 
filled by very inferior material': IB, Communism, (1935),p.158
2 2 . IB, Communism, (1935), p.160; MCG: 1 & 2.
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and he was in prison for most of 1930. It was not until after
his release in November of that year that his capacity for
assertiveness was to become fully apparent. Deshpande was
the main public figure during 1929-30, while Nambiar took over
the 'tech' (organisational) and financial departments.
Deshpande's was a particularly domineering and sectarian
2 3leadership style. But of the three leaders the Meerut group
credited Nambiar with the dominant role: to them it was 'at
once obvious' that she was 'the leading personality of the 
2 4group'. An intense Party controversy developed around the 
issues of her intentions and her influence on the other two.
Suhasini Nambiar was, by all accounts, and in common 
with the other members of her family, a remarkable and powerful 
personality. She was capable of arousing the strongest of
25attractions and antipathies, both inside and outside the Party.
Her family background was at once unorthodox, liberal, intellectual,
artistic and political. It included a strong women's-
emancipationist element and a scorn for the prejudices and mores
2 6of high caste, middle class India. Her friend Lester Hutchinson 
found her 'a lady of great culture and charm' who discovered 
'scope for her talents as an actress and in the political
23. Eg., the Meerut group noted in 1932, when it was supporting 
Deshpande against Ranadive, that Deshpande's 'personal 
defects' were 'not few' and were 'of a grave character'.
These included 'a tendency to narrowness and dogmatism',
and 'rough behaviour, tactlessness and a desire to dominate': 
MCG:2.
24. MCG:1. This is also a dominant theme in MCG:2.
25. Eg., two former Congress leftists closely acquainted with 
Party activity at the time gave the author widely contrasting 
assessments of her character and political abilities: 
interviews with M.R. Masani (19/10/74) and S. Batliwala 
(16/10/74). The Party divisions over the issue will become 
apparent below.
movement'; Agnes Smedley, the American revolutionary and 
Virendranath Chattopadhyaya's common-law wife, described her 
as 'a musician and singer, a women of striking beauty and 
noble bearing', who was to become a fully committed communist; 
but, she added, 'it was years before she would bow her handsome 
aristocratic head and meet on a plane of equality with men of 
lesser station'.2^
It is clear from Party reports of the period that few
were unaffected by her dramatic entrance into their world. The
Meerut group believed that Deshpande and Ranadive became 'so
infatuated and dominated by her that they will do exactly as
she wants', while they themselves came to regard her with deep 
29suspicion.
The Meerut group believed that she was working on 
behalf of a Berlin-based faction, centred around her brother, 
which was seeking to take over M.N. Roy's Comintern position 
as its main spokesman on, and contact with, Indian politics. 
This faction's plan, the Meerut group argued, was to discredit
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26. Aghorenath Chattopadhyaya was a Brahmo Samajist and a close 
associate of Keshub Chunder Sen, a D.Sc. from Edinburgh 
University and a liberal educator of some note - setting up 
the Nizam's College in Hyderabad. He appears to have taken 
his Brahmo ideals seriously and was an iconoclast in matters 
of caste orthodoxy and superstition. His wife was artist­
ically talented and shared with him his views against the 
subjugation of women. Aghorenath was also a strong 
supporter of early nationalism. Finally, he developed a 
reputation as an eccentric - particularly for his 
experiments in alchemy. (For sources see fn. 14 above).
27. Hutchinson, o£. cit., p.33.
28. Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, (London, 1944), pp. 
18-19. (Smedley attained distinction in the 1930s as a 
journalist and revolutionary activist in China.)
29. MCG:1.
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Roy and his Indian contacts in order to bolster its claim
that Indian communism required new international and national
leaderships. Thus, the Meerut group reasoned, Nambiar and
Hutchinson had probably been sent by Chattopadhyaya to attempt
to enter the Party and, eventually, to reorganise it under a
leadership loyal to her brother's faction and clearly
differentiated from the old leadership. The Meerut arrests
had provided an ideal opportunity, they hypothesised, and her
influence on Deshpande and Ranadive had made it possible to
consolidate her position. 'We believe', the Meerut group
concluded, 'that this hypothesis, better than any other, will
30explain the strange behaviour of the group'.
The Meerut communists marshalled considerable 
circumstantial evidence, including certain incidents during the
31WPP split in Bengal in 1928-29, in support of their hypothesis.
30. ibid.
31. MCG:1. Both Bhupendranath Dutt (Swami Vivekananda's brother) 
and Jawaharlal Nehru had returned from Berlin in 1928 with 
rumours, originating there, that the existing Party leader­
ship contained spies, that it had misappropriated much of 
the supposedly large sums of money it had received from the 
Comintern, and that it sided with the British against the 
Congress. (See also MCCC, P.2148: P.C. Joshi to Ahmad, 
25/2/29, reporting a conversation with Nehru; and MCCC, 
P.1097: Ahmad to Joshi, 19/3/29, replying to this 
information and reporting the effects of these rumours on 
anti-Party factionalism during the Bengal WPP split.)
Another man who had returned to India from Europe in 
September 1928 had begun similar propaganda, but had 
admitted on questioning that his activity had been 
inspired by a Berlin faction. Inside the Meerut jail 
Hutchinson hinted occasionally that he and Nambiar had 
arrived in India 'with some task of a political nature on 
hand', but did not explain further, and the reasons for his 
arrival continued to remain a mystery to the Meerut prisoners. 
The Meerut group could also draw on Adhikari's intimate 
knowledge of expatriate revolutionary politics in Berlin
in forming its hypothesis.
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This lends it a certain plausibility. Moreover, as we saw
in Chapter 5, 1928 was an opportune time for factional
mobilisation against Roy's position in the Comintern.
Chattopadhyaya did in fact win the influential position of
joint-secretary to the LAI in 1928, and in 1929 he became
Inprecor's main rapporteur on India. Finally, we have Smedley's
account as evidence of the very strong emotional bond between
32Nambiar and her brother and of his strong influence on her.
Nor is it surprising that a dynamic, unconventional and 
attractive woman should exercise upon the other two a strong 
influence, and one that was not entirely political; nor, given 
the extreme weakness and isolation of the Party, that such a 
contingency should have substantial political effects within it. 
Moreover, much of the 'strange behaviour' of which the Meerut 
group complained was congruent with, if not necessarily fully 
explained by, their argument. The most obvious of these 
features - which will be explored below - was the Bombay 
'triumvirate's' bureaucratic exclusion of the Meerut group, 
and those of the preceding activists who remained in Bombay 
and the other provincial centres, from the decision-making 
process. Thus the hypothesis does, at least, connect and 
highlight a pattern of symptoms of a deep crisis of leadership.
Nevertheless, the contention that the fundamental 
cause of the problem was that an ambitious woman had 'corrupted'
32. Smedley, op. cit., pp.18-19. Smedley was present when 
they met each other, for the first time, in Berlin. As 
a child Suhasini had been 'sung to sleep with lullabies 
about her exiled brother'.
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two 'previously promising young men, caused them to fight
among themselves, and reduced them to inactivity' suggests
33a one-dimensional - and very male - reductionism. The 
suggestion is reinforced by the fact that Nambiar remained a life­
long Party member, long after the Berlin group had disappeared - 
even if, as Smedley noted, her 'aristocratic' ways took a long 
time dying. This establishes that she was motivated by far 
more than narrow factional ambitions on behalf of her brother.
The Meerut group's hypothesis, in its reductionism, fails to 
take sufficient account of the other two factors.
The Psychology of Defeat.
The humiliating trauma of total defeat in the 1929 
textile strike prepared the ground for much of what was to 
follow within the Party.
On taking office the new leadership was initially
cautious and moderate in its political approach. The calling
of the 1929 strike was a reluctant and defensive move - not,
as has been argued elsewhere, an early implementation of
34Comintern ultra-leftism. Even as late as June the new
33. MCG:1. There was a close parallel between this explanation
and the one Roy used to account for Chattopadhyaya's hostility 
to himself: 'It seems that ... [Agnes Smedley] managed to
poison Chatto's mind against me. ... she was the evil genius 
of the Indian revolutionary group' in Berlin (M.N. Roy,
Memoirs, p.488). For Smedley's (fictionalised) account of her 
involvement in Indian revolutionary circles in America and 
Berlin, see her autobiographical novel Daughter of Earth,
(New York, 1974) (reprinted), passim.
34. Eg. Karnik, op. cit., p.200. The old GKU leadership approved
of the calling of the strike: 'It has been contended that
it was rash to enter upon the strike so soon and without 
adequate preparation. There may be some justification in 
this criticism, but probably not much. The strike was for- 
seen as a necessity in our time and it had been prepared for 
... . The employers backed by the Government were determined
on a fight and it would have been impossible to avoid it at some time or other, without making drastic concessions':MCG:2
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communist leadership 'could not ... be described as preaching
35specifically Communist doctrines'. The ideological militancy
and sectarianism that were to characterise the next four years
did not appear until after the back of the strike had been
3 6broken in July. Instead of recognising the terrible reality
of defeat, cutting their losses and beginning the painful process
of gradually rebuilding the union, Deshpande and Ranadive
responded to the crisis with militant speech-making and
leadership actions in a hopeless attempt to maintain the
37strikers' morale long enough to defeat the millowners. At
the same time they branded as 'strike-breakers' those within
the union - such as Pendse and the non-Brahman militants -
who opposed the prolongation of a by then hopeless strike and
the escalation of the tactics of militance. The government
reported that 'personal quarrels among the leaders' became
3 8increasingly frequent from this point.
This response was, in fact, a retreat into militance 
and sectarianism, away from an acceptance of a bleak reality and
35. NAI, H.Poll, 303/1929: note by Haig of conversation with 
the Bombay Commissioner of Police, 4/6/29.
36. NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FRl Jul.
37. BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: note on Bombay communist groups, 1929- 
33 (hereafter, 1036/B/II/1935: op. cit.). The Meerut group 
interpreted this as a 'typically petty bourgeois' response. 
But although Deshpande and Ranadive took the lead, they had 
the support of the majority of the managing committee; the 
worker activists were keen to maintain the strike as they 
anticipated victimisation if it failed: Newman, op. cit., 
p.343.
38. NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FRl Oct.; see also NAI,
H.Poll, 17/1929: Bombay FRl & FR2 Dec., and 18/11/1930: 
Bombay FRl and FR2 Jan.
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of their partial responsibility for it. It was supplemented
by other escapist manifestations. For example, just as the
Meerut group, while acknowledging it, played down their own
responsibility for the situation, the new leadership began to
lay great emphasis on the old leadership's organisational and
political failures. This tendency, and the tendency to erect
a protective bureaucratic barrier around themselves, were
further encouraged by both the Meerut communists' criticisms
of the Bombay leadership's strike tactics, and their attempts to
intervene in the strike. According to Dange, the other former
Bombay leaders attempted, in an authoritarian manner, to
39'direct the outside movement by fiats'. Dange also attempted 
unilaterally to intervene in the strike through V.H. Joshi and 
Mrs Dange -and, it was later alleged, through some of the mill 
managements. Dange's activity, the other Meerut communists 
agreed, was 'annoying (and later dangerous) ... and must have
given ... [the Bombay leadership] a very bad impression about
, 40 u s ' .
Thus the psychology of defensiveness and defeat 
compounded the objective difficulties, posed by the communists' 
almost universal opposition, standing in the way of the 'united-
39. MCCC, P.2512: 'The Situation in India' (ca. Jan. 1930).
40. MCG:2. The suspicion that Dange had dealt unilaterally
with some of the mills was fostered by the close relationship 
he had developed with Sir Victor Sassoon. (The BTLU leader 
Bakhale, for example, described Sassoon as 'one of the 
greatest admirers of Mr. Dange': RCLI, 1(2), p.261.) The 
issue resurfaced in 1937 when the Royists charged Dange 
with having received money from Sassoon during the 1929 
strike (BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: reports dated 15/1/37 &
5/2/37). Dange's orthodoxy was also (implicitly) called 
into question by his wife's and V.H. Joshi's joining the 
Roy group in 1931 (eg. V. Basak, Some Urgent Problems of 
the Labour Movement in India, (London, n.d. (ca. early
1933), p.6). (This booklet was an ECCI attack on the 
activities of the Roy group in India.)
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front' policy demanded by their now weak position. It
encouraged the opposite, 'left-sectarian' response of
asserting that the proletariat remained undefeated, but that
its revolutionary potential was being 'betrayed' by those -
both within and beyond the Party - who opposed the 'correct'
policy laid down by the leadership. This provided an ideological
justification for the disparagement of the 'reformist',
incremental organisational work of rebuilding that was now
necessary, and for a regime of extreme centralism and 'discipline'
in the Party. These were the characteristics which, after they
had become entrenched during 1930, the Meerut group was to
describe in the following terms:
... the illusion that all difficulties would melt away 
before a few agitational speeches, a tendency to 
neglect the hard and unpleasant work of organisation,
... the idea that it is the whole duty of a Communist 
to be "militant" and that care and thought and caution 
are never necessary, ... [the adoption of an 
organisational mode] in the Party ... of extreme 
centralisation, but ... [with] none of the advantages 
of centralisation ... not only oppressive and ^
bureaucratic, but in addition extremely inefficient.
In the psychological underpinnings of this response to defeat by
non-'proletarianised' intellectuals we can perhaps detect a
mixture of pride and panic.
The Comintern's Contribution
This was the situation when, at the end of 1929, the 
first of the succession of 'third period' Comintern agents who 
were to visit India in the next few years arrived in Bombay. He
41. MCG:1.
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was believed by Intelligence to be Earl Browder, the American
Communist Party leader, and he was to stay undetected in Bombay
42for some six months before leaving India. In July 1930 he
was replaced by two more Americans, Kweit and Somers, who were
able to remain until their deportation in December. All three
were sent to supervise the CPI's adoption of the new ECCI policy,
to assist in the reorganisation of the Party, and to finance its 
4 3activities. With little previous knowledge of the Indian 
situation, they were not in a position to assess against Indian 
realities the adequacy of the policy guidelines they brought 
with them. Moreover, because they had to function covertly, 
they were severely constrained from augmenting their knowledge, 
and from developing contacts, independently of the Bombay 
leadership.^
Browder arrived at a critical juncture for the CPI. 
Firstly, by then the leadership had been narrowed down to 
Deshpande, Nambiar and Ranadive. Further, Ranadive had just 
received his one year sentence. As he was later to demonstrate 
a marked capacity for independent responses to the influence of 
Comintern representatives, he may have acted to counter some of 
Browder's initiatives had he been free. Secondly, the Bombay 
leadership had just sustained its trade union and BPCC defeats.
42. IB. Communism, (1935), pp.175-9.
43. Large sums of money were brought to India by these agents 
and those who were to follow them. One brought Rs.12,000: 
loc. cit.
44. MCG:1 & 2. The Meerut group was not impressed with their 
qualifications as guides for the Indian revolution, while 
the IB (Communism, (1935), p.179) commented on their
'inferior stamp'.
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Finally, it remained theoretically innocent. Deshpande had
joined the movement only a few months before the Meerut arrests
and had attended only the few inconclusive political discussions
on the Sixth Congress theses on the eve of the arrests; and,
in any case, the CPI's theoretical basis throughout the 1920s,
and thus its legacy to the new leadership, had been the Royist
form of 'left-sectarianism'. Nambiar's conversion in Berlin had
also been recent and incomplete. Under constant attack since
the arrests, they could hardly have found the time to develop
a detailed and critical grasp of Marxism-Leninism, or even,
perhaps, of the abstractions - and ambiguities - of the Sixth
Congres theses. Accordingly, the potential basis for an
independent theoretical response to the Tenth Plenum assertions
was very weak. Thus the new ECCI directives first arrived in
India when the CPI was at its most vulnerable - psychologically,
45politically and theoretically.
In fact the Tenth Plenum line reinforced the similar 
tendencies that had already begun to appear in Bombay. There 
was no conflict. On the contrary, there must have been a 
certain comfort to be gained by the new leadership from the 
ECCI's revelations that, contrary to appearances: India was on
the verge of a proletarian-led revolution; that Indian capitalism 
was 'counter-revolutionary' and that the National Congress, 
including its left wing, was its political agency; that for
45. Browder appears to have been the new leaders' first definite 
contact with the ECCI. As late as February 1930 the DIB 
was unaware of their having 'become involved in the 
international Communist conspiracy': NAI, H.Poll,
95/1930: note by Petrie, 6/2/30.
563
this reason the worker-peasant movement would break the now-
fragile shackles imposed on their revolutionary impulses by
the bourgeois Congress, and that these revolutionary forces
would gravitate naturally towards the only 'genuinely'
revolutionary Party - the CPI; that the 'unmasking' of the
'national reformists', and particularly of the 'left-reformists',
in both nationalist and industrial politics, was a prime duty for
the communists; that the only constraint on the revolution was
the temporary problem of revolutionary leadership; and that
this problem arose almost entirely from the organisational
shortcomings and dangerous political deviations of the preceding
Party leadership. The battered Bombay leadership could endorse
this scenario enthusiastically; in fact it is possible that a
'united-front' policy would have been resisted. Browder's
message provided a convenient, authoritative rationalisation of
its current predicament, and a more coherent statement of many
of the arguments it had already begun to advance. The Tenth
Plenum line's optimistic determinism also provided an illusory
hope in an otherwise apparently hopeless situation. In doing so
it further encouraged the neglect of the patient and gradual
organisational work that would be a pre-condition for the CPI's
46return to political significance. It was, in fact, a very 
therapeutic program for this battered and disorientated leadership, 
if not one for its political rehabilitation.
46. Eg., Deshpande constantly inveighed against participation 
in strikes for limited ends. All strikes were to be 
transformed into general strikes in this 'objectively 
revolutionary situation'.
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The Meerut communists failed completely to see the 
mutually reinforcing character of the nexus between the ECCI and 
the Bombay leadership. Unaware of the structural imperatives
behind contemporary Comintern politics - or, at least,
. 47preferring to disbelieve their existence - they continued to
assume that the Comintern was a genuine 1 World Party', and that
the Soviet leadership was acting in good faith in the interests
of the world - and the Indian - revolutions. They could not
believe that the Comintern or its agents could actively
contribute towards what they saw to be inappropriate policies
and aberrant political behaviour. These 'mistakes', they
believed, were due solely to bad advice - to the fact that the
Bombay group was successfully 'deceiving' the Comintern
4 8representatives and, thus, the ECCI. Only in this way could 
they explain, for example, the pungency of the sequence of 
criticisms of their earlier leadership which appeared in the 
Comintern press. They could not see that these ritual scape­
goating denunciations were now standard fare during Stalin's 
pragmatic policy switches. In criticising the Bombay leadership 
the Meerut group was also, implicitly, criticising much of the 
Comintern's role. But by condemning the Bombay leaders as the 
sole source of the problem they overemphasised - through the 
'Nambiar conspiracy' hypothesis - the personal dimension, and
47. Eg., M.G. Desai, one of the Meerut prisoners, had been in 
Britain in the late 1920s and was aware of the background 
to Stalin's campaign against Trotsky. However his criticisms 
of Stalin's strategy and tactics were dismissed as misplaced 
'Victorian liberalism': Interview with M.G. Desai. See
also Spratt, Blowing up India, pp.53-5.
4 8. MCG:2.
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49heightened intra-Party tensions accordingly.
The Development of the New Pattern, 1929-30
The new pattern of Party politics in Bombay outlined 
earlier developed against this complex and mutually reinforcing 
background: leadership inadequacies, defeat and 'third period'
bolshevisation. Substantially the result of political defeat 
and isolation during 1929, the institutionalisation of this 
pattern completed the process of isolation from the Indian 
environment. The most dominant features of the pattern were 
bureaucratic centralism, 'left-sectarianism', inactivity and 
increasing political isolation.
The Bombay leadership's successful dominance of the 
Party apparatus, and its bureaucratic exclusion of the other 
regional groups - and of the small rank-and-file which began 
to join the Bombay branch - were central features of the emerging 
pattern.
The exclusion of the Meerut group was a relatively
simple exercise. Apart from the facts that it was isolated
in jail and that the ECCI had cast doubt on its revolutionary
credentials, Communist Party members automatically lost their
membership rights on imprisonment and had to be formally
readmitted to the Party on release. This routine security measure
was used effectively by the Deshpande leadership during 1930 to
50neutralise the capacity of the Meerut communists to intervene.
49. See, eg., Spratt, Blowing up India, p.53.
50. MCG:1 & 2.
566
Bombay's dominance over the other surviving provincial groups
was made possible by a number of factors. Initially it was
based on the legacy of the past. The new Bombay leadership
inherited its predecessor's mass base and its correspondingly
predominant weight in the embryonic 'all-India' Party
apparatus that had been formally established just prior to the
Meerut arrests. The predominance survived the loss of the mass
base. In part, this was made possible by its initial position
of relative strength in the organisation. But it was also
made possible by a number of contingencies. Firstly, the
same AITUC regulations that had prevented the communists at
the 1928 Jharia AITUC from using their GKU base to increase
their voting strength, now operated in the new Bombay leadership's
51favour, even though the GKU had been destroyed. The Bombay
group's voting strength at the Nagpur AITUC in December 1929
was sufficient, for example, for Deshpande to be elected as
its secretary and for the reformists to secede from the 
52organisation. This position provided the Bombay leadership 
with substantial resources and authority relative to Bengal, 
despite the fact that the basis for Bombay's position in the 
AITUC was only formal. Secondly, the ECCI's proletarian 
revolutionism worked in Bombay's favour; for Moscow, citing 
the 1929 mill strike, the GIPR strike and the May Sholapur 
uprising, claimed that the Bombay workers were continuing to act
51. This was the stipulation that voting strength at the 
Congress be based on the average membership figures for 
the preceding 12 months.
52. MCG:2; IOL, L/PO/73: Shiva Rao to Graham Pole, 21/12/29.
Of the 930 delegate votes at the Congress, 599 went to the 
communist-nationalist alliance. Of these the GKU had 200 
votes and the GIPRU had 150.
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5 3as the 'vanguard' of the alleged proletarian upsurge in India.
This view provided a 'theoretical' justification for the
relatively greater importance of the Bombay branch of the Party.
Thirdly, the Bombay group received further ECCI reinforcement
in the arrival of the sequence of Comintern agents. The ships
that brought them from Europe arrived at Bombay rather than
Calcutta; and, because their movements were restricted by
security considerations after arrival, very few made contact
54with the Bengal group. They remained dependent on the 
Bombay leadership for information on Party affairs. It was 
during Browder's stay that the Party's Secretariat and Central 
Committee were formed and manned solely by Bombay people. Thus 
the Bombay leadership had almost unchallenged access to the 
authority and funds provided by these agents. In a weak and 
isolated Party these were powerful weapons of dominance over 
other centres. They could also be used, if necessary, to
55reinforce leadership dominance over the small (30 by 1932)
Bombay membership which the Party began to attract during 1930.“^  
The Meerut group described the Bombay leadership's 
attitude towards them as having been one of 'neglect and 
indifference, or else distrust':
53. See Chapter 6 above.
54. There is evidence of only one such visit to Calcutta, and
that was very brief: Ranen Sen, op. cit., p.4: interview
with Abdur Rezzak Khan.
55. BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: op. cit..
56. Bombay's monopolisation of the contacts with the ECCI 
representatives was also used in an attempt to keep the 
Meerut group isolated from Moscow.
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In addition to systematically ignoring our advice 
they have refused us information which we have asked 
for from time to time, and this in some cases has had 
serious effects [on their activity]. ... some Party
comrades, even when they have wanted to, have been 
prevented, under the cloak of disciplinary measures, 
from even writing to us or meeting us.57
But in addition to excluding the Meerut group, Bombay had also
made a systematic attempt to 'disparage our work and ourselves'
and had propagated the claim that 'the CPI did not exist until
5 8they came upon the scene, i.e. after our arrests'. The Meerut 
group believed that this policy had existed from the beginning 
and that it had originated with Nambiar.
However, while it is possible that Nambiar did play a
particularly active role, it is apparent that other factors were
important - for the deterioration in the Bombay-Meerut relationship
was not a uniform process. This can be seen, for example, in the
history of the defence committee set up by the Bombay leadership
soon after the Meerut arrests. Initially the committee worked
'enthusiastically', and through it the new leadership kept in
59fairly close contact with Meerut. The committee collected and 
forwarded considerable sums of money to Meerut and also conducted 
satisfactory propaganda work. However, by the end of the year, 
following the collapse of the OKU, the committee was moribund. 
During 1930, under Deshpande's direction, it consistently failed 
to forward or publish accounts of the sums it received, and its
57. MCG:1. However Bombay maintained close contact with 
Hutchinson and regularly sought his advice.
58. ibid.
59. ibid.
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propaganda work ceased. Proposals from Meerut for an alternative 
defence committee system were consistently ignored, and finally 
rejected.^
Thus the defeat of the 1929 strike and the collapse of
the GKU appear to have marked a turning point in the relationship.
This was for the psychological reasons noted above, because
of resentment at the Meerut communists' 'interference' in the
strike - and, it seems, because Bombay by then needed alternative
sources of income. There is evidence, moreover, that Browder's
arrival marked a further turning point. On January 26 the
Bombay Party began publication of a new organ, edited by
Deshpande, called Workers' Weekly. It was to continue until
April. It was established at Browder's instigation, and he
financed and supervised its publication and wrote much of its 
61material. In March a special edition commemorating the
anniversary of the Meerut arrests was published. But instead
of commemorating the old leaders, it patronised them as 'militant
6 2trade unionists, but not genuine communists'. This was the
6 3first public denigration of the Meerut group. Naturally, they 
were incensed by it; but they saw behind it only Bombay's 
factional ambitions. However the characterisation was perfectly 
in accord with the ECCI's; and the facts that it was the first
60. ibid. & MCG:2.
61. MCG:2.
62. Quoted in ibid.. See also L.P. Sinha, op. cit., p.243.
63. However it was not the last. The ECCI's attacks on the
'petty bourgeois' WPPs and on those who had resisted dis­
banding them, and the derogatory association of the old 
leadership with Satyabhakta's 1925 conception of a legal 
CP, were repeated during 1930: leaflets in BSB, 1036/B/V/
1935.
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public criticism voiced in India, and that Browder was so 
closely associated with Workers' Weekly, also strongly suggest 
that it was his initiative.
But, whatever the reasons for the development of 
Bombay's attitude towards Meerut, its consequences were both 
clear and serious: it compounded the radical discontinuity in
Party leadership and experience caused by the Meerut arrests 
and confiscations; and it greatly aggravated the CPI's 
existing and future factional hostilities.
The deterioration of Bombay's relations with Bengal 
followed a similar itinerary.
The Meerut arrests almost eradicated the Bengal branch. 
The only Communist Party members left were Abdul Halim and 
Abdur Rezzak Khan, though gradually a few of those, such as 
Abani Chowdhuri, who had been close to the WPP, began to join 
the group. Apart from its unsuccessful attempt to establish an 
independent influence in the 1929 jute strike, the communist 
group's activities in 1929 were restricted to involvement in 
strikes-in Calcutta's match and ice factories, defence committee
6 4work for the Meerut Case, and the publication of a few leaflets.
Contact with Bombay could not be established until the 
Nagpur session of the AITUC at the end of November of that year.
At Nagpur, however, Deshpande soon quarelled with the Bengal 
contingent, led by Abdul Halim, during discussions on the re­
organisation of the CPI. Deshpande set several pre-conditions 
for Bengal-Bombay participation in this project: the Meerut group
64. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: Notes on the Bengal WPP after the
Meerut arrests and on the Calcutta Committee; MCG:1 & 2; 
Ranen Sen, op. cit., pp.1-4; interview with Abdur Rezzak 
Khan; NAI, H.Poll, 17/1929: Bengal FRl May & FR2 Jun..
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were not to be informed of the plans because, being in jail,
they were no longer Party members; the Punjabi comrades were to
be excluded; and the Bengal group was to be subordinate to
the Bombay branch. When Halim rejected these conditions
Deshpande chose another man he met at Nagpur - the former
Karachi socialist, Jamaluddin Bukhari, who had moved to
6 5Calcutta in mid-1929 - to head the Bengal branch. The choice
was a curious one, for Bukhari had neither the experience nor
the contacts of Halim and was not even familiar with the
Bengali language. Under Bukhari a small Bengal branch of the
CPI was established and (meagrely) financed by Bombay. After
6 6Bukhari was interned in 1930, another Deshpande nominee,
6 7M.A. Zaman, filled his place. Halim's group was denied funds
by the Bombay branch and, without independent contact with the
ECCI, it was unable to alter the situation.
The Bombay-Punjab relationship followed similar lines.
At the Lahore Congress Nambiar made contact with the Moscow-
trained Fazl Elahi, who was regarded by the Meerut group as 'by
far the.most competent and best instructed comrade in the
6 8country at the time.' However the meeting ended in conflict.
65. Report by Halim cited in MCG:1; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: 
note on the Calcutta Committee. Deshpande subsequently 
admitted this to the Meerut group (MCG:2). In February and 
March Bukhari had come to the notice of the CID in Karachi 
and Hyderabad for his propagation of radical views (BSAI,
1929, paras. 332 and 520).
66. Bukhari then returned to Bombay in February 1931 and joined 
the Bombay group.
67. Zaman had been peripherally involved in the BJWA during the 
1929 jute strike (RCLI, Vol. V(l), p.147) but in little else. 
He was suspected by many as a 'doubtful element', and possibly a spy: MCG:2; interview with B.T. Ranadive.
MCG:1. Elahi was a Moscow-trained Punjabi communist who had 
returned to India in 1926, only to be interned soon after.
He was released in 1929.
68.
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Subsequently, throughout the period of the Meerut Case, no 
links were established with the miniscule Punjab group and it
continued to work in isolation and without access to Bombay's
C 69funds.
As with the Meerut group, the Bengal and Punjab groups
70bitterly resented Bombay's policy. By the end of 1930 there 
was a clear split in Indian communism. On one side was Bombay, 
reinforced by its Comintern contacts, and the artificial 
'official' Bengal group it had established; against these 
the Meerut group, the Calcutta communistsand the few Punjabi 
comrades formed a loose, impotent alliance. However, under 
the Meerut group's restraining influence, the Bengal and Punjab 
groups did not launch a public counter-attack against Bombay 
during 1930-31.71
In Bombay the institutionalisation of the bureaucratic-
centralist mode did not meet active resentment in 1930. During
1930 both working and middle class members were recruited, and
in roughly equal numbers. The former were mostly unemployed
former GKU and GIPRU activists and the latter were mostly
nationalist intellectuals who had decided that the Gandhian
72mode of politics was unacceptable. The new recruits from 
both classes appear to have accepted an almost unquestioning 
relationship of subordination to the leadership. The Meerut 
communists commented that 'by means of the slogan of discipline
69. MCG:2 & 3. For Punjabi revolutionary movements during this
period see: Harcourt, op. cit., Chapter 6, passim; and IB,Communism, (1935), pp.2^T-79.
70. MCG:2; interviews with Abdur Rezzak Khan & Somnath Lahiri.
71. MCG:2.
72. Interview with S.G. Sardesai, (one of the new recruits).
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etc., the Secretariat seems to have tried from the beginning
to create the impression in the Party that ... to criticise 
73them was a sin*. The rank and file membership's acceptance of
this 'showed docility, weakness and a lack of comprehension
74of the situation as a whole'. The conditions of repression
and political isolation facilitated the acceptance of this
'disciplined' relationship. A Bombay Party member in this
period has commented that
It required very deep conviction and courage to go 
against the Gandhian Congress then and to face the 
resulting isolation and hardship - virtual starvation 
often - and this built a strong sense of fraternity 
and discipline. ... I fully accepted the requirements 
of Party discipline. 75
Even after the Central Committee was formed it met infrequently
7 6and exercised little control over the Secretariat.
The Bombay leadership had first adopted a militant 
'left-sectarian' tactical approach in the latter stages of the 
1929 textile strike. But it was not until the very end of the 
year that it became a definitely formulated strategy in 
nationalist and industrial politics. Even as late as November
73. MCG:2.
74. ibid.
75. Interview with S.G. Sardesai.
76. MCG:1 & 2. Those of the Meerut group who visited Bombay 
during their trial also found marked inequalities in the 
allocation of the Party's limited funds. The leaders' 
allowances were far greater, and were often devoted to 
personal expenditure rather than political work. The 
working class members were most discriminated against. Two 
of the leaders also took up residence in the Fort area, 
making it difficult and expensive for the working class 
members and trade unionists to see them. These features 
were found to be demoralising the Party and were providing 
ammunition for propaganda by the Party's rivals: MCG:1 & 2.
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1929 the communists actively sought an alliance with the
77Congressites in the AITUC. The eventual full-scale adoption
of a 'left-sectarian' strategy followed close on the communists'
defeat in the BPCC, and it coincided with Browders arrival,
the increasing difficulties for the communists within the
unions, and the stepping-up of the BPCC's working class campaign.
The communists produced their first systematic public
characterisation of the National Congress as an organisation of
the 'counter-revolutionary' bourgeoisie, in a manifesto to the
7 8Lahore session of the Congress in December. The manifesto's 
extremism was firmly registered by the slogan appearing on the 
front cover:
Would you be protected by Imperialist Machine-guns 
along with Gandhi and Nehru under Dominion Status?
or
Would you face the fire of Machine-guns along with 
the workers in the fight for Complete Independence?
Following this opening rhetorical question came an analysis
in accordance with the ECCI's Tenth Plenum policy on India,
and in similar language. The condemnation was reiterated
constantly after the Lahore session, then after the launching
of Civil Disobedience, despite the enthusiasm these events
79aroused among radical nationalists. The Lahore resolution was
77. A tactic which was criticised by the Meerut group as
being unnecessary: MCG:2.
78. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: 'Manifesto of the Workers' and
Peasants' Party to the Indian National Congress, 1929'.
79. Eg., the 10 leaflets issued between June and October 1930, 
contained in BSB, 1036/B/V/1935. See also L.P. Sinha's 
summary of the contents of the different issues of 
Workers' Weekly, in op. cit., pp.242-44.
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'merely' an attempt by 'the traitors of Indian Independence'
to 'throw dust in the eyes' of the worker and peasant masses
to disorganise their independent struggle; 'The real struggle
for Complete Independence will never be fought out under the
banner of the Congress. It will be fought out only under the 
8 0Red Flag'. This message was hardly calculated seriously to
win over even the most 'honest' of the 'petty bourgeois
revolutionary elements' among the Congress rank-and-file. Nor
did the Stalinised language in which the message was couched
increase the possibility. On this both the Meerut group and
the Intelligence Branch were agreed: the former categorised
the communists' style as 'ponderously theoretical' and the
latter as 'Deshpande's vaporous thunderings', and both
contrasted it with the accessibility of the Royist group's 
81literature. The contrast with the propaganda skills developed 
by the former leadership during and after the 1928 strike was 
even greater. This contrast is another indicator that the 
difficulties of attaining or retaining a mass base seriously 
retarded the CPI's development of an 'Indian' Marxism.
The Bombay-Browder ideological counterposing of the Red 
and the Congress flags was translated into action during the year.
80. Kranti (edited by Deshpande), quoted in NAI, H.Poll, 18/11/
1930: Bombay FRl Jan.. Deshpande described his policy as
being one of fighting 'stubbornly for rallying the 
revolutionary masses under working class leadership, with 
independent slogans and for independent action': quoted
in MCG:2.
81. MCG:1; IB, Communism, (1935), p.168. The Meerut group
later commented appropriately that the Bombay communist 
leaders became increasingly 'drugged with Communist 
phraseology' during this period; they were not in a fit 
ideological condition for 'going to the masses'.
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In fact this was effected quite literally in an event at the
beginning of the year - an event which was to become typical of
the Bombay branch's mode of political action. For the
Congress's 'Independence Day' celebrations on January 26,
the GKU leaders organised a counter demonstration. The 30,000-
strong rally at Chaupati Sands was 'brought to an abrupt end' by
an 'invasion' of the platform by 1,000 millhands, carrying red
flags and led by Deshpande, Nambiar and the GKU's president,
8 2Kandalkar. During the 'pandemonium' which followed; a red 
flag was hoisted alongside the Congress flag. The public
8reaction against this 'insult to the National Flag' was vehement.' 
It was so strong that the GKU leaders subsequently felt it 
necessary to state that the action had not been meant as a 
devaluation of the Congress flag, but simply as a symbolic 
statement of the need for the nationalist movement also to 
represent the working class.^
The Independence Day demonstration was a politically 
disastrous event. It did draw upon and express the 'anti­
bourgeois' ideology and sentiments of the millhands - or at least 
of those who remained politically engaged - and it affirmed the
82. NAI, H.Poll, 18/11/1930: Bombay FRl Jan.; BC, 27/1/30, p.ll.
It may not have been a coincidence that the Independence
Day celebration was the Nariman BPCC's 'debut in politics'; 
(Kumar, 'From Swaraj to Purna Swaraj', p.98). As this was 
the leadership which had completely displaced the communists 
as the focus for BPCC radicalism, it must have been a galling 
day for the Deshpande group - and the more so as it had just 
emerged from the GKU's disappointing AGM.
83. See, eg., the series of articles and letters to the editor in
BC between January 27 and February 13. Jawaharlal joined his 
voice to the condemnation of this attempt to 'dishonour' the 
flag: IQR, 1930, Vol. 1, p.23. It was widely reported that
the communists had torn down the Congress flag and replaced 
it with the red flag.
84. See the press statement in BC, 3/2/30, p.8.
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new leadership's revolutionary credentials in Moscow.^ But it
also provided the Congress with a very convenient albatross to
hand around the CPI's neck, both during the BPCC's current
campaign against the communists and for a long time afterwards.
It would be used to categorise the communists as 'anti-nationalists'
and, at the same time, to reaffirm, for the benefit of the radicals
8 6and against the communists' claims, its own nationalist credentials.
But not only did it place a further barrier between
the communists and the radical intelligentsia over whom the old
WPP leadership had once exercised considerable influence; it
also hastened the communists' divorce from the working class and
trade unionism. At the beginning of 1930 the communists remained
united with Kandalkar and Ruikar, both within the respective
8 7unions and against the BPCC's labour program. The splits 
with Ruikar and Kandalkar developed soon after the Independence 
Day demonstration and the public backlash it produced. This 
event, and the approach to nationalist politics that it symbolised, 
appear to have helped convince the non-communist union leaders
8 8that their.communist colleagues had become a definite liability; 
the positive attraction of the material benefits provided by a 
Congress alliance was complemented by the increasingly perceived 
political liabilities of an alliance with the communists during
85. See the section below on Comintern reportage.
86. See fn. 92. For an example of subsequent use of the 
demonstration to establish communist 'anti-nationalism' see 
Masani, op_. cit. , p.42.
87. See Chapter 6(2) above, and note Kandalkar's participation 
in the Independence Day demonstration.
88. Kandalkar's break with Deshpande came immediately after they
had both served short terms of imprisonment in early 1930 
for their part in a fracas at a labour meeting (NAI, H.Poll, 
7/20/1934: Note on the GKU, 1929-33). This experience
appears to have helped Kandalkar to decide that the costs
of the 'left-sectarian' strategy were too high.
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a period of Congress-led mass agitation. And, because of the 
Bombay communist leadership's now unremitting hostility towards 
the Congress, once Ruikar and Kandalkar had made their tactical 
shifts they and the communists were in opposite/enemy camps.
This was the context of the bitterness of the conflict between 
Ruikar and Deshpande during the railway strike. Having been
isolated in the GIPRU, Deshpande then engaged in an equally
. 89bitter and personal attack on Kandalkar. The issue came to
a head at the GKU's annual general meeting on October 2. The
meeting, which was attended by some 4,000 millhands, broke up
in uproar and eventual police intervention. On October 12 the
adjourned general meeting voted to expel Deshpande from the 
90union.
That both Ruikar and Kandalkar were able to carry with 
them the great majority of the unions' leaders and remaining 
mass following demonstrated the extent of the divorce which had 
developed between the communists and the working class since the 
Meerut arrests. After the Meerut arrests the majority of the 
workers on the GKU's managing committee had initially continued 
to defend the communists against the non-Brahman attacks, as 
they had done before. But when the communists split with the 
former jobber Kandalkar, the working class members went with him. 
The communists' attitude towards the Congress appears not to 
have been the central issue at stake at this level. When Ghate 
spoke to the old GKU and GIPRU worker activists during his visit
89. NAI, H.Poll, 18/VIII/1930 : Bombay FR2 Jul.; BSAI, 1930, 
paras. 1276(1), 1367(23); NAI,H.Poll, 18/IX/1930: Bombay 
FR2 Aug.; MCG:2.
90. NAI, H .Poll, 18/X/1930 : Bombay FR2 Sept., & 18/XI/1930 : 
Bombay FRl Oct..
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from Meerut to Bombay in mid-1930, he discovered that 'some
sort of hostility towards Communist leadership seemed to have 
91sprung up'. The reasons given by these activists were the
distance from the workers maintained by the new Party leadership,
its bureaucratic-elitist failure to involve them in the running
of the unions, its sectarianism towards the non-communist
union leaders and the personal character of the attacks upon
them, and its increasing inactivity. Deshpande's 'shouting
from outside' at the Ruikar leadership during the already
difficult GIP railway strike had been particularly resented.
Following the collapse of this strike the communists
remained isolated and uninfluential in the GIPRU. After their
expulsion from the GKU Deshpande formed a rival 'Ladhau
(militant) GKU', but it received no support from the millhands,
remained subordinate to the now Royist GKU, and maintained only
92a nominal existence. The Deshpande leadership's rejection of
'partial struggles', in favour of ritual calls for a general
strike as the 'prelude' to the proletarian-led revolution,
was both a prescription and a rationalisation for inactivity.
The Royists could then step in, effectively unopposed, to fill
the vacuum. Moreover, they were able to pick up as members many
of those former WPP members or allies - such as Pendse,
V.H. Joshi and Mrs. Dange, as well as Kandalkar and Ruikar -
93who had earlier been alienated by the communist leadership.
91. MCG:2; also BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: op. cit.
92. ibid.
93. BSB, 1036/B/II/1935 : op. cit..
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By the end of 1930 the new leadership had paid the price in 
full for its 'neo-Brahmanical' divorce from the labourers 
who had once provided its mass base. This divorce had been 
reinforced by the ECCI's representatives, with their predilection 
for direction 'from the top', and their Moscow-derived insistence 
that the working class remained undefeated, despite their 
(formalistic) emphasis on the importance of working class 
participation in its own leadership.
The Bombay leadership's growing impotence at the base
was paralleled by the collapse of the position of influence it
had won in the AITUC at the 1929 Nagpur session. In part, this
followed directly from the loss of its mass base - and thus of
its voting strength for the next annual session. But the
communists' policy towards the Civil Disobedience movement and
'reactionary' trade union 'left-reformism' increased the
antagonism of the nationalists with whom they had allied themselves
at Nagpur, arid whose support they now needed much more if they
were to remain even a significant minority force in the
organisation. Moreover, Deshpande's conduct as the AITUC's
secretary both widened the split and provided the nationalists
and the Royists with very effective ammunition in their campaign
9 4against the communists. Under Deshpande's secretaryship the 
AITUC became almost completely moribund. Among other lapses, 
he failed to submit reports of the AITUC's work, provided no 
accounts of the expenditure of the Rs.2,300 which he received
94. MCG:2. For the Royists' campaign to oust the communists 
from the AITUC and capture it for themselves, see 
Haithcox, op. cit., pp.180-83.
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at Nagpur from the treasurer, called only three executive
meetings during his term of office, and, accurately predicting
his demise at the next AITUC, refused to hold this session
when it fell due. Among other consequences of these failings,
Subhas Bose was able to use them to propagandise against the
95Bengali communists. When the AITUC session was finally held 
in July 1931, at Calcutta, the communists faced an attack which 
they were quite unable to deflect. Rather than risking expulsion 
of remaining as a minority within the organisation, they 
seceded to form another rival organisation - the 'Red AITUC'.
But,as with the Ladhau GKU,it was only a nominal body, even 
weaker than the parent AITUC which was captured by the Royists 
at Calcutta.^
The Bombay leadership remained inactive in the local
nationalist arena, too, despite the fact that the city had
become the storm centre of the Civil Disobedience movement.
Towards the middle of the year, during the BPCC's campaign in
the mill area, Deshpande, on Ghate's suggestion, formed the
Young Workers' League (YWL) as a 'front' political platform
for the Party. This attracted a measure of support which,
though very limited, marked an advance and indicated certain
97possibilities for further advance. But following the
95. MCG:2. These shortcomings also strengthened the growing 
anti-communist 'prejudices in the minds of the workers'.
96. ibid.; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: notes on the Red AITUC;
IB, Communism, (1935), pp.161-62; NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1931: 
Bengal FR2 Jul..
97. We do not have figures for the YWL membership in 1930, but 
as it had 'dwindled' to about 60 by mid-1931, its 1930 
membership must have been appreciably higher than this 
figure (MCG:1). This suggests that there were significant 
numbers of potential cadres available for a determined 
leadership to mobilise. The YWL was in fact the main vehicle of recruitment of those who were to become Party members
in this period.
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imprisonment for brief terms of several of the leaders,
they, as in Bengal, 'showed a marked inclination to keep
within the law and to do no more than was necessary to retain
9 8their nominal leadership'. By the end of the year the YWL
had stagnated and Deshpande was engaged only in organising
study circles and publishing ventures. Even these limited efforts
99produced few of the intended results. As in industrial 
politics, the ECCI policy towards nationalist politics, too, 
became a rationalisation for inactivity.
The Meerut group was to describe 1930 as 'the
blackest period' in the Party's history, 'a story of almost
unrelieved gloom and set-back on all fronts'.
Apart from sheer wanton inactivity, the principal 
defect seems to have been lack of thought and study, 
and especially of self-criticism. ... in its objective 
value and effectiveness and in its subjective honesty 
etc., the Party leadership declined greatly in this 
period. ... a sort of disease or paralysis ... 
affected the whole Party life.100
'Probably even a definitely incorrect policy', the Meerut
communists commented with unintended irony, 'would not have
led to such a complete collapse ... if it had been pursued
vigorously'.
The Meerut group's assessment of the situation was, 
apart from its non-recognition of the ECCI's substantial level 
of responsibility for it, a perceptive and accurate one. It
98. IB, Communism, (1935), p.161.
99. loc. cit.; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: notes on the Kamgar
Vangmaya Prasarak Mandal (Workers' Literature Publishing 
Company) and the Marxist League; the limits of the 
effectiveness of Deshpande's publishing activity can be 
gauged from the fact that the sales of Workers1 Weekly 
never exceeded 40: MCG:1.
100. MCG:2.
101. MCG:1.
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was diametrically opposed to the assessments that were being 
provided in the Comintern press. The fiction that a 
significant, Bombay-led communist existed in India,
would have died completely by this time had it not been 
maintained by Moscow.
Because of its many-levelled commitment to the
unreal position it had adopted on the Indian situation, Moscow
had a large stake in 'proving' it to be correct. It went to
extreme lengths in its search for supporting evidence for this
view. The pages of its weekly newspaper, Inprecor, regularly
102reported such evidence during 1930-31. Even the theoretical
journal, Communist International,continued to lend its prestige
to the Bombay group's barely discernable efforts. Having
established that the proletarian-led Indian revolution was
'going ahead with flying leaps' to 'new and higher forms of
struggle' after its early d e f e a t s , i t  was Deshpande's
formalistic 'left-sectarianism' that was most loudly applauded.
The conduct of the GIPR strike, for example, was declared to
be 'a very important step in advance': 'For the first time
in the history of the Indian Labour Movement, the proletarian
revolutionaries came forward openly before the workers against
104the "left" National Reformists'. The Deshpande group's
102. Much of this material was written by V. Chattopadhyaya.
If the Meerut group's hypothesis about Chattopadhyaya's 
intentions was correct, then he had a particular interest 
- additional to that of the ECCI - in reporting the 
'success' of the new leadership. Many of the Inprecor 
reports on India were the weekly's leading stories. Events 
such as the Sholapur insurrection and the Gharwali soldiers 
revolt were portrayed as being typical of the mass response 
to Civil Disobedience, and the movement's leading edge.
103. G.Safarov, 'The World Economic Crisis and the Revolutionary
Ferment in the Colonies', in Cl, Vol.6(31), 15/2/30, p.1245
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sectarian attacks on the Ruikar and Kandalkar factions, the
Royists and the Congress, were claimed to be events of
105'historic importance'. The communists' Comintern-financed
publications and its sporadic militant actions were constantly
publicised in Inprecor and Communist International as
historically decisive ideological and political interventions.
The ECCI rewarded the new Party leadership for its 'breakthrough'
in the development of Indian communism by affiliating the CPI -
106for the first time - to the Comintern. Observations that
the communists had not achieved all that was possible in the
'matured' revolutionary conditions in India formed only a
minor, counterpoint theme in the ECCI's public commentary at 
10 7this stage. Moreover, this failure continued to be reduced
to problems of leadership - problems for which the old leadership
10 8continued to be given the main responsibility.
104. 'W , 'Prospects of the Labour Movement in India', in Cl,
Vol. 7(12), 15/10/30, p.258.
105. Eg., Valiya, 'The Struggle of the Working Class for the 
Leadership of the National Movement in India', in CJE, Vol. 
8(17), 1/10/31. p.520.
106. MCG:1.
107. Only R.P. Dutt seriously (though in a very qualified manner)
recognised this fact: Dutt, 'Road to Proletarian Hegemony
in the Indian Revolution', Cl, Vol.7(13), 15/11/30,
pp.282-88, & Vol.7(14), 1/12730, pp.312-18.
108. This feature, and the others noted above, are encapsulated
in the following quotation (Valiya, op. cit., pp.520-21) 
commenting on the Indian situation following the Gandhi- 
Irwin Pact: 'Now ... the situation has completely changed.
It has now become clear to vast sections of the proletariat 
that the National Congress is a bourgeois, treacherous 
institution; freedom from the influence of the bourgeoisie 
has gone ahead rapidly among the working masses and the 
peasantry, the influence of the Community Party and belief 
in the party and its platform has begun to grow rapidly. 
This has become possible only on the basis of the struggle 
of the proletarian vanguard especially during 1930. (...
for the first time there appeared in the name of the 
Communist Party illegal leaflets, there took place 
demonstrations under Communist slogans, illegal
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Moribund, but seemingly warmly supported by Moscow, 
it is not completely surprising that the Deshpande leadership 
should restrict its activity to the 'window-dressing for the
benefit of the Centre' (the ECCI) for which it was criticised
109by Meerut. It was happy to provide the 'evidence' - such
as the sporadic, publicity-gaining activities, the publications 
and the nominal rival 'Red' trade unions - that Stalin's ECCI 
needed as grist for its ideological mill. The Party was being 
kept alive only through artifical respiration, while the faint 
signs of life were being carefully monitored then vastly 
amplified by Moscow to demonstrate the health of the Indian 
section of the 'World Party' - and, thus, the correctness of 
the 'third period' analysis and strategy in this important 
colony. The CPI was playing its part in the justification 
of the program of rapid collectivisation and industrialisation 
in the Soviet Union. The basis for a symbiotic relationship, 
particularly destructive for the further advance of Indian 
communism, had been established.
This was the overall situation at the end of 1930. 
However at this point two changes occurred which were to catalyse 
a significant shift in the internal pattern of Party politics 
in Bombay. The first was Ranadive's release in November 1930.
The second was the arrival in February 1931 of a third American
108. (Cont'd)
organisations began to be formed, etc.) ... [The Pact 
and the ensuing mass enlightenment were] helping the 
Communist Party to grow and to muster around itself all 
the revolutionary forces of the Indian people'.
109. MCG:1. The Meerut group believed that 'this line is 
taken deliberately with the intention of giving the Centre 
the impression that they are active and militant, so that they may continue to enjoy its confidence and money with 
the minimum of trouble'.
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Comintern representative - Henry Lynd. Ranadive immediately 
raised the question, apparently for the first time, of why the 
Party had collapsed so b a d l y . T h e  ECCI had also begun 
privately, behind its enthusiastic public support for Deshpande, 
to ask the same question. One of Lynd's tasks was to carry 
out this investigation and to attempt to set things right.
However, paradoxically, these two new initiatives were to lead, 
not to a decisive new start, but to a further collapse in 
Bombay and to a further deterioration in the relationship with 
Bengal.
The Development of Factionalism in Bombay During 1931
Ranadive's questioning was based on a political 
analysis of some originality, and leading to quite different 
policy conclusions, developed during his year's imprisonment.
The questioning, and the articulation of his unorthodox analysis 
and conclusions, contributed to three developments within the 
Party: it immediately precipitated a conflict with Deshpande;
it later found a positive response among several of the subordinate 
members who had already begun to worry about the Party's situation; 
and it brought Ranadive into conflict with Lynd. Before looking 
at these developments we will first look briefly at Ranadive's 
analysis.
110. Ranadive characterised the Party's situation as one of
'complete isolation from the working class masses and 
complete shattering of our prestige as anti-imperialist 
fighters': quoted in MCG:2.
111. IB, Communism, (1935), ps. 174 & 176.
587
Contrary to an argument that is almost universal in
existing accounts, Ranadive took a less sectarian view of
112Indian politics than Deshpande. He agreed that the 
bourgeoisie was a 'counter-revolutionary' class, but argued 
that the driving force of the Civil Disobedience movement was 
the urban 'revolutionary petty bourgeoisie'. The bourgeoisie 
was represented politically by the Liberals. However the 
Gandhian Congress leadership also fulfilled important 
functions for the bourgeoisie. In particular, Gandhism, 
which had originally been a 'distinctly petty bourgeois 
philosophy', had in the 1920s become 'the most potent tool 
to hoodwink the masses in the interests of the native 
bourgeoisie. ... the conscious strategy of the treacherous 
bourgeoisie to liquidate the national revolutionary forces 
and to stabilise Imperialist terror'. Gandhism had successfully 
'hoodwinked' the Congress's 'petty bourgeois' rank-and-file until 
the late 1920s. Then the latter had successfully revolted 
against the Gandhians' ideological and political control over 
the Congress and had forced this proxy-bourgeois leadership to 
participate in a second mass movement against imperialism.
Civil Disobedience was launched under a heterogenous leadership 
- part 'bourgeois' and part 'petty bourgeois'. But although
112. Eg., Haithcox, op. cit., p.178, & Overstreet and Windmiller, 
op. cit., p.146. The misconception appears to arise from 
the fact that Ranadive's group became more active than 
Deshpande's. The following is based on: the summary of,
and quotations from,Ranadive's analysis,in MCG:2; the 
summaries of his analysis in 'Open Letter to the Indian 
Communists from the Communist Parties of China, Great 
Britain and Germany', in Inprecor, Vol.l2(22), 19/5/32, 
pp. 436-42 , and in V. Basak, op. cit... (The latter two 
accounts do not refer to Ranadive or Deshpande by name.)
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the ’bourgeois’ Gandhian section participated in Civil 
Disobedience, a 'great gap' separated its aspirations from 
those of the 'petty bourgeois' leadership section and mass 
membership. Ranadive reaffirmed his view of the importance 
of the independent 'petty bourgeois' basis of Civil 
Disobedience after the movement's suspension. It collapsed, 
he argued, because of the success of the Raj's repression of 
the 'revolutionary petty bourgeoisie'.
Ranadive compounded his heterodoxy by arguing 
strongly that the working class had suffered long-term defeats 
in the collapse of the 1929 textile strike and the 1930 railway 
strike. Because of the 'physical and moral exhaustion' of the 
working class, strike activity had declined drastically and it 
was now inherently very difficult to organise the workers for 
either industrial or nationalist politics.
From his analysis Ranadive drew a number of political 
conclusions which differed very substantially from those of the 
Deshpande-ECCI line. Because of the predominantly 'petty 
bourgeois', revolutionary character of the Civil Disobedience 
movement, and the gulf between this section and the Gandhian 
component in the leadership, the CPI should actively participate 
in the movement. The communists should take a leading role in 
the mass movement. They should abstain from attacks on the 
Congress left and should try to expose the true role of the 
Gandhians and win the rank-and-file to a struggle against the 
Indian bourgeoisie and 'feudalism' as well as the British. 
Sharply criticising Deshpande, he argued that it was
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... completely un-Marxist to expect that the masses 
would completely and consciously break away from the 
class ideology of the bourgeoisie until and unless 
proletarian leadership could be demonstrated to them 
in action, until and unless they have seen the 
proletariat act as the vanguard of the masses in 
their fight against imperialism.
Further, because of the contemporary weakness of the working
class, a proportionally much greater emphasis should be given to
organising the urban middle class in the political field, while
in trade unionsim a less militant and sectarian policy should be
implemented. In particular, the 'general strike' slogan should
be replaced with a program of participation in the workers'
partial struggles, and the policy of attacking the 'left-reformist'
unionists such as Kandalkar should be rejected in favour of a
policy of trade union unity.
The scope of Ranadive's analysis remained very limited, 
and his conceptual framework crude. Most notably, it retained 
a simplistic (and wrong) categorisation of the political 
strategy of Indian capital, misunderstood the relationship 
between Gandhi and the bourgeoisie and the role of Gandhism, 
was trapped in an exclusively urban framework, mechanically 
divided the different tendencies within the Congress on a rigid 
class basis, and over-estimated the political independence of the 
urban middle classes within the Congress. Nevertheless it 
possessed two virtues absent from Deshpande's position. It 
reflected a serious and independent attempt to understand the 
nature of Indian politics. And, despite its complete failure 
to grasp much of the dynamics of Civil Disobedience - particularly 
the significance of agrarian politics - it provided a much more 
realistic assessment of urban politics and a much more adequate 
policy towards the Civil Disobedience movement in Bombay.
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However Ranadive's political differences led only to
conflict with Deshpande, not to a productive dialogue within
113the Secretariat or a new lead for the Party. Indeed,
within a month of Randdive's release, he and Deshpande came
to blows while leading a procession in the mill area.^^
There were several barriers to the development of a more
satisfactory Party policy. One of these was, of course, that
Deshpande could draw on the ECCI's authority in defence of his
formally 'correct' policy-. This stand was strengthened when
Lynd arrived in February, ending the brief period, since
Kweit's and Somers' deportation in September, during which no
American Comintern representatives were in residence in Bombay.
Part of Lynd's mission was to reaffirm the ECCI's policy, as
laid down in the CPI's 'Draft Platform of Action' (which probably
arrived for the first time with him) and to fight the growing
115influence of the Royist heresy. Ranadive's policy was too
unorthodox, and contained elements too close to the Royist 
analysis, to be tolerated. Accordingly, Lynd provided 
additional reinforcement for Deshpande's stand against Ranadive. 
Ranadive, however, sharply resisted Lynd's attempts to impose 
ideological orthodoxy. A stalemate resulted. A second reason 
for the conflict was that the political differences between the
113. MCG:2; BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: op. cit.
114. Labour Gazette (Bombay), Vol. X(5), 1931, cited in 
Haithcox, op. cit., p.178.
115. IB, Communism, (1935), p.176.
116. Basing itself on Lynd's and other reports, the Meerut 
group claimed that Ranadive and Nambiar had become very 
hostile towards Lynd, had criticised his command of 
Marxism, and had claimed that he was a Deshpande partisan: 
MCG:2.
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two were accompanied and complicated by a personality clash
and 'personal jealousy' arising from the relationships between
117these two and Nambiar. The animosities arising from the
latter factor became even more bitter after Nambiar joined 
Ranadive in his criticisms of Deshpande. Finally, although 
Ranadive's analysis found a positive response among some of the 
middle class Party members, the ideological conflict within the 
Secretariat was not opened into a general Party debate. In 
fact the Meerut group found that the internal operations of 
the Bombay branch became even less democratic than during 1930. 
This precluded the possibility of a resolution of the 
Secretariat's differences within the main body of the Bombay
n  4. U SParty.
The stalemated leadership situation undermined any 
possibility that Ranadive's reemergence would mobilise the 
now substantial discontent of the lower level cadres and provide 
a new start for the Party. The discontent had been brewing 
since 1930. A few Party and YWL members, concerned at the 
Party's.poor showing in Civil Disobedience and convinced that 
they should be participating in it, had taken initiatives which 
diverged from the official policy. S.G. Sardesai, for example, 
managed to persuade Deshpande, and then Shanker Rao Deo, who 
was in charge of the Maharashtra satyagraha committee, that he 
should lead a forest satyagraha among the tribals of Sanganmer, 
in Ahmednagar District. At Sanganmer he, as a Congressman,
117. BSB, 10 36/B/II/19 35 : op. cit.; MCG:2.
118. MCG:2.
was able to establish a militant movement - nominally
Congress but free of Gandhian controls - which won the Party
119considerable popularity in the area. This was one example
of the results - albeit limited - which the communists might
120have won from the Civil Disobedience movement. Another
/Of discontentexample/was D.B. Kulkarni's. In the closing stages of the
GIPR strike Kulkarni, disillusioned with the results, left it
121to join the Gandhian movement. Many of the original YWL
122members had also left by this time.
By 1931, rank-and-file discontent had become general.
Some, the Meerut group discovered, had 'even begun to doubt the
12 3correctness of the line itself'. But despite Ranadive's
new policy direction he did not initiate any real attempts to 
participate in the Gandhian movement during the five months 
between his release and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. After the Pact 
Sardesai was deputed to attend the Karachi session of the
119. Interviews with S.G. Sardesai and B.T. Ranadive; BSAI,
1930, para. 1109(16). Sardesai says that the area has 
remained a CPI stronghold to this day, and that the 
movement also brought some of the local Congress 
radicals towards - and eventually into - the Party.
120. However it should be again stressed that even if the 
Party leadership had been willing to authorise as Party 
policy this sort of participation in the Congress 
movement, it would undoubtedly have met with a great 
deal of resistance from the Congress leadership. In this 
case Sardesai was probably given permission primarily 
because, as a former private secretary to Sapru, he was 
well known to top Congress leaders such as the two Nehrus; 
and without Deo's authorisation he would not have been 
able to organise a Congress agitation at Sanganmer 
(interview with S.G. Sardesai) and would thus have been 
isolated, and impotent to organise such a movement.
121. BSAI, 1930, para.651. Presumably he was also disillusioned 
by his exclusion from the Party in 1929 (see above).
However he returned subsequently.
122. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the YWL; MCG:2.
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National Congress to distribute the Draft Platform of
12 4Action and a Party manifesto. In the post-Pact disillusion
he found there he was able to make a modest impact on some
sections - most notably at the Nau Jawan Bharat Sabha
Conference.125 But, apart from occasional demonstrations and
leafleting in the 1930 mode, 126 this was not followed up. 127
Some efforts were also made in the trade union field. In 
particular, Sardesai was able to reestablish contacts with the
124. The manifesto was titled 'Karachi Congress and the Struggle 
Against Imperialism' (in BSB, 1036/B/V/1935). There was an 
interesting discrepancy between the manifesto and the Draft 
Platform - a discrepancy which indicated the difference 
between Deshpande's and Ranadive's political positions. 
Unlike the Draft Platform, the manifesto did not attack the 
Congress leftists - an absence which was later criticised 
by the ECCI in the 'Open Letter' cited in fn.121 above.
125. MCG:1 & 2; BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: op. cit.
126. That Ranadive's methods of intervention in the nationalist 
arena were not substantially different to those of 
Deshpande's is apparent from the following examples. On 
March 16 the BPCC convened a meeting in the mill area.
Gandhi addressed the 20,000 persons present. Ranadive led 
a procession of some 1000 YWL members to the rally then, 
repeating the Independence Day action of the previous day, 
rushed the platform, overpowered the Congress volunteers, 
and hoisted a red flag alongside the Congress flag.
Ranadive subsequently participated in the radical attack
on Gandhi for having concluded the Pact in the interests of 
the capitalists, landlords and Princes, at the expense of 
the workers and peasants. (BSAI, 1931, para. 940(3-6); NAI, 
H.Poll, 18/III/1931: Bombay FRl Mar.) In a similar fashion, 
Ranadive and Deshpande led a hostile demonstration of 75 
YWL members against Gandhi on the day of his arrival in 
December from the Round Table Conference. They joined the 
welcoming crowd along the route to shout 'boycott Gandhi'. 
(NAI, H.Poll, 5/82/1932: report by the Bombay Commissioner 
of Police, 28/12/31.) However, in the atmosphere of radical 
disillusion after the Pact, these attacks on the Congress 
leadership probably did not have such totally negative 
repercussions on the communists' reputation as did the 
1930 demonstration.
127. MCG:2. The Bombay leadership did make a brief attempt to 
reactivate and. expand the YWL at this stage, but it was 
soon wrecked on the twin reefs on internal dissension
and lack of working class support: NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934:
note on the YWL.
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Party sympathisers in the GIPRU and to build up a substantial
12 8nucleus of supporters within the managing committee.
Ranadive's limited efforts to reassert a communist presence
in the mill area came to little, and the communists remained
as isolated as before in the province's textile unionism.
The Royist GKU, in contrast, led a number of small strikes
during the year and, though these were not successful, managed
to increase the strength of the union. While the Ladhau GKU
continued to exist only on paper and the BTLU to languish,
the Royist GKU's membership rose from 100 in October 1930 to
12 9some 4,000 in July 1931. Communist attempts to intervene
in a strike which closed down five of the Madhaoji Dharamsi
130mills in July-August produced no significant results.
By the middle of the year, then, the Bombay branch was 
back in the rut it had found in 1930. But this time the rank- 
and-file were more restive. The Bombay Committee called a 
meeting in July to express its dissatisfaction with the stalemated 
leadership's inactivity, its divorce from themselves, their 
own lack of access to the Party's resources, and the impotence 
of the Central Committee. The Meerut group saw the meeting as
128. Eg., this faction was able to muster 11 votes against the
Ruikar's 14 when the latter began moves to expel them, 
thereby staving off the attempt: MCG:2.
129. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the GKU, 1928-33. The
union's income and expenditure for the preceding year was 
some Rs.2,500. The communists also lost the original 
WPP trade union base - the small Municipal Workers'
Union - to the Royists.
130. MCG:2; Karnik, op. cit., pp.262-63.
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131the 'beginnings of a revolt' against the leadership.
The calling of the meeting was in itself a 
significant development; but of particular interest was the 
class-based pattern of voting which emerged there. The working 
class members, who had been the most discriminated against in 
the allocation of the Party's resources, argued that the 
leadership as a whole was at fault and that the Party's main 
problem was the 'petty bourgeois' character of both the 
Secretariat and the Central Committee. This vote was another 
clear indication of the non-'proletarianisation' of the 
leadership - and, thus, of another of the consequences for 
the quality of leadership of the absence of interaction with 
a mass base. It also demonstrated the continued perils of an 
'elitist' orientation towards working class Marathas; the vote 
indicated the reemergence of the rejection of 'outsider' 
leadership that, before the 1928 strike, had been a major 
obstacle to middle class communist access to the working class, 
and which had subsequently made possible the communists' 1930 
expulsion from the GKU.
On this occasion, however, the working class revolt was 
contained by Sardesai, who was not identified closely with any 
of the leaders and was thus trusted by the Marathas. They 
accepted his argument that it was the leadership's inactivity, 
not its class character, that was the essential problem. This 
was also accepted by the middle class members and was passed by
131. MCG:2. Except where indicated, the following account of
intra-Party developments during 1931 and the first half of 
1932 is based on this detailed report. The MCG:2 account is 
based, in turn, on the following sources: interviews with
eight of the participants between January and July 1932 ; 
two reports on the situation by Lynd; Ranadive's and 
Deshpande's replies to Lynd's reports to the Central 
Committee; the replies of five of the CC members to the 
same reports; the CC's resolution on the Party crisis; and 
several written reports to the Meerut group by other members.
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the meeting. The meeting also sharply criticised the Central 
Committee for its weakness vis a vis the Secretariat.
Lynd completed his investigation of the Party situation
at about the same time as the Bombay Committee meeting. He came
to a similar conclusion - the Party's problems were due
primarily to the leadership's inactivity, organisational
incompetence and bureaucratic exclusion of the subsidiary organs
132from the decision-making. He immediately called the Central
Committee together to submit his report and initiate discussion 
and remedial action.
However these complementary initiatives, from below and 
from above, did not produce the desired results. Soon afterwards 
Deshpande and Ranadive finally brought their differences into 
the open - and then proceeded to canvass support for their 
respective positions from among the general membership. The 
Meerut group argued that this was an attempt to defuse the 
potential rank-and-file revolt and to frustrate Lynd's attempts 
to mobilise the Central Committee. But, whatever the motivation, 
the attempt was successful. During the second half of 1931 the 
membership was gradually mobilised into two opposing factions 
until, by the end of the year, no neutral members were left; 
the attempt to create bolshevist 'monolithic' unity within the 
CPI was beginning to have some perverse consequences.
During the factional mobilisation Ranadive argued that 
the central cause of the Party's problems was Deshpande's personal 
shortcomings. Deshpande argued that it was Ranadive's political
132. ibid.; IB, Communism, (1935), p.178; BSB, 1036/B/II/1935:
op. cit..
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deviations from orthodoxy. As in the July meeting of the
Bombay membership, a definite class pattern emerged in the
faction formation. The Meerut group explained this as being
a result of factors such as 'personal relations, places of
residence, political backwardness, etc.', to Ranadive's covert
appeal to the 'petty bourgeois prejudices' of the intellectuals,
and to Deshpande's overt manipulation 'of the class consciousness
of the worker members to discredit R[anadive] and his group'.
The depth of the membership's frustration at the Party's
situation was reflected in the bitterness of the factional
conflict into which it was channelled:
Instead of thinking about the right course for the 
Party, the Comrades were acting to secure exclusive 
domination in the Party ... . During the discussions
they used words against each other as if they were 
class enemies and acted as if they were factions inside 
the Congress or a like body and not at all fellow 
members of the Revolutionary Party. They forgot the 
existence of the Cl and their responsibility to it.
The class pattern of the two factions produced a further
debilitating result: because the Central Committee was composed
primarily of the middle class intellectual members, and the
lower committees of working class members, Ranadive's faction
dominated the former and Deshpande's the latter. Deshpande
used his dominance in the Party's lower committees to block any
activity initiated by the Secretariat and the Central Committee:
... they prolonged meetings indefinitely - up to 12 
hours at a time, with the reading of the minutes 
alone taking 4 hours sometimes. In meetings, rowdy 
and uncomradely methods were used, including obscene 
and irresponsible language. In CC meetings R[anadive] 
and Sar[desai] were called spies etc. [by the 
Deshpande minority]. Proposals and plans of work 
were not considered on their merits but shelved or 
thrown out for factional reasons. Thus all of the 
internal work of the P[arty] was sabotaged.
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Deshpande's blocking tactics, which completely stalemated the
functioning of the Party, also consolidated the factional
commitments of even the more neutral of the intellectual members}
Both Lynd and the Meerut group attempted to arbitrate
the dispute. Lynd's efforts, however, were ineffective. The
Meerut group's proposal that Nambiar and Ranadive be dropped
from the Secretariat - the former for her alleged 'corrupting
influence' and the latter because he was more influenced by
her than Deshpande - added to the heat rather than dissipating
it. Two visiting representatives (John Clark and William
Bennett) of the Comintern's RILU - this time Canadians - took
up Lynd's efforts after he was deported in December. While Lynd
had been critical of all three Secretariat members, and
particularly of Deshpande - and reported accordingly to the
134Comintern on his return - Clark and Bennett supported 
Deshpande, encouraging his efforts to use the lower-level 
committees to fight the Central Committee. But Ranadive's 
faction remained recalcitrant, arguing (correctly) that the two 
RILU representatives did not have the authority to intervene 
in Party affairs.
From Factionalism to Party Split
It was the Ranadive faction which finally broke the
133. Eg., R.D. Bharadwaj. Bharadwaj first came to Bombay, to
begin Party work there,during the July-August Madhaoji 
Dharamsi mill strike. After witnessing Deshpande's efforts 
to 'sabotage' Ranadive's initiatives during the strike, he 
decided that Deshpande was 'a terrible man': 'My whole
experience is that Com. D[eshpande] will allow Party work 
only if he is to be the boss, otherwise he is ready to 
sabotage': quoted in MCG:2.
134. IB, Communism, (1935), p.178.
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stalemate - by seceding from the Party in mid-December to form
135a new 'Bolshevik Party'. Significantly, it did so in the
name of the Comintern. In a statement to the Party it condemned 
'the counter-revolutionary clique of Deshpande and his gang 
which is in a majority in the Communist Party of India', and 
announced that:
We affirm our loyalty to the Communist International.... 
We assure the Communist International that we will 
work ... on the lines laid down by [it] ... and because 
of this we announce our firm decision to work 
independently of the present counter-revolutionary 
clique, which has been sabotaging the work of 
revolution in every sphere.136
Having seceded, the Ranadive group then sought Comintern
recognition for the Bolshevik Party as the legitimate and most
effective representative of that organisation. It intended to
proceed in its political activity as if it was the real CPI, and
it regarded its task as 'building the movement from the foundations'.
It would not publicly attack the Deshpande Party and was prepared
to work with it in the trade unions, but it intended to
criticise individual members if they 'deviated from the correct
policy'. The public truce did not last long, however, for the
Deshpande group initiated a sequence of mutual attacks in the 
137local press.
There were now three separate and mutually hostile 
groups in Bombay city - the 'official' CPI, the Bolshevik 
Party and Roy's Revolutionary Working Class Party - competing for
135. MCG:2; BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: op. cit.
136. Quoted in NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the 'Lai Bavta'
Girni Kamgar Union.
137. In the Sunday Advocate: MCG:2.
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recognition by the Comintern as its only legitimate
representative leadership group in India; the claim to
legitimacy became a weapon in the factional struggle. Of
these, only Roy's group exercised political influence of any
138significance - though even this was fast disintegrating.
The seceding group began with about 15 members and
139the Deshpande group with about twenty. By mid-1933 the
former had increased to about 30, while the latter had
140dwindled to 15. The Meerut group - who, on the grounds of
Party discipline, supported the Deshpande group - gave the
following comparative assessment of the composition and
capabilities of the two factions:
The Party group is intellectually very weak.
D[eshpande] himself is the only intellectual in the 
group ... . Almost all the members are workers, but
this does not mean much, as we should not take 
seriously any attempt to idealise them. The truth is 
that these comrades are intellectually very backward, 
with few opportunities of improving themselves in 
this respect. In practice they have shown no 
particular capacity as organisers or agitators.
Almost all come from the textile workers but they 
have failed to get the mass support or even mass 
contacts for the Party. ... they are fairly completely 
divorced from the working class ... . [nevertheless]
it is necessary ... to acknowledge the loyalty and 
sincerity which the worker members of the Party and 
the YWL have displayed ... . But ... they are not
competent to build up by their own efforts a CPI 
which can be really called a CP. ... the seceders 
are distinctly superior. ... The seceders form 
almost the whole cadre of the Party, as it were. ... 
a strong element of this sort [middle class intellect­
uals] is indispensable for the Party. ... Nevertheless 
... the seceders also are incapable of carrying out 
their declared programme of building up a CPI ... at 
least within a reasonably short time.
138. IB, Communism, (1935), p.169; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: 
note on the GKU, 1928-34.
139 MCG:2.
140. Figures taken from membership lists of the two groups, 
in BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: op. cit..
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Forming ’almost the whole cadre of the Party' , the
seceding group took with it virtually all of the Party's
141remaining contacts and influence. Moreover, once free of
the Party stalemate, the Bolshevik Party undertook a more
active campaign to increase their influence. In addition to
their work in the existing unions they formed a new textile
union - the 'Lai Bavta (Red Flag) GKU' - in Bombay, and
the 'Mill Mazdoor Union' in Ahmedabad. After they had been
expelled from the GIP and BB & Cl railway unions they formed
rival 'Red' unions. These, unlike the earlier communist
14 3rival unions, undertook some activity. Though they were
extremely small they retained some influence and were to
provide the nuclei for the later development of the Party's
144trade union base.
Not only did the Deshpande group begin with a much
weaker base, but it also suffered further disintegration within
145six months of the split. In mid-1932 there arose a pattern
of dissension within the official Party which almost exactly 
replicated that which had led to the split. Following the 
secession Deshpande was joined by the other remaining 
intellectual, N.S. Desai, to constitute the Party leadership.
141. The pro-communist factions in the two railway unions worked 
with the Ranadive group, and almost all of the Bombay 
office-bearers in the Red AITUC were among the secessionists 
NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: notes on the GIP Railway Labour 
Union, the Red BB and Cl Railway Workers' Union and the
Red AITUC; MCG:2.
142. Source for the railway unions as in fn. 150; NAI, 7/20/1934: 
note on the Lai Bavta GKU and the Mill Mazdoor Union, 
Ahmedabad; MCG:2.
143. Eg., during the sharp wage-cutting in the textile industry 
during 1933, Ranadive's group, in contrast to Deshpande's 
and in competition with the Royists, undertook a fairly 
vigorous - if ineffective - campaign to mobilise the 
workers against the wage-cuts: NAI, H.Poll, 18/IV/1933 - 
18/IX/1933: Bombay FRs Mar. - Aug.; NAI, H.Poll, 117/1933: 
note by Haig, 9/7/33.
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Because of a shortage of cadres considered suitable for the 
job, the Central Committee, which had been reduced from eleven 
to five, could only be expanded to seven. It exercised no 
more influence on the new leaders than had its predecessor. 
Deshpande and Desai continued to exercise the same mode of 
control; in the words of a critique from Meerut, they were 
'more interested in keeping the "Contacts" in their own hands 
than in using them in the interests of the building of the 
Party'. The result was, once again, a revolt by the working 
class members against the 'petty bourgeois' leadership, followed 
by the formation of two rival factions holding majorities at 
different levels of the Party's organisation. The conflict 
was, again, extremely bitter. Soon the working class dissenters 
that Deshpande had earlier praised as 'revolutionary proletarian 
elements' were being condemned by him as 'rabid counter­
revolutionaries in league with the seceders'. The Party was 
stalemated for a second time. The last possible opportunity for 
a resolution of the situation - arbitration by the resident 
RILU representatives Bennett and Clark (which was requested by 
those in revolt against the Deshpande leadership) - was removed 
in September when they were arrested and deported by the British}^ 
An attempt by the Meerut group to arbitrate, also requested by 
the dissenters, failed when it was ignored by the Deshpande
144. See the notes on the respective organisations in NAI, H.Poll 
7/20/1934.
145. The following account of the second wave of factional strife 
within the 'official' Party is based on MCG:3. This 
report^ too, is carefully documented.
146. ibid.; IB, Communism, (1935), p.179.
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leadership. By the beginning of 1933 the situation within the
Deshpande group was 'as chaotic as it was at the end of 1931',
147and with no prospects for an improvement in sight.
The Deshpande group's only remaining source of
strength was the support he received from the Meerut and other
provincial groups. Only Amir Haider Khan's small circle in
14 8Madras supported the seceding group. The grounds for this
support were provided by the Meerut group. Despite its 
recognition of the clear political superiority of Ranadive's 
party, it responded to requests for an opinion from both parties 
in the following manner:
... without being taken to be partisans ... we would 
of course, in principle, support the Party as such.
... We are proud to take our stand under the banner 
of the Cl and are in duty bound to stand by its 
section in our country.149
The imperatives of Party discipline overrode questions of merit.
At about the same time, the ECCI finally recognised
the Party situation publicly and issued an explicit condemnation
of the political behaviour of the Bombay leadership. In May
1932 a lengthy 'Open Letter' to the Indian communists appeared 
150in Inprecor. It was written after Lynd's return to Moscow and
appears to have incorporated both his report and the report from
151the Meerut group which he took with him from India. It
147. MCG:3; the government reported that after Ranadive's 
secession the activities of the Deshpande group were 
'generally confined to interfering in labour disputes ... 
and to creating trouble at meetings organised by rival 
parties': NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the YWL.
148. IB, Communism, (1935), p.178; MCG:2.
149. MCG:2.
150. This is the 'Open Letter' referred to in fn.121 above.
151. See IB, Communism, (1935), p.177. Much of the message 
of the 'Open Letter' was repeated in V. Basak, op. cit..
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reaffirmed the indisputable 'correctness' of the ECCI's policy 
and placed all responsibility for the CPI's situation on to 
the shoulders of its current leadership (the old leadership 
being implicitly, and finally, absolved). In particular, it 
singled out the Bombay leadership. It sharply criticised 
Bombay for its bureaucratic dominance of its own branch, 
for 'reducing the whole Party merely to a local organisation', 
and for the respective 'deviations' of its two factions. Though 
without mentioning names, Deshpande was criticised primarily 
for his defeatist sectarian abstentionism, and Ranadive for 
his neo-Royist exaggeration of the political weight of the 
nationalist 'petty bourgeoisie' and his corresponding under­
estimation of the revolutionary potential of the proletariat.
The 'Open Letter' did not refer directly to the Party split, but 
it was unambiguous on the general question of factionalism:
There can be no greater crime than if the Communists 
... follow the path of unprincipled factional 
struggle, fractions and personal groupings ...
[which] play into the hands of the British Imperialists. 
True Communist groups must put the interests of the 
proletariat above everything else, direct all their 
efforts towards the rapid formation of the Communist 
Party, settling all disputed questions within the 
framework of the Communist International and if 
necessary with its assistance.152
However, because it did not state a definite preference for
any particular group, the 'Open Letter' did not provide a clear
lead for the reorganisation of the Party.
If factionalism was the 'greatest crime' then secession 
was a mortal sin. But, despite the combined pressure of the 
ECCI and the Meerut group, the Ranadive group remained firm in
152. 'Open Letter', p.442.
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its resolve not to rejoin the official Party - at least not
while it was led by Deshpande. When the Meerut group asked the
five leading members of the secessionist group what would be
their response to an ECCI ruling, either way, on the current
situation, their replies reflected this attitude: two said that
they would 'consider it', two said that they would accept it
provided that it did not require them to work with Deshpande,
15 3and only one said he would accept it unconditionally.
But this stand did not entail an uncritical attitude towards
Ranadive. In a collective statement to the Meerut group they
accepted that Ranadive had 'committed many grave mistakes', and
several were hostile to Nambiar's influence within the group.
They believed, however, that Ranadive, unlike Deshpande, was
'capable of correcting his mistakes and of working in a sincere
154collective manner'.
By the beginning of 1933, then, the Bombay branch of 
the CPI appeared to be in the last throes of the agonies of its 
slow death. It had reached this point after a protracted four- 
years illness, beginning with the wounds it had suffered in 
1929, and despite (and because) of the constant attention of 
a sequence of international physicians. Because of Bombay's 
dominance over the 'all-India' Party apparatus, the CPI, too, 
was sharing Bombay's fate. In Bombay, only the weak and 
illegitimate secessionist offspring stood any chance of survival.
153. Cited in MCG:2.
154. ibid.
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Given time it might, possibly, become a viable force.
By 1933 it had clearly outpaced the Deshpande group and,
because of the gradual disintegration of the Royists
following the imprisonment of their leader, it stood a chance
155of overtaking that group, too. Nevertheless, the forseeable
future of Ranadive1s Bolshevik Party-was hardly a promising one.
The prospect was no brighter elsewhere. The only 
other members of the 'family circle' that had survived as 
entities were those - the Meerut group and the unofficial 
Halim group in Calcutta - who had earlier been abandoned by 
Bombay; and the former was about to be condemned to long 
terms of imprisonment. We will now look at the latter's 
progress from 1930 and situation in 1933.
Bengal, 1930-33
After Deshpande had installed the Bukhari-Zaman 
group as the official Bengal branch of the CPI, it and the 
Halim group maintained an uneasy co-existence through 1930. 
Moreover, these two groups had to share the claim to Marxist 
leadership with several other groups. But, despite these 
competing claims and the substantial variations in the level 
of commitment to a Marxist ideology and politics, all of the 
groups shared a similar situation; they were opposed to
155. The Intelligence Branch conjectured that Ranadive also 
stood a good chance of eventual recognition as the 
'official' Party, following Lynd's very critical report 
to the ECCI on Deshpande: IB, Communism, (1935), p.178.
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Bengal's Congress leadership, but they did not have much 
influence in local nationalist politics and they had even less 
on the working class or peasantry. Apart from these 
features, the aspects of the Bengal story most relevant to 
this account are the following: the 'unofficial' Halim
group's development as a cohesive body, despite the factional 
conflict which surrounded it and its failure to establish a 
mass base; its eventual emergence as the predominant Marxist 
group in Calcutta; its continued inability, despite this 
relative success, to overcome Bombay's dominance in the CPI; 
and its growing hostility towards Bombay for this reason.
During this period there were four other groups,
in addition to the Halim and the Bombay-supported groups,
15 7which saw themselves as Marxist. The members of two of
these had been involved with the Goswami-Chakravarty faction 
at the time of the split in the Bengal WPP, before the Meerut 
arrests. One of these, the 'Samyaraj Party', evolved, under 
the leadership of Badul Ganguly and Aghore Sen, from Santosh
156. The leaders of one of these groups, Bankim Mukherji, appears 
to have been a partial exception to this categorisation.
His main arena of activity was the BPCC. His influence 
there is suggested by the fact that his vote in the BPCC 
for a resumption of Civil Disobedience in December 1931 
was narrowly defeated by 189 votes to 143. (Gallagher, 
'Congress in Decline', p.611.) Mukherji's group also 
had some contact with peasant organisations: NAI, H.Poll,
7/20/1934: note on the Indian Proletarian Revolutionary Army.
157. Roy also attempted to set up a Bengal group, but without 
noticeable success. The following paragraph is based on 
the following sources: the notes on the different 
organisations in NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934; MCG:1 & 2; IB, 
Communism, (1935), pp.240-42; Ranen Sen, op. cit., pp.4-7.
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Mitra's Socialist Youth League. It consisted almost entirely 
of terrorists and ex-terrorists. Its membership grew to about 
50 in 1932, but it then split in two in that year. The second 
group was led by Bhupendranath Dutt and Bankim Mukherji and 
called itself the 'Indian Proletarian Revolutionary Party'.
Its membership, too, was primarily terrorist or ex-terrorist.
A third group was organised around a Prabhas Banerji in 1929 - 
again, mainly from those with backgrounds in terrorist 
organisations.
Banerji was also associated with a small group of
158Indian communists in London. They were almost all students
at Oxford - 'of exceptionally good stock', in the Intelligence
Bureau's words, and 'the sons of India's intellectual 
159aristocracy'. Almost all were Bengali; they were to be
Bengal's first 'upper bhadralok' communists. They were in close 
contact with the CPGB, and particularly with its Indian member, 
Saklatvala. In fact their conversion was the first real success 
for the CPGB's efforts since the early 1920s to establish a 
communist nucleus among Indian university students in England. 
Under their leader, Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar, a former law 
student, they formed themselves in 1930 into a loosely organised 
Marxist circle, of about a dozen members, called the 'University 
Students' Group'. They underwent political training in London
158. This paragraph is based on IB, Communism, (1935) , pp. 248-
54; D.M. Laushey, Bengal Terrorism and the Marxist Left, 
(Calcutta, 1975), pp.113-16 (Laushey's account is based 
partly on an interview with the group's leader,
N. Dutt Mazumdar).
159. IB, Communism, (1935), pp.248-49.
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and under Chattopadhyaya in Berlin, and published a magazine
160for Indian students in Britain. In 1931 Mazumdar sent two
of its members home to Bengal to begin work, then returned 
himself in August 1932. In Calcutta he developed an 
independent group called the 'Labour Party, Bengal', and under­
took a vigorous campaign to establish contacts in other
provinces and with working class organisations, and to penetrate
161other Marxist organisations.
Mazumdar had one distinct advantage over the other 
groups - the legitimising factor of independent international 
communist contacts. He was to use this advantage to some 
effect. The CPGB, for its part, also valued the connection.
Its relationship with the University Students' Group appears 
to have provided it with its only direct link with the Indian 
movement in this period. It was not a very satisfactory link, 
for, 80 percent of the students' group being Bengali, the 
CPGB's contact would be restricted to that province until 
Mazumdar managed to establish a wider network. But this 
situation proved to be even more unsatisfactory for the Halim 
group; the authority that Mazumdar and the envoys who preceded 
him derived from their independent international contacts with
160. The magazine was called New Bharat, later to become 
Indian Front. Copies are preserved in the Marx Memorial 
Library, London.
161. IB, Communism, pp.250-4; NA!, H.Poll, 25/51/1931: notes 
on Nirmal Sen Gupta, Nov. - Dec., 1931; NAI, H.Poll, 
7/20/1934: notes on the Calcutta Port and Dock Workers' 
Union.
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162the CPGB and with Chattopadhyaya proved to be very disruptive.
Thus, during 1930-33 the Halim group had to exist as 
one Marxist group among several making the same claim. All 
built independent - and sometimes competing - trade union 
contacts, and all published separate organs. All except 
Halim's group existed in a state of considerable flux, with
16 3members moving from one group to another or leaving altogether.
In the longer historical perspective the phenomenon as a whole 
can be seen as the second terrorist transition towards 
communism - the first being that led by Goswami and Chakravarty 
in the early 1920s. These conversions were eventually greatly 
to swell the CPI's ranks in Bengal. But during this period the 
divisions between the different groups were to reinforce the 
weakness of communism in an already difficult period. The 
formation of these new groups marked a significant, if partial, 
ideological transition in one dimension of bhadralok politics; 
but, at this stage at least, they had not made a substantial 
transition from the modes of political action practised in their 
immediate past.
This was the immediate context of the conflict between
162. This was still the case in late 1934: see BSB, 1036/B/XIV/
1935: letter from the CPI, Bombay, to the ECCI, ca. Dec. 
1934. The letter is also a request for an ECCI resolution 
of the general problem for the Party of returnees with 
international communist contacts: 'The Party must be kept
informed of the arrivals of these people, and they should 
be instructed definitely to work with the Party group. ... 
Since they are RETURNED from abroad, they get a particular 
advantage and status which it takes time to combat'. See 
also the sources cited in fn.170 for further evidence of 
Mazumdar's use of his international contacts.
163. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: notes on the different Bengal 
groups; MCG:1 & 2; Ranen Sen, op. cit., pp.4-10. However 
they cooperated on the Red AITUC.
the Halim and the Bombay-supported group during these years.
After the disorientation of 1929, both groups entered 1930 in
164an extremely weak state. It was in this condition that
they became involved in the one noteworthy 'communist' event
of the period - the Calcutta carters' strike in April. It was
to demonstrate, once again, the frailties of the early Bengali
communist approach to trade unionism.
The strike was a protest at a recently notified
government restriction, inspired by the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, on the hours of operation of
bullock carts. The carters, already affected by the trade
recession, became very agitated about the measure. The Halim,
16 6Bukhari and Mukherji groups then stepped in to organise the
agitation - which appears to have been intended by them more as
16 7a challenge to the Raj than as an industrial dispute. A
16 8'Carters' Union' was hastily established, and a 'satyagraha' 
organised for April 1, the day the new regulation came into force.
164. See, eg., NAI, H.Poll, 88/1930: Tegart to G of Ben., 27/1/30.
165. The strike, its background and its sequel are described in: 
IOL, L/PJ/6/2000, files 1974/1930 & 2987/1930: Tegart to
G of Ben., 3 & 11/4/30; & IB, Communism, (1935), p.160 
& pp.292-4.
166. Mukherji appears to have played the main role.
167. See, eg., the leaflet published for the occasion by Abdul 
Halim, titled 'To the Workers, Students and Citizens of 
Bengal' (in TNA, GO 549, Public, April 28, 1930). The 
Meerut group described it accurately as 'a rather silly 
and violent appeal to the carters to seize power etc.':
MCG:1.
168. It is possible that the organisers were able to use 
earlier contacts with the carters. Gopen Chakravarty says 
that during the 1928 Lillooah strike they managed to 
organise a carters' union (Chakravarty, Interview, p.140).
It also seems that the carters' chaudhris acted as inter­
mediaries: see Tegart to G of Ben., 11/4/30, as in fn.165 
above.
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At midday on April 1, large numbers of carters unyoked and
dismantled their carts on the Howrah bridge and surrounding
streets. Simultaneously, thousands of youths barricaded the
streets over a wide area of Calcutta. A pitched battle with
the police - described by the Intelligence Branch as 'the
first barricade street fight with the police in India' - then 
169ensued. Six were killed by police fire and 59 injured. The
police sustained 57 injuries, a number of which were serious.
The unrestrained violence soon persuaded the carters that the 
costs of this form of action were too high, and from the next 
day the Communist leaders had to rely to an increasing extent 
on the Congress rank and file for the furtherance of their aims' 1"^ 
Although the event seems to have increased the 'Carters' 
Union' leaders' stocks with the students of Calcutta, it 
produced little else of value. In particular, it did not 
further the communists' working class program.17'*' However it 
did lead to several imprisonments. One of these was Halim's. 
Others, including Bukhari, were interned under the new Criminal 
Law Amendment Act during the year and subsequently. The 
repression of 1930 virtually immobilised both the Halim and the
Bukhari groups. 172 It also heightened the communists 'left-
169. IB, Communism, (1935) , p.160. Very large numbers were
involved in the street fights, which soon had little 
to do with the original issue.
170. ibid., p.293. See also NAI, H.Poll, 248/11/1930: note by 
Sir B.L. Mitter, 15/5/30, after a visit to Calcutta.
171. MCG:1 & 2. The carters were to organise a hartal two years 
later on the same issue; but this time it was peaceful, 
and no communists were involved (NAI, H.Poll, 18/VII/1932: 
Bengal FR1 Apr.). The Bengal FRs frequently reported 
poorly attended labour meetings, organised by the communists 
and the other groups, throughout this period. The workers 
showed little interest in them.
.72. Ranen Sen, op. cit., p.4, who says that their only achieve­
ment for the year was the publication of one leaflet:MCG:1 & 2.
sectarianism': as one of the participants explained, the
ECCI's Tenth Plenum line 'meant isolation from everyone but
ourselves'; but it struck a responsive chord because 'we had
been driven into a corner by imperialist persecution, which
17 3bred a psychology of trusting no one but ourselves'. There
was a particular reason for distrusting terrorists - close 
involvement with them invited police repression for a cause 
which the communists rejected politically. The Halim group 
vigorously denounced both terrorism and Congress politics.
But, unlike in Bombay, 'left-sectarianism' in
Bengal appears to have promoted unity rather than destroying it.
After his release Halim formed an unofficial 'Calcutta
Committee of the Communist Party of India' with Abani Chowdhuri,
17 4Akhil Banerji, Ranen Sen, Ranen Bose and Somnath Lahiri.
Starting with this small nucleus, the Calcutta Committee slowly
grew during 1931. The Bombay-supported group, in contrast,
disintegrated - some of its members joining the Calcutta
Committee. By mid-1932 the former had about 20 active members,
17 5compared to the latters' six to eight. The Halim group
devoted much of its attention during 1931-32 to attempting to 
develop a mass base. It maintained or established rudimentary 
trade union organisations among the transport workers, the EIR 
workshop men, on the East Bengal Railway, and among the Matiaburz, 
rice mill and match factory workers. (However it failed to make 
contact with any of the peasant movements of the period.) Along 
with several of the other groups, it also had representatives on
173. Interview with Somnath Lahiri.
174. ibid.; Ranen Sen, op. cit., p.4.
175. MCG:2; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the Workers' 
Party of India.
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17 6the (powerless) Red AITUC. It gave considerable attention
177to Marxist study and translation work. Finally, it managed
to form an alliance with the Calcutta branch of the Sikh Akali 
17 8Dal. But it became convinced that, even more important
than immediately building a mass base, 'Party unity was the
17 9first necessity'. The conviction was based on the
debilitating experience of the WPP split before the Meerut 
arrests, and was confirmed by the current Bombay situation and
the division which surrounded them in Calcutta's impotent left-
. . , . 18 0wing politics.
Having successfully established its own unity, the
Calcutta Committee initially made every effort to forge an
inter-provincial unity with Bombay. Its cooperation with Bombay
on the Red AITUC, despite Bombay's policy of excluding it from
181the Party, was one expression of this effort. But finally
the Calcutta Committee abandoned its restraint. In mid-1932
it published a manifesto denouncing 'the present so-called,
self-constituted CC of the CPI', and its Calcutta affiliate,
182in the most bitter of terms. It described the existing
Central Committee as being
176. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the Red AITUC.
177. Ranen Sen, op. cit., pp.6-7; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note 
on the Workers' Party of India; NAI, H.Poll, 90/1932: 
extract from Halim to Editor, Labour Monthly (London), 
6/4/32.
178. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: note on the Akali Dal.
179. Interview with Somnath Lahiri.
180. ibid.
181. MCG:2.
182. ACH, 1935/25: 'Manifesto of the Communist Party of India'.
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... dominated by a few careerists and adventurists 
of the worst sort who have made it a basis of their 
self aggrandisement only, allowing willingly the 
real work of the Communist Party of India to go to 
the dogs. ... We are against this bureaucratic 
opportunism.
The Bombay leadership was also attacked for its inactivity,
'careerism', factionalism, splitting of other communist groups,
and for 'flirting and collaborating with persons of doubtful
roles and police spies'. Included in the pamphlet's list of
slogans was 'Down with rampant opportunism in the C.C. of the
C.P.I.'. The manifesto also proposed the development of a
CPI independent of the current Bombay leadership, but, hopefully,
affiliated to the Comintern:
We appeal to all honest and sincere Communists... to 
organise themselves into local Committees 
independently of the so-called CC of the CPI and 
then to put up a united front against British 
Imperialism and native counter-revolution. ... 
we propose to organise an independent CC of the 
CPI on the lines laid down by the Cl, and we 
appeal to all individual Communists and Communist 
groups to join and help us in this.
The pamphlet also inaugurated a significant shift
in tactics towards the Congress rank-and-file and the
terrorists. While firmly pointing out the 'illusions' of a
belief in Congress nationalism or terrorism being able to win
independence, it also made a concerted and sympathetic effort
to win these sections to a communist position. This contrasted
with the harshness of earlier criticisms. In line with this
tactical shift, the Calcutta Committee began a serious attempt
to contact, provide literature for, and convert, the internees
18 3in the detention camps.
183. Ranen Sen, op. cit., pp.8-9; interview with Somnath Lahiri.
616
But neither the call for the isolation of the Bombay 
leadership and for the creation of communist unity around an 
independent Central Committee, nor the campaign in the jails, 
could change the Calcutta Committee's immediate situation.
•k k k
The Calcutta manifesto was a cry of desperation. It 
reflected the isolation and mutual hostilities that had 
overtaken Indian communism in the wake of the Meerut arrests 
and in the difficult,coinciding, Civil Disobedience and 'third 
period' phases.
The Bombay leadership's bureaucratic domination of the
formal Party apparatus was the immediate cause of the more
serious of the divisions among the communists. This dominance
was made possible by the great regional imbalance that had
developed in the CPI following the contrasting successes of
the two communist centres in the critical late 1920s period.
This contrast was, in turn, essentially a consequence of the
great differences - created largely by the unevenness of the
colonialisation of eastern and western India - in the objective
possibilities for communist politics in the respective regions.
Bombay's dominance was also made possible by the existence of
a formal, centralised, 'all-India' Party, affiliated to, and
supported materially and morally by, the Comintern. The
experiences of this period demonstrated the prematurity of the
great emphasis that was given from December 1928 to the creation
184of such a Party apparatus. That it was established - if only
184. As distinct from a strong underground organisation. The
irony was that while the formation of a centrally directed, 
'all-India' Party in the conditions of the late 1920s and 
early 1930s was premature, the formation of an underground 
apparatus was long overdue.
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in essentially formal terms - then legitimised and supplied 
with resources by Moscow, while the great disparity in the 
strengths of the provincial branches remained, made possible 
Bombay's subordination of the other branches even after it 
had lost its mass base. It made possible the projection of 
Bombay's intra-Party politics on to the other branches - with 
disastrous effects.
The situation which resulted was an ominous legacy for 
the future - particularly as it was created during the penultimate 
phase of the bolshevisation of the Comintern. The pattern of 
dominance and subordination that was established in India 
paralleled the escalation since 1928 of a similar process in 
the 'World Party'; as with the other national Parties, the 
CPI was expected to follow a path determined by the exigencies 
of domestic politics in the Soviet Union. But, for the CPI, 
the threat of bolshevisation was the greater because the ECCI- 
CPI relationship was not simply one of political dominance- 
subordination. In part it had an ideological basis. Initially 
at least, most of the Indian communists were willing enough to 
attempt to traverse this impossible path: because of their great 
faith in the revolutionary credentials of those who had made the 
Russian Revolution; because the Soviet Union was the enemy of 
British imperialism; because of their deep commitment to
185. In this we can perhaps see a parallel with the projection 
of Bombay factionalism on to the national Congress 
organisation in the Congress split of 1907: see G. Johnson, 
Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism, Bombay and the 
Indian National Congress 1880 to 1915  ^ (Cambridge, 1975), 
Chapter 4.
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revolutionary internationalism and their identification of
this with the Communist International; and because in this
particular phase 'left-sectarianism' reinforced the
ideological-psychological response they had already made to
186an extremely defensive situation. But, in addition to
these ideological factors, the communists' attachment to the 
Comintern was determined very largely by a situation of 
political dependency. For the undivided Bombay leadership 
after the loss of its mass base and political momentum, the 
ECCI connection provided it with its only authority and 
resources; for the secessionist and excluded groups, unable 
to make immediate political progress, a favourable decision by 
the ECCI provided them with their only apparent means for 
beginning to resolve their immediate problem of lack of political 
authority. But, given the factionalism that had already been 
conducted in the Comintern's name and the continuation of 
the same objective conditions that had aggravated this 
factionalism, there was no reason to believe that even a clear 
ECCI decision would be capable of decisively resolving the 
wider problem of Party unity. The Meerut group's assessment - 
noted at the beginning of this chapter - that the outlook was 
'hopeless', appeared to be fully justified; in the first half 
of 1933 it seemed that there would be a long haul ahead before 
a unified and effective Community Party of India could 
emerge from the debris of the 1929-33 collapse.
186. This is reflected in Indian communist recollections of this 
period - both in published form and from those that I have 
interviewed. Almost all stress that the 'left-sectarian 
mistake' was theirs as well as the Comintern's.
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CHAPTER 8
THE FORMATION OF A COMMUNIST PARTY - 1934-1937
Towards the end of 1932 the Meerut group commented
that 'Efforts have been going on now for 11 years and [yet] it
cannot be said that a Party exists'.^ In October 1937, only
five years later, the Intelligence Bureau was describing a very
different reality: a functioning, centralised, national CPI,
with effectively combined open and underground organisational
2levels and a growing membership, had come into existence.
Though still somewhat unstable in 1937, this structure was to 
survive, providing the foundations of the CPI's subsequent
3history. Thus within a few years the 'hopeless' chaos of 
impotent, warring factions was transformed into an effective, 
centralised order. How was this dramatic change possible? On 
what terms was the transformation effected? And what were the 
implications of these terms for the Party's future history?
This chapter argues that the transformation depended upon the 
incorporation of a basic contradiction into the CPI's foundations, 
that this contradiction corresponded to the inescapable dilemma
1. MCG:2.
2. NAI, H.Poll, 7/7/1937: IB, 'A Review of Recent Communist 
Activities in India', dated 26/10/37.
3. See, eg.: NAI, H.Poll, 7/7/1939: IB, 'Communism in India -
a survey of recent developments (to 31/10/1939)'; Overstreet 
and Windmiller, o£. cit., Chapters 8-14.
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faced by the Indian communists, and that the bolshevist way 
in which they resolved the preceding crisis was the only way 
in which a national, centralised communist party could be 
formed at that time in the given conditions.
Two contemporaneous events which occurred in late 
1933 made possible the formation of the Party between 1934 
and 1937: the unexpected early release of the Meerut prisoners;
and the ECCI1s explicit recognition of their legitimacy as the 
leadership of the CPI. The keys to the formation of a national 
Party apparatus lay, therefore, in the Meerut jail and in Moscow.
The Meerut Group: The CPI's First National Leadership
The Raj's launching of the Meerut Case effectively 
broke the communist movement at a critical time. But, as we 
saw in Chapter 5, the logic of repression imposed by the Indian 
situation entailed certain costs to the Raj. Among these costs 
was the forging of India's first unified, national leadership 
from among the several provincial groups represented inside the 
Meerut jail. But for the Meerut Case, this process would 
undoubtedly have taken much longer. Another cost was the 
collective political education of these leaders during their 
four long years together, with the leisure to study their well- 
stocked Marxist library, to reflect on their past activities 
and the Party's present plight, and to observe political India 
at a time of crisis. A third cost was the early release of 
the newly formed leadership, allowing it to put into practice 
its recently acquired political wisdom.
From all accounts the Meerut jail experience was a
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profound one for the imprisoned communists. The psychology 
of jail life took its toll. All of the communists appear to 
have been subject, in varying degrees, to the conflicting, 
fluctuating and often unheroic psychic states brought about 
in even the most politically committed by extended - and, 
particularly, indeterminate - imprisonment. Moreover, the 
unprecedented leisure of jail life allowed the communists 
not only to deepen their knowledge of theory; it also allowed 
reflection on the high personal costs of revolutionary politics 
and on the more unsatisfactory aspects of their received Marxism 
and contemporary Soviet, Comintern and Indian communist practice. 
These reflections led Usmani, who had so recently sat alongside 
Stalin on the Comintern's Presidium, and Nimbkar, to break with 
communism while still in Meerut. Spratt's reflections began 
a process of rejection of both communist politics and Marxist 
theory - a process which was completed during a period of 
extended solitary confinement in the Belgaum Fort to which he
7was sentenced soon after his release from Meerut. For the
4. This became apparent from my interviews with the former 
Meerut prisoners. See also the reminiscences by Adhikari, 
Desai, Ghate, Goswami, Sohan Singh Josh, and Mirajkar in 
(CPI) S.V. Ghate, and Rao and Sen, Our Doc.
5. Spratt, prompted by Nehru's reflections,in his Autobiography, 
on the jail experience, has stressed this dimension in an 
interesting analysis titled 'Some Notes on Jail Psychology', 
in Modern Review, LXI(6), 1937, pp.649-54. See also his 
Blowing Up India, Chapter IV.
6. Usmani suffered a nervous breakdown when he was told that
his companions on his trip to Moscow had been shot in Russia 
as spies: ibid., pp.41-42.
7. Spratt traces this intellectual and psychological process in
a moving letter to a friend written from Belgaum in 1936 
(Spratt to G.A. Hutt, 19/2/36, in NAI, H.Poll, 7/2/1936). 
Spratt added that he had been broken by his seven years of 
imprisonment: 'I am tired, Allen, I am tired. I agree
entirely with the Hindu classics that the ultimate aim must 
be release from the sorrowful cycle of existence in this 
weary world. Peace, Moksha, I shall achieve it some day,
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majority of the communists, however, the Meerut jail experience 
deepened their commitment to communism and cemented deep and 
long-lasting bonds of comradeship. For most of them this was 
the first real test of their commitment. With very few 
exceptions they maintained an intransigent and principled stand 
for their convictions, despite the demoralising collapse of the 
movement they had left behind, and despite their awareness ofgthe heavy sentences that would follow a refusal to recant.
Their long defence statements, for example, and particularly
their collective statement to the sessions court, were devoted
to uncompromising declarations of faith in communism.
By early 1930 the communists among the accused had
formed themselves into a formal and disciplined group with
9established operational procedures and under Adhikari's 
secretaryship. Only Dange was excluded. The grounds for his 
exclusion were similar to the charges brought against him in 
August 1928, during the general strike: breach of discipline
through his unilateral initiatives during the 1929 general strike 
and through sending, without the knowledge of the others, a report 
to the ECCI.^ Dange was to remain outside the Party until after
7. Cont'd
I suppose'. See also his Blowing Up India, pp.54-56, where 
he remarks that 'Eventually I abandoned communism not because 
of any personal experience, but because of a gradual loss 
of confidence in it, brought about mainly by reading'.
8. M.G. Desai, for example, one of the non-communist accused, 
was particularly impressed by the communists' stand. They 
rejected their defence lawyer's pleas to omit such 
declarations of faith so that they might obtain lighter 
sentences. They were also approached by certain sympathetic 
court officials with the same argument.
9. The following is based on MCG:1 & 2.
10. This document - MCCC, P.2512 - contained accounts of the 
communists' continuing political involvement with both the 
Comintern and the Indian Party and of underground methods etc.
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the Meerut releases. The bitter Bengal factional struggle 
preceding the arrests appears to have been subsumed by the 
new loyalties. However the solidarity of the communist group 
was matched by a definite split with most of their former non­
communist allies, including Alve.^ This arose in part from 
differences over defence strategy - the non-communists were not 
prepared to court heavy sentences by espousing a commitment 
either to the communists or to communist doctrine. Many of 
them were unhappy about the hidden cost of extended imprisonment 
for having associated with the communists. Hostilities were 
also exacerbated by the tensions of jail life. The split 
between the communists and most of the non-communists ended a 
number of alliances which had been very important for the
communists' advances in the 1920s - in Bombay at least. Alve,
12for example, actively opposed the Party after his release.
Thus 1929 marked the end of the first phase of communist 
politics in this way, too.
The political development of the Meerut group can be
13judged by its theory of, and policy towards, Indian politics. 
Though the analysis reveals that the Meerut group's theoretical 
capacities remained seriously limited in certain respects, it
10. Cont'd
It was, after its capture,introduced into the Meerut Case 
by the prosecution. Dange's report also displays a response 
to his 1930 expulsion very similar to that which he made 
to his August 1928 censuring: he vigorously attacked his 
attackers.
11. On this see also Spratt, Blowing Up India, ps. 50 & 52.
12. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: Note on the GKU.
13. Adhikari, Spratt and Joshi appear to have played particularly
important roles in this work: 'Biographical Sketch', in
Rao and Sen, Our Doc, p.7; Ghate, 'Most Human Comrade', 
in ibid., pp.13-14; Spratt, Blowing Up India, p.54.
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did, nevertheless, mark an important advance. The analysis
and policy contrasted sharply with both the ECCI's and the
14'outside' CPI's contemporary alternatives. They can be 
seen in part as a continuation of the autonomous tendencies 
displayed by the Bombay group before the Meerut arrests. They 
were based on a selective and interpretative reading of the 
Sixth Comintern theses in the light of the communists' own 
political experience.
The Meerut group analysis took the Non-Cooperation 
movement as its point of departure and accepted the Sixth 
Congress's argument that the interests <bf imperialism and 
of the Indian bourgeoisie were in long term contradiction with 
each other. Non-Cooperation, the political thesis argued, 
emerged from the 1919 mass unrest catalysed by the inflationary 
post-War situation. The agitation was neither initiated nor 
supported by bourgeois interests; for the bourgeoisie had 
already obtained its political concessions in the Mont-ford 
reforms, and the announcement of the setting up of an 
Industrial Commission had already foreshadowed substantial 
economic concessions. Thus the bourgeoisie's class interests 
lay in the defeat of the potentially threatening mass agitation.
14. In fact the Meerut group produced two documents - one for 
public consumption (the collective defence statement) and 
one for Party and Comintern audiences (in MCG:2). The 
former was, at the request of the Bombay group, closer to 
the orthodox position than the latter. (This is explicitly 
recognised in both MCG:1 & 2.) The following account of 
the Meerut group's theoretical position is based on the 
MCG:2 version.
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Once Non-Cooperation had begun the bourgeoisie was faced with 
a tactical choice: it could openly support the imperialist
repression or it could 'join and disorganise the whole 
struggle from within'. The second choice was politically 
wiser. The former would have undermined the bourgeoisie's 
oppositional role vis a vis imperialism - a role which it was 
necessary to maintain as a possible future defence of its own 
interests. But the latter tactic would allow the bourgeoisie 
to defeat the mass upsurge while retaining, and perhaps 
increasing, its political influence. The Liberal bourgeoisie 
of the old Congress was not prepared to risk playing with the 
mass movement in this way, and so split from the organisation.
But this did not mean that the Congress had changed its class 
character. It remained under the leadership of the 'national 
bourgeoisie' - politically represented by figures such as Motilal 
Nehru, C.R. Das, Lajpatrai and Malaviya - and its program was 
not changed after the split. The Congress, despite its 
increasingly petty-bourgeois mass membership, remained a 
bourgeois organisation. That the initial stated goal of the 
movement was the redress of specific grievances, and did not 
include Swaraj or a program of mass economic demands, underlined 
this reality. Swaraj was not mentioned until the mass pressure 
from below had increased. But by then the bourgeois leadership 
had successfully confused the political consciousness of the 
masses with its apparent opposition to imperialism, and had 
disorganised the agrarian struggle with its ideology of non­
violence and class collaboration, thus paving the way for 
defeat by the British. Finally,
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After the worst period of the crisis had been 
tided over and the revolutionary forces sufficiently 
dissipated, and when the peasant masses were about 
to break the shackles of the bourgeois leadership, 
the Congress betrayed the whole struggle by the 
Bardoli Resolution. The anti-imperialist forces 
were not defeated, ... they were misled and finally 
betrayed.
The Meerut analysis stressed the importance of a 
'correct*understanding of both the content and the function 
of the ideology of Gandhism. Its content was analysed in the 
following terms:
... it is a set of reactionary principles, which 
are definitely feudal ... . Its essential ingredients
are non-violence, truth, opposition to industrialism, 
and in general the idealisation of the feudal 
relationships of the countryside. As such this 
philosophy is opposed to the bourgeois mode of 
production and bourgeois aspirations.
It was, nevertheless, a potent ideology, its initial
formulation having 'an electric effect on the rural petty
bourgeoisie and allied classes'. This was because
... these principles appear to contain a negation 
of the existing conditions of oppression, although 
they propose to replace them by a "reactionary utopia". 
Gandhian philosophy appeared to be pitched against 
the existing Satanic system and hence succeeded in 
rallying behind it the mass support of the rural and 
a section of the urban petty bourgeoisie ... .
Neither the essential features of Gandhism's content, nor the
power of its hold over the petty-bourgeoisie, had changed between
the 1919-21 and 1930-31 movements. Gandhism had undergone some
careful changes: non-violence had been developed into 'a whole
technique of national-reformist ... [struggle] of the latest
type'; and the apparent anti-capitalist bias of the first
formulation had been 'eliminated' by, for example, combining
Khaddar, the boycott of foreign goods, and protection to
Indian industries, into a single program. Nevertheless these
changes did not alter the fundamentally 'feudal' content of the
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ideology. Moreover Gandhism, even after the withdrawal of 
the Civil Disobedience Movement, continued to enjoy the 
support of the 'rural petty bourgeoisie' and of sections of 
the urban petty bourgeoisie.
However the function of Gandhism in the overall
strategy of the national bourgeoisie had undergone important
changes. During NCO the bourgeoisie had patronised Gandhi,
but it had remained uncertain about whether or not his was a
safe method of political mobilisation. The NCO experience allowed
the bourgeoisie to realise more clearly the utility of Gandhian
politics. Despite its superficially anti-bourgeois thrust,
Gandhism was particularly suited to the interests of the
Indian bourgeoisie because of the latter's specific class
location. In providing the following characterisation of
this location the Meerut communists showed that they had
developed a level of analytical sophistication which had
previously been absent in CPI theorising. The explanation of
the close fit between Gandhism and the interests of the Indian
bourgeoisie, they argued, lay in the latter's relationships
'with feudalism and with the masses'.
The Indian bourgeoisie is integrated with feudalism, 
and therefore cannot champion a progressive social 
philosophy. [Its] class position ... condemns it 
to the acceptance of feudalism with Imperialism, 
but for its development even within the framework 
of feudal and Imperialist society it has to 
struggle for its continued existence. This it 
obviously cannot do without relying to some extent 
on mass support. But while seeking this support 
it has to guarantee that the mass awakening does 
not develop into a revolutionary mass movement which 
can menace the existing feudal-imperialist order, 
because that would also result in its own annihilation.
Because of this rather delicate situation, the analysis continued,
Gandhism has proved itself of immense service to the 
bourgeoisie by affording it an ideological basis on
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which it can build up the whole technique and tactics 
of ... the anti-revolutionary national reformist 
struggle ... of the Civil Disobedience type.
The bourgeoisie's growing realisation of the 
utility of Gandhism had led it definitely to embrace this 
political mode. This, in turn, had resulted in certain 
modifications of Gandhism - the ideological modifications 
noted above, and the promotion of reformist characteristics 
at the extense of the national-revolutionary possibilities 
initially inherent in this politics. The bourgeoisie's 
acceptance of Gandhism subsequent to the Non-Cooperation 
movement, and the resulting modifications in Gandhian ideological 
and tactical levels, marked the change in the function of: 
the Gandhian mode in the bourgeois-nationalist struggle.
Another very important distinction between NCO and 
CD, the Meerut analysis continued, was the quite different 
relationships between the bourgeoisie and imperialism in the 
two movements. In the CD movement the class relationships, 
and thus the political tactics, were much more complex. During 
NCO the bourgeoisie was seeking only to assume the leadership 
of the movement in order to disorganise it, for it had already 
come to satisfactory terms with imperialism. In CD, in contrast, 
the bourgeoisie was in genuine opposition to imperialism and, 
thus, adopted a significantly different relationship to the 
mass revolutionary forces: 'The bourgeoisie had to launch the
struggle ... to secure concessions for itself'. Between 1924 
and 1929, after the NCO movement had successfully been broken, 
the Congress, 'as was befitting a true party of the bourgeoisie, 
returned to the tactic of constitutional opposition in order 
to reap the benefits of the concessions it had been granted..
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However these concessions proved to be much less than promised.
From 1927, moreover, the 'increasing dislocation of the world 
capitalist stabilisation of the post-war period' meant that 
British imperialism was less and less able to satisfy the 
nationalist bourgeoisie's need for concessions - either economic 
or political. From this point the bourgeoisie 'had to fight 
not only for advancing, but also for safeguarding its interests'. 
Because the Lahore Congress's threats against the British failed 
to break the colonial oppositional policy, the Indian 
bourgeoisie decided, early in 1930, to cease its constitutionalist 
tactic. The majority of the nationalist party resigned from the 
legislature; and, about the same time, the Annual Meeting of 
the Federation of Merchants' Chambers, following the final 
refusal of the Government of India to concede the rupee-sterling 
ratio and other economic demands, decided to support the 
Congress. From that point 'The organised bourgeois class fell 
into line with the Congress movement'.
But, during this growing radicalisation of the 
bourgeoisie, unrest was also developing among the petty 
bourgeoisie and the working class. The imperialist concessions 
to the bourgeoisie had done nothing to check the declining 
conditions of both the petty bourgeoisie and the workers.
This resulted in a developing dissatisfaction not only with 
imperialism, but also with the passivity of the bourgeois leader­
ship of the Congress. The events at the Lahore Congress 
demonstrated that 'if the Congress stuck to orthodox constitution­
alism any longer it would lose considerably in political 
influence [over the petty bourgeoisie] and the revolutionary 
anti-imperialist movement would grow - and be directed also 
against it'. At the same time, from 1927 to 1929, a
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'phenomenal rise' in the working class movement took place - 
and, for the first time, with the support of a militant class 
policy. But the proletarian challenge remained limited: 'The
proletarian movement had become a challenge but not [yet] a 
menace' at the point at which the British launched the Meerut 
Case as 'the first blow against its mortal enemy'. However it 
'was obvious that decisive struggles were ahead between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie' for the leadership of the 
nationalist movement. Nevertheless, the Meerut group argued in 
a polemical attack on Deshpande's current position, it 'would 
be an impudent exaggeration to say that proletarian hegemony 
had been secured. It had yet to be won'. But there were real 
possibilities that this could have occurred after 1929, the 
Meerut group believed. The Meerut analysis categorically 
rejected Ranadive's view that the working class was exhausted 
following its 1929-30 defeats. The problem had been one of 
leadership.
In 1930, then, the Indian bourgeoisie was, according
to the Meerut analysis, in a complex and contradictory situation:
The bourgeoisie was being threatened by the growing 
revolt of its petty bourgeois rank and file and the 
emergence of a rival proletarian leadership, and it 
had to fight to retain its leadership. The bourgeoisie 
could not join the open counter-revolutionary front 
of imperialism because imperialism was not willing 
to compromise with it, and it had yet to secure the 
required economic and political concessions which it 
could only hope to do if it could retain the leader­
ship of the national struggle.
Because of the need to find a compromise balance within these 
conflicting forces the bourgeoisie was forced to adopt the 
'other' tactical alternative - 'leading the struggle and 
thereby retaining its leadership, while at the same time 
effectively sabotaging the revolutionary forces from within'.
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Civil Disobedience was 'the reformist political weapon of the 
colonial bourgeoisie. Its use and importance is determined 
by the particular position of the colonial bourgeois class 
with foreign imperialism and the colonial masses'. It was used 
by the bourgeoisie to contain mass revolutionary possibilities, 
to build its own political credibility in the eyes of the 
masses, and to use mass pressure to gain concessions from 
imperialism. The Civil Disobedience tactic 'enables the 
bourgeoisie to fulfill its political class role, and it is 
undeniable that it has done this with great skill and some 
success'.
Because of Deshpande's and Ranadive's failure to 
recognise this complexity in its totality, the Meerut group 
polemicised, these two had misunderstood the true nature of 
the CD movement. Deshpande had seen only the leadership role 
of the bourgeoisie, and so saw the movement as only 'a counter­
revolutionary manoeuvre of the treacherous bourgeoisie'. Further­
more, he had failed to see the real, if limited, oppositional 
role of the bourgeoisie in the CD movement, or the genuine 
mass character that it possessed. Ranadive had exaggerated 
the extent of petty-bourgeois leadership and initiative and, 
consequently, had exaggerated the revolutionary possibilities 
of the movement under this leadership.
In the Meerut group's view, both of the Bombay leaders 
had also failed to recognise the importance of the increasingly 
agrarian character of the CD movement.
The petty bourgeois character of the rank and file 
[of the Congress] continued only up to August 1930, 
and after that the results of the agrarian crisis 
were acutely felt ... and the movement assumed a 
primarily agrarian character. [the view] that the
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truce came in March 1931 when the rank and file of 
the Congress had been crushed is as one-sided as 
the view that the movement had been brought about by 
its pressure. The truce came at that time because, 
among other things, the agrarian revolt was imminent.
The CD movement had acquired a changing character as different
strata of the population were progressively affected by the
economic crisis and so joined the movement. This had meant,
in turn, changing tactical considerations for the bourgeois
Congress leadership. Finally, the increasingly militant and
independent agrarian revolt required that the movement be
called off.
The conclusions for a political strategy for the
CPI were obvious to the Meerut group. It was the duty of the
communists to recognise the genuinely mass character of the
CD movement and, consequently, to intervene in the movement to
'complete the rupture between the Congress leadership and the
masses'. In this they agreed with Ranadive's conclusions, if
not with his analysis, and condemned Deshpande's abstentionist 
15position. Concurrently, the Meerut group argued, the 
communists should mobilise the working class's allegedly 
substantial political potential - but not through Deshpande's 
impotent tactic of ritual calls for a general strike. The 
workers could be mobilised only through close involvement in 
their day-to-day struggles. A general strike was possible, but 
only on this basis.
This was an analysis of some originality when compared
15. The Meerut group cited with approval the Ranadive attack
(quoted in Chapter 7) on the 'completely un-Marxist' nature 
of Deshpande's abstentionism.
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to Moscow's extant line. In their development of the ambiguous,
and hence flexible, Sixth Comintern Congress theses, the Meerut
group AiA o»t ioc*c|pof*T<^  through their criticisms of Deshpande's
'left-sectarian' crudities, implicitly condemned - the Comintern's
subsequent mechanistic and quite inappropriate formulations."^
This was clearest in the scorn which the group poured on the
notion that the Congress was 'the counter-revolutionary agent
of Imperialism' - a formula constantly repeated by the Comintern
commentators on India - and in their continued resistance to
the abolition of the WPPs. The Meerut leadership had put into
practice the resolution passed at the CPI which had begun
consideration of the Sixth Congress theses prior to the Meerut
arrests - to take the theses as a basis for discussion to be
'changed according to the conditions in India'.
In addition to having this level of originality, and
despite its incorporation of a number of the 'third period'
17fallacies, the Meerut analysis also provided a reasonably
18plausible theory of contemporary Indian politics.
16. Spratt says that P.C. Joshi and Dange did explicitly question 
the wisdom of the Tenth Plenum line: Blowing Up India, ps.
44 and 54.
17. For example the Meerut analysis reproduces (though in a much 
more subdued and sophisticated form) the ECCI's prevailing 
mechanistic economic reductionism, its unjustified
'proletarianism', its failure to identify the political 
differentiation between industrial and merchant Indian 
capital, and its failure to realise that both the 
bourgeoisie and the Congress leadership were 'serious' 
about the eventual capture of state power.
18. See, eg., Chapter 5, above. Sarkar's 'The Logic of 
Gandhian Nationalism' shows that the broad political 
relationships sketched in the Meerut analysis corresponded 
fairly closely with Civil Disobedience realities, despite 
the shortcomings of the analysis noted in fn.17.
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Further, it reveals a level of subtlety previously absent in 
the Indian communists' Marxism. This can be seen, for 
example, in the analysis of the structural location of the 
Indian bourgeoisie in Indian society, and of Gandhism's 
consequent appropriateness and value as the bourgeoisie's 
'social philosophy' despite the apparent conflict between 
Gandhian 'feudalism' and the needs of a developing capitalist 
class. The explicit recognition of Gandhi's genuine popularity 
with the 'masses', and of the strength of the 'bourgeois'
Congress leadership's hold over its rank-and-file, also marked 
the advent of a new level of realism in CPI analysis; and 
this recognition marked the beginnings of a break with the 
inadequate concept of 'false consciousness'. More importantly 
however, for immediate Party political activity at least, the 
tactical conclusions of the analysis provided a far more 
satisfactory orientation than that prior to the Meerut arrests 
and that currently being practiced outside the jail.
Nevertheless, despite these positive developments 
in the sphere of theory, there was one shortcoming of some 
importance for later theoretical work: the analysis did not
incorporate a refutation of the assumptions of the earlier 'new 
Imperialist policy' theory. The omission of this critique 
seriously weakened the foundations of the new analysis. By 
not establishing a procedure of collectively criticising previous 
formulations before accepting a new position, the door was left 
open for later untheorised rejections of current strategies, and 
for an associated failure to recognise the consequent theoretical 
discontinuity: it meant an increased vulnerability to .
bo1shevisation.
Spratt found another aspect of the Meerut group's
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Marxism to be unsatisfactory - it was exclusively and
directly political in orientation. The Meerut communists
showed little interest in philosophical questions - such as the
epistemological bases of the Comintern's current 'dialectical
19materialism' - or in ethical theory. These lacunae inhibited
the development of an Indian critical Marxist theory which could
develop beyond, and counter, the Comintern's 'vulgar' Marxism.
They also weakened the communists' ability to deal adequately
at a popular level with the philosophical-ethical challenge 
20of Gandhism. The Meerut group's lack of interest in these
dimensions contrasted with the preoccupation with them of, for
example, the Vietnamese communists, for whom philosophical and
ethical questions were of burning importance; and that they
were treated so seriously in Vietnam was a significant factor
behind the popular success of Marxist theory and ideology in 
21that country. It is significant that Spratt's rejection of
19. NAI, H.Poll, 7/2/1936: Spratt to Hutt, 19/2/36.
20. Particularly in the absence of close, continuous communist 
involvement with a mass base. Eg. it is apparent that the 
traditional ethical concepts which played a central role 
in the 1929 'Girni Workers' Poem' did not take firm root 
in the Bombay communists' consciousness.
21. This is a central theme of David Marr's current work. See 
also Nguyen Khac Vien (a leading Vietnamese communist 
theoretician) 'Confucianism and Marxism in Vietnam', in 
Nguyen Khac Vien, Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam,
(Eds, D. Marr and ÖT Werner), (Berkeley, 1974), pp.15-74. 
Vien stresses both Vietnamese communists' concern with 
ethical theory and the importance of the contribution of 
the Confucian ethical legacy in this.
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Marxism began with his reflections on the inadequacies of
the 'metaphysical materialism' of the Comintern's Marxism,
and that while at Meerut he developed a new respect for
Gandhism and its relationship to Indian mass politics.
Spratt, surveying what was currently offering, identified
'Marxism' with 'vulgar Marxism' and, accordingly, found it
22wanting, particularly in the Indian context.
A Problem and a Solution: the Dilemma of Indian Communism
At the time that they developed their theory of
Indian politics the Meerut group also gave a great deal of
attention to the question of the rehabilitation of the
disintegrating Party. Initially they tried to intervene to
rectify matters. However, partly because they did not fully
comprehend the extreme difficulties faced by their successors,
their efforts produced nothing more than a hostile reaction.
As the Party situation worsened, as the demoralising effects
of the endless trial increased, and, finally, as they approached
their day of judgement and the long imprisonment for their
23political faith they were sure would follow, the Meerut
22. Spratt, Blowing Up India, Chapter IV, passim, and his letter 
to Hutt cited in fn.19. Spratt later moved intellectually 
to an extreme Freudianism and a Cold War analysis of 
international and Indian politics (see Blowing Up India, 
Chapter I and Part II). It is interesting to contrast
the jailed Gramsci's contemporaneous intellectual 
confrontation with 'vulgar Marxism'. Gramsci grappled 
with very similar issues to those raised by Spratt, but 
resolved them within a very different framework: see
Chapter 1, fn.42.
23. See Spratt, 'Some Notes on Jail Psychology', on this.
Also, interview with M.G. Desai.
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prisoners reached a rather desperate conclusion. In their
August 1932 report to the Comintern representative, Lynd, they
formulated it in the following way:
... the CPI has proved itself unworthy of remaining 
a section of the Cl any longer. It seems at first 
a logical conclusion that the CPI should be dis­
affiliated. We are, however, definitely against 
this step being actually carried out. The CPI has 
committed many mistakes ... But it should not be 
treated in the same way as if it were a fully grown 
or even real CP. Its leaders have been very youthful 
and inexperienced and the Party itself is very small 
and young. We consider that the only practical and 
sensible course to adopt is to build up a real CP 
directly under the instructions and leadership of 
the Cl. It would be a suicidal policy to leave the 
various communist groups to fight among themselves 
and leave it to time and fortune for a genuine CP~ 
to arisen 777 the organisational connection of the 
Cl with India would act as both a check and a spur ... 
We know that if this factor is absent the relations 
among the various groups will become worse rather 
than better, and no progress will be made within any 
reasonable time. Our concrete suggestions may at first 
give an impression that we are stretching too far the 
doctrine of building up the movement from the top. We 
have carefully considered the various aspects of the 
question and are convinced that there is no other 
alternative to letting things drift or stagnate ...
It is only if the Cl leads as the supreme leader and 
moves on the lines we have ventured to suggest, that 
we think that the matter can be set right and local 
initiative and response will be forthcoming in 
proper measure and in the right direction and a 
CP will be built which would earnestly and completely 
carry out the instructions of the Cl.24
Thus, in the Meerut group’s considered judgement,
Indian communism in the first half of the 1930s was faced with 
only two choices: it could 'leave it to time and fortune for
a genuine CP to arise' - a process that would be extremely 
protracted and without guaranteed success; or a Party could be 
constructed 'from the top' under the direct instructions and
24. MCG:2 (emphasis added).
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sanctions of the ECCI. The Meerut group had correctly 
identified the dilemma faced by the CPI, if not its deeper 
roots. The Meerut communists realised the essential
artificiality of the latter alternative. But they opted 
for it nevertheless, for they could not accept the first. 
Moreover, as they did not question the revolutionary bona 
fides of the Comintern they did not see the longer term 
implications of the course they proposed.
The Meerut group sent with their recommendation a
detailed plan for the benefit of the Comintern agents they
25hoped would be despatched to India to set things right.
They suggested that two Comintern representatives be sent - 
one to supervise the reorganisation of the Bombay branch and 
one for the other provinces. These delegates 'should be in 
sole charge of putting into practice the new instructions and 
should have the necessary mandate, with the right to override 
the decisions of the CC' - at least until a National Convention 
of the Party could be held. However the Central Committee 
should have the right to appeal to the ECCI against the 
decisions of its representatives. First a new Central 
Committee, genuinely representing the other provinces as well 
as Bombay, should be appointed on a provisional basis. Then 
the Comintern should publish an open letter to the entire Party 
membership and to the seceding group, analysing the experiences 
of the past three years: 'mistakes [should be] pointed out,
blame apportioned to individuals ... and generally a final 
decision on the points of dispute be arrived at'. The open
25. ibid..
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letter should condemn the seceders for their breach of 
discipline but allow them a certain period of time to return 
unconditionally and to admit their mistakes. Both Deshpande 
and Ranadive should, as a disciplinary measure, be barred from 
membership on the provisional Central Committee for at least 
a year: 'They are both competent and are yet young, and may
improve themselves. It will be worthwhile to give them a 
last chance'. Nambiar, however, should be expelled. The 
provisional Central Committee should devote itself essentially 
to the formation of the Party - in the first instance it should 
concentrate on overcoming the factional divisions and preparing 
for a National Convention. The ECCI should provide detailed 
instructions for future political and trade union work. The 
Party membership must be substantially increased as quickly 
as was practicable, largely because this was 'the only effective 
way of ending factionalism, or at least of giving more earnest 
and less factious Comrades chances to improve themselves and 
do real work'. The Meerut group stressed that great tact would 
be necessary until the factions had been dissolved, and 
recommended that democracy should prevail over centralism until 
the problem had been overcome.
The Meerut group's desperate call for direct Comintern 
intervention contrasted with the level of autonomy it had 
attained in the creation of theory and policy. These two 
dimensions symbolised the meeting point between the old Bombay 
leadership's mass-based, non-bolshevised past and the Party's 
bolshevised future; they symbolised, that is, the differences 
between the political conditions of 1927-28 and those of the 
years that followed.
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The Return of the Meerut Prisoners: 1933-34
When the Meerut prisoners began to be released in
August 1933 they were suddenly in a position to begin
implementing the detailed plan they had worked out for the
proposed Comintern representatives. They began to implement
their plan for the formation of the Party on the day of the Meerut
Case appeals at Allahabad. P.C. Joshi and Adhikari were among
2 6those released immediately. At Allahabad they met with a
number of the Calcutta Committee members, who had travelled
there to discuss with those who were on bail a campaign around
27the earlier Calcutta communist unity appeal. The Allahabad
meeting decided to begin work on the formation of a provisional
Central Committee and the drawing up of a political thesis, and
informed the Punjabi communists accordingly. Adhikari then
returned to Bombay to begin reorganisation there and to draft
the political thesis. In November a meeting was held in
Calcutta to consider the thesis and to form a provisional
Central Committee. Representatives from five provinces attended
the seven day meeting, which approved the draft thesis and
decided to constitute itself as the 'nucleus of the Provisional
2 8Central Committee of the CPI', with Adhikari as Secretary.
26. NAI, H.Poll, 27/11/1936: Notes on the release of the 
Meerut prisoners.
27. Interview with S. Lahiri.
28. ibid.; Sen, 'Communist Movement in Bengal', pp.10-11; 
IB, Communism (1935), pp.188-89. Those present were: 
Bengal - Lahiri, Halim and Ranen Sen; Bombay - Adhikari 
and S.G. Patkar (of the Deshpande faction); UP - Joshi; 
Punjab - Gurudit Singh; Nagpur - M.L. Jaywant.
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It resolved that the pre-existing federation of autonomous
communist units must be replaced with a centralised Party linked
firmly to the Comintern. The meeting planned a detailed program
of work to unify and centralise the Party and to build an
effectively combined open and underground all-India Party
apparatus. The momentum generated by these early moves
increased with the release of a second group of seven Meerut
2 9communists in November.
It was a good start. The next task was the
clarification of the factional situation, particularly in
Bombay. But this proved to be difficult. Adhikari, on his
return to Bombay in August, joined the 'official', but less
significant,Deshpande group, and appealed to Ranadive and his
30supporters to dissolve their secessionist group. The Ranadive
group refused to do so. Its members resented the Meerut group's
assessment of the dynamics of the Bombay factional struggle,
believed that any organisation in which Deshpande was involved
could only be 'counter-revolutionary', and asserted that the
Adhikari-Deshpande group did not have the Comintern mandate
justifying its claim to be the 'official' Party group. In the
Ranadive group's view, Adhikari had 'merged himself into
Deshpande's clique completely and ... [had begun] to further
31its work of sabotage. However Adhikari's efforts were boosted
29 . See fn.26.
30. BSB, 1036/B/II/1935: Note on Bombay communist organisations, 
1929-33; BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: Report by Jambhekar (of the 
Ranadive group), ca. mid-1935.
31. ibid..
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by the coincidental arrival in Bombay of one Iqbal Singh Hundal,
alias 'Nuruddin', who claimed to have come from Moscow with
instructions that Ranadive's group should merge with 
32Deshpande's. The secessionists replied that they were
prepared to consider rejoining, but that 'if the C.P.I. were
to be a functioning organisation, certain Comrades like Com.
3 3Deshpande will have to be removed'. Adhikari's group then
began a moderately successful campaign to win over the rank-
and-file members of the Ranadive group. The Ranadive leadership's
position was further weakened after the second batch of Meerut
prisoners returned to Bombay and reinforced Adhikari's stand.
Mirajkar, who was one of those released in November, recalls that:
When we came out we were able to patch up things.
Of course in the beginning there was resistance.
We said [to the Ranadive group] alright, if you 
don't come ... to join the Party within two days,
... [or] don't give us a reply ... we go ahead, 
and then we will condemn you ... we will hold 
public meetings and condemn you.34
The Ranadive group decided, resentfully, that they had little
choice but to capitulate, and so, by the end of the year, a
35fragile.unity had been effected in Bombay.
The Meerut communists, in accordance with their jail
plan, then barred Deshpande and Ranadive from membership on
the Provisional Central Committee, and imposed additional
restrictions, for a year's trial period. They hoped thereby
3 6to free the Party from 'the disease of factionalism'. Indeed
32. ibid., & BSB Note, 11/6/35. It was later revealed that 
though he had come from Moscow he did not have any ECCI 
instructions.
33. ibid..
34. Interview with Mirajkar; also, interview with Ranadive.
35. IB, Communism, (1935), p.190; BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: Report by 
the Provisional Central Committee to the ECCI, ca. late 
1934 or Jan. 1935.
36. ibid..
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the new leadership did successfully suppress factionalism for
some time. The Meerut leadership further increased its
authority through the dominant role that it played in the two
and a half months-long general strike which began in late
April 1934 - the first substantial industrial action since the
1929-30 strikes. However the repression which the strike
unleashed, combined with the banning of the Party and its
37Bombay subsidiaries in the second half of 1934, led to a
subsequent regression in the Bombay unity moves. The detention
of most of the old leaders in the strike repression allowed the
factionalism to resurface; and the banning of the Party
prevented the convening of the intended national unity
conference which, the Meerut group had hoped, would provide a
clear national consensus for the reconstituted Central
3 8Committee. Moreover, the government's breaking of the strike
prevented the new leadership from backing up its increased
39authority with a mass base: it remained little more than
another powerless faction.
This time Ranadive was not the cause of the Party's 
factional problems. Though he had been demoted by the Meerut 
group, so had Deshpande. Deshpande's removal from leadership
appears to have satisfied Ranadive's conditions, for the Meerut 
leadership had found Ranadive to be 'a very sincere and valuable
37. See Chapter 5, fn. 267, and the lists of those arrested 
during 1934-35, in NAI, H.Poll, 7/17/34 , 7/25/34 and 
22/93/35.
38. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: Report by Prov. CC to the ECCI.
39. IB, Communism, (1935), pp.195-7.
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comrade' after he had returned to the Party. It was the 
aggrieved Deshpande who was the new stumbling block. After 
his demotion he began secretly mobilising those of his old 
faction who were unhappy with the return of the Meerut leader­
ship. At the same time Suhasini Nambiar who, given the Meerut 
group's attitude to her, had nothing to lose, re-formed an 
anti-Meerut faction among the old 'Bolshevik Party' faction.
By late 1934 'this disease of factionalism' was once again 
'standing in the way of a healthy growth of the Party', severely 
hampering the formation of the all-India Party organisation.
In Calcutta, too, factional problems between the Calcutta 
Committee and the other communist groups were hampering the 
program of Party formation; and in the Punjab there was a
division between the group led by the ex-Meerut prisoners,
41Sohan Singh Josh and Abdul Majid, and a Ghad^ group.
However these manifestations were not as serious as the Bombay 
problem, both because they were not as intense as in Bombay and 
because Calcutta and the Punjab remained less important centres.
40
40. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: Report byProv. CC to the ECCI. This 
account of the 1934 factional problems is based on this 
report and on my interview with Mirajkar, who travelled 
round the provinces at this time with the mission of 
overcoming factionalism.
For the background of the GK»<1 r and other Punjab communist 
groups, see IB, Communism, ("1935) , Chapter 21, and for 
the post-Meerut Case factionalism see ibid., pp.279-84.
41.
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In the short term the new Provisional Central
Committee could do little to overcome the factional problem.
Apart from the fact that so many of the Committee members were
under detention, it explained to the ECCI at the end of 1934,
'It must frankly be admitted that at this stage of the Party's
growth any strong action against a prominent member would do
42more harm than good'. The problems involved in overcoming or 
neutralising the resistance to the Provisional Central Committee 
would probably have been insurmountable - in the short term at 
least - had the new unity initiatives not received the support 
which the ECCI began to give them from late 1933.
The ECCI and the CPI, 1933-34
In September 1933 Inprecor carried the first of a
series of articles on the CPI situation. These often lengthy
articles, published in late 1933 and during 1934, took much
further the themes that were first raised in the 1932 'Open
Letter' that had ended the period of public ECCI support for
4 3the post-Meerut arrests Bombay leadership. The articles
42. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: Report from Provis. CC to ECCI, ca.
Dec. 1934.
43. The 1933 (Vol. 13) articles are: V. Basak, 'The Present 
Situation in India', No. 39, pp.853-54, No. 41, pp.896-7,
No. 42, pp.927-8, and No. 43, pp.946-48; 'Open letter to 
the Indian Communists from the C.C. of the C.P. of China', 
No. 51, pp.1153-58; 'The New Party of Bose and What Should 
Be Our Attitude to It' (Sect. 5), No. 52, pp.1187-88. The 
1934 (Vol. 14) articles are: 'A Few Facts of History', No. 8
pp.221-25 and No. 10, pp.277-81; Orgwald, 'A conversation 
with Indian Comrades', No. 20, pp.517-32; V. Basak, 'A Few 
Remarks on the Indian Communist Movement', No. 32, pp.845-49
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endorsed the program of unification suggested to the ECCI in
the Meerut groups August 1932 report, gave full support to
the Calcutta Committee's mid-1932 manifesto condemning the
Bombay leadership and calling for the formation of an
independent Central Committee, and legitimised the new
Provisional Central Committee against the claims of the other
Party factions and of the non-Party groups hoping for Comintern 
44recognition. The articles stated bluntly that no CPI yet
existed, despite allegedly 'fully mature' conditions for its 
45existence, and that the formation of an 'iron, monolithic
44. In particular, the important 'Open Letter' (purportedly 
from the Chinese Party, published in November), p.1154:
'... we welcome the Calcutta Committee of the Communist 
Party of India, which energetically took up the call for 
the formation of an All-Indian Communist Party, which 
understood the necessity to shift the centre of gravity 
of Party work to activities on an All-Indian scale and 
which proposed to put an end to the pitiful chapter in 
the history of the C.P. of India, the chapter of petty 
squabbles and splits, and to open a new page by the 
formation of a powerful united Communist Party of India.
We hope that the Calcutta Committee, just as other local 
organisations, will show initiative and will energetically 
take up the task of uniting the scattered Communist groups 
and thus form the foundation of a mass Party'. See also 
Vol. 13(52), p.1188, Vol. 14(8), p.221, andVol. 14(32), 
p.845. Adhikari, in 'The Comintern Congresses and the CPI', 
Marxist Miscellany, No. 2, 1971, p.53, stresses the 
importance to the Provis. CC of this ECCI support. That the 
Calcutta Committee got this response to its call was a 
matter of great pride to its members: interview with 
S. Lahiri. For the ECCI's rejection of the overtures to it 
of the non-Party groups (such as the Royists and Dutt 
Mazumdar's Labour Party) see in particular: N., 'The 
Problems of the Labour Party', in Vol. 14(14), pp.345-48; 
and V., 'The Karnik-Roy-Shetty Group', in Vol. 14(16), pp. 
421-24.
45. Vol. 13(43), p.948, Vol. 13(51), pp. 1153-54, Vol. 13(52), 
pp.1187-88, Vol. 14(8), p.221, Vol. 14(20), p.519.
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46Communist Party' was the paramount task of the moment. The
main problem preventing its formation was factionalism,
compounded by the respective political 'deviations' of the
47two Bombay factions. The factionalism, the ECCI asserted,
was 'criminal', and was very possibly the work of agents of
the bourgeoisie and the police.^ Past mistakes and disruptions
could be overcome only by a relentless 'Bolshevisation' of the
Party: 'The Party must not allow any factions and groupings.
It must carry on a consistent struggle against all deviations
from the Bolshevik line'; 'You are faced with the task of the
49everyday struggle for the Bolshevisation of your ranks'.
Moreover:
Every communist must understand once and for all 
that we cannot break the framework of the Party in 
defiance of the instructions of the Comintern and 
form fractions, and still less can we split the 
Party organisation. ... all disputed questions of 
principle should be solved within the framework of 
the Comintern, and in case they cannot be solved 
on the spot they should be handed over to the E.C.C.I., 
and then the decision of the Comintern should be 
firmly and loyally carried out by all members of the 
C.P.I. This is the ABC of Communism, and no one has the 
right to call himself a Bolshevik Communist if he does 
not understand or if he violates this principle.50
This series of articles reached its apotheosis in the March 1934
46. Vol. 13(51), p.1153. Also Vol. 13(43), pp.946-48, Vol. 14(8), 
p.222, Vol. 14(10), pp.278-9, Vol. 14(20), pp.519-20 and 
p.527, and Vol. 14(32), p.845.
47. Vol. 13(41), pp.896-97, Vol. 13(43), p.947, Vol. 13(51), 
pp.1155-57, Vol. 14(10), pp.277-78, Vol. 14(20), p.521.
48. Vol. 13(43), p.947-8, Vol. 13(52), p.1188, Vol. 14(20), 
p.519.
49. Vol. 13(51), ps. 1153 and 1157 respectively.
Vol. 13(41), p.896 (emphasis in original).50.
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piece titled 'A Conversation with Indian Comrades'. This
article epitomises the bolshevist mode of ECCI 'guidance',
not only in its content, but also in its format. It is
allegedly a record of a question and answer session. A
group of earnest but innocent Indian communists ask an
avuncular authority-figure, Comrade Orgwald, how they should
go about building their Party and developing their movement.
Though he admits not having a detailed knowledge of the Indian
situation, Orgwald patiently replies to some 50 questions in a
series of 'correct' revolutionary maxims. However he fails to
note that many of the extreme 'left-sectarian deviations' he
counsels against had been initiated by the ECCI. The Indian
comrades accept all of his answers without further questioning.
Here we have, perfectly expressed, the 'Great Teacher'-disciple
relationship that Damodaran discovered on entering the
communist movement in the second half of the 1930s. Orgwald's
'conversation' was distributed widely within the Party in both
51English and vernacular versions.
The Inprecor pronouncements legitimised the new Meerut- 
Calcutta-Punjab leadership and helped hold the fort for it during 
the repression of 1934-35. As both of the Bombay factions had 
previously placed a great deal of emphasis on their claims to 
be the Comintern's legitimate representatives in India, and as
51. BSB, 1036/B/X-2/1936: Report on house searches of communists 
in Bombay, 18/9/35, which lists the literature found; BSB, 
1036/B/X-I/1936: BSB to G of Bom, 30/9/35; NAI, H.Poll, 
7/6/35: Note by DIB, 8/5/35.
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neither had established the political momentum that could have
reinforced its claim, they were particularly vulnerable to the
ECCI's 1933-34 pronouncements. The ECCI further curtailed
Deshpande's and Ranadive's freedom of manoeuvre by instructing
the Provisional Central Committee to send them to Moscow for
52a decisive resolution of the situation. The ECCI further
reinforced the new Provisional Central Committee's position
after the publication of the Draft Political Thesis in early
1934. Adhikari incorporated the current ECCI line into the
thesis (thereby retreating considerably from the theoretical
advance achieved in the Meerut analysis) and Moscow gave the
thesis its imprimatur by publishing an abridged version in
5 3Inprecor in July. Finally, Bradley's return to Europe greatly
52. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935 : Report of Provis. CC to the ECCI, ca.
Dec. 1934. This report is in response to ECCI instructions 
(probably conveyed through Teja Singh Swatantar, who had 
recently arrived from Moscow: IB, Communism, (1935), p.282;
G. Adhikari, 'The Comintern Congresses' p.55) and refers to 
this particular instruction. As Ranadive was in jail he 
could not be sent, but Deshpande was despatched in Dec.
1934. (He was, however, caught in Singapore and sent back
to. India: NAI, H.Poll, 18/4/19 35: Bombay FRl Apr.; interview 
with Mirajkar, who was with Deshpande in Singapore.) The 
Provisional Central Committee report stressed to the ECCI 
that, because of his factional intrigues, Deshpande was 
being sent only as a 'visitor', not as a Party delegate 
to the coming Seventh Comintern Congress. See also Dange, 
When Communist (sic.) Differ, p.43.
53. 'Abridged Draft of Political Theses of the C.C. of C.P.
of India', in Inprecor, Vol. 14(40), pp.1024-34. Adhikari 
completed the Draft Thesis, which was based on the 1930 
'Draft Platform of Action', in Dec. 1933 and it was 
circulated in India in the first number of the Party's new 
organ (The Communist, Vol. 1(1), Feb. 1934, in BSB, 1036/ 
B/III/1935). Inprecor also published the Provisional CC's 
'Draft Provisional Statutes of the CPI': Inprecor, Vol.
14(29), pp.775-78.
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strengthened the new leadership's hand. He was released in
November 1933 and left India soon after, taking with him the
documents of the November Calcutta meeting and subsequent unity
moves. He visited Moscow in mid-1934 and provided a full report
5 4on the situation in India. Bradley then began a career as one
of the Comintern experts on India. Inprecor carried an article
of his in December 1934, and he was a regular correspondent in
55the newspaper throughout the second half of the 1930s. At 
the same time the CPGB re-emerged as the primary Comintern 
agency for India. The British Party's contacts were strongest 
with the old 1920s leadership and so this development also 
reinforced the latter's position. Under Bradley's guidance, 
secret channels of international communication of both 
information and money were established in the second half of 
1934.56
Building a Party Apparatus: Stage 1, 1934-35
In the absence of the conditions which could allow 
the new.leadership to establish its authority definitively 
through a rapid political advance, the factional problem made 
the building of a strong, centralised Party apparatus particularly 
urgent. But this was not easy, even with the Comintern's help.
54. IB, Communism, (1935), p.206; Adhikari, 'The Comintern
Congresses', p.65. It was Bradley who took the Draft 
Political Thesis and the Draft Statutes to Moscow.
55. B. Bradley, 'What the Congress Socialists Want',
Inprecor, Vol. 14(63), pp.1694-98. In 1935-39,14 articles 
by Bradley (some of them written jointly with R.P. Dutt 
and H. Pollitt) appeared in Inprecor.
56. IB, Communism, (1935), p.206; NAI, H.Poll, 28/31/1935:
G of Bom. to G of I, 10/5/35.
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In the same month that the Provisional Central
Committee was formed in Calcutta the Home Department observed
57that the CPI was 'not functioning now'; the new leadership
had to start almost from scratch. The Bombay and Calcutta
groups remained weak and isolated. In the UP, Joshi, on his
return in August, had gathered together only a few individuals
- though these included Ajoy Ghosh, formerly of the HSRA
terrorist organisation, who was later to become a Party General 
5 8Secretary. Sohan Singh Josh and Abdul Majid returned to
Lahore and Amritsar after their release in November and
attempted, with little immediate success, to forge a Party
59centre from the Punjab's divided leftist factions. In Nagpur,
one of Ranadive's contacts, M.L. Jaywant, had established a
small nucleus and a weak 'Red' textile workers' union. Only
6 0tenuous contacts had been made with Sholapur. In Ahmedabad,
Bukhari's Mill Mazdurs' Union struggled to find a niche along-
61side the well established Gandhian labour association. And
in Madras, Amir Haider Khan's small (about 10 members) Young
Workers' League,and the few cells it had established in three
local mills, maintained a bare existence during Haider's
6 2intermittent imprisonments. Moreover, there was virtually no
57. NAI, H.Poll, 17/11/1934: Note by Hallett, 6/11/33.
58. IB, Communism, (1935), p.190.
59. ibid., pp.279-81; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: G of Punjab to 
S of S, 17/9/34; BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: Provis. CC to ECCI, 
ca. Dec. 1934. The Punjab FRs for 1934-35 constantly report 
factional strife between the different Punjabi leftist groups.
60. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: G of CP & B to G of I, 26/11/34;
NAI, H.Poll, 18/14/1933: Bombay FRl Dec.
61. NAI, H.Poll 7/20/1934: Note on the Mill Mazdur's Union, 
Ahmedabad.
62. NAI, H.Poll, 44/92/1934: passim.
6 52
organisational contact between the different provincial 
centres and, apart from Haider Khan's work, no attempt had 
been made to build an underground apparatus.
The new leadership was able to direct its attention 
increasingly towards the organisational question as the Bombay 
factional problem eased. As a Provisional Central Committee 
circular argued in late 1934, after the post-Meerut Case 
repression had begun:
This [organisational task] is, in general, the main 
task before us. If we succeed in this ... then we 
will have survived the ... imperialist repression.
We will have rooted our influence deep among the 
masses. Let each member of each cell fight for 
this great organisational task with Bolshevik 
determination and resoluteness. It is only by 
this determined struggle that we can lay down a 
firm foundation for the magnificant ... structure 
that is in the process of building (sic.) - the 
Communist Party of India.63
The new leadership began by attempting to re-form and extend
the influence of the provincial branches - particularly in
Bombay and Calcutta - and to establish the framework of an
6 4all-India organisation.
The Bombay branch made most progress. By September
1934 it had established a formal Bombay Provincial Committee,
65despite the disruption caused by the constant arrests. The 
Committee had 15 members - representing the Meerut communists and 
the Deshpande and Ranadive factions - and a five-member Politbureau 
Each Politbureau member had a particular function - Mirajkar
63. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: Provis. CC circular titled 'Work of 
the Cells of the CPI, Organisational Task'.
64. IB, Communism, (1935), pp.188-9.
65. BSB, 10 36/B/V/19 35 : report, 12/12/34.
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supervised organisational work, Ghate looked after mass work, 
Jambhekar dealt with 'agit-prop', Patkar was in charge of 
the underground 'tech' apparatus, and Tambitkar took over 
secretarial functions.^
The Bombay branch also improved its position somewhat 
in local mill unionism. Conditions in the textile industry 
after the defeat of the April-June general strike were much less 
favourable for the building of trade unions than they had been 
before. However after the strike the rival Royist GKU fell 
victim to a pattern of internal dissension very similar to 
that which had culminated in the communists' expulsion in 1930, 
thus weakening the communists' main rivals.
When Alve returned to Bombay from Meerut in August
1933 he had immediately rejoined the GKU and begun working,
with some success, to rebuild its organisational structure
6 7and its influence. At the same time he stepped up the GKU's 
campaign against the communists - who responded in the same 
spirit. The two GKUs managed to form a temporary alliance for 
the preparation and execution of the general strike - which was 
intended by both the communists and the Royists to be a part of 
an India-wide textile general strike. However the alliance 
dissolved acrimoniously during the latter stages of the strike -
66. The budget for August-September was approximately Rs.2,500
- a significant sum, indicating the Bombay Committee's 
return to a regular program of work: ibid.: report,
8/12/34.
67. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: Note on the GKU; NAI, H.Poll, 
18/10/1933: Bombay FRl and FR2 Sept.; NAI, H.Poll, 
18/12/1933: Bombay FR2 Oct.; NAI, H.Poll, 18/13/1933: 
Bombay FR2 Nov.; BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: report, 13/9/33.
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6 8thus hastening its defeat. But Alve, together with his old
colleague Kandalkar, also fell out with V.B. Karnik's Royist
group of 'outsiders'. The dissension between the two leaderships
intensified after the collapse of the strike, leading to an open
split in July. The Alve group charged the Royists with
manipulating the workers for political purposes and with
69cooperating with the communists during the strike. The
Alve-Kandalkar group managed to expel the Royists in July,
and then got the managing committee to resolve that only workers
70could be office bearers. However Alve and Kandalkar followed 
a much more moderate, non-political policy than they had before 
the Meerut Case, and this led gradually to a loss of rank-and- 
file support. At the GKU's 1935 general elections in August an 
uneasy alliance of Royists and communists was able to defeat the 
Alve-Kandalkar leadership resoundingly because of the latter's
68. The preparations for, and conduct of, the strike, and the 
fragmentation of the leadership during its latter stages, 
are described in: NAI, H.Poll, 18/1/1934 - 18/VIII/1934: 
Bombay to FRs Jan.-Jul.; IOL, Brabourne Papers, Vol. 4B: 
Brabourne to Hoare, 27/4/34 and 28/6/34; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/ 
1934: Note on the GKU; copies of several of the leaflets 
published during the strike are reproduced in NAI, H.Poll, 
7/17/1934, pp.9-33; see also Karnik, op. cit., pp.256-59. 
The communists' optimistic proletarian revolutionism, and 
its associated hostility towards its temporary allies,
(both of which characteristics were in line with current 
ECCI policy) contributed substantially towards the dis­
integration of the strike leadership. This was later 
admitted by the Bombay Committee in a June 1935 pamphlet 
titled "Communist Bulletin No. 1": in BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935.
69. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: Note on the GKU, & G of Bom to G 
of I, 21/11/34; NAI, H.Poll, 18/7/1934: Bombay FR2 Jul.; 
BSB, 1036/B/X-I/1936: Note on Bombay left-wing groups, 
11/9/35 (which traces the whole history of the GKU 
factional struggles).
70. NAI, H.Poll, 18/10/1934: Bombay FR2 Oct.
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7 1increasing reformism. At that point the communists were
still the junior partner in the alliance. But they were now
in a much better position to begin to retrieve their earlier
position as Bombay's dominant trade union leadership -
particularly as the Royist group had already begun its decline.
The Bombay branch also managed to hold a position in the
72railway unions, though this was very weak.
The Calcutta branch was unable to make much progress
during 1934-35. It managed to form an official Bengal
Provincial Committee in late 1934. But, largely because it
was unable to come to terms with most of the other leftist
groups, and partly because of repression, it was still not
7 3functioning regularly in early 1935. The Party group 
achieved a modest increase in its middle class following, but 
it made little progress in trade unionism during this
71. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: Note on the GKU, and G of Bom to 
G of I, 21/11/34; NAI, H.Poll, 18/11/1934: Bombay FRl &
FR2 Nov.; NAI, H.Poll, 18/4/1935, 18/5/1935 & 18/8/1935:
Bombay FR2 Apr., FR2 May & FR2 Aug.; BSB, 1036/B/X-I/1936:
Note on Bombay left-wing groups, 11/9/35. The Alve-Kandalkar 
leadership was defeated in Aug. 1935 by 2,033 votes to 398.
The defeat indicates that ideology and policy still played 
an important role for some millhands.
72. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: Notes on the GIPRU Labour Union 
and the Red BB & CIRU.
73. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: report, 10/2/35; NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934:
notes on the Workers' Party, The People's Revolutionary 
Party and the Calcutta Communist Party (Dutt Mazumdar's 
group); Chapter 7, fn.171, above; IB, Communism, (1935),
p.205; interview with Mirajkar. The Calcutta branch did 
manage, however, to effect a partial merger with it of 
Bhupendranath Dutt's People's Revolutionary Party. A 
number of leaders (including Mirajkar) from other provinces 
visited Calcutta to try to resolve the Bengal Committee's 
problems, but with little immediate success. Repression 
created problems. Eg. Ahmad was interned for another year 
immediately after being released from his Meerut sentence
in July 1935.
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period. Of the Marxist groups, Dutt Mazumdar's Labour Party
(which changed its name in February 1935 to the 'Calcutta Communist
Party') had most success in the trade union field in 1934; but
its achievements were fragile. Its most significant activity
was in the Dockworkers' Union, and in November 1934 it managed
7 5to bring off a large dockworkers' strike. However this was
soon broken by the use of blacklegs, by the arrests of the
leaders, and by 'one Bengali gentleman [H.S. Suhrawardy] having
the courage to publicly denounce the Communist agitators ...
[for] deceiving the labourers into the belief that they were
working on their behalf, whereas they were merely exploiting
7 6the poor fellows for their own ends'. He appears to have
77mobilised the sardars, who initially had supported the strike. 
Suhrawardy's community-oriented form of labour organisation, 
combined with employer intransigence and government opposition, 
proved once again to be more than radical bhadralok trade
74. NAI, H.Poll,7/20/1934: Notes on the Red AITUC (Bengal), 
the BJWA, the City Motor and Transport Workers' Union, 
the Bengal Match Factory Workers' Union, and the Calcutta 
Corporation Workers' Employees' Union; WBA, Commerce, 
2R-14(l-4) Progs Al-4, Jan. 1935: Report on the working of 
the Indian TU Act. The Bengal FRs for 1934 report only 
very limited working class activity by the Party group 
during 1934. It was more active in 1935, but mainly in 
organising demonstrations. Its achievements in organising 
strikes and TUs were very limited, partly because of increased 
repression after the banning of the Party's organisations.
See, eg.: NAI, H.Poll, 18/2/1935, 18/3/1935, 18/4/1935, 
18/5/1935, 18/6/1935: Bengal FR2 Feb., Bengal FRl & FR2
Mar., Bengal FRl Apr., Bengal FRl May, Bengal FR2 Jun. ;
NAI, H.Poll, 24/29/35: G of Ben. to G of I, 8/4/35.
75. NAI, H.Poll, 7/20/1934: notes on the Calcutta Communist 
Party and the Calcutta Port and Dock Workers' Union; NAI, 
H.Poll, 18/11/1934: Bengal FR2 Nov.
76. NAI, H.Poll, 12/5/1934: note by Williamson, 3/1/35. Also:
NAI, H.Poll, 18/12/1934: Bengal FRl Dec.: IB, Communism, 
(1935), pp.255-56 & p.307; Karnik, op. cit., p.266.
Suhrawardy's intervention was encouraged by the government
loc. cit..77.
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7 8unionists could match.
The UP group made some progress in late 1933 and early
1934 under P.C. Joshi's leadership. However this progress soon
ceased following a strike organised by Joshi’s group in March
in the Muir textile mills at Kanpur. This was the UP group's
first involvement in industrial activity, and the Kanpur
strike - which the communists attempted to transform into a
79general strike - was badly organised. It collapsed after 
a week. Moreover it earned Joshi and Ajoy Ghosh terms of 
imprisonment - Joshi's being for two years. After this blow 
the very small UP group was rendered virtually inactive.
8 0The Ahmedabad, Sholapur and Nagpur centres suffered similarly.
The campaign to build a centralised, all-India 
apparatus, capable of directing and coordinating the provincial 
centres, began in early 1934. Several members of the new
78. As the Intelligence Bureau commented, the 'pathetic' 
outcome of the strike 'augurs ill for the future of 
Coprmnism in Calcutta': IB, Communism, (1935), p.256.
79. NAI, H.Poll, 18/3/1934: UP FRl & FR2 Mar.; IB,
Communism, (1935), p.199.
80. The communists were able to lead a strike against a 6h 
percent wage cut in the Ahmedabad mills in January 1935.
The strike involved some 22,000 workers at its height.
It was defeated within two weeks by the familiar combination 
of employer intransigence and government intervention, 
and, in addition, the opposition of the powerful Gandhian 
Textile Labour Association. The strike demonstrated, 
nevertheless, that Gandhi's hold over the Ahmedabad working 
class was not total. See: NAI, H.Poll, 18/1/1935 and 
18/2/1935: Bombay FR2 Jan. & FRl Feb; IOL, Brabourne 
Papers, Vol. 43: District Magistrate, Ahmedabad, to 
G of Bom, 5/5/34; Karnik, op. cit., pp.259-61.
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leadership travelled constantly between the centres, both
to promote unity and organisation within them and to canvass
support for the Provisional Central Committee and the draft
political thesis.^ In February 1934 the first issue of the
Party's first national organ, The Communist, was produced
8 2(illegally) and circulated. It was intended that it appear
monthly. This was an important step forward in the formation
of a national Party - for the first time there existed a
national medium which could link a central leadership with
the provincial centres. The first issue, basing itself on
Lenin's conception of the function of a central Party organ,
defined its task in the following way:
The Provisional Central Committee ..., which has 
set itself the task of unifying all genuine 
Communist groups who accept the Draft Platform 
[of Action]... and who are prepared to work under 
the guidance of the Communist International, is 
taking the initiative in issuing "The Communist" - 
which is to act at the same time as a collective 
organiser of the Party and as a weapon in the 
struggle for the Bolshevik unity inside the 
Communist ranks. ... [it] will be the main 
channel through which ideological guidance and 
material will flow from the Centre to all provincial 
branches ... it will give the correct Communist 
analysis on all problems facing the Indian people as 
a whole. It will thus act as a mass organiser of the 
people of India ... It will mercilessly criticise 
the reformist solutions and actions and consistently 
put forward the only revolutionary solution - the one 
laid down in the Draft Platform ... Thirdly, it will 
invite discussions on certain proposals ... on which 
the Party P[olit] B[ureau] wishes to get the viewpoint
81. IB, Communism, (1935), p.195, pp.205-06; NAI, H.Poll,
27/11/1936: Note on the activities of the Meerut group 
after their releases from prison.
82. Editorial, in The Communist, Vol. 1(1), in BSB, 1036/ 
B/III/1935.
ERRATUM
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of the Party members. It will invite and promote 
discussion on certain points on which perfect 
ideological unity has not yet been achieved.
"The Communist" will carry out the task of 
preparing for the [National] Convention - which is 
to set the final seal on the realisation of the 
ideological and organisational unity inside the 
Communist ranks and to result in the election of 
a properly elected Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of India.
The paper made a special point of praising the progress towards
unity that had been achieved so far:
'"The Communist" sincerely extends the hand of 
welcome to all those comrades who by a magnanimous 
gesture have thrown the past overboard and have 
offered their unreserved cooperation to the 
Provisional C.C. and have shown that they accept 
the Communist principle of clearing up all the 
differences within the framework of the Comintern'.
Most of the first issue was devoted to the publication of the
Draft Political Thesis, upon which the editors invited
critical comment. The second issue, in the following month,
emphasised strongly that the CPI was 'a Section of the
Communist International - the World Communist Party', and was
therefore 'bound to carry out the program and the policy laid
down by that central organisation. It is the duty of the
section to explain to its members and popularise ... the program
8 3which the C.I. from time to time adopts': there was no longer
any room for taking Comintern decisions as 'a basis for 
discussion' as with the Sixth Congress theses. The second 
issue mainly consisted of an abridged version of the Inprecor 
report of the ECCI's January 1934 Thirteenth Plenum.
Unfortunately the disruption created by the repression 
delayed the second meeting of the Provisional Central Committee
83. Editorial, in The Communist, Vol. 1(2), in ibid..
until October 1934, prevented the holding of the National
Convention, and stopped publication of The Communist for a
year. In October the provisional secretary, Adhikari,
confined to remote Bijapur since his release from a three
month sentence in July, managed to make contact with Bombay.
He nominated a national Politbureau consisting of Mirajkar
(secretary), Ghosh (mass organisation) and Lahiri (agit-prop),
and sent detailed instructions on organisational policy. He
laid particular stress upon the paramount importance of
effective underground organisation, clearly separated from the
open apparatus, to meet the repressive situation. He also
emphasised the importance of reestablishing The Communist and of
getting a representative to Moscow for the Seventh Comintern 
84Congress. The October Provisional Committee Meeting - held
to coincide with the Bombay session of the National Congress
to minimise detection by the authorities - endorsed Adhikari's
proposals, considered the provincial reports, and planned a
8 5program for 1935. The provincial reports revealed that the
670
84. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: reports, 13/10/34, 17/11/34 & 27/12/34; 
IB, Communism, (1935), p.204.
85. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935 : reports, 30/10/34 , 2/11/34 & 8/12/34;
BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: report, 9/11/34; IB, Communism, (1935) 
pp.208-09. The meeting elected the following as Provis. CC 
members: Mirajkar (Bombay), Patkar (Bombay), Ghosh (UP),
Santosh Kapur (UP), Ghate (Bombay), Sundarayya (Madras), 
and Lahiri (Bengal). The new committee then coopted as 
members Bukhari and Jambhekar, as representatives of the 
former Bolshevik Party group. It also confirmed Adhikari's 
nominations for the Politbureau. Ghate subsequently replaced 
Mirajkar as secretary after the latter left for Moscow:
BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: report, 10/2/35.
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Bombay branch had been the most active - for example it was 
the only one to have translated the Party's basic documents 
into the vernacular. The membership of the Party as a whole 
had increased to about 150, with about the same number 
awaiting acceptance. But virtually no efforts had been 
taken anywhere to establish an underground apparatus. The 
Committee resolved to rectify this and to implement 
Adhikari's recommendations on international contacts and 
the Party organ.
The leadership began to effect these decisions from 
late 1934. They were aided by the recently arrived Moscow-trained 
communist, Teja Singh Swatantar, an expert in underground work, 
who had arrived with definite Comintern instructions to
8 6establish a functioning organisation as quickly as possible.
Mirajkar was immediately despatched (unsuccessfully) as a
8 7delegate to the Seventh Comintern Congress. The first steps
towards establishing a Leninist Party apparatus were taken in
88 89early 1935, and The Communist reappeared in April. However,
86. NAI,• H.Poll, 44/23/1936 : G of I to S o^ S, 14/4/36; see 
also sources cited in fn. 52, above.
87. See sources cited in fn. 52, above.
88. These initiatives were guided by a report drawn un by 
either Adhikari or the October Provis. CC meeting and 
then circulated among üarty meters. Titled 'Work of the 
Cells of the CPI, Organisational Task', it incorporates the 
experiences of 1934 (particularly the Bombay general strike 
and its repercussions) and urges Party education and the 
rapid formation of a cell structure capable of functioning
in conditions of illegality: in BSB, 1036/B/V/1935, together
with a report dated 6/12/34. See also: ibid., report, 15/1/35; 
BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: reports, 4/2/35 & 10/2/35 (reporting 
a tour by Ghate and Lahiri from Bombay to Lahore and 
Calcutta); ibid.: letter from a Provis. CC member (probably 
Ghosh) to other members, early Mar. 1935; NAI, H.Poll, 
27/11/1936: note on the activities of the Meerut group 
after their releases from prison.
89. The Communist, Vol. 1(3), in BSB, 1036/B/III/1935.
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despite Adhikari's instructions that the leading figures
should restrict their activities to underground work and not
risk themselves in open activity, most of the leadership was
imprisoned or detained during the year. Once again the
Provisional Central Committee had been reduced to virtual 
9 0inactivity. Symptomatically, The Communist did not reappear 
91till November. The final blows came in August and September.
In August the police captured the secretary, Mirajkar - who
had successfully evaded arrest up until that point by going
underground - along with the documents he was carrying for a
Provisional Central Committee meeting scheduled for the following 
92day. Then, on September 18, the police conducted widespread
searches of communist centres and confiscations of Party
literature and records throughout the Presidency. The police
were not able to find any documents that could be used in court -
a fact which showed how much the communists had learnt from the 
9 3Meerut Case. But the confiscations very seriously disrupted
the work of both the Bombay branch and the Central Committee.
After the Meerut releases the Bombay government had
carried out most of its anti-communist actions under the
Executive powers provided by the temporary emergency legislation
94enacted during Civil Disobedience. It used these powers rather
90. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: Note on the history of the CC, 27/1/37; 
BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: Ghate (acting Sec.) to Bombay Ctee., 
late Mar., 1935; NAI, H.Poll, 7/8/1935: G of Bom to G of I, 
20/6/35. Two of the three Politbureau members were arrested 
during the year.
91. The Communist, Vol. 1(4), in BSB, 1036/B/III/1935.
92. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935 : report, 10/8/35.
93. ibid., BSB to G of Bom., 30/9/35.
94. See the table listing the details of the actions taken by 
the Bombay government against communists and other radicals 
during 1934-35, in NAI, H.Poll, 22/93/1935.
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than the legislation banning the Party because the latter
95required judicial proceedings and was not as effective. However
the special Emergency legislation was in force only until the
end of 1935 - a fact offering some hope for the future of
communism in the Presidency. But this hope was dashed by New
Delhi's mid-1935 decision that both the Bombay and Bengal
96governments should make their legislation permanent. In fact
95. This was also New Delhi's view. In April 1935 it informed 
its provincial governments that 'to counteract such a 
movement Government must rely primarily on executive 
rather than judicial action' (NAI, H.Poll, 7/13/1934: G
of I to all LGs, 29/4/35). New Delhi considered that the 
legislation banning the Party and its subsidiary organisations 
was useful more for its moral effect than for the additional 
legal powers it gave the government - it would make it clear 
to the country that 'we are declaring war on communism root 
and branch': IOL, L/PO/43: V to S of S, 30/6/34.
96. NAI, H.Poll,7/13/1934: Notes by Hallett, 17/6/35, and Craik,
20/6/35. The background to this decision is recorded in ibid.. See also the correspondence and notes in NAI, H.Poll, 
77771934, 7/11/1934, 17/11/1934 and 17/13/1934. New Delhi 
decided on permanent provincial emergency legislation after 
London had vetoed its proposal to pass central legislation 
(by Ordinance if necessary) giving the Government of India 
similar powers to move against 'anything like' communist 
activity (NAI, H.Poll, 17/11/1934: V to S of S, 13/4/34, 
and note by Haig, 14/4/34). As New Delhi moved a little 
further from the siege mentality of the Civil Disobedience 
period, and as it became more certain that the Congress 
leadership sought a return to constitutionalism, it saw 
more clearly the wisdom of London's viewpoint. As Hallett 
minuted in August: 'if we combine an attack on ... [the CPI]
with an attack on the Congress Socialist Party, we will have 
the whole of the Congress ostensibly against us. ... it would 
be a great pity to lose such support as we have got from 
that direction': NAI, H.Poll, 7/13/1934: Note by Hallett, 
7/8/34.
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the Bombay house searches were intended to uncover communist
documents that could be used in the currently 'rather tame'
Legislative Council to persuade the 'waverers' to support the
97government's legislation. Sufficient waverers were convinced,
98and the new Act was passed in October. Bengal's was passed 
9 9in August. The communists now faced the prospect of 
permanent 'civil martial law' in both provinces. This 
situation was a measure of, primarily, the Bombay communists' 
late 1920s successes and the government's assessment of their 
probable future success should they be allowed free rein.
The Bombay government immediately exercised its permanent 
legislation by moving against six top Party leaders between 
November 1935 and January 1936.^^
97. BSB, 1036/B/X-I/1936: BSB to HD, G of Bom, 30/10/35, and 
DIB to BSB, 23/10/35.
98. The Bombay Act was passed 49:27 (IQR, 1935, Vol. II, pp. 
168-74). During the debate the Bombay government's Home 
Member stressed that the legislation was directed only 
against 'the menace of communism': ibid, p.171.
99. ibid., pp.142-47. The government introduced the Bengal Bill 
as a measure directed against terrorism rather than 
communism. The government agreed to compromise by restricting 
the Act's duration to three years in the first instance,
and it was then passed without opposition. However in August 
1936 the Bengal government took additional powers 
specifically against industrial agitation in the Calcutta- 
Howrak-24 Parganas area: NAI, H.Poll, 6/7/1936: G of Ben to 
G of I, 31/8/36.
100. NAI, H.Poll, 18/11/1935, 18/12/1935 and 18/1/1936: Bombay 
FRl Nov., FRl Dec., and FRl Jan. - reporting the 
restriction of Joglekar's movements and activity, Ghate's 
externment to the Madras Presidency, and the arrests of 
Lahiri, Iqbal Singh Hundal, Teja Singh Swatantar and 
Chinta Singh. A large quantity of literature, and
Rs. 4,500 in Party funds, were captured during the 
latter arrests.
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The intense repression in the Bombay Presidency during 
1935 effectively disrupted the task of Party construction. This 
disruption, combined with the passage of the emergency powers 
act, forced the beleaguered leadership to undertake more 
seriously the construction of an underground apparatus and 
to take new initiatives.
By the end of 1935 Ghate's statement in March that
'we are still far too open' was beyond argument: an underground
network was absolutely necessary 'not for achieving big results,
but merely for the existence and continuity of the Party
Accordingly the leadership decided both to concentrate on this
task and to move the Party centre out of Bombay to a relatively
102repression-free province. The Provisional Central Committee
took the opportunity of the National Congress's Lucknow
103session in April 1936 to meet and make new arrangements. It
chose UP as the Party centre's new location, and appointed the
recently released P.C. Joshi as secretary. Ajoy Ghosh and
104Bharadwaj joined him on the Politbureau. It was the first
time that the top Party leadership had been filled by non-Bombay 
men and that the Party centre had been located outside Bombay.
101. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: Ghate (acting sec., Provis. CC) to 
Bombay Provincial Ctee, late Mar. 1935; also Tambitkar 
to Jambhekar, Jul. or Aug. 1935.
102. NAI, H.Poll, 7/2/1936: Note in the HD, 29/5/36, which 
commented that 'Pressure by the Bombay police has caused 
the removal of the headquarters'.
103. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: Note on the development of the CPI's 
CC, 27/1/37; NAI, H.Poll, 45/22/1936: Intelligence reports 
of the Lucknow session.
104. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: Note on the development of the 
CPI's CC, 27/1/37.
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The Party's vulnerability and continued
ineffectiveness in 1935 also forced some communists to begin
to question the wisdom of the CPI's current trade union and
nationalist policies. Open activity was essential for the
development of mass influence, but with its trade unions and
political organisations banned, and without access to other
organisations, the open activity that the Party could undertake
was very limited. A number of the Party leaders became
increasingly concerned about this situation. By early 1935
Ghate was very worried by the prospect of the Party being
isolated from the industrial and nationalist mainstream and
then crushed with ease by the British: 'The reformists wish to
liquidate us not by entangling us organisationally but by
isolating us and leaving us to the tender mercies of 
105Imperialism'. If this was so then the CPI's extreme 'left-
sectarian' strategy played right into the 'reformists' hands. 
Ghate argued strongly that for the Party to survive it must 
concentrate not only on building a strong underground 
organisation, but also on forging some sort of unity with the 
‘reformists'. This had been the policy that, in line with its 
jail analysis, the Meerut leadership had adopted towards the 
rival GKU from late 1933 in preparing for the 1934 textile 
strike. In October 1935 the Bengal Provincial Committee, also, 
affirmed the wisdom of that approach and criticised the Bombay 
communists' abandonment of the alliance during the strike:
105. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: Ghate to Mirajkar, late Mar. 1935.
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... in the later stages of the strike the weakening 
of the ranks of the conscious revolutionary cadres 
through numerous arrests ... led to a gross violation 
of communist tactics and principles. The national 
reformist union [the GKU] was declared to be a 
police union and the infantile left tendencies 
went so far as to proclaim the necessity of 
organising purely communist trade unions. Sectarian 
blindness found its expression in numerous attempts 
to heap into one pile the treacherous national 
reformist trade union leaders and the masses of the 
workers following them and being misled by them.106
This 'sickness of sectarianism', the critique continued, had 
been manifested in Calcutta too. The communists, in their 
attempts to mobilise an opposition to 'the reactionary and 
bourgeois ideology of Gandhism', had made the mistake of 
'lining up the whole of the deceived rank and file ... with 
the treacherous leaders of the Congress'. Consequently the 
'Gandhi Boycott Committee' that the Calcutta communists 
organised in 1934 'did not grow into a platform of anti­
imperialist struggle ... - rather, with the imprisonment and 
persecution of its leaders it dwindled in strength and slowly 
went out of existence'. For the Bengal Committee the lesson 
was clear. The communists must take advantage of the legality 
that the Raj allowed the Congress by entering that organisation 
and working within it to mobilise the rank-and-file against the
leadership, while simultaneously organising an independent mass
107base outside the Congress. The alternative was to perish.
106. NAI, H.Poll, 17/10/1936: extracts from Communist Review 
(organ of the Bengal Ctee of the CPI), Vol. II, Oct. 1935.
107. The Bengal Ctee nevertheless saw that the possibilities 
for mobilising support in the 'bankrupt, semi-feudal' 
Bengal Congress were very limited. But even the Bengal 
Congress would provide added protection for the 
communists' underground work.
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In the years that followed the Calcutta branch remained a strong
advocate of the 'united-front' approach.
Ghate's and the Bengal Committee's analyses
reflected the views of others within the Party, who saw in the
unanticipated emergence from Congress ranks of the Congress
Socialists the basis for a possibly fruitful alliance. However
some sections of the Party vigorously opposed this perspective.
For one Provisional Central Committee member this approach
was the 'discarded policy of forming fractions inside the
Congress', and it would mean 'repeat[ing] the whole history
108since the very formation of the Party'. The Congress, he
argued, echoing the viewpoint of several leaders, had no 
genuine mass basis,and there was little chance of forcing the 
Congress leadership to accept the collective affiliation of 
mass organisations. To enter the Congress would be a 'right 
opportunist step'.
Thus during 1935 considerable ideological and policy 
differences coexisted inside the Party. Because the 
Provisional Central Committee and its organ were unable to • 
function during the year these differences threatened to 
lead the various Party centres in different directions.
The Comintern's Changing Policy
However this threat was reduced by the ECCI's stand 
in favour of a 'united-front' approach, against the extreme 
'left-sectarianism' it had counselled in the preceding years.
108. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: a Provis. CC member (probably Ghosh) 
to the Bombay Ctee, Feb. or early Mar. 1935.
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This strengthened the hands of those within the Indian Party
who favoured the former approach. In its 1933-34 Inprecor
articles the ECCI urged the Indian communists to rectify
their past sectarian 'mistakes' and to enter the reformist 
109unions. The communists could fight the 'reactionary
national reformists' (i.e., the non-communist labour leaders) 
from within their unions as well as from outside, and should 
not be afraid to consider merging their 'Red' unions with the 
dominant 'reformist' organisations wherever that seemed advisable. 
Similarly, the communists should participate in the mass 
nationalist movement with the same aim - winning the masses 
from the 'reactionary' Congress leadership. However these 
articles remained ambiguous. Part of the ambiguity arose from 
the facile 'false consciousness' argument employed in the 
articles - the ECCI could assert, without apparent discomfort, 
that the 'national reformists' were either consciously or 
objectively pro-imperialist,while recognising that they 
exercised a powerful influence over the 'deceived' masses.
The ECCI articles did not attempt to explain how this 
'deception' was sustained, and so failed completely to come to 
terms with the problem. But, secondly, the tactical advice 
provided in these articles was internally contradictory. They 
counselled the Indian communists both to maintain the old policy 
of 'merciless' attack on the 'national reformists' (a tactic 
which would make unity impossible) while simultaneously advising
109. This aspect of the Inprecor articles is summarised in 
Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., pp.152-56.
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the merging of the 'Red' and the ‘reformist' unions. Thus 
these articles could provide support for both sides in the 
CPI tactical debate.
However early in 1935 the ECCI clarified its stand in
a long letter to the CPI's Provisional Central Committee.
The letter retained the analytical ambiguity embodied in the
Inprecor articles. But it did state definitely that the
communists must enter both the 'reformist' unions and the
National Congress and carry on inside them as well as outside
the struggle for the allegiance of the masses:
The struggle ... to enter the National Congress 
does not by any means signify that the C.P. has 
changed its attitude to the I.N.C. in principle.
It merely means that on the basis of an estimate 
of the actual state of affairs and taking into 
account the fact that the National Congress still 
exists as a mass organisation, the Communists 
cannot neglect to set themselves the task of 
carrying on mass work inside the National Congress 
so as to win over the rank and file members of the 
Congress who are really striving towards the 
struggle against imperialism, but who have not yet 
taken the correct path. ... An equally urgent task 
for the CPI is the struggle for trade union unity.
. . . the Party has not yet brought about a sharp 
change in the struggle for trade union unity.
In this way a 'wide anti-imperialist front' could be built,
setting itself 'in opposition to the whole policy of the
leaders and calling over their heads on the masses'. The
110. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935 : ECCI to the Provis. CC, CPI, 17/3/35. 
Intelligence, who first saw this letter in June, 
surmised that it had probably reached Bombay in the 
first half of April: ibid., Note, 19/6/35. An article
in the March 9 issue of Inprecor (Vol. 15(10), pp.289-92), 
titled 'Problems of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle in 
India', contained similar advice.
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communists should exploit all opportunities for joint actions
with all organisations 'reformist or otherwise'. This did
not mean giving up the right to criticise the reformists;
'This criticism, however, must not be abusive, but clear
and based on principles'. Finally, the letter administered
a snub to the CPI's 'left-sectarians':
'we cannot help noting that some of the Indian 
comrades are having great difficulty in getting 
over their sectarian remnants on the question of 
a united front. ... The biggest danger for a young 
Party is precisely its isolation from the struggle 
for the immediate needs of the workers and peasants, 
its isolation from the national-liberation struggle 
against British imperialism'.
Having legitimised those within the CPI who advocated a 'united- 
front' approach,the ECCI reminded the Party membership that 
'the complete elimination of all group tendencies' was long 
overdue. With the receipt of this letter the 'third period' 
legitimisation of the CPI's 'left-sectarians' was definitively 
withdrawn.
However the 'left-sectarians' did not give up without 
resistance. The CPI's responsiveness to the ECCI's 
instructions came to the test almost immediately. In January 
1935 the EC of the Royist dominated AITUC had issued a set 
of unity proposals to the other national labour federations.
In the view of some communists the Party should regard these 
proposals as simply 'the latest manoeuvre of reformist trade 
unionism' . Nevertheless a majority of those on the Provisional
111. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: CPI thesis on TU unity - probably by 
Deshpande. See also the Party document quoted in 
M. Limaye, Communist Party: Facts and Fiction (Hyderabad, 
1951), p.23~ In fact the first, very tentative moves 
towards unity had begun in October 1934: NAI, H.Poll, 
18/10/1934: Bombay FR2 Oct..
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Central Committee accepted the ECCI's instructions and fell
in with Ghate's view that, 'under the circumstances', the
112AITUC's unity proposals were acceptable. At the Fourteenth
AITUC annual session in Calcutta in April the communists and
Royists drew up an agreement for the subsequent merger of the
Red AITUC with the main body. The Provisional Central
Committee then took up more seriously the question - first
broached at the October 1934 Congress annual session - of
114forging an alliance with the Congress Socialists. The
Congress Socialists, for their part, were very interested in an
115alliance against the Congress leadership. With the old
factionalism dampened and with sufficient consensus within the 
Party achieved, the CPI appeared to be set on a new course.
112. BSB, 1036/B/V/1935: Ghate to Bombay Ctee, late Mar. 1935, 
and BSB report,18/4/35.
113. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: copy of the Calcutta agreement, and 
CPI Notes on it; British Museum, Proscribed Indian Books, 
11/5: a manifesto issued by the Vice-Pres. Red AITUC,
Apr. 1935, titled 'An Appeal to Indian Workers to Unite' 
(translated for the author from the Marathi original by 
Mrs. P. Paricharak); NAI, H.Poll, 18/4/1935: Bengal FR2 
Apr. (report of the AITUC session); BSB, 1036/B/X-I/1935 : 
Note on the unity moves, 11/9/35. See Punekar, op. cit. , 
pp.328-35 for the overall history of the attempts in the 
1930s to forge unity between the different TU federations. 
The April agreement was immediately put into practice on 
May Day: NAI, H.Poll, 18/5/1935: Bombay FRl May.
114. NAI, H.Poll, 18/10/1934 and 18/1/1935: Bombay FR2 Oct. and 
FR2 Jan.; BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935: pamphlet issued by the 
Provis. CC, titled 'To the Congress Socialists and Anti- 
Imperialist Revolutionaries'.
115. See Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., pp.156-57 and
p.161.
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However the Party's internal balance and sense of 
direction were soon disrupted once again - this time by the 
Comintern's Seventh Congress, held in July-August 1935. This 
was serious because the Party's recently achieved, and still 
tenuous balance, was highly dependent on the Comintern's 
mediation. Paradoxically, the Party crisis which ensued 
heightened the CPI's dependence on Moscow's authority.
The new policy directions which the ECCI 'recommended'
with increasing insistence to the CPI between late 1933
and early 1935 arose more from changing Soviet priorities than
from the changing situation in India. From 1933 the Soviet
leaders became increasingly concerned about Hitler's rise to
116power and the associated threat to the Soviet Union. At
the same time the imperatives which had led to the 'third 
period' policy diminished in intensity: Stalin had defeated
the 'Right Opposition' CPSU faction, and the industrialisation 
and collectivisation programs were well advanced. Accordingly, 
between 1933 and 1935, a subtle shift in Comintern policy 
occurred. The Comintern moved from the 'class against class' 
strategy that had been enshrined by the 1929 Tenth Plenum to 
the 'popular front' line which was finally decided upon at the 
Seventh Congress. At the Seventh Congress, as at the Sixth 
Congress seven years earlier, the Soviet leadership expected 
the endorsement of an already decided policy shift. This time, 
however, the shift took place in a different way. The Sixth 
Congress policy change arose primarily from Soviet domestic
116. For an analysis of the context and content of the ECCI's 
policy changes in 1933-35, see Claudin, op. cit., pp. 
166-99.
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issues and received a highly 'theoretical' justification.
The Seventh Congress policy shift was equally Soviet-centred.
However the issue which prompted it was external - the growing
fascist threat to Russia - and no attempt was made to justify
the change through an analysis of the dynamics of world 
117capitalism. The issue was presented in simple terms. The
Seventh Congress policy was based on the assumptions that the 
Soviet Union was progressing rapidly towards the construction 
of complete socialism and that it was therefore the fountainhead 
and the bulwark of the World Revolution. If these assumptions 
were accepted - and the Sixth Congress had accepted them - 
then the logic was faultless: the Soviet Union was under a
grave threat; therefore the world's communist parties' first 
duty was the defence of the Soviet Union; the defence of the 
Soviet Union would be maximised by the mobilisation of the 
broadest possible front of anti-fascist forces - including the 
liberal, anti-fascist bourgeoisie; therefore the 'revolutionary' 
strategy of the 'third period' must be replaced by an alliance 
with many of yesterday's enemies - principally the formerly' 
'treacherous' social democratic movement. Simultaneously, 
it was argued, because of the extreme gravity of the situation,
117. Claudin (ibid., p.91) has commented rightly that the Seventh 
Congress was 'the least theoretical congress ever held by 
the Comintern - the transition to what Dimitrov called "a 
new tactical orientation" was effected without any critical 
analysis of the past. Thus, the crisis of the Marxist theory 
of world revolution was "resolved" by renouncing, in 
practice, any explicit theory of world revolution'. The 
key Seventh Congress policy document was Dimitrov's report, 
'The offensive of Fascism and the Tasks of the C.I. in the 
Struggle for the Unity of the Working Class Against 
Fascism', reproduced in Inprecor, Vol. 15(37), pp.957-78.
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there was absolutely no room for 'deviationism' within the 
communist parties.
Because the European situation was now the major
object of Soviet concern the colonial world received little
119attention at the Seventh Congress. Moreover, because theory
was not at a premium, India did not have the important theoretical-
ideological role to play that it had had at the Sixth Congress.
A Chinese delegate, Wang Ming, delivered a report on the
120Chinese situation, but India was mentioned only in passing
at the Congress. The strategy to be followed by the CPI was
treated in more detail after the Congress, in a revised edition
121of Wang Ming's report. But it was not until February 1936
that a special report on India - prepared by R.P. Dutt and
Bradley - appeared in Inprecor. The Dutt-Bradley thesis,
titled 'The Anti-Imperialist People's Front', was the definitive
122statement of the Seventh Congress line for India.
118. See Claudin, op. cit., pp.122-23, for an account of the 
extremities to which the demands for 'monolithicity' were 
taJcen in the mid-1930s.
119. This probably also arose from Stalin's concern not to 
provoke trouble with those democratic imperialist powers 
that might join with the Soviet Union in an anti-Hitler 
pact. For Stalin's overall concern not to alienate the 
capitalist democracies see ibid., pp.89-90.
120. 'Report on China', in Inprecor, Vol. 15(60), pp.1488-92.
Apart from the controversial question of the Chinese 
revolution, China was important to the Soviet Union's foreign 
policy because of the Japanese expansion; for the Japanese 
also threatened the Soviet Union.
121. This is summarised in Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., 
pp.157-58.
122. In Inprecor, Vol. 16(29), 1936, pp.297-300.
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The Dutt-Bradley thesis went far beyond the ECCI's
1933-35 instructions to the Party. It recognised the Congress
radicals as genuine socialists, pressing for 'irreconcilabe
struggle with imperialism' and engaged in a radical challenge to
12 3the non-revolutionary Congress leadership. Moreover it
portrayed these radicals as the wave of the Congress future who,
with communist help, could oust the Gandhian leadership and
transform the character of the Congress. Thus the Congress was
already 'the united front of the Indian people in the national
struggle'. The Congress could 'play a great and foremost part
in the work of realizing the Anti-Imperialist People's Front'.
It was 'even possible that the National Congress, by the further
transformation of its organization and programme, may become the
form of realization of the Anti-Imperialist People's Front; for
12 4it is the reality that matters, not the name'. The communists
should therefore concentrate on entering the Congress and in 
working there with the Congress Socialists to transform the 
organisation.
The sudden, untheorised, Comintern switch to the 
'popular front' line greatly disrupted the Party. For some 
communists even the earlier transition had been too much to 
accept. But the Dutt-Bradley line required the Indian commun­
ists fully to acknowledge as comrades those 'national reformists' 
who yesterday had been branded as enemies of all that was
123. ibid., p.297.
124. ibid., p.298.
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progressive. It was very similar to the line pursued by the 
arch-enemy, Roy. Many found this too great an ideological and 
psychological readjustment to make. Nor would they abandon 
without a struggle the notion that policy should be based on 
theory. The Seventh Congress line negated the rationale justi­
fying the sacrifices that had been endured and the commitments 
that had been made during the past six years. However others 
within the Party welcomed the unqualified shift from sectarian­
ism to participation in the nationalist mainstream, for it 
appeared to offer greater political opportunities. The ensuing 
polarisation of the Party centred around a conflict between the 
new P.C. Joshi leadership and a re-formed Ranadive faction. The 
final stage in the process of Party formation was accompanied 
and conditioned by this ideologically motivated factional 
struggle.
Building a Party Apparatus : Stage 2, 1936-early 1937
Joshi, who was the son of a school master and was a law
student at Allahabad University at the time of his arrest for
12 5the Meerut Case, was a serious and capable intellectual. But 
for both him and a majority of the Provisional Central Committee 
which appointed him as the Party's leader, the perceived 
benefits of accepting the new 'popular-front' line outweighed 
the costs to the CPI's theoretical and political continuity.
125. E.g. in the Meerut jail Joshi, in particular, devoted
himself to a comprehensive study of the Marxist classics, 
while at the same time completing his law degree: 
interviews with M.G. Desai and D. Goswani.
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Because of these benefits the leadership was prepared to accept 
this externally determined, pragmatic, theoretically unjustified 
negation of the basis of the Party's previous position. The 
carefully constructed Meerut analysis, which could have provided 
a valuable starting point for the future development of theory 
and policy, was jettisoned along with the more negative legacies 
of the party's 'third period'. This negation of the past was 
closely related to the most serious weakness of the Meerut 
group's theory of Indian politics —  its failure to proceed from 
a critique of the preceding analytical basis of communist 
politics.
Apart fO^ pm its faith in the Comintern and the Soviet Union,
the Joshi leadership accepted the Dutt-Bradley thesis for two
quite different reasons. The first was positive —  a definite
preference for this policy over 'left-sectarianism'. Joshi was
a 'moderate' — a man for the 'popular-front' times. During the
Meerut Case he had questioned the wisdom of the Tenth Plenum
policy, and he now believed that the Dutt-Bradley line was -
appropriate for current Indian conditions. Others felt the
same way —  in part, no doubt, because of their 'war-weariness'
12 7after years of hardship in political isolation. The very
126. That Joshi, from Allahabad, was a personal friend of 
Jawaharlal, probably contributed to his enthusiasm for the 
Seventh Congress line; for he could see at close quarters 
the post-CD disillusion of the Congress 'radicals'.
127. E.g. Lahiri commented that after the communists' 1930-33 
experience, and after the Calcutta Committee's efforts to 
find a way out of the cul de sac, he was 'just electrified' 
by the news of the Seventh Congress's policy change: 
interview with S. Lahiri.
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extremism of the Tenth Plenum line encouraged an equally extreme 
reaction. The 'popular-front' provided a welcome change, offer­
ing an opportunity to capitalise on new developments and engage 
in real political activity. Besides, no mass revolutionary wave 
existed which might have led a majority of the leadership 
seriously to question the appropriateness of the Seventh Congress 
approach. But the second reason was more fundamental. In 1932 
the Meerut group had resolved that Comintern authority was in­
dispensable to the CPI's continued existence, for it offered the 
only means of countering the centrifugal forces which threatened 
to disintegrate the Party. The progress achieved since the 
release of the Meerut prisoners was not sufficient to warrant a 
change in that viewpoint. For the Meerut leadership and those 
that had allied with it against the Bombay factions, there still 
could be no question of going against the Comintern: for to do
so would jeopardise the most important task of all — the 
formation of a strong national Party apparatus. Thus, because 
the Seventh Congress policy provoked disunity in the CPI, it in 
fact led to the leadership's heightened dependence upon the 
Comintern — at the very time that the Soviet leadership's
128special ideological need of the CPI's orthodoxy had diminished.
128. The ECCI's declining interest in India in general, and in 
the CPI in particular, was reflected in Inprecor in 
1936-39. There were far fewer articles on India than in 
the preceding period and, from 1937, the CPI was barely 
mentioned. As the IB commented in Oct. 1937, the ECCI's 
interest in India in this period was 'somewhat desultory 
and patronising': NAI, H.Poll, 7/7/37: 'A Review of
Recent Communist Activities in India', 26/10/37.
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Comintern authority had regularly to be invoked to legitimise the
CPI leadership's policy change and to get on with the job of
Party-building. For all these reasons the Joshi leadership
accepted wholeheartedly the Seventh Congress line —  and the
rationale for it —  as provided in the Dutt-Bradley thesis: the
Sixth-Congress/Tenth Plenun line had been 'correct' for the
conditions of 1929-33, though the Indian communists had committed
sectarian 'mistakes' in executing it; but now the objective
conditions had changed fundamentally and this required a new
129policy — the 'popular-front'.
Ranadive had been 'a very sincere and valuable comrade' 
after he had made his peace with the Meerut group and rejoined 
the Party in early 1934. But he refused to accept the Dutt- 
Bradley line unquestioningly. Moreover, he articulated a grow­
ing sentiment in some sections of the lower levels of the Party. 
Though factionalism had been dampened before the arrival of the 
Dutt-Bradley line, it had not been 'liquidated'. For example, 
even in September 1935, before the Dutt-Bradley thesis had , 
materialised, the Nagpur centre was near revolt. It wrote to 
the Provisional Central Committee member, Jambhekar in protest 
against the Committee's decision to unite with the Congress 
Socialist Party:
129. E.g.: ACH, 1936/19: The Editor, 'Collective Affiliation
to the Indian National Congress', in The Communist, Vol. 1 
(7), March 1936; BSB, 1036/B/III/1935: 'Hans Raj',
‘About Our Minimum United Front Tactics', and the Editor, 
'The Communist Party and the Coming Elections', in The 
Communist, Vol. 1(10), July 1936.
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We simply fail to understand how the E.C.C.I. 
instructions can be interpreted in this manner.
... such a step would mean giving up our correct 
theoretical position [that the Congress is an 
organ of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie] 
and would be the worst kind of opportunism.
This decision has got to be immediately revised.
In our opinion this decision is a hopeless 
capitulation to the Royist slander and would 
lead the whole Party straight into the mire of 
liquidationism. I hope you re/Ha/ise the gravity 
of the issue and try to repair the mischief if
it can be repaired. .^q
For the Nagpur branch the Committee's decision demonstrated the 
latter's 'complete inability ... to face issues squarely'. If 
the Committee did not reconsider this decision and also improve 
its organisational contact with Nagpur then it would be 'goodbye 
to the C.C. It will have once more proved that it is a bunch of 
irresponsible, spineless Bureaucrats who don't deserve to be at 
the head of an organisation'. We see expressed in this letter 
the consequences for the Party's integrity of both government 
repression and the nature of the Comintern's switch. The 
writer, in his protest against the Committee's 'bureaucratism', 
did not take into account the extreme problems created for the 
leadership by the repression. For him the Committee's failure 
to maintain adquate organisational contact with Nagpur, and its 
failure to involve the Nagpur members democratically in the 
decision to change Party policy, were simply failures of leader­
ship. Secondly, he could not believe that the ECCI would 
sanction such an extreme and untheorised policy change; the 
fault lay squarely with the CPI leadership.
130. BSB, 10 36/B/XIV/19 35: 'K' to Jambhekar, 3/9/35.
692
The 'Ranadive-Sardesai group', as it was called by 
131Intelligence, took further the ideological theme raised by
the Nagpur branch. This group championed 'the VI World Congress
132Line as opposed to the VII World Congress Line'. It was an
organised, ideologically motivated faction based on the
133suppressed Bolshevik Party group. It began to form in late
1341935, and from early 1936 it conducted its opposition to the
leadership's ' popular-front' policy through an organ called
Red Star. The paper's slogan was, significantly, 'Comrades! To 
135the Masses!' It appeared monthly, with some 10 issues
being produced during 1936 and early 1937. According to
Intelligence some 400 to 500 copies of each issue were circu- 
136lated. Overtly, Red Star directed its attack not against the
131. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: Note, 5/1/37.
132. loc.cit.
133. Sardesai had been Ranadive's main lieutenant. Jambhekar,
in whom the Nagpur group had confided, had also been an 
important member of the Bolshevik Party group. It is 
significant that it was not until late 1935 that the 
Ranadive group launched an open attack on the Meerut group 
for the way in which it had suppressed the Bolshevik - 
Party in late 1933 and early 1934: BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1935:
'Charge Sheet by Jambhekar Against "Nuruddin"', ca. Sept. 
1935.
134. ibid.; the Nov. 1935 issue of The Communist went to some
lengths to demonstrate the 'incorrect views' of an un­
specified 'left-sectarian' group: BSB, 1036/B/III/1935 :
the Editor, 'The Trade Union Movement and Our Tasks', in 
The Communist, Vol. 1(4), 1935.
135. A number of issues of Red Star are filed in BSB, 1036/B/ 
XIV/19 3 7.
136. ibid.: Note, 5/1/37.
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Party leadership, nor against the current Comintern line, but
137against Royism. But the covert parallels were obvious. The
Red Star group's opposition to the new line was sufficiently 
vehement for the leadership to suspend Ranadive's Party member­
ship and to drop Jambhekar from the Provisional Central
1 3 RCommittee during 1936.
It is significant, too, that the Bombay Committee, as well 
as the Red Star group, was less receptive to 'popular-frontism' 
than were the other provincial centres. Bombay's resistance 
arose from the dynamics of re-establishing a mass base —  a 
possibility which was still absent in the other provinces in this 
period. These dynamics conflicted with the political restric­
tions required by the Joshi-Comintern line. Thus the Bombay 
situation in 1936-37 reinforces the argument that the political 
momentum provided by a mass base was a prerequisite for relative 
autonomy from the Comintern, even though in this case both the 
momentum and the autonomy were very limited. It also illustrates 
the inappropriateness of universalised, India-wide policies.
137. See, e.g., the editorial titled 'Communist Attitude to 
Nationalism and Struggles for National Liberation', in 
Red Star, No. 9 (in ibid.). The article draws on the 
Sixth Comintern Congress theses for support but ignores 
the Seventh Congress line. See also fn. 143, below.
138. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937 : note on the development of the
CPI' s CC, 27/1/37 .
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By late 1936 the Bombay communists had re-established
themselves as the dominant labour leadership in Bombay. To a
significant extent this followed from Dange's mid-1935 return
from prison. Dange was 'undoubtedly a most popular person with
139mill labourers' and quickly rebuilt a working class following.
Dange, together with Nimbkar, led the very successful campaign
against the Alve-Kandalkar leadership in the August 1935 GKU 
140elections, though at that point Dange was still outside the 
Party. In 1936 Dange also won election to the BPCC and, from 
there, to the AICC. For these reasons he could no longer be 
ignored by the Party leadership and, in mid-1936, on Ghate's 
initiative, he was readmitted.^ ^  Bombay's growing confidence 
in its working class support led it to differ with the national 
CPI leadership over the correct application of the new line.
The 1935 Government of India Act provided for special seats for 
labour representatives, and the AITUC decided to field can­
didates for these seats in the 1937 elections for the provincial 
legislatures. It selected Joglekar as its Bombay candidate.
The Bombay Committee decided that the election campaign would
provide an excellent, legal propaganda platform from which to
142rebuild the Party's influence over the working class. The
139. NAI, H .Poll, 18/5/1935: FR2 May; see also ibid. : FR1 May.
140. For source, see fn. 71, above.
141. 3SB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: note on the development of the
CPI's CC, 27/1/37.
142. ibid.; report, 2/2/37. According to a Party document,
Joglekar received a very encouraging 10,000 votes in the 
election: BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: circular from Ghosh to
the Bombay Cttee, Mar. 1937.
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competition became bitter, with the communists attacking the
Congress as a pro-capitalist 'factory of lies and intrigues'
14 3opposed to the interest of the working class; it was remini­
scent of the late 1920s. Because of this situation Dange, as 
an AICC member as well as a communist and AITUC executive 
member, had conflicting loyalties. He decided to support 
Joglekar against the Congress candidate — a decision which led 
him into serious trouble with the Maharashtra Provincial 
Congress Committee. Eventually it suspended Dange from the
The Party's national leadership strongly disapproved of
the Bombay Committee's campaign and Dange's open support of
145Joglekar's candidature. It regarded Dange's action as a
breach of discipline and 'popular-front' principles, and his 
suspension from the AICC as a serious blow to the Party's 
program. It even considered withdrawing Joglekar from the 
campaign, but then decided that this would cause too much damage 
to the Party's trade union interests. The 'popular-front' line 
was, thus, inimical to militant mass organisation, for this 
would inevitably bring the communists into conflict with the 
Congress.
143. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: report, 9/2/37, reporting speeches
in the mill area and citing a Marathi manifesto to the 
workers signed by Nimbkar, Pendse, Ranadive, Tambitkar, 
Dange, and several others. See also: Red Star, No. 10,
Jan. 1937 in ibid. which carries an article titled 'The 
Two Camps' condemning the representatives of 'the bourgeois 
National Congress' and praising the 'proletarian repres­
entative', Joglekar; and NAI, H.Poll, 18/1/1937 and 
18/2/1937: Bombay FR1 Jan. and FR2 Feb.
144. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: reports, 13/1/37 & 15/1/37.
145. ibid.: reports, 2/2/37 & 5/2/37.
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The national leadership prevailed over both the Red Star 
group and the Bombay Committee. By the end of 1936 Joshi had 
built a national Party apparatus capable of withstanding such 
divisions and of asserting its viewpoint over those of sub­
groups. The health of the national organisation in this period 
is indicated by the fact that during the year from March 1936 
The Communist appeared monthly. The youthful Joshi was a 
capable and energetic leader, and from the time of his appoint­
ment as secretary he firmly 'took the reins of the Party in his 
146hands'. Operating from the relatively safe base of the
United Provinces, the new Politbureau began implementing the
Lucknow Provisional Central Committee's decision on organisation
14 7immediately after that meeting. Joshi became a roving
organiser, travelling from centre to centre, making personal
contact with t he membership and encouraging and guiding the
14 8formation of both underground and open organisation. He also
managed to undercut some of the CPI's leftist competition by
146. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: note on the development of the
CPI's CC, 27/1/27 — which added that 'a man of Joshi' s 
energy would hardly allow any grass to grow under his feet.'
147. NAI, H.Poll, 7/11/1936 : note in the HD, 29/5/36 .
148. Sources in fn. 146. In my interviews several communists 
recalled the importance of Joshi's personal approach (e.g. 
interviews with K. Damodaran and D. Goswami). In Goswami's 
words, 'One of P.C. Joshi's highest qualities ... was that 
he knew all of the Party members by name and could remem­
ber them, and he took an interest in their family members 
also'. According to Sardesai, Joshi was such a proficient 
organiser that even the leading Party members were not 
aware until after Independence of the identities of the 
communists working underground (interview with S.G. 
Sardesai). The Intelligence Bureau surveys of the Party in 
NAI, H.Poll, 7/7/1937 and 7/7/1939 are testimony to the 
organisational skills of Joshi and his colleagues.
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incorporating non-communists into the Party. Because of his
personal qualities, and because he was not identified with any
of the old Bombay or Calcutta factions, he was uniquely quali-
150fied for the conciliatory and integrative task required. For
the first time the CPI had a leader who could be identified in 
primarily national terms.
Joshi's project of building the Party apparatus and mem­
bership was facilitated both by the policy he pursued and by the 
contemporary situation, which allowed new opportunities for im­
plementing it. In particular the Marxists among the Congress 
Socialists, and the emerging Marxist ex-terrorists of Bengal and
north India, were amenable to an alliance or merger with the Party
151against the conservative Congress leadership. The communists'
penetration of the CSP provided a new measure of freedom from
repression —  and, to the CSP's eventual chagrin, a new source
152of membership, particularly in Kerala.
149. E.g. He brought Dutt Mazumdar into the Party and then onto 
the Central Committee. A number of important Congress 
Socialists, such as Soli Batliwala, who was soon to be 
elected to the Central Committee, also joined the Party at 
this point. Batliwala was attracted away from the CSP 
because of its middle class 'dilettantism': BSB,1036/B/XIV/ 
1937: note on the development of the CPI's CC, 27/1/27; 
interview with S. Batliwala.
150. According to one Party source Joshi was chosen as Party 
secretary 'as a representative of the younger comrades who 
were outside the factional groupings': Deven & Balkrishna 
quoted in Overstreet & Windmiller, op. cit., p. 564.
151. For CPI-CSP relations, see Overstreet & Windmiller, op.cit.
pp. 161-70. For the Bengal terrorist conversions to 
Marxism, see: Laushey, op.cit.,pp.100-110; Hale, op.cit., 
pp.7-8 & p.65; IOL, L/PO/43: a 1936 report by Tegart on
conversions among detenus, & memo on the situation by 
Williamson 7/5/37, and Anderson (Governor of Bengal) to 
Linlithgow, 27/3/37, commenting on Tegart's report. For 
north India see: Hale, op.cit., pp.65, 86, 94, 96 & 117; 
Harcourt, op.cit., pp. 373-81.
152. For the wholesale 'capture' by the Party of the Kerala 
branch of the CSP, see Jeffrey, op.cit.
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But even though the strength of the emerging national
organisation was sufficient to contain the factions, the
Provisional Central Committee felt it necessary during the year
to pay special attention to the problem. The unity theme was a
prominent one in The Communist throughout 1936 and into 1937.
At first the leadership adopted a conciliatory, cooptive approach
towards the factions. The June 1936 issue of the paper, which
carried the caption 'At All Costs: Against All Odds: FORWARD TO
A UNITED PARTY!', spoke to the dissenters in the following way:
. . . The Central Committee throws open the doors 
of the Party to ... [the dissenters] and expects 
all Party members to give these comrades a ready 
revolutionary welcome ... and to assimilate them 
in our Party organisation. ... The existence of 
the independent groups is a living proof of the 
weakness [and mistakes] of the Party. ^
But this attempt at reconciliation was followed by a hint of
coercion:
... the Central Committee declares that it is 
[now] improper for a Communist to remain outside 
the Party and impermissable to form an independ­
ent group. ... no real abiding work is possible 
except through the Communist Party. ... The 
Central Committee calls upon all Communists to 
cease forthwith all carping criticism of each 
other, give up the hunt for imaginary deviations 
... In our struggle for Party unity we must con­
centrate on finding out our points of agreement, 
which will enable us to see our remaining differ­
ences in their true perspective .
Finally, the dissenters were gently reminded that the leader­
ship had the Comintern on its side and The Communist called on 
the factions to rally to the cause of the World Party:
153. BSB, 1036/B/111/1935: The Communist, Vol.l(9). Initially 
Joshi also wanted to bring Ramadive on to the Central 
Committee, but this suggestion was overruled: BSB, 1036/B/ 
XIV/1937: note on the development of the CPI's CC,27/1/37.
154. ibid.
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... We whole-heartedly accept the line of the
Seventh World Congress ... working out and
applying our new line to the concrete situation
in India. ... Who dare deny this? ... let us
not lag behind but fulfill our Bolshevik role.
We would be justifying ourselves before the
Communists of the whole world by establishing a
united Party and then launching ourselves
successfully on the path of the Uni.ted Anti-
Imperialist People's Front... c cI 5 5
But by early 1937 the Politbureau was taking a harder line.
In February Joshi prepared a Party circular which pointed out
that the Politbureau was executing recently received instructions 
15 6from the ECCI. In it he produced the following quotation from
the ECCI's communication:
The opportunists and sectarians from the left 
and right, among them hidden agents of the 
police, will criticise the new line, which 
arises from the decisions of the VII Congress.
This must not disconcert you. You can state 
outright that you are applying a new line in 
accordance with the demands which are raised 
before the emancipation movement by the interests 
of our people at the present stage.
Thus there was no more room for discussion. The Party as a whole
had to accept that the leadership's policy was 'correct'; and
the proof of its correctness was, finally, that Moscow had
certified it as being so. The dissenters' criticisms arose,
Joshi wrote, from
... an over preoccupation with theory divorced 
from practice. ... it arises only in the minds 
of those who have studied Marxism as a philosophy 
of history but who have been unable to apply it 
to the practical questions confronting the working 
class in the situation in which it finds itself in 
India at the present time. Not until we have fully 
understood this shall we as a Party break free 
from ... those factional disputes which render us 
ineffective and isolate us from the working class 
and the masses in general.
155. ibid.
156. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: 'The Communist Party in the Fight
Against Imperialism'.
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The writer's assessment of the shortcoming's of his opponents 
may have been appropriate; but was this a call to praxis or to 
pragmatism?
The Politbureau also made a special effort to bring the 
Bombay Committee on to the 'people's-front' rails. In March 
1937, after the election campaign was over, Ajoy Ghosh circular­
ised the Bombay Committee to delineate the path forward in the
157new era of popular government in the provinces. His circular
reveals the profound impact of the Congress triumph at the polls
on the thinking of the Party leadership. The Bombay Committee
was reminded that now that the elections were over 'our method
of approach ... must be radically different from the approach
during the elections'. The Congress had scored a 'phenomenal'
victory — 'a victory of the Indian people'. Therefore:
As Indians, as anti-imperialists, we rejoice at 
this popular victory, at this unprecedented 
triumph of our great national organisation — 
the Congress . . . through whose triumph our 
nation voiced its determination to end the 
foreign rule.
For this reason the communists had to be especially careful in 
their choice of tactics for the Party's campaign against the 
acceptance of office:
157. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: 'Circular to the Bombay Committee
on Anti-Ministry Agitation and Preparing for a General 
Strike', and BSB note, 5/3/37.
By merely substituting the word 'Congress leaders' 
for Congress in our criticism, we shall not 
succeed in winning over the Congress masses.
Any frontal attack on the Congress, or even its 
leadership, is bound to create a hostile atmos­
phere for our case against acceptance of mini- 
steries ... we must not impute motives to the 
Congress right wing. Ours must be in line of 
emphatic support to Jawaharlal and the socialists 
. . . and fraternal appeal to the Congress as a 
whole ... It is not only what we say but also how 
we say it that affects the masses. ... Appeal for 
United Front is not a challenge to an adversary to 
prove his honesty. Our United Front approach must 
be sincere and warm, not soulless. Lastly it must 
be unequivocal. ... There is no place for ifs and 
buts in the United Front Appeal.
The exaggerated moderation of this approach increased 
158during the year. It must have been extremely galling to the
159Red Star group. But by March 1937, at the end of Joshi's
first year of leadership, the Party's organisation was sufficiently
developed for the holding of its first National Convention.
160This took place during an AICC meeting at Delhi. The National
Convention confirmed the Joshi leadership and freed it from its 
provisional status. In the same month Ranadive's group decided, 
for the second time since the Meerut releases, that it had no
*i -y
real choice but to capitulate. In March 1937, with the hold­
ing of the first National Convention and the capitulation of the 
Red Star group, the final step in the formation of the Communist 
Party of India had been taken and the defeat of the last stand 
against bolshevisation had occurred. From that point, in the
158. Eg.: Ishaque, 'The Anti-Imperialist People's Front and the 
United National Front', and Venkatayya, 'The Role of the 
Indian Bourgeoisie in the United National Front' - both 
articles in The Communist, Vol.l(18), Jun. 1937.
159. Even the CSP found the Joshi leadership's moderation 
excessive: Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., pp.163-64.
160. BSB, 1036/B/XIV/1937: reports, 9/3/37 & 31/3/37.
161. ibid.: report, 24/3/37.
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relatively freer political conditions provided temporarily by 
the popular ministries, the united Party was able, for the first 
time, to concentrate successfully on extending its apparatus, 
building its membership and implementing its political strategy. 
By the end of 1937 it was clear that the Party was established 
permanently, with a resilient organisation based on the Leninist 
principle of 'democratic centralism' as its foundation. The 
former regional-group basis of Party organisation had been 
replaced by a hierarchical system of functional cells firmly 
controlled by the Politbureau. Special 'auxilliary cells' 
exercised disciplinary functions to undercut factionalism and 
'purge' the inactive and suspect. At the same time contact
0 2with Moscow and London was improved. With this organisational
basis the Party was in a much better position to involve itself
purposefully in political activity.“^0 By late 1939 the Party
was, in the words of the Intelligence Bureau, 'numerically weak
but organisationally strong', its leadership displaying a
'marked ability in planning' and its cadres distinguishing
themselves by their 'zeal and better organisation' from their
164non-communist colleagues and rivals. By the end of the
decade the CPI's membership had increased from about 150 in 1934
165to between 1,000 and 2,000. The Party's foundations appeared
to be firm.
162. This description is based on the IB's October 1937 study 
of the Party, in NAI, H.Poll, 7/7/1937.
163. Eg. by January 1938 the IB was worried because 'Communist 
agitators in three provinces may, without risk of over­
statement, be said to threaten public peace and industrial 
prosperity': NAI., H.Poll, 44/60/1937: note by Barley,
17/1/38.
164. NAI, H.Poll, 7/7/1939: IB survey of the CPI's activities,
31/10/39-165. ibid.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has taken as its starting point the fact of 
the historical failure of Indian communism. It has argued that 
the bolshevisation of the CPI has been the. most immediate
cause of this failure, for the bolshevist mode has continuously 
alienated the Party from both its Indian environment and its 
own history. But the bolshevist mode has also been employed 
to help 'resolve' the Party's recurring internal problems - 
problems which have largely been symptomatic of the very great 
difficulties for communist politics imposed by the Indian 
environment. I have therefore sought to identify the factors 
which led to the initial bolshevisation of the CPI during the 
process of its formation.
• As we have seen, the bolshevisation of early Indian 
communism was partly a consequence of the prominent role which 
India played in the politics of the post-Leninist Comintern 
throughout all but the last few years of the Party's formative 
period. India, as the preeminent colony of the dominant world 
capitalist power, played a key role in the Comintern's 
theoretical and ideological schemas. Accordingly the CPI 
received more of the Comintern's attention than did any other 
colonial communist party except the Chinese Party. This level 
of attention, combined with the generally inappropriate content 
of the theory and policy which the Comintern and its inter­
mediaries provided to the Indian communists, meant that the
CPI began its life under a particularly severe handicap.
However bolshevisation was also a product of the Party's 
Indian context. I have argued that, given the relative 
intensity of the Comintern's 'Bolshevisation' program for the 
CPI, the Party could remain non-bolshevised only if it could 
maintain a position of mass-based political momentum. During 
the Party's formative period the communists were unable to 
maintain such a position. The main body of this thesis has been 
devoted to investigating why this was the case and to examining 
the consequences for the modes of Indian communist leadership.
I have argued that, broadly, there were two structural 
features of the Indian environment which prevented the communists 
from developing a sustained political momentum. The colonial 
presence played a critical role in both features. The first 
was the intensive colonialisation of eastern India. This, I 
have argued, effectively prevented the Bengali communists from 
even beginning to establish a mass base. The second was the 
lack, except for one brief period, of 'political space' for 
radical mass politics. , This absence prevented the Bombay lead­
ership from maintaining the 'revolutionary momentum' it did 
manage to initiate in the late 1920s. The contrasts between 
Bombay and Calcutta throughout the period studied, and between 
Bombay before and after 1929, help us to delineate the contours 
and roles of these two structural features.
Any generalisation about the reasons for major contrasts 
in regional political patterns needs to be carefully qualified. 
Nevertheless in attempting to explain the very marked contrast 
in the inherent possibilities for revolutionary mass politics 
in Bombay and Calcutta, the differential colonialisation 
hypothesis appears, at this stage of research, to provide the
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most adequate explanatory framework. We can identify some of 
the negative consequences for revolutionary politics of 
intensive colonialisation with some confidence - for example the 
divorce of the intelligentsia from pre-colonial tradition and 
from the masses. However the precise relationship between 
colonialisation and, for example, the heterogeneous, primarily 
extra-provincial character of Calcutta's industrial workforce, 
has yet to be established. Nevertheless it appears safe to 
argue that because eastern India was far more intensively 
colonialised than western India it was inherently far more 
difficult for a Marxist intelligentsia in Bengal to mobilise a 
mass base than it was in Maharashtra. Maharashtrian society 
had been dislocated by the colonialisation process, but it 
retained a much higher level of continuity internally and with 
its pre-colonial past. As was demonstrated in the 1927-29 
period, this combination of dislocation and continuity provided 
a more promising environment for communist-led radical working 
class politics than in Calcutta.
As Chapter 5 showed, the political conditions allowing 
the Bombay communists to take advantage of this inherent potent­
ial in 1927-29 were atypical. The significant degree of 
political space available for radical industrial politics in 
this period was conditional upon a temporary configuration 
of political alignments in the continuing struggle between 
'bourgeois' nationalism, in its various manifestations, and the 
colonial state. The Raj's need for extensive collaboration, 
combined with the relative strength of 'bourgeois' nationalism, 
led the Raj to adopt a restrained, discriminating and very 
legalistic approach towards political opposition. The communists
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and their radical working class movement benefited temporarily 
from this situation. But the political space available until 
1929 was progressively closed between 1929 and 1935. By early 
1929 the Raj had found a formula allowing it to move against the 
communist leadership without provoking a significant Congress 
or moderate reaction. With the launching of Civil Disobedience 
in 1930 the Raj's inhibitions about repressing radical working 
class activity were further reduced. From 1932, after the 
government had won back the collaboration of virtually all 
elements of the big bourgeoisie by granting it concessions, it 
was much freer to move against all forms of opposition - 
including the Congress. Finally, with the return of the Congress 
to participation in constitutional politics the Raj was able 
safely to take the measures against the communists which were 
not possible in the late 1920s - the banning of the Party and 
the enactment of permanent emergency legislation.
Thus the logic of the Raj's repression allowed the 
communists limited but significant advantages - both in the 
delaying of the 1929 repression and in the fact that it and the 
subsequent repression were less than total. But the same logic 
also reflected the strength of the communists' indigenous 
opposition, and the repression was sufficient for this opposition 
to recapture the ground on to which the communists had encroached. 
The Raj's approach maintained the communists in 
isolation from the mainstream of Indian nationalist politics 
while depriving them of their working class base and the chance 
of extending it to other areas. Meanwhile, while the communists 
struggled for survival, Congress nationalism went from failure 
in Civil Disobedience to success at the polls, thus heralding 
its eventual supersession of the Raj: the communists lost ground
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both absolutely and relatively.
Thus, because of the intensive colonialisation of 
eastern India and the logic of the conflict between nationalism 
and the Raj, the Indian communists were able to establish mass- 
based political momentum in only one centre and in only one 
period. The overall consequences of this situation for the 
autonomy of Indian communism have been demonstrated in the thesis 
by contrasting the leadership modes which developed in Bombay 
in the late 1920s with those in Calcutta throughout the formation 
period and with those in Bombay after 1929.
In Chapter 4 we saw that the opportunities provided by 
a mass base, and the demands it imposed upon the leadership, both 
allowed and forced the Bombay leadership to begin to progress 
towards a creative 'proletarianised1 and 'Indianised' mode of 
leadership. In particular, the Bombay leadership came to adopt 
a markedly autonomous stance towards the Comintern. Contempor­
aneously the Bengal leadership disintegrated and the dominance 
of the leading faction was secured largely through its orthodoxy. 
But in the early 1930s, after the Bombay leadership had been 
drastically reduced by repression and had lost its mass base, it, 
too, exhibited many of the features which characterised the 
Bengal leadership in the late 1920s. One consequence of this 
situation was, as we saw in Chapter 7, that Comintern authority 
began to play a very active - and solicited - role in intra- 
Party factional politics. Because this period coincided with 
an intensification in Moscow's 'Bolshevisation' campaign the 
role of the ECCI in the CPI's affairs became even more pronounced. 
Moreover, because of the contrast in the political achievements
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of the Bombay and Calcutta branches in the late 1920s, and 
because of the ECCI's apparent support, the Bombay leadership 
was able to dominate the Calcutta branch in a bureaucratic- 
centralist manner in the early 1930s. This undermining of 
regional autonomy within the Party contributed to the bolshevis- 
ation of the Party.
With the release of the Meerut group in the mid-1930s
the final phase in the formation of the CPI began. In Chapter 8
we saw how the Meerut Jail experience had forged India's first
national communist leadership. Further, this leadership
recognised that Indian communism faced a dilemma. On the one
hand, if the formation of a centralised Party was left to the
unaided efforts of the Indian leadership(s) and the natural
course of events it would be an extremely protracted and
uncertain process. This was because of the impossibility of
developing a mass-based momentum in the forseeable future and
because of the attendant great difficulties in maintaining the
unity of the Party on an India-wide basis. On the other hand,
the Party could possibly be formed in the forseeable future if
the ECCI intervened directly in the Party's affairs. Dange,
many years later, formulated this choice in the following way:
If we had no sense of proletarian internationalism, 
if we had no Comintern to guide, if we had no 
loyalty to the Communist International and its 
democratic centralism, we would not have remained 
on the map of revolutionary history and would have 
been consigned to the dustbin. 1
The Meerut group recognised that there was a certain
artificiality in thus forming the Party 'from the top'. But
because they did not doubt the revolutionary bona fides of the
'World Party' they did not suspect the dimensions of the dilemma
1. Dange, When Communist (sic) Differ, p.45.
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they faced. The extent of their illusion was summed up by 
Spratt in a 1927 pamphlet:
-- we oppose -- Qthe Church and the State] because
they use all the power of the masses to force their 
rule upon the latter in an authoritarian, official 
and brutal manner. If the International ... 
organised itself in the State manner, we, its most 
enthusiastic friends, would ... become its bitterest 
enemies. But it cannot possibly organise itself in 
such a form. The International cannot recognise 
limits to human fellowship and equality, while the 
State cannot exist unless it limits, by territorial 
pretensions, such fellowship and equality.2
In the mid-1930s this view of the Comintern still prevailed;
Spratt was one of the very few who had begun to question the
fundamental divide he had drawn between the International and the
State and the Church. Thus, with this conception of the
Comintern, the Meerut leadership opted firmly for the second
alternative, despite its artificiality; because for them the
formation of the Party was the necessary basis of the revolution.
Following the Meerut releases the Meerut group, together 
with the Calcutta Committee, received the ECCI's blessing and 
thus became proxy Comintern representatives. The rationale 
for the Meerut group's program retained its force in the 1934-36 
period because of the continuing obstacles (particularly 
repression) to sustained political leadership and activity and, 
finally, because of the factional strife provoked by the Seventh 
Congress's sharp change in policy. Despite the great problems, 
the Joshi leadership was able to build the framework of a 
functioning, centralised, national Party. With this achievement 
the fate of the dissenting factions was sealed: those who could 
not be coopted could be suppressed. The Party had been formed.
On this basis its organisation and membership developed rapidly.
2. MCCC, P.1003: 'The Organisation of the International' (early
1927) .
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The CPI's leaders had unwittingly incorporated a basic
contradiction into the Party's foundations. They did not realise
that because the Party had become a 'frontier guard' of the
Soviet state it could not become - except perhaps for brief
periods when Soviet foreign policy accorded with Indian realities
- the 'vanguard' of the Indian revolution. The contradiction
remained camouflaged until the second change in Comintern policy
after the 'popular-front' line - the 1942 'People's War' policy.
After having signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler in 1939 and
then characterising the Second World War as an 'Imperialist War',
Stalin declared it to be a 'People's War' when Hitler broke the
3
pact by invading the Soviet Union in 1942. The world's
communist parties were now enjoined to do all in their power to
support the allied war effort. In India this required the Party
to support the British colonialists - and at the same time that
the Congress was launching its 'Quit India' campaign against the
Raj. Despite discontent in the ranks the Joshi leadership
accepted this about-face. The CPI has lived with the considerable
disadvantage of the resulting 'pro-British/anti-nationalist'
4stigma ever since. It caused it very great damage. When the 
hidden contradiction finally emerged it did so with a vengeance.
The hidden costs of the bolshevist mode were again 
demonstrated soon after, following a 'radicalisation' of Soviet 
foreign policy. This provided Ranadive with an opportunity 
to win the leadership of the Party and to implement the policy
3. For these two War-time policy changes and their application 
in India see Overstreet & Windmiller, op. cit., Chapters 9 
Sc 10, and Damodaran, 'Memoir', pp.39-42.
4. Some communists have argued that the Party was strengthened 
during the 'People's War' time by having 'swum against the
iaorwTnf
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5he had earlier counter-posed to Joshi's 'popular-frontism'.
It was not so much the change in policy content that was so 
destructive to the Party as the way in which it was effected. 
Ranadive was able to claim legitimacy for the policy that had 
previously been rejected and, thereby, to move from being the 
leader of a suppressed faction to being the leader of the 
Party. The Joshi leadership now became the victim of precisely 
the same logic that had enabled it to secure the 'popular- 
front ' line and its own hegemony in 1936-37. Joshi's 
contributions to the building of the Party were not remembered. 
The enthusiastic new leadership finally had the opportunity to 
prove the correctness of the policy it had championed a decade 
earlier. It ejected both the old leadership and all traces of 
its policy and, following this sharp break in the continuity 
of policy and leadership, ineptly led the Party into disaster. 
Thus we see within a decade of the Party's formation the full 
functioning of the bolshevist 'factional balance of power' that 
we noted in Chapter 1.
Having identified the most critical features contribut­
ing to the bolshevisation of the Indian Party it is perhaps 
profitable to compare its experience schematically with that of 
the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties, which remained essentially
5. For the Ranadive leadership succession and its context
and consequences, see Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., 
Chapters 12 and 13. On his succession to leadership Ranadive 
reproduced many of the key documents of the pre-'popular- 
front' period, such as the two 'Open Letters' published in 
Inprecor in 1932 and 1933 and the Draft Platform of Action. 
This indicates his continuing commitment to this theoretical 
position despite his suppression. (The documents were kindly 
supplied to the author by Chinmohan- Sehanavis.)
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non-bolshevised. However this comparative testing of the 
hypotheses developed in this thesis can only be tentative, and 
suggestive of possibly profitable lines for more systematic 
future research.
Did the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties face a dilemma 
equivalent to that which made the bolshevisation of Indian 
communism a pre-condition for the formation of a centralised 
national Party? If we investigate the nature of state 
repression, and the factors conditioning it, in the Chinese and 
Vietnamese contexts, we begin to see some rather different 
patterns from that in India. These patterns suggest that the 
Chinese and Vietnamese Parties' situations were more open-ended 
than the CPI's.
In China the fact that the repression of the communists
and their 1920s working class movement was so brutal appears to
have been largely a symptom of the Kuomintang's essential 
7weakness. The Kuomintang government did not rest upon stable 
institutions of social control, did not have complete control 
over all of China, and was insecure even in those areas which it 
did control. The Chinese communists suffered a terrible defeat 
in the cities in the late 1920s. But after the urban defeat 
the communists and working class militants who survived did have
Osomewhere to go, beyond the Kuomintang's reach. Indeed, in 
order to survive as a political force of any significance they
6. For example Mao's views on Comintern intervention were bluntly 
stated: since the Seventh Congress, Mao commented, the 
Comintern 'has not intervened in the internal affairs of the 
Chinese ... Party. And yet, the ... Party has done its work 
very well': quoted in S. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tunq, (London, 1963), p.290.
7. On this see L. Bianco, The Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 
(London, 1972), Chapter 5.8. See, eg., Guillermaz, op. cit., pp.147-226.
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were compelled to move to the countryside. Moreover, after
reaching their rural fastnesses they had the 'revolutionary
space' to make full use of the rich political experience of
eight years of struggle in the cities, and Mao had already given
9serious thought to the question of peasant-based revolution.
The existence of this space allowed, in turn, a political 
resolution of the factionalism that overtook the Party following 
the urban defeat - factionalism which was exacerbated by the 
ECCI1s apportioning of blame. Both the compulsion and the 
subsequent possibilities were necessary conditions of the 
unorthodox Maoist faction's rise to dominance within the CCP 
in the 1930s.
In India, in contrast, neither the compulsion nor the 
rural possibilities existed to such a marked degree. The CPI 
faced a fundamental dilemma as an urban, working class-based 
Party - a dilemma it might possibly have avoided had it managed 
to build a strong peasant base. But this was something which 
the dominant Bombay-Calcutta section of the CPI did not 
seriously attempt during the critical formative period. The 
problem of rich peasant dominance and effective state control 
in the villages,and the 'petty-bourgeois' psychology of the 
communists,inhibited them from taking the necessary step from 
urban successes (in Bombay) and defeats into the countryside. 
Moreover there were no peasant revolts of the Hunan type to
9. See Mao's classic analysis of, and eulogy to, the 1927 Hunan 
peasant revolt: 'Report on an Investigation of the Peasant
Movement in Hunan', in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol.l, 
(Peking, 1967), pp.23-56. Chesneaux argues that the working 
class radicalism of the 1920s contributed directly to the 
contemporaneous peasant revolts: op. cit., p.410.
10. See fn. 8 for this.
714
command the communists' attention - Satara in 1927-28, for
example, was not a Hunan. The peaks of peasant revolt in India
remained out of phase with the peaks of working class
radicalism. It was thus less likely that the Indian communists
would 'discover' the importance of the peasantry in the way
that sections of the Chinese Party did. Moreover the
comparatively limited character of the Raj's repression made it
both possible and tempting for the Indian communists to continue
11to believe that a strong proletarian based Party was feasible.
Both the possibility and the temptation remained after the
release of the Meerut prisoners and the partial reconstruction
of the Bombay unions. Dange, for example, who had earlier
recognised the 'suicidation' of an exclusively proletarian
perspective, returned to the city of Bombay, not to its
mufussil. In contrast to China, those branches of the CPI -
such as the Keralan section - which established a peasant base
remained peripheral in the Party in the colonial period.12
In virtually non-industrialised Vietnam,'proletarian
13orthodoxy' was hardly possible.. Moreover, the very severe
repression of the communists before and after the period of the
Popular Front government in France, in the second half of thepartly
1930s, appears to have been/related to one advantage that the 
Vietnamese communists had over their Indian comrades. This was 
the extreme weakness of the Vietnamese bourgeoisie and, hence,
11. I am indebted to Professor Low for having stressed the 
importance of this point.
12. For the building of the Keralan communists' peasant base 
see R. Jeffrey, 'Peasant Movements and the Communist Party 
in Kerala, 1937-57', paper presented to the South Asia 
History Section, Australian National University, August 19, 1976.
13. Nevertheless the tendency existed until the Nghe-Tinh peas­
ant revolt of 1930: communication with David Marr.
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of nationalist movements of the Congress type.1  ^ Therefore the 
French would not have had to concern themselves with the 
problems created for the British by a strong bourgeois 
opposition when repressing radical movements. Consequently, 
although the immediate costs of repression were higher for the 
Vietnamese Party than for the CPI, there was no alternative 
anti-imperialist movement of consequence to exploit the 
opportunity provided by the extended removal of the communists 
from open politics.
This very cursory comparative survey does not 
attempt to provide an explanation for the respective successes 
and failures of the different Parties considered; but it suggests 
that the CPI was confronted with a number of particularly 
intractable problems arising from its national environment.
When one considers these in conjunction with the special 
problems it faced in its Comintern environment, then the truth 
of the statement made in Chapter 1 that the failures of Indian 
communism have a context becomes more apparent. It was for 
these reasons that the CPI came to embody the more negative 
aspects of the isolated Russian Revolution's ambiguous legacy.
14. For the weakness of the Vietnamese bourgeoisie and of
bourgeois nationalism, see D.G. Porter, 'Imperialism and 
Social Structure in Twentieth Century Vietnam', (Ph.D. 
thesis, Cornell University, 1976), Chapters I, II & III.
For the factors governing French political policy,see 
D. Hemery, 'Aux Origines des Guerres d'Independence Viet- 
namiennes: Pouvoir Colonial et Phbnomene Communiste en 
Indochine avant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale1, in Mouvemenl 
Social, No.101, 1977, pp.3-35. (Translated for the authcr 
by Nguyen Anh Thu.) The differences between British and 
French colonial policy of course involved much more than tle relative strengths of the respective indigenous bourgeoi;ies_ 
Eg., unlike India, French investment in Indochina increaiec 
markedly during the 1930s, thus increasing French determ.n- 
ation to stay (ibid., pp.12-13).
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